The rationale of punishment by Oppenheimer, Heinrich
THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
MONOGRAPHS ON SOCIOLOGY
EDITED BY
PROF. L. T. HOBHOUSE
AND
PROF. E. A. WESTERMARCK 
VOL. I
THE RATIONALE 
OF PUNISHMENT
BY
HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER
D.LiT., LL.D., M.D.
Thesis approved for the degree of Doctor of Literature 
in the University of London
%onbon: TUntversitg ot %on5on press
PUBLISHED FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS, LTD. 
BY HODDER AND STOUGHTON, WARWICK SQUARE, E.G.
1913
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
PUBLISHERS TO
THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS
PREFACE
AT the present time, when the State punishment of 
crime is constantly cited before the tribunal of science 
in order to show cause why it should not be eliminated, 
like other relics of barbarism, from the arsenal of modern 
civilization, in which there is no room for mere supersti- 
tions of the past, a critical investigation of the problem 
of punishment cannot be out of place. The new doctrine 
has already succeeded in insinuating some of its minor 
canons into more than one legislative system, and whilst 
it must be conceded that the measures hitherto adopted 
under its influence, such as the probation of first 
offenders, conditional sentences, and conditional liber- 
ation of prisoners, have all proved highly beneficial, the 
more extravagant claims of the criminological school 
threaten to subvert the very foundations of the rampart 
which society has laboriously erected against the on- 
slaughts of crime. Indeed, one shudders at the mere 
thought that the accumulated wisdom of thousands of 
years may be sacrificed, in a few years of revolutionary 
experiments, on the altar of a fashionable and self- 
complacent, withal utterly unverified, hypothesis. If 
we remember that the institution of punishment has had 
its beginnings in the infancy of the human race, and that 
it has accompanied mankind all along the course of its 
progress from savagery to barbarism, from barbarism 
to civilization, if we realize how deeply rooted it is even 
in the consciousness of modern society, we cannot accept
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the thesis that the elaborate machinery which it has 
evolved serves no useful purpose whatever without, 
at any rate, attempting to ascertain its deeper meaning 
in the past and in the present. I am not acquainted 
with any monograph in which both these aspects of the 
problem have been submitted to a critical examination. 
If a further apology were required for the appearance 
of this book, the extreme meagreness of the English 
literature on the subject would appear to supply a suffi- 
cient justification.
In conclusion, I cannot allow this volume to go forth 
without acknowledging the debt of gratitude which I owe 
to Prof. L. T. Hobhouse for many valuable suggestions 
and criticisms generously offered.
5 Essex Court, Temple,
December 1912.
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INTRODUCTION
" POSITIVE LAW, as an empirical fact, is subject to 
the eternal law of causation; as a product of historical 
development it is the necessary outcome of antecedent 
facts, linked to a long chain of causes and effects. The 
law which we now obey derives its origin from that which 
once was law; it is what it is and as it is, because the old, 
in growing old, begot the new. In the dim distant past 
lies the seed of modern legislation. The seed had to 
decay if it was to bear fruit. But how can we comprehend 
the fruit without watching its growth, without tracing it 
back to the ultimate cause of its existence ? The common 
herd stands gaping at that which is, and sees nothing, 
and wishes to see nothing, but that it is. The Hoiv ? and 
the Why ? are questions which every superior mind claims 
as its privilege." In this passage Feuerbach prescribes 
the route which our investigation is bound to follow if we 
wish to discover the rationale of punishment, the true 
reason for state punishment of crime as an institution 
of positive law, as a sociological phenomenon. Specula- 
tion, unchecked by constant reference to historical facts, 
has always resulted in theories of an imaginary punish- 
ment which has no counterpart in political reality. Our 
object is to discover what function punishment does 
discharge in the modern state, not what function it might, 
or ought to, discharge in an ideal commonwealth. It is 
obvious then that no doctrine can appear acceptable 
which is not built upon the bed-rock of solid fact. Now 
punishment, as we know it, is the outcome of a long 
evolution, and its origin and the course of its organic
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development cannot, therefore, fail to supply the most 
reliable index to its real meaning. Hence a study of the 
theories of modern punishment must be preceded by an 
inquiry into the genesis of punishment. But if history 
is to be the guide of our researches and the test of their 
results, history must not itself be made the playground 
of speculation, and we must rest content to stop at that 
point of the historical horizon where distant phantoms, 
but faintly perceptible in outline, pass into palpable 
realities. Such statements, for instance, as von Liszt's 
assertion (Lehrbuch, par. 2) that the origin of punishment 
coincides with the origin of the social life of man, are quite 
incapable of historical verification; for an endless void 
is reached in our knowledge of the past at a stage 
certainly posterior to the first beginnings of the socializa- 
tion of man.
Before we embark upon our historical inquiry, it will 
be necessary to ascertain the precise meaning of punish- 
ment. Most definitions of the term met with in the 
literature of the subject contain as an essential ingredient 
a reference to the supposed end of punishment, and are, 
therefore, quite useless for our purpose; we cannot, 
without begging the question, adopt any of them. 
Again, we have to reject all definitions based on the notion 
of crime or offence. There are no acts intrinsically 
criminal, no deeds that constitute offences at all times 
and in all places. Indeed, the sole generic character of 
crime is that it is visited with punishment, and, by being 
made punishable, any course of conduct is converted 
into a crime. Since, then, the definition of crime implies 
a definition of punishment, the assertion that " punish- 
ment is the social reaction against crime," and similar 
statements, though true as far as they go, and valuable 
because they draw attention to the important fact that 
crime and punishment connote each other, are circum- 
locutions rather than definitions. We must also exclude
INTRODUCTION 3
definitions which take into account the facts of mature 
jurisprudence alone and are couched in terms that become 
meaningless when applied to early communities. Of the 
few remaining definitions we accept that of Prof. Wes- 
termarck, subject however to such modifications and 
explanations as appear necessary in order to elucidate 
fully the nature of punishment. " By punishment," 
writes this author (Moral Ideas, i. 169), " I do not under- 
stand here every suffering inflicted upon an offender in 
consequence of his offence, but only such suffering as is 
inflicted upon him in a definite way by, or in the name of, 
the society of which he is a permanent or temporary 
member." For " upon an offender in consequence of 
his offence " we substitute " upon a wrongdoer as a 
wrongdoer." By doing so, we eliminate the words 
" offender " and " offence," to which we have taken 
exception, and at the same time avoid a form of expres- 
sion which might be thought to imply assent to that 
theory according to which punishment is the necessary 
consequence of crime. The words " by, or in the name 
of, society " are to distinguish punishment from civil 
redress, the alternatives being inserted because punish- 
ment may be awarded and executed either by society 
as a whole or by an agent to whom it delegates its powers. 
The terms chosen fail, however, to express the real 
difference between the two classes of sanctions. For 
society, in imposing an evil upon a wrongdoer, may act 
at the sole instance, and in the exclusive interest, of one 
of its members, and in this case the sanction is private, 
not public. What really matters is that in punishment 
the sanction is inflicted on behalf and, to use Austinian 
phraseology, at the discretion of society itself. In the 
next place, the suffering must be inflicted upon the 
wrongdoer " in a definite way," or it is not punishment 
proper. The definiteness of the sanction marks off the 
field of criminal law from the sphere of positive morality.
B 2
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But to be definite the evil must proceed from a deter- 
minate body of persons; society must be organized or act 
through an ascertained organ. In other words, society 
must inflict the suffering in its corporate capacity. And, 
finally, the person upon whom the suffering is inflicted 
must be " a permanent or temporary member " of the 
society which inflicts it; harm done to an utter stranger 
is an act of hostility, and not punishment. Our definition, 
then, runs as follows :
Punishment is an evil inflicted upon a wrongdoer, 
as a wrongdoer, on behalf and at the discretion of the 
society, in its corporate capacity, of which he is a 
permanent or temporary member.
The next few chapters, which are devoted to a critical 
study of current views on the genesis of punishment, will 
afford us ample opportunity for applying this definition.
BOOK I
THE ORIGIN OF PUNISHMENT

PART I
CURRENT VIEWS ON THE ORIGIN OF PUNISHMENT 
CHAPTER I
PRIVATE VENGEANCE THE SOTJRCE OP PUNISHMENT
THE first theory which we have to examine, teaches 
that private vengeance is the seed out of which criminal 
justice has grown. This theory is supported by an over- 
whelming weight of authority; for, however much they 
may differ in detail, and especially in the description of 
the historical stages by which primitive revenge was 
gradually transformed into state punishment, the vast 
majority of writers upon the subject have accepted as 
an almost axiomatic truth the proposition that private 
vengeance has been the first phase in the evolution of 
the idea of punishment.
It will not be necessary for us to enter into a psycho- 
logical analysis of the impulse of revenge or to discuss 
the relation which it bears to anger or irascible emotion; 
it is immaterial for our immediate purpose whether it 
has its root in the intoxicating joy of cruelty, in the wild 
satisfaction to be derived from the infliction of suffering 
upon others, in the desire for self-expansion after the 
self has been humiliated by the infliction of an injury 
(Steinmetz), whether it is "a binary compound of anger 
and positive self-feeling " (McDougall), or whether it is 
a deliberate form of non-moral resentment, in which the 
hostile reaction against a cause of pain is more or less
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restrained by reason and calculation (Westennarck). 
Utilitarians look upon revenge as a necessary means of 
self-defence against external attacks. Physiologists claim 
that it has its foundation in the reflex movements with 
which all living matter responds to such stimuli as 
disturb its conditions of existence; in revenge those 
defensive reflex movements are merely postponed and 
controlled by reason and reflection. Evolutionists insist 
upon the advantages which strong vengeful emotions 
confer in the struggle for existence; those slow to forget 
a hurt received and always prepared, even after a long 
period of time has elapsed, to get even with an aggressor, 
were most likely to be immune from attack and had the 
best chances of raising a large progeny. Again, we need 
not take sides in the controversy whether man alone is 
capable of a desire for vengeance or whether this desire 
is founded upon an instinct shared by man with some of 
the lower animals : the answer to this question must 
depend largely upon the definition which we accept of 
the term. And, finally, we may renounce the attempt, 
which, in the absence of historical evidence, would be 
purely a matter of speculation, of tracing the steps by 
which individual revenge gave way to group vengeance, 
and of determining the respective shares which feelings 
of sympathy and more tangible self-interest had in 
bringing about this change.
We take up the thread at that stage when the clan
organization is at its height, when there is complete
solidarity between the members of each of these small
ethnical groups and the desire for vengeance has become
, collective. It is the phase in human history known as
  the era of the blood feud. It is at this epoch that ven-
' geance, " at first neither a right nor a duty, but simply a
fact " (De la Grasserie), having become a constant habit,
at last acquires the force of custom and is thus converted
both into a right and into an obligation. It is at this
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epoch, too, that vengeance, at first boundless, has its 
wings clipped and is reduced to the proportions prescribed 
by the ubiquitous lex talionis. Furthermore, custom 
now more or less vaguely defines the occasions on which, 
and the circumstances in which, to retaliate. And soon, 
as property becomes more valuable and grows in public 
estimation, avarice enters in competition with the more 
primitive passion and drives it more and more into the 
background, with the result that over wider and wider 
areas the system of revenge is displaced by a system of 
compositions.
Gradually and slowly the organizations based upon the 
principle of blood-relationship begin to decay, and as this 
process goes on, the blood feud is carried on between 
smaller and ever smaller groups till, at last, there remains 
but a single avenger to wreak vengeance upon the actual 
malefactor alone (Post). Revenge has once more become 
individual. But simultaneously with these retrogressive 
changes in the clan and tribal organizations, the germ 
of state organization develops, and the kinsman, 
transformed into the citizen, either voluntarily delegates, 
or is forced to transfer, the exercise of his right of revenge 
to the political power, which henceforward acts in his 
stead. " We cannot doubt that the state acquires its 
punitive power by redemption of the right of the indi- 
vidual to demand satisfaction for the injury inflicted upon 
him " (Wundt). Nor is this connection between punish- 
ment and vengeance simply a matter of history. Modern 
punishment of crime by the state has been defined as " a 
substitute for private vengeance " which the state has 
to supply, since nowadays it forbids the individual to 
avenge himself (Lammasch, Lilienthal). According to 
Bruckner and Schulze the right to punish flows from the 
necessity to appease the desire for vengeance excited in 
the victim of the crime. Again, criminal justice has been 
described as the official regulation of private vengeance,
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with a later infusion of theological notions relating to sin 
and guilt. In a similar strain writes Letourneau : " The 
very imperfect sense of justice which to-day exists in the 
brain of the majority of men with any pretence at civiliza- 
tion, is but the product of the life of the ancestors, a slow 
and painful acquisition, the psychic transformation, the 
idealization of the desire for vengeance." Other authori- 
ties, without going quite so far, yet assert that one at 
least of the functions of punishment is to afford what 
Bentham calls a " vindictive satisfaction " to the injured 
party. However, by no means all writers who subscribe 
to the doctrine that the state first acquired its punitive 
powers as the mandatary of the individual wronged, 
uphold the view that it still exercises the same, wholly 
or in part, in the interests of its quondam principal; 
many of them maintain that by passing into the hands 
of the state the reaction against the wrongdoer acquired 
an entirely new meaning, that it was gradually divested 
of the last vestige of vindictive feeling and pressed into 
the service of the objects of the state, whatever these 
may be.
The process just outlined, by which the state comes 
into the heritage of vengeance, explains the origin of 
capital punishment. But there is another way, it is 
claimed, in which the foundations of a true criminal juris- 
prudence have been laid. We have seen that at a certain 
phase in the early history of mankind it became customary 
to commute private vengeance for a money payment. 
When once this practice had firmly struck root, disputes 
as to the amount of compensation would, as a matter of 
course, be referred for settlement to the tribal assembly, 
which was held periodically among most primitive 
peoples. Soon the nascent state would take altogether 
into its own hands the regulation of such compositions 
and retain for itself a share thereof whenever its inter- 
vention had been invoked by the parties. From its very
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infancy the state displayed an insatiable appetite, and 
the part which found its way into its coffers, small at first, 
would gradually become larger and larger. Before long, 
the state retained the lion's share and in the end, as the 
tertius gaudens, the whole amount paid by the offender. 
In this manner what had been compensation to the subject 
wronged became converted into punishment by fine. 
But the malefactor may have taken to his heels and fail 
to appear when summoned before the tribal assembly by 
his adversary; or he may refuse to satisfy the judgment 
when it has gone against him. In either case, sentence 
of outlawry would be passed upon him. " The prototype 
of a modern criminal trial appears in the solemn proclama- 
tion, at the tribe meeting, after full inquiry, of the sentence 
of outlawry" (Cherry). Capital punishment, fine and 
outlawry, the three primitive forms of state punishment, 
are thus accounted for. And as the list of punishments, 
so the catalogue of crimes is explained by the source out 
of which criminal jurisprudence has issued. " Different 
acts became crimes under different systems, but the 
general principle which underlay all was the principle of 
revenge. Those acts have everywhere come to be 
regarded as crimes which in early times tended to provoke 
vengeance or retaliation " (Cherry).
The theory of which we have just given a rough sketch, 
is based upon the history of those wrongs which are 
described in modern codes as offences against individuals, 
more especially upon the history of the reaction against 
that wrong to the person which in civilized countries is 
looked upon as the crime par excellence, viz. homicide. 
That individual or group vengeance was the normal mode 
of repelling attacks long before the state yet existed even 
in embryo ; that self-redress, in the form of revenge, was 
sought only in the case of injuries received by the group, 
or by a member thereof, from without, whilst wrongs 
committed in the bosom of the family, clan, or tribe, as a
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rule, failed to excite any reaction whatsoever; that at a 
later stage the practice of retaliation gave way to a 
system of compositions; and that finally the state took 
over the regulation of the one and other; all these are 
facts supported by unassailable testimony. The point, 
however, which requires a good deal of elucidation is the 
alleged transformation of revenge or compensation into 
true punishment. It must, therefore, be our task to 
examine in greater detail the mode or modes in which the 
state came to deal with what hitherto had avowedly been 
matters concerning individuals and families alone.
There are several ways in which the public authority 
may be brought into contact with these personal quarrels 
or family feuds. Even under tribal organization we find 
that the injured person or family, if too weak to take 
revenge, would invoke the assistance of the chief. Thus 
among the tribes of Eastern Africa, the injured party, at 
his own choice, either personally avenges the injury 
received, or he places the exercise of his vengeance into 
the hands of the chief (Burton, Lake Regions of Central 
Africa, p. 662. 1860). Similar customs prevail in the 
Sandwich Islands and elsewhere (see the instances quoted 
by Westermarck, i. 180). Before lending his help, the 
chief would naturally inquire into the merits of the case, 
and in this inquiry, quite informal at first, but in the 
conduct of which he would soon associate with himself 
some of the most prominent members of the tribe, we 
have one of the germs of public jurisdiction. Before the 
chieftain's court, thus constituted, the injured family 
would, in the Togo colony, summon its adversary if 
unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain self-redress 
(Henrici, EpJieneger, p. 147). Moreover, from an early 
date, the ruler tended to become the champion of all 
those who, through age, infirmity, or want of a natural 
protector, were unable to retaliate upon an aggressor. 
Where the tribal constitution was of a democratic
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character, the victim of oppression would complain to the 
popular assembly, which would investigate his grievance 
and help him to obtain satisfaction. In all these cases 
the intervention of public authority is merely in aid of 
private vengeance and an alternative to its exercise by 
the injured party himself. Indeed, we find these alterna- 
tive methods of seeking redress, at the option of the 
aggrieved party, even after the courts are in full working 
order and when an award in damages has become the only 
form of reparation obtainable through an action at law. 
According to the law of the Salic Franks, for instance, 
the aggrieved party could choose between the exercise 
of personal vengeance, after giving due notice to the 
magistrate, and instituting legal proceedings with a view 
to pecuniary compensation. The origin of jurisdiction 
in arbitration, mainly in connection with the assessment 
of compositions, has already been touched upon. But 
there remains one method more in which the state came 
to evince a practical interest in private vengeance and 
family feuds. The organs of society intervened proprio 
motu in order to regulate and restrict that internecine 
warfare which could not fail to sap the strength of the 
young commonwealth. Such interference was probably 
at first of the most rudimentary kind. Nothing more 
might be required, in order to render revenge legitimate, 
than notice to the magistrate of the intention to take it. 
We have seen that such notice was exacted by Salic law; 
it was only after giving such notice that, in Johore, the 
avenger of blood was entitled to hire assassins (Waitz, v. 
154); according to ancient Chinese law nobody could be 
made responsible for slaying an enemy out of revenge 
provided that he had given formal notice to the judge 
(Plath, Oesetz und Becht im alien China, p. 84); but the 
best-known instance is the kataki uti—i. e. lawful ven- 
geance of Japan, practised as late as the nineteenth 
century, according to the provisions of the code of Jyeya :
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here the notice had to specify the exact number of days 
or months which the avenger of blood required for the 
execution of his design, and a document to that effect 
was drawn up by the magistrate in solemn form (L. 
Metchnikoff, L'empire japonais, p. 613). But the public 
functionary, from being a merely passive recipient of 
such notice, would easily be converted into an examining 
magistrate : being informed of the avenger's intention, 
he would naturally be prompted to inquire whether, in 
the actual circumstances of the case, the applicant was 
justified by custom in taking revenge. At any rate, the 
active interference of society does not, originally, go 
beyond insistence upon the observance of the customary 
rules governing vengeance. In the next stage the state 
takes the bolder step of imposing, in the interest of public 
order, further checks of its own devising upon the practice 
of revenge. And, finally, it makes the exercise thereof 
dependent upon the consent of the public authority, such 
consent being given only after inquiry duly held. It is 
important to remark that the measures taken by society 
of its own initiative are all directed towards a limitation 
of the right of revenge and never operate in furtherance 
thereof. Indeed, in order to accomplish its object, the 
preservation of the public peace, the intervention of 
public authority was bound to assume the form of pro- 
tection extended to the malefactor against excess and 
abuse of vengeance rather than that of support given to 
the injured party in the assertion of his claim. We shall 
have to revert to this point in a later chapter; but it is 
necessary to point out already here that though the 
spontaneous interposition of the state founds jurisdiction, 
the theory according to which punishment is but a meta- 
morphosis of revenge, derives no support from this source. 
In whatever manner and from whatever cause the public 
authority acquires jurisdiction, the only question which 
the primitive tribunal is called upon to decide, is the
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existence or non-existence of the right of revenge or of a 
claim to compensation. Even in peoples that have 
attained a comparatively high degree of civilization, this 
is the only issue before the court in trials for wrongs 
inflicted upon individuals.
Among some of the native tribes of North America, 
the 0 jib ways (Jones, History of the Ojibway Indians, 
pp. 109 seq. London, 1861) and the Wyandots, the avenger 
of blood prosecutes the slayer before the tribal council. 
If judgment is pronounced in his favour, the parties 
negotiate with a view to compensation; if they do not 
come to terms, the plaintiff proceeds to take revenge 
(Kohler, Nordamerika, p. 407). In the Malay Peninsula, 
the case is tried by the chief of the suJcu or, if of sufficient 
importance, by a council of chiefs; but it is for the sister's 
son of the slain man to execute the murderer (Wait/, i. 
143). Steinmetz (Rechtsverhdltnisse, p. 48) informs us 
that a similar practice prevails among the Banaks and 
Bapukus of the Cameroons. We owe to the same 
authority the following particulars as to other African 
tribes. In the Sansanding territories, on the Senegal 
river, nobody may lay hands upon the murderer except 
the avenger of blood, here the nearest agnate; but even he 
is liable to punishment if he takes the law into his own 
hand. After judgment obtained, he takes revenge; but 
it rests with him to pardon the murderer, and so may 
the widow of the slain man who is reckoned among the 
agnates (pp. 88, 89). Among the Waganda of Uganda, no 
malefactor is ever brought to trial unless the aggrieved 
party institutes proceedings (p. 199). Again, among the 
Diakite-Sarrakolese (French Sudan), the cadi takes cog- 
nizance of causes only on the complaint of an interested 
person. Even in case of murder the criminal cannot be 
brought to trial unless the relatives of the murdered man 
prosecute. The chief provides for the execution of 
offenders, but the family of the victim witnesses it.
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Capital punishment can, however, be redeemed by a 
money payment; and it rests entirely with the clan of 
the victim to accept or to refuse such composition (p. 130). 
Among the Basutos, the administration of justice is 
committed to the chiefs; but, says Casalis (Basutos, 
p. 237), the idea of wrong to the individual is that which 
governs their action in relation to crime, the punishment 
for which depends on the social position of the offender 
and on the kind of satisfaction which the aggrieved party 
desires. In Shoa (Abyssinia), cases of homicide must 
first be submitted to the judgment of the prince or 
governor. If condemned, the slayer is delivered up to 
the family of the victim. The relatives themselves are 
the executioners, for which purpose six of them generally 
combine. But if the family cannot supply the full 
contingent, the king, virtute officii, commissions some of 
his own men to co-operate with them in the application of 
the lex talionis, viz. a life for a life (Combes et Tamisier, 
Voyage en Abyssinie, iii. 7). Among the Aztecs, writes 
Kohler, self-redress was in no circumstances allowed. 
The punishment for murder was death; but if the family 
of the murdered man forgave the murderer, slavery was 
substituted for capital punishment, and the culprit had 
to work in order to provide the necessaries of life for 
the family of the victim. In other offences too, e.g. in 
adultery, the pardon of the injured party operated in 
mitigation of punishment. In some of the states the 
execution of the sentence was left to the victim or his 
friends, who could deal with the offender as they pleased. 
In Japan, crimes other than homicide were regarded as 
simple torts. Thus in case of adultery, the husband 
might with impunity kill both guilty parties. If he did 
not do so, the judge had to punish the culprits; but even 
then the husband had the right to pardon, and the judge 
was bound to postpone the execution of the sentence in 
order to give the husband time to exercise his privilege
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(Metchnikoff, op, cit., p. 612). Among the Hebrews, the 
practice of blood-revenge did not fall into desuetude till 
after their return from the Babylonian Captivity. " The 
revenger of blood himself shall slay the murderer : when 
he meeteth him, he shall slay him " (Numb. xxxv. 19). 
It was only if the homicide had succeeded hi reaching one 
of the cities of refuge that a trial was held, hi order to decide 
whether the killing had been " at unawares " or of malice 
aforethought. And the text clearly defines the meaning 
of these proceedings where it is said that " the congrega- 
tion shall judge between the slayer and the revenger of 
blood" (Numb. xxxv. 24). The Koran, whilst for- 
bidding murder under the severest penalties to be in- 
flicted in the next life (Sura iv.), prescribes no temporal 
punishment, but is content to sanction the practice of 
retaliation, though recommending the heir, as a work 
of charity, to accept a composition in camels instead 
(Suras iv., xvii.). In Mahometan law, however, blood- 
revenge is placed under the control of the state. The 
person or persons entitled to exercise that right, here the 
heir or heirs, must apply to the cadi for permission, and 
this is only granted after a judicial inquiry. If the 
latter ends in a capital sentence, it is for the avenger of 
blood to execute the same. Execution by the relatives 
of the slain man is " the universal practice among the 
Moslems from the West Coast of Africa to the extreme 
borders of Persia " (Du Boys, Peuples modernes, iii. 33). 
For this purpose the cadi hands over the murderer to the 
heir, but not without reminding him of the precepts of 
the Koran : "I deliver the murderer into your hands. 
Make yourself paid on account of the blood shed, but 
know that God is indulgent and merciful." This is the 
formula in use among the Mahometans in Persia 
(Chardin, Voyage en Perse, vi. 294; Kohler, Blutrache, 
p. 18). The heir is at liberty to follow or to disregard this 
recommendation, which is supported by the entreaties
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of the murderer's friends and relations; but if there are 
several co-heirs, any one of them can compel the others 
to accept the composition. Such commutation of the 
sentence does not, however, exempt the offender from all 
further liability. For if he obtains a private pardon, he 
receives at the instance of the public authority a hundred 
lashes and a year's imprisonment (Kohler, op. cit., 19; 
Du Boys, op. cit., i. 271). The rule of retaliation applies 
also to bodily injuries; unlike blood-revenge for murder, 
it is not practised by the injured party himself, but always 
by a public executioner, who by reason of his greater 
experience is credited with superior skill. The Persian 
chronicle of Tabari (ed. Zotenberg, i. 283) records the 
following saying of King Parwitz, one of the last Sasanids : 
" If a man kills another unjustly, the king may not pardon 
him. On the contrary, he must administer the law of 
retaliation, unless the relatives who have the right to 
avenge the blood, choose to pardon the murderer." In 
Athens, up to the time of the Solonic legislation (Plutarch, 
Solon, 18), none but the blood-relations of the victim 
within the fourth degree, i. e. those originally entitled to 
take blood-revenge, could prosecute for murder; and 
this monopoly of the kinsmen is all the more significant 
as, in offences of a public character, it was open to every 
citizen who enjoyed full political rights, to institute 
criminal proceedings (v. Meier-Schomann-Lipsius, Der 
attische Prozess, pp. 199, 202. 1883. Freudenthal in 
Mommsen's Kulturvolker). The prosecution of the 
murderer was altogether forbidden if the victim, before 
expiring, had forgiven him (Demosthenes in Pantaenetum). 
Up to the time of judgment, the accused could avoid 
condemnation, either by voluntary exile or by inducing 
the family of the victim to abandon the action and to 
grant him a pardon in consideration of a pecuniary 
compensation. Such a bargain was quite lawful (Demosth. 
in Macartatum; idem, in Theocrinem, 28, 29; Plato,
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Leges, ch. ix.); but in order to be effective, this pardon, 
at any rate under the Solonic system, required the unani- 
mous consent of the kinsmen who, in the more ancient 
law, had been privileged to prosecute. Originally it was 
for the prosecutor to carry out the sentence; but later 
on this right dwindled down to the privilege of the nearest 
relative to be present at the execution. In cases of 
involuntary homicide, pursued at first before the Ephetes 
and later before the tribunal of the Palladion, the slayer 
had the legal right to redeem himself from exile by means 
of a penalty, the amount of which was settled by the court, 
paid to the family of the victim. We have it on the 
authority of Pliny that in Rome the punishment for 
homicide was, from the first, death. But " the proba- 
bility is that the infliction of death was here, as elsewhere, 
merely sanctioned by the law, if inflicted, in retaliation, 
by the relatives of the murdered man " (Cherry). How- 
ever that may be, the ancient law governing personal 
injuries has come down to us in the well-known provision 
of the Statute of the Twelve Tables : "Si membrum 
rupit, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto " (Festus). The penalty, 
hi default of compensation, was retaliation exacted by 
the nearest relative of the injured person (" talione 
proximus cognatus ulciscitur," Cato in Priscian, 6, 710) 
in execution of a judicial sentence : " si reus, qui depacisci 
noluerat, iudici talionem imperanti non parebat, Eesti- 
mata lite iudex hominem pecunia damnabat' (Gell., 20.1). 
It would seem from the latter passage that the delinquent 
could resist talio if he pleased, in spite of the judgment, 
and insist on a judicial fine. " The procedure in offences 
against individuals is, in principle, purely civil procedure 
(actio) and hardly differs from civil procedure in non- 
delictual causes. The court never moves in these matters 
unless the injured party takes the initiative." (Hitzig 
in Mommsen, Kulturvolker.) Passing on to the Germanic 
peoples, we can trace the transition from self-redress to
c 2
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state jurisdiction in the ancient Icelandic code. The 
Grdgds permits private vengeance up to the next all- 
thing. Thereafter, the injured part}' was no longer 
allowed to take the law into his own hand, but had to 
bring suit before that assembly. The nearest heir alone 
could prosecute for murder; if there were several heirs 
of the same degree, they exercised that right collectively 
and could not accept composition unless they were 
unanimously agreed. In Scandinavia, it depended at 
first upon the victim or his relations alone whether the 
offender, after proclamation of outlawry, could recover 
his peace (Du Boys, Peuples modernes, i. 120). And 
even after an exercise of the royal prerogative had become 
necessary for that purpose, the Norwegian sources make 
it abundantly clear that the king's pardon does not 
protect a murderer from the vengeance of the friends of 
the victim unless and until he has succeeded in regaining 
their friendship. Mr. Lee describes it as a general 
characteristic of the barbarian codes that " the act which 
is to-day described as a crime was then looked upon as a 
private wrong. The wronged party, not the state or 
that which stood for the state, brought suit " (Historical 
Jurispudence, p. 375). It was, accordingly, at first a 
universal rule that if the injured person or his family 
failed to take action, the offender could not be called to 
account, and there was nothing to prevent the victim 
from remaining silent or from privately coming to terms 
with his adversary. Thus the Zealand code of King Eric 
expressly provides that nobody shall be compelled to 
prosecute the offender; and this rule was recognized, 
at a much later date, by the Saxon common law (L. I. 
art. 62) : " Nobody is bound to prosecute unless he has 
started proceedings. Every man is at liberty, as long 
as he likes, to suffer in silence any wrong inflicted upon 
him." Indeed, as Wilda remarks, the law at first defines 
who is entitled, not who is bound, to institute proceedings.
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And the person so privileged in cases of murder was 
invariably the person singled out by ancient custom to 
avenge the blood shed, viz. the nearest male relative. 
The intimate relationship existing between the right to 
take blood-revenge and the right to institute proceedings 
for homicide is indicated, in the language of medieval 
German law, by the use of the term rachen—i. e. to 
avenge in the sense of " prosecuting for murder." In 
many cases it was for the plaintiff to carry out the sen- 
tence pronounced by the court (P. Frauenstadt, Die Tot- 
schlagssuhne des deutschen Mittelalters. 1886). Nor was 
it only in cases of homicide that the execution was left 
to the complainant. This was the practice of the Eastern 
Goths, Burgundians, Bavarians and Anglo-Saxons (Hob- 
house, i. p. 100, note 2); and the law of the Visigoths is 
specially rich in passages which provide that capital 
sentences are to be carried out by the accuser, or that the 
evildoer is to be handed over to the plaintiff to receive 
at his hands such treatment as the latter chooses to mete 
out to him; e.g. " ut in potestate eius vindicta consistat " 
(L. Wisigoth, iii. t. 4, c. 1, 3, 9); " quod de eis facere 
voluerint habeant potestatem " (vi. 5, 12). He might 
keep the condemned man as his slave, sell him into 
slavery, chastise, or mutilate him (iii. 4, 13), and satisfy 
his thirst for vengeance by the infliction of all tortures 
imaginable (Wilda). The Frisian common law, which 
was in force up to the time of the Carolina (sixteenth 
century), provides : " When the thief is caught, he is 
to be taken before the magistrate. If he is condemned 
to death, it is not for the magistrate to provide for his 
execution. The court beadle must bind him and lead him 
to the gallows. There the man whose property he has 
purloined may either himself hang the thief or hire an- 
other to do it for him." And a similar practice is met in 
Flemish law, the " Keure of Arkes " (anni 1231, art. 28) pro- 
viding : " De homicidio voluntario convict us parentibus
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vel cognatis occisi tradetur occidendus " (Warnkonig, 
Flandrische Eechtsgeschichte, iii. 1. p. 182). It is clearly 
a survival of this ancient function discharged by the 
prosecutor in carrying out the sentence that according to 
some later law-books, e.g. that of the city of Augsburg 
(Stadtbuch, 27), the plaintiff had to pay the executioner. 
The " Civil Law and Customs of the Eight Free Cities of 
Hungary" lay down the principle that punishment 
cannot be awarded unless the injured party prosecutes. 
Not only may the victim accept a composition in lieu of 
the execution of punishment, but often the judge himself 
recommends such a bargain. Indeed, in cases of murder, 
the judge is directed to appeal three times in succession 
to the prosecutor to agree to pecuniary compensation : 
" Mitibus sermonibus obviari actori ne festinet in mortem 
ipsius homicidae. . . . Judex actorem debet inquirers 
utrum sua iura contra homicidam petit effectui mancipari, 
qui si respondent quod vult, iudex tamquam misericordia 
motus compatiendo debebit dicere : Bone vir, aut Bona 
mulier, quid tibi auxiliabitur de morte huius viri 1 Num. 
quid resurget ipso facto vir tuus vel frater ? " (lib. iii. 
c. 61, "De homicidis"). Not a few instances occur in 
Slav law of the practice of giving up the criminal to the 
injured party to receive punishment at the latter's hand 
and at the latter's discretion, subject, however, to this 
limitation that the punishment should correspond to the 
amount of injury suffered (Macieiowski, Slavische Bechts- 
geschichte, ii. 127). The statute of King Otho of Bohemia 
(anni 1229) enacts in art. 17 that the murderer must 
leave the country till he has compounded with the family 
of the victim.
The survey which we have just taken teaches us that, 
from the very dawn of jurisprudence up to comparatively 
high stages of civilization, the procedure in trials for what 
we now call offences against individuals exhibits every- 
where one or all of the following features 
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1. Nobody is bound to prosecute. Such persons alone 
as are directly affected by a wrong, may institute legal 
proceedings; and even for them to do so is a right, not a 
duty. In cases of homicide, this privilege is, as it were, 
but a continuance of the ancient customary right to take 
blood-revenge and is generally enjoyed, like the latter, by 
the nearest heir or heirs.
2. The plaintiff himself carries out the sentence of the 
court. In the early stages of legal development this 
practice appears to have prevailed everywhere, and the 
instances given could be supplemented by a further list 
drawn from the four quarters of the globe (see, for in- 
stance, the examples given by Post, Bausteine, i. 156,157, 
and by Westermarck, i. 184). Occasionally, as in Frisia, 
the complainant was allowed to act by deputy; and the 
right of the family of the victim to witness the execution, 
which we have met with both among the Diakite-Sarra- 
kolese and under the later Athenian law, probably deve- 
loped out of the practice of an earlier period when the 
aggrieved parties were present at the execution in order 
to convince themselves that their agent did carry out the 
job for which he had been hired by them. Indeed, it 
seems that the habitual employment of paid deputies has 
given rise to a class of men who made a speciality of that 
work, in other words, to the professional hangman. The 
public executioner himself, at first paid by the plaintiff 
in the suit, as in Augsburg, appears to have been in origin 
but a statutory agent whom, on account of his superior 
skill in the work, the complainants were bound to employ.
3. In discharging the function of the executioner, the 
injured party is in no sense an instrument of public 
justice ; he is merely exercising that which the court has 
pronounced to be his right. He is under no legal obliga- 
tion whatsoever to execute the judgment, and if he does 
not do so, nobody else will. In some instances, as in 
Mahometan and in Hungarian law, the weight of public
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authority is thrown into the scale in favour of the offender, 
the plaintiff being urged by the judge not to exact his 
pound of flesh. But the final decision of the fate of the 
malefactor lies always entirely with the victim. He may 
let him go scot-free, or he may pardon him for a considera- 
tion and, unless there is a customary or statutory tariff 
or a rule requiring the amount of the compensation to be 
fixed by the court, he may, in imposing terms, indulge in 
every known art of extortion. In many cases bis right 
goes even further than that, the offender being delivered 
into his hands to be dealt with at his unfettered discretion, 
and he may then, whilst sparing his life, inflict upon him 
every form of suffering and oppression.
4. Whilst the aggrieved person has the right to pardon 
the offender, no such power is possessed by the public 
authority.
So far, then, as we have traced legal development, in 
wrongs to individuals the sanction is invariably enforced 
or remitted at the discretion of the injured party; and 
this, according to Austin, is the true distinguishing 
characteristic of civil from criminal procedure. The 
conclusion is, in fact, forced upon us that society did not 
feel itself attacked in the attack upon one of its members. 
It did not assert any claim of its own as against the 
aggressor; but whilst ready and prepared to adjudicate 
impartially between the contending parties, it was satisfied 
the moment those directly affected declared themselves 
satisfied.
It now remains to inquire how, if at all, the civil is 
converted into a criminal trial. Indications of a nascent 
penal procedure were, indeed, not wanting in our short 
historical sketch of early jurisdiction. We have seen 
how in Mahometan law the public authority punishes the 
murderer if the family of the victim fails to call him to 
account. Here we are brought face to face with a genuine 
criminal sanction, but it is of a subsidiary nature and
PRIVATE VENGEANCE 25
entirely subordinate to the private right to redress vested 
in the heirs. Again, on several occasions outlawry has 
been mentioned, undoubtedly one of the most ancient 
forms of public punishment. But lest we jump to false 
conclusions, we must remember that outlawry is known to 
ancient law under two different aspects. On the one 
hand, it was a recognized form of punishment for crime, 
on the other a mere procedural measure. As Sir Henry 
Maine has pointed out, one of the greatest difficulties with 
which the law in its infancy had to deal, was how to get the 
defendant into court, and proclamation of outlawry in 
default of appearance must have been a very effective 
means of inducing the offender to submit to its jurisdic- 
tion. Besides, in medieval law outlawry was regularly 
employed against the recalcitrant judgment debtor. The 
fact that outlawry, as a matter of procedure, was not by 
any means limited to criminal trials, but was freely 
resorted to in civil causes, is quite familiar to English 
lawyers, since in this country its application in civil suits 
was abolished by a statute of quite recent date, viz. by 
42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, sec. 3. It is undoubtedly to its use 
as a form of procedure in civil actions that the early codes 
must be understood to refer where they mention outlawry 
in connection with wrongs to the person, since in such cases 
it depended at first upon the plaintiff alone whether the 
outlaw should, or should not, be inlawed. Even when the 
consent of the king, as well as the consent of the party 
prejudiced by the wrongful act, was required, it does not 
necessarily follow that outlawry in such cases has acquired 
an altered meaning; for matters of procedure, in civil no 
less than in criminal trials, are publici juris, and inasmuch 
as the proclamation of outlawry had been made by the 
public authority, whether in the popular assembly or in 
the king's court, it is but natural that the sanction of the 
representative of public authority should be necessary if 
it is to be revoked and its effects cancelled. Moreover,
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even when wrongs to individuals come to be regarded as 
attacks upon society, i. e. as true crimes, the rights of the 
injured party are not all at once extinguished, but are 
recognized no less than the claims of the state, if the former 
are not actually given priority. " The pardon of homicides 
in Brabant does not take legal effect until the slayer has 
come to terms with the family of the victim" (Depape, 
TraiU de la joyeuse entree). Thus runs art. 20 of the 
Book of Liberties of Brabant, which was in force down 
to the time of the French Revolution. In Antwerp, as 
late as the seventeenth century, it availed a murderer but 
little to have received his sovereign's pardon unless and 
until he had succeeded in reconciling the relations of the 
murdered man; and in order to obtain their forgiveness 
he had to sue for it in solemn form, and had, moreover, to 
comply with such conditions as they thought fit to impose. 
In Spain, up to quite modern times, the exercise of the 
royal prerogative of pardon was dependent upon the 
consent of the friends of the victim. The co-existence of 
civil and criminal liability is well illustrated by the 
Lithuanian Code of 1529 which in Book VII (" Of Acts of 
Violence and Homicides ") provides capital punishment 
for murder, but at the same time expressly directs that, 
as heretofore, golovt-china, i. e. the composition, shall be 
paid to the family of the victim and the fine to the state. 
But no better instance can be found of civil and criminal 
procedure continuing side by side than the reduplication 
of legal remedies available, in theory at least, till modern 
times in English law. At any rate, throughout the Middle 
Ages, and even long after the close of that period, cases of 
murder and manslaughter were tried either at the suit 
of the sovereign or at the suit of the kinsmen of the 
victim, the latter form of procedure being the more usual 
one to the end of the fifteenth century. Proceedings at 
the suit of the king bore all the characteristic features of 
a criminal prosecution and did not differ in principle from
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a modern trial upon presentment by a grand jury. It is 
the proceedings instituted by the relatives, technically 
called an appeal, that interest us here and repay a more 
detailed study. An appeal is defined by Blackstone 
(Commentaries, iv. 312) as " an accusation of a private 
subject by another for some heinous crime, demanding 
punishment on account of the particular injury suffered, 
rather than for the offence against the public." An appeal 
when for homicide and appeals for other " heinous 
crimes " fell into desuetude at an early date could be 
brought only by those who were of the blood of the 
deceased, or by his widow. Not until he had appealed 
against the slayer could the heir, in feudal times, be ad- 
mitted to the fief. Originally, the right of the subject 
to an appeal had priority to the sovereign's right of 
proceeding by indictment. By the Statute of Gloucester 
(6 Edw. I, c. 9), the appellor was restricted to a year and a 
day within which to bring his appeal; but to save the 
suit of the party, the homicide was never arraigned at 
the suit of the crown till the year and the day had expired. 
This practice found statutory recognition in 22 Edw. IV. 
It proved, however, so mischievous that, before many 
years had passed, the policy of this act was reversed by 
a clause in the Star Chamber Act (3 Hen. VII, c. i) which 
allowed indictments to be tried at once, but safeguarded 
the rights of the relatives by a proviso that an acquittal 
on an indictment was to be no bar to an appeal. Pro- 
ceedings on appeal were on the civil side of the court. 
The appellee could claim trial by battle, and if he were 
worsted in the combat, he suffered the same judgment as 
if convicted on an indictment. In olden times the execu- 
tion of the sentence was left to the relatives of the mur- 
dered man; and later, down to the reign of Henry IV, 
they had to drag him to the place of execution where they 
delivered him up to the hangman. The appellee could, 
however, always compound with his accusers by a money
28 THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
payment. Indeed, as Blackstone (loc. cit.) remarks, 
" the chief object of an appeal at all times was to compel 
the defendant to make a pecuniary compensation. For 
where the verdict in an appeal was given in favour of the 
appellant, he might insist upon what terms he pleased 
as his ransom of the defendant's life, or a commutation of 
the sentence." The right of pardoning the convicted 
appellee always rested with the appellor, whilst the crown 
had no power to pardon him. The underlying idea was 
that as the king was not a party to the suit, he had no 
claim to interfere with the result; as regards the sovereign 
an appeal was res inter olios acta. This is the reason 
given by Hallam (View of the Middle Ages, after Little- 
ton, par. 189, 190). Appeals, then, whilst unmistakably 
betraying their origin in the primitive modes of redress 
by vengeance and pecuniary satisfaction, were, as Sir 
James Stephen (History, i. 496) observes, " in nearly 
every respect in the nature of civil actions, and were 
conducted like other private litigations," thus affording 
striking evidence in favour of the proposition for which 
we contend, viz. that revenge was the source, not of 
punishments, but of rights to redress for wrong enforced 
by civil actions, in other words, of liability in damages. 
The view here advanced, then, amounts to this : that 
in the infancy of the courts their jurisdiction in wrongs 
to individuals was limited to an adjudication upon the 
claims of the offended party to take revenge or to exact 
composition, both of which kinds of claims were subse- 
quently transformed into a claim to damages. The 
transition from compositions to damages does not seem 
to amount to much more than a change in terminology. 
But the modern mind finds it somewhat difficult to grasp 
that the claim of one man to slay another should ever have 
been recognized as a right, in the nature of an indemnity 
to the aggrieved party, enforceable by an|action at law. 
According to Post and other writers, the rationale of this
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right and of its legal recognition must be sought in the 
fact that the act of revenge tends to restore the social 
equilibrium temporarily disturbed by the act of aggres- 
sion. By killing a member of group A, group B has 
obtained an undue advantage, both military and economic, 
which it ought not to be allowed to retain; therefore 
group B must, in its turn, lose a man in order that the 
balance of power between the two groups may be re- 
established in the only way in which it is possible to restore 
it. This explanation is not acceptable; for it presupposes 
a capacity for evolving far-seeing schemes of statesman- 
ship for which we are not entitled to give credit to the 
primitive public authorities of peoples as yet hardly 
emerged from the stage of barbarism. The problem 
admits of a much simpler solution. The right sued for 
was the right to the enjoyment of such satisfaction as 
can be derived from the gratification of the desire for 
revenge. We wish it to be clearly understood that we 
pronounce no opinion about the origin of the impulse 
of revenge. But whatever its source and its primary 
significance, there can be no doubt that revenge is sweet 
even to modern man. The pleasure of vengeance, writes 
Bentham, " calls to my mind Samson's riddle it is the 
sweet coming out of the terrible, it is the honey dropping 
from the lion's mouth." Being a source of pleasure, the 
right to take revenge is a valuable right, and since the 
economic theory of primitive races is not advanced 
enough to enable them to distinguish value in use from 
value in exchange, it was regarded as a proprietary right. 
Numerous facts can be adduced in evidence of its quasi- 
proprietary character. Thus the right of avenging blood- 
shed, or the equivalent right of instituting proceedings 
for homicide, is intimately connected, and generally 
co-extensive, with the right of succession to the property 
of the slain man. Mahometan law, for instance, accord- 
ing to the teaching of both Shafeites and Azemites,
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concedes this privilege to each of the heirs, and to none 
but the heirs, of the victim (von Tornauw, Moslemisches 
Kecht, p. 230); and this principle appears to have been 
recognized by the Arabs in pre-Islamitic times. The 
same relationship between the two rights is discovered 
in the Germanic law-books. The Lex Angliorum et 
Wrinorum enacts in chap. 31 : " Ad quemcunque 
hereditas terrse pervenerit, ad ilium vestis bellica, id 
est lorica, et ultio proximi et solutio leudis debet perti- 
nere." Similar provisions are to be found in Lango- 
bardian and Scandinavian law and occur with special 
frequency in the Anglo-Saxon sources (L. Ines, c. 74; 
L. Edmund, II. 1 and 7; L. Knut, II. 56; L. Henrici, 
I. i. 70, sec. 5). Indeed, the right of revenge seems to have 
come to the heir by way of inheritance as part of the 
ancestor's estate. For that right belonged in principle 
to the injured party himself, in cases of homicide to the 
victim; but since he could not exercise it himself, it 
descended to the person or persons who stepped into 
his shoes and continued his legal personality. Again, 
it is only by regarding the right of revenge as closely akin 
to a right of property that we shall cease to be amazed 
at the facility with which it is known to have given way, 
on five continents, to claims for compensation. Nor did 
the one merely succeed to the other; our sketch of early 
legal development has shown how promptly, if composi- 
tions are refused, the more ancient right revives. It is 
not likely that revenge and compositions should have 
continued over such long periods of time to exist side by 
side as alternative remedies if they had not been felt to 
be eiusdem generis. Far more incomprehensible even, 
without some such assumption, is the practice of allowing 
the one remedy to supplement the other in cases where 
full satisfaction cannot conveniently be obtained by the 
ordinary form of redress alone. The most striking 
instance in point is the Mahometan law of bodily
PRIVATE VENGEANCE 31
injuries. The general method of redress is here a strict 
application of the lex talionis. But an exception is made 
in case of internal lesions and, generally, whenever the 
injury inflicted is of such a nature that retaliation would 
endanger the wrongdoer's life. In such cases an injury 
not dangerous to life is inflicted, and the resulting in- 
equality is compensated for by a money payment. 
Again, if the limb of the wrongdoer is so much smaller 
than that of the injured party as to render the infliction 
of an injury of equal extent a matter of physical impossi- 
bility, the deficiency is made up in money. Not only 
pecuniary compensation, but other proprietary and 
quasi-proprietary forms of satisfaction frequently take 
the place of revenge. Thus among the Wapokomo of 
Tanaland blood-vengeance is the rule if a man is slain; 
but if the victim is a woman, the avenger of blood claims 
another woman in her stead (Steinmetz, Bechtsverhdltnisse, 
p. 292). " Among the Jbala of Northern Morocco, a 
homicide sometimes induced the avenger to abstain from 
his persecutions by giving him his sister or daughter in 
marriage; and a similar custom has been noticed among 
the Beni Amer and Bogos " (Westermarck, i. 484). 
" Sometimes," again, " the manslayer, instead of being 
killed, is adopted as a member of the family of his victim " 
(ibid. For instances see also Steinmetz, Studien, i. 410 seq. 
& 439 seq.). In connection with these practices it is 
enough to remind the reader of the well-known fact, 
symbolized in the meaning of the Latin word familia, 
that in primitive peoples domestic subjection bore a 
proprietary character. We have seen how the homicide, 
instead of being made to serve the short-lived pleasure 
of vengeance by being done to death, may be put to more 
lasting uses by being reduced to slavery " in order to 
provide the necessaries of life for the family of the vic- 
tim" ; how he was liable to be sold into slavery or to be 
surrendered at discretion by the judicial authorities, to
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become a mere chattel in the hands of the successful
plaintiff. But the strongest proof of the proprietary
character of the right of revenge is afforded by the
provision found in several Germanic, particularly Ale-
mannic, sources, according to which the body of a fugitive
homicide, if he had died an outlaw, was to be delivered up
to the relatives of the victim, whose claim to the corpse is
expressly recognized in art. 26 of the Penal Code of Zug of
the year 1432, and, as late as 1675, in art. 22 of the code
of the county of Kyburg (Osenbriiggen). The conception
of the right of killing, enslaving, or mutilating a convicted
tortfeasor as originally partaking of the nature of a
proprietary right will, probably, strike the reader as not
quite so strained and unnatural as it might at first sight
appear, if he will remember that these forms of redress
were by no means limited to those actionable wrongs
which are nowadays crimes, but were the regular
methods of execution, in practically all primitive systems
of law, for breach of contract. To mention but one
example, the old Roman " Statute-Process " by manus
iniectio enabled any creditor whose claim was liquidated,
after complying with the prescribed formalities, to put
the defaulting debtor to death or to sell him into foreign
slavery. And if there were several creditors, they were
allowed to cut their portions of his body. Nor could a
Portia have delivered an old-Roman Antonio from the
clutches of Shylock; for the Twelve Tables expressly
provide that " no creditor who cuts too little or too much
shall be therefor called to account."
Rights of retaliation, then, are damages in kind. We 
now proceed to examine the primitive measure of such 
damages, the lex talionis. According to modern notions, 
damages, if properly assessed, leave the plaintiff neither 
better nor worse off than he would have been if he had 
never suffered the wrong. Expressed, not in terms of 
the money standard to which we are accustomed, but in
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units of revenge, the rule of damages ought to read : 
The plaintiff is to be allowed to inflict upon his opponent 
an evil of such gravity as to render the gratification 
which he derives therefrom equal, or since pleasure 
and pain are incommensurable magnitudes equivalent, 
to the pain which the wrong has caused him. And a 
modern judge, in his charge to the jury, would probably 
lay down that that amount of satisfaction was to be 
considered equivalent which would induce the plaintiff 
voluntarily to submit to the injury which he has suffered. 
Of course it would be quite impossible even for one of 
our special juries ever to apply this rule in practice. 
Primitive man, however, is no psychologist. To him the 
external act is the measure of all things. He could not 
grasp, if it were explained to him, the ideal and sub- 
jective compensation of pain and pleasure. But what 
offers no difficulty whatever to his mind is the elementary 
and transparent principle " Equality is equity," as long 
as the equality here spoken of refers to the number of 
lives, limbs, eyes, teeth, or heads of cattle, or to the 
length and depth of wounds, and he is quite willing to 
submit to a restraining rule founded upon the principle 
of objective equalization, whether imposed by public 
opinion or public authority. Instead of repaying an 
injury with hundredfold interest, he will be content 
with such satisfaction as he can obtain by rendering 
like for like. As Alfred Fouillee rightly remarks (p. 290), 
only an optical illusion can cause a man to believe that 
by knocking out the eye of his enemy he recovers his own 
lost eye an illusion, however, vivid enough with some 
primitive peoples among whom " the blood of the slain 
homicide is supposed to restore, as it were, to the family 
of his victim the loss of life which he has caused them " 
(Westermarck, i. 483). In truth, the principle upon 
which the lex talionis directs damages to be assessed, is
not that of reparation at all, but the principle of fairness
D
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in exchange. Once again we are confronted with the 
quasi-proprietary character of the right of revenge. 
For " the foundation of talio is an idea commercial rather 
than legal; the mental register of wrongs and acts of 
revenge corresponds but to the debit and credit sides of 
a ledger " (Letourneau, p. 489).
" In the infancy of jurisprudence the citizen depends 
for protection against violence or fraud not on the Law 
of Crime, but on the Law of Tort " (Maine, Ancient Law, 
p. 371). The remedial rights to which wrongful attacks 
upon the individual, whether directed against his person 
or against his property, give rise, are the right of revenge 
and the right of compensation, damages in kind and 
damages in money, and both these rights are enforced, 
at the sole discretion of the injured party, by a suit 
which bears all the characteristic features of a civil 
action. The state intervenes, first as arbitrator, later 
as judge, but never as party, and provides, when once 
its jurisdiction is firmly established, in the institution 
of outlawry, an effective method of procedure in order to 
compel the defendant to appear and to satisfy the judg- 
ment of the court. And where pecuniary compensation 
is awarded to the plaintiff, it claims a share therein as 
a fair price for its time and trouble. This, at any rate, 
is the meaning assigned by the best authorities, such as 
Kemble, Maine and others, to the participation of the 
state in the composition. The share which found its 
way into the public treasury has, therefore, to be re- 
garded as the source, not of punishment by fine, but of 
modern court-fees. We have seen how at a higher level 
of civilization, when the state itself begins to call to 
account those guilty of serious infringements of the 
elementary rights of its subjects, in other words, when 
wrongs to individuals enter into the domain of criminal 
law, civil and criminal proceedings run in parallel, but 
independent, channels. But however far down the
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current of time we follow legal development, no scintilla 
of evidence is forthcoming of the alleged transformation 
of civil into criminal sanctions. Never do we find the 
individual, either expressly or impliedly, deputing society 
to exercise his rights or his remedies on his behalf. 
History fails to supply the missing link in the chain of 
that theory according to which the state punishment 
of crime originates in, and has to be regarded as the 
continuation of, private vengeance.
Criminal law has a different origin. With the rise of 
the power of the state it gains in strength and expands 
and begins to claim joint-ownership in large tracts 
hitherto held by the civil law alone. As the weapons 
of which it disposes are so much more powerful, the 
individual is content to rely on them more and more 
for the protection of his vital rights. Where an effective 
criminal sanction co-exists with the civil sanction, the 
latter loses more and more in relative importance, with 
the result that, in the end, one of two things must happen. 
Either the civil remedy falls into complete desuetude in all 
the more heinous offences; to borrow the language of 
English law, the trespass is merged in the felony; and 
only in respect of minor offences do the two classes of 
remedies continue to exist side by side, as in our own law 
in cases of assault and libel. Or the criminal and the 
civil proceedings coalesce, the plaintiff being allowed, 
as in France, to join, in the subordinate character of 
partie civile, in the criminal proceedings instituted by 
the state. But here, too, is the tendency noticeable for 
the private remedy to become obsolete in the most 
serious classes of crimes. It is many a long day since 
a partie civile was joined in a trial for murder.
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CHAPTER II
SOCIAL VENGEANCE THE SOURCE OF PUNISHMENT
IF there is truth in Bacon's remark that revenge is a 
wild kind of justice, we have learnt in the preceding 
chapter that it is civil, not criminal, justice of which 
private vengeance may be regarded as the primitive 
equivalent, the savage prototype. But how about public 
vengeance ? Is not collective wrath the source, as well 
as the soul, of punishment ? Is it not a fact that punish- 
ment is, and always has been, an expression of public 
indignation, the passionate reaction of a community 
against an act that stirs its corporate conscience ? Philo- 
sophers, lawyers and sociologists of the greatest eminence 
do not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirma- 
tive. " The sentiment of justice," writes John Stuart 
Mill, " in that one of its elements which consists of the 
desire to punish, is, I conceive, the natural feeling of 
retaliation or vengeance, rendered by intellect and 
sympathy applicable to those injuries, that is, to those 
hurts, which wound us through, or in common with, 
society at large." Sidgwick concurs in this view "pro- 
vided that it is taken as an account of the antecedents 
rather than the elements of the sentiment in question." 
The same attitude is taken by Bain, who teaches that " a 
main prompting to justice, in the first instance, is sympa- 
thetic resentment," that " in the sentiment of justice, 
when analysed, there may still be traced an element of 
resentful passion," but that " the idea of justice, when
36
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matured, guides and limits revenge," so that the gratifica- 
tion of the sympathetic resentment of the community is 
merely an incidental effect of modern punishment, the 
principal end of which is the prevention of injury. Whilst 
the utilitarians look upon public resentment as the main- 
spring in the evolution of criminal justice, but assign to 
it a subordinate place in its administration in civilized 
countries, there are jurists who regard the gratification 
of those feelings as the chief object, or one of the chief 
objects, with which punishment is awarded in modern 
tribunals. Especially emphatic in expressing this view 
is Sir James Stephen, who insists that one of the purposes 
of punishment is to serve as an outlet, a kind of safety- 
valve for the indignation of the community. " The 
benefits which criminal law produces are twofold : In 
the first place, it prevents crime by terror; in the second 
place, it regulates, sanctions and provides a legitimate 
satisfaction for the passion of revenge. The criminal 
law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same 
relation as marriage to the sexual appetite " (General View 
of the Criminal Law, ch. iv. p. 98). And again : " In 
short, the infliction of punishment by law gives definite 
expression and a solemn ratification and justification to 
the hatred which is excited by the commission of the 
offence. . . . The criminal law thus proceeds upon the 
principle that it is morally right to hate criminals, and it 
confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon 
criminals punishments which express it. ... I think it 
highly desirable that criminals should be hated, that the 
punishments inflicted upon them should be so contrived 
as to give expression to that hatred, and to justify it so 
far as the public provision of means for expressing and 
gratifying a healthy natural sentiment can justify and 
encourage it " (History, vol. ii. pp. 81, 82). Prof. Wes- 
termarck, according to whom " punishment is, in the 
main, an expression of public indignation," has taken
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great pains to prove that " even among savages public 
indignation frequently assumes that definite shape which 
constitutes the difference between punishment and mere 
condemnation." Nay, more than that : even individual 
and family revenge become an expression of public 
feelings, of moral indignation, as soon as a custom of 
revenge is established and blood-revenge is regarded, not 
only as a right, but as a duty incumbent upon the relatives 
of the slain person. " Thus public indignation displays 
itself not only in punishment, but, to a certain extent, in 
the custom of revenge." But " strictly speaking, the 
relationship between the custom of revenge and punish- 
ment is not, as has been often supposed, that between 
parent and child. It is a collateral relationship. They 
have a common ancestor, the feeling of public resent- 
ment." Makarewicz goes a step farther. He describes 
" public, social and instinctive vengeance " as one of the 
forms which the social reaction against crime takes, as 
one of the three roots out of which punishment has 
developed. " The instinctive reaction of society against 
one of its members who has in any manner infringed its 
laws or attacked its interests, has for its basis the desire 
for revenge. As Loeffler remarks, speaking of the ancient 
Germans, in many respects public punishment has been 
but an act of vengeance accomplished by the state. There 
are, indeed, facts which show that a crowd may be 
regarded as a collective individual, and which entitle us 
to say that from the psychological point of view there is 
no difference between such collective individual and a 
natural person." Moreover, from the moment when 
society begins to display an interest in acts prejudicial 
to individuals and to control the exercise of private 
vengeance, private revenge " may be regarded as an 
equivalent of punishment, or of social reaction, may be 
looked upon as punishment the execution of which is left 
to the injured party." According to Garofalo, the final
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end of punishment is the elimination of the offender, its 
primary and proximate object to wreak vengeance upon 
him. It is of the essence of crime, he writes, to wound 
one of those feelings which are most deeply rooted in 
the human soul, one of those sentiments which collectively 
form the moral sense of a community. Every race 
possesses a store of innate moral instincts, and, without 
indulging hi undue generalizations, it may be asserted 
that over a vast area of the inhabited globe the more 
important of these instincts are identical; they are none 
other than the fundamental altruistic sentiments, viz. 
benevolence and honesty. Crime, then, may be defined 
as an act which shocks the public conscience by wounding 
the fundamental and essential altruistic sentiments of 
the community. The insult thus offered to the collective 
feelings evokes a reaction on the part of society the 
apparent aim of which is revenge. For " vengeful passion 
is not purely individual, though it is in a minor degree 
only that others feel, through sympathy, the indignation 
and the pain caused by the delict. Now it is neces- 
sary, in order to allay the one and the other, to inflict 
an evil upon the malefactor. The hatred towards the 
criminal always brings with it a desire that he should 
suffer."
A similar train of thoughts underlies the teaching of 
Emile Durkheim, in whom the theory of social vengeance 
has found its most thorough exponent. In order to 
constitute a crime, an act must wound feelings which 
in a given social type 
(1) are shared by all normal members of society;
(2) attain a certain average intensity;
(3) are definite and precise.
Universality, strength and precision are the only dis- 
tinguishing features of those sentiments. It is quite 
impossible to specify their intrinsic nature or to define 
them with reference to their particular objects. Nowa-
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days the altruistic sentiments undoubtedly exhibit those 
characteristics in the most marked degree. But there 
was a time, not so long past, when religious, family, and a 
thousand other traditional sentiments had exactly the 
same effects. One cannot, therefore, compile a list of 
sentiments the violation of which constitutes crime. 
But the mere fact that a sentiment, whatever its origin 
and whatever its content, is shared by all members of a 
society with a certain degree of strength and definiteness, 
makes an act that wounds such sentiment, a crime. It is 
incorrect, then, to say that an act gives a shock to the 
feelings of the public because it is criminal; it is criminal 
because it shocks those feelings. Now the ensemble of 
beliefs and sentiments common to the average members 
of a society forms a definite system which may be called 
the collective or public conscience. It has a life of its 
own, independent of the individuals of which the society 
is composed. The latter pass away, while it remains. It 
does not change with every generation, but, on the 
contrary, forms a connecting link between successive 
generations. It is the psychic type of the society. We 
may then say that an act is criminal if it offends strong 
and well-defined states of the public conscience.
What characterizes crime is that it determines punish- 
ment. If, therefore, our definition of crime is correct, 
it must account for all the characteristics of punishment. 
What are these ?
1. Punishment consists in a passionate reaction. At 
the lower levels of civilization this is an unmistakable 
feature of punishment. Primitive peoples, indeed, punish 
in order to punish, strike in order to strike, strike blindly, 
indiscriminately, inanimate beings, animals, and with the 
offender innocent members of his family. For passion 
which is the soul of punishment does not stop till it is 
completely exhausted. But nowadays, it is claimed, 
punishment has changed its nature; it is no longer to
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avenge itself, but to defend itself, that society punishes; 
the pain which it inflicts is in its hands but a systematic 
instrument of self-protection. One is not, however, 
entitled to draw so radical a distinction between these 
two kinds of punishment, merely because it can be proved 
that they are employed with different ends in view. The 
essential nature of a practice does not necessarily change 
because the conscious aims of those that resort to it 
undergo a modification. It might, as a matter of fact, 
have served the very same object from the very beginning, 
the true part which it was playing all along remaining 
unnoticed. And, indeed, it is an error to believe that 
vengeance is but useless cruelty. In itself but a mechani- 
cal, aimless reaction, a passionate, irrational desire to 
destroy, it yet in reality constitutes a genuine act of 
defence, however instinctive and indeliberate. The 
instinct of vengeance is, after all, but the instinct of self- 
preservation stimulated into activity by peril. Vengeance 
is a weapon of defence which has its value; only it is 
a coarse weapon. Unconscious of the services which it 
renders automatically, it is unregulated in its action and 
strikes haphazard in response to blind impulses, with 
nothing to moderate its impetus. Nowadays we are 
better aware of the end to be attained and, consequently, 
we know better how to utilize the means at our disposal; 
we protect ourselves with more method and, therefore, 
more effectively. But the same result was attained, 
though in a less perfect manner, from the very beginning. 
Between modern and primitive punishment there lies 
no impassable gulf. In fact, punishment has remained, 
partly at least, an act of vengeance. It is claimed that 
we do not make the guilty suffer in order that they may 
suffer. It is, nevertheless, true that we find it just that 
they should suffer. The trouble which we take to adjust 
the suffering to the guilt would be quite unintelligible if 
punishment were but a measure of defence. For against
42 THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
an enemy one cannot take too stringent precautions. 
The nature of punishment has never changed. All one 
can say is that the desire for vengeance is now better 
directed than formerly. The modern spirit of foresight 
no longer leaves the field to the blind operation of passion, 
but assigns it certain limits and prevents absurd outbursts 
of violence. More enlightened, it does not discharge 
itself in the same haphazard fashion as in primitive 
society. In short, we may say that punishment nowa- 
days consists in a passionate reaction of graduated 
intensity.
2. The reaction emanates, not from the individual, but 
from society. If society alone disposes of the means of 
repression, the reason is that it is attacked, and is attacked 
even in those cases in which individuals are attacked too; 
it is the attack upon society which is repressed by punish- 
ment. The social character of the sentiments wounded 
by crime and of the punitive reaction is illustrated by an 
experience drawn from our inner life. When we demand 
the punishment of crime, it is not ourselves we wish to 
avenge, but something sacred which we feel, more or less 
confusedly, outside and above ourselves. This something 
is conceived differently, according to time and environ- 
ment. Sometimes it is merely an idea, such as morality, 
duty. More often it represents itself in the shape of one 
or more concrete beings, like ancestors, a deity. This 
representation is obviously illusory; for it is in a sense 
ourselves we wish to avenge, ourselves we seek to satisfy, 
since in us, and in us alone, do the wounded feelings 
reside. But the illusion is necessary. As by reason of 
their collective origin, their universality, their permanence, 
their intrinsic intensity, these sentiments have an ex- 
ceptional force, they separate themselves radically from 
the rest of our consciousness, the states of which are much 
weaker. They dominate us, they have, as it were, some- 
thing superhuman and, at the same time, they attach us
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to objects which lie outside our temporal life. They, 
therefore, appear to us like an echo within us of a force 
foreign and, moreover, superior to us. Yet this error is 
but partial. Since the sentiments in question are collec- 
tive, it is not ourselves, but society, which they represent 
to us. Hence, in avenging them, it is society, and not 
ourselves, we avenge, and society is surely something 
superior to the individual.
3. Penal repression is organized. This feature dis- 
tinguishes punishment from those diffuse kinds of reaction 
which follow acts merely immoral. The organization 
met with wherever there is punishment properly so-called, 
consists in the establishment of a tribunal. It matters 
not how the tribunal is composed, whether it comprises 
the whole people or only a chosen few, whether or not 
it follows a regular procedure in the investigation of the 
cause and in the application of punishment; by this 
alone that the infraction, instead of being judged of by 
each person individually, is submitted to the appreciation 
of an organized body, that the collective reaction has for 
its instrument a definite organ, does it cease to be diffuse 
and becomes organized.
Punishment, then, consists essentially in a passionate 
reaction of graduated intensity, which society applies, 
through the instrumentality of an organized body, against 
those who have violated certain rules of conduct.
Among the supporters of the doctrine according to 
which punishment is both in origin and in substance the 
passionate reaction of the community against an act 
which excites its wrath, it is a matter of controversy 
whether or not the feelings to which society gives vent 
in punishing criminals are identical with, or at any rate 
closely akin to, revengefuhiess. And this difference of 
opinion has to be taken serious notice of, as it is intimately 
connected with, and indicative of, a profound divergence 
of views relating to the source and character of the
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sentiments supposed to be offended by the criminal 
act.
First of all, however, we have to make up our minds as 
to the nature of the social group whose ebullition of feeling 
is to be regarded as the fountain of punishment. Within 
the smallest social units, the family, the clan, and even 
the smallest tribes, solidarity of feeling and of interest 
is so complete that the whole group feels, with undimin- 
ished force, the shock received by any one of its members 
and responds thereto, as it were, with one soul and with 
one body. The same wave of true vengeful passion 
surges in the breast of each member; and each member, 
in avenging his fellow, really avenges himself. Group 
vengeance of this type could not by any stretch of imagina- 
tion be called public vengeance; it is private revenge pure 
and simple.
Passing on to the larger social aggregates, in which 
collective sentiment may with strict propriety be de- 
scribed as public in character, we find that the advocates 
of the theory under consideration, whilst agreeing that 
punishment is an expression of popular indignation, are 
at variance in assigning the cause of such indignation. 
According to some, the root-feeling is common compassion 
for the immediate sufferer, whilst others claim that crime 
causes the passions of the public to explode because a 
blow inflicted upon the community is felt as a blow 
inflicted upon himself by every member thereof.
When used by those authorities who maintain that 
sympathy with the victim is the key-note to the wrath 
of society, the term " public vengeance " is undoubtedly 
a misnomer. As Green well expresses it, " indignation 
against wrong done to another has nothing in common 
with a desire to revenge a wrong done to oneself. It 
borrows the language of private revenge, just as the love 
of God borrows the language of sensuous affection." 
Such indignation differs from revengefulness in two
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essential particulars. First, unlike the latter, it is altru- 
istic, not egoistic, in character. And secondly, the feeling 
primarily excited by the wrongful attack in the dis- 
interested spectator is not one of hostility to its author, 
but one of pity for the sufferer; and only in this somewhat 
circuitous manner do his feelings turn against the 
aggressor. But we need not pursue any further this 
purely academic aspect of the question. What really 
concerns us here is that those writers who regard punish- 
ment as the outcome of sympathetic resentment, impliedly 
assert that criminal law starts with wrongs to individuals, 
whereas we have seen in the preceding chapter how not 
only primitive communities, but societies that have made 
fair progress on the path of civilization are content to 
leave such wrongs to be dealt with by the injured party, 
and how, later on, self-redress for these wrongs is replaced 
by civil, not by criminal, proceedings. We do not deny 
for one moment that individual suffering sets vibrating 
a responsive chord in the soul of society; what we contend 
for is that public indignation aroused by sympathy 
remains purely moral, i. e. fails, even in highly organized 
communities, to be translated into punishment proper.
The same argument is fatal to the view that private 
or family revenge, when it has acquired the obligatory 
force of custom, " may be regarded as punishment the 
execution of which is left to the injured party " (Makare- 
wicz), or, as Wundt expresses the same idea, that the 
state, at a certain stage of its evolution, " entrusted its 
vengeance to the injured man or his kindred." The true 
attitude of early society towards the feuds between its 
members is well illustrated by an old proverb of the 
Ossetes : " Aggressor and avenger meet on an equal 
footing " ; that is to say, they are equally entitled to claim 
the rights of belligerents, and it is the duty of those not 
directly involved in the quarrel to observe a strict neu- 
trality. The community is in truth but an impartial
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looker-on, a part it could hardly be content to play if the 
avenger were its accredited organ. And when in the long 
run the state came to interfere, it did not do so in order 
to lend its aid to the offended party, as we should expect 
if the latter's were the arm entrusted with the sword of 
punitive justice : on the contrary, it imposed restrictions 
upon his right of vengeance and prescribed conditions 
with which he had to comply before he was allowed to 
enforce his claim. At a certain level of social develop- 
ment blood-revenge was certainly both a custom and a 
duty. But we have seen that it was a right before it 
became a duty, a right highly prized by primitive man in 
whom the combative spirit was more strongly developed 
than it is in us moderns, a right exercised as a matter of 
course by the party entitled and the enjoyment of which 
no one would think of foregoing unless, indeed, fear of 
a powerful adversary counselled prudence. If what 
everybody does becomes of itself binding upon all, the 
duty of taking vengeance was all the more readily enjoined 
because failure to conform to the ordinary practice 
betrayed cowardice, the one unpardonable sin in the code 
of primitive man. But how was this obligation enforced ? 
The man, we read, who is weak enough to submit to 
insult and injury, is taunted by the old women, shunned 
by the maidens, despised by his companions, treated with 
contempt even by those nearest and dearest to him, and 
constantly upbraided with pusillanimity. In short, the 
evils to which he exposes himself, are ridicule and con- 
tempt, and though social ostracism may become so 
intolerable as to drive him into voluntary exile, it is, 
nevertheless, true that all the sanctions which he incurs 
are purely moral, and not legal. It may be contended 
that it is not permissible to draw so sharp a line of demar- 
cation between early law and early morality. Whilst 
we recognize the force of this objection, the fact remains 
that the man who omits to avenge a wrong incurs the
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displeasure of society, not because he fails in the supposi- 
titious duty to vent the anger of the community upon the 
wrongdoer, but because he violates that fundamental 
commandment of primitive man's decalogue : "Be 
strong." Nor does it make any difference that the 
obligation is often conceived as a duty to the slain man, 
or as a duty which the avenger owes to his own kinsmen 
who would share his disgrace if he were remiss in the 
fulfilment of the obligation; for in early society the 
family honour, like the family property, is undivided. 
Besides, even in higher stages of legal development, when 
the practice of revenge is controlled by the state, we do 
not find that the public authority enforces any such 
obligation. Only one system of laws is known in which 
blood-revenge may be said to have been recognized as a 
duty of which the courts took cognizance, and this 
solitary instance, instead of supporting, weakens the 
doctrine with which we are dealing. In Athens, during 
the classical period, the heir who neglected to prosecute 
the murderer of his ancestor was liable to proceedings for 
aaefieia, and since the duty to prosecute the murderer 
has undoubtedly succeeded the earlier duty to avenge the 
murder, it may fairly be maintained that at an earlier 
stage the latter obligation was enforced by a similar 
remedy. Now, a suit for doefisia lay for breaches 
of religious duties alone and was available against him 
who, by his impious conduct, had excited the anger of a 
god. And though the wrath of the deity was clearly 
but the reflection of the wrath of society and was believed 
to be kindled by those very acts and omissions which were 
held in abhorrence by the community, the fact that 
public indignation had to be refined in the crucible of 
religion before it could find expression in punishment, 
proves that it-is not of itself sufficient to generate a 
criminal code.
There is, however, as we have seen, another version
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of the theory of public vengeance, according to which 
public indignation, which is said to find expression in 
punishment, is aroused, not mediately, through sympathy, 
by an attack upon an individual, but directly, by a blow 
inflicted upon the community. Here again we have to 
be on our guard against an ambiguity. The deed may 
wound the susceptibilities of every member of society 
and provoke in each one of them a passionate reaction 
which differs in nothing from genuine revenge. As their 
pulses beat with the same emotion and their hearts burn 
with the same desire, they will combine their forces the 
more effectively to strike the common object of their 
hatred. Mental contagion adds further fuel to the flame, 
and the fury of the populace no longer knows any psychi- 
cal bounds. Nothing less than the destruction of the 
obnoxious individual will satisfy it, and the choice of 
means becomes a matter of absolute indifference. Such 
is the genesis of mob-law which, undoubtedly, has its 
source in public ire. But is this punishment 1 So much 
is it wanting in all the attributes of what we call justice, 
so clearly does it appear to be the very antithesis of law 
that, in the absence of cogent proof, it cannot be conceded 
that it is the primordial form in which the nascent idea 
of justice first clothed itself, or that it has anything in 
common with punishment properly so called. And no 
evidence whatever is forthcoming that the latter has 
developed out of, and has superseded, lynch-law. Nor 
must it be forgotten that the reaction of a crowd is but 
the reaction of the individuals composing it; whilst acting 
together, they yet act ut singuli. Penal repression, on 
the other hand, is, as Durkheim remarks, organized. It 
is the organic reaction of the community against an 
attack upon the commonwealth in its corporate capacity. 
For " crime is an outrage, not on the one, or the many, 
but on the whole " (Watt). Now a corporation has 
proverbially no soul, and the commonwealth, as a cor-
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porate whole, is in itself immune from vengeful emotion 
and other passions which postulate an animal body as 
their material substrate. If it is claimed that the attack 
upon the organic whole excites a passionate reaction in 
all of its members, it may be granted that in a few in- 
stances, of which treason by adhering to an enemy at 
war with one's country suggests itself as the most obvious 
one, the shock received by the community is at once felt 
by every citizen. But in most crimes the notion of a hurt 
to the state is not arrived at without a good deal of 
abstraction, and its representation is not, therefore, either 
immediate enough or vivid enough to justify a purely 
emotional explanation of the reaction. In any case, by 
being delegated to special organs and by being clothed in 
definite forms, such reaction is freed from the dross of 
vengeful emotion which clings to it only as long as it 
remains diffuse in society, and acquires that dispassionate 
character which we regard as an essential feature of 
justice. We see, then, that M. Durkheim's definition 
of punishment, as being an organized, yet passionate, 
reaction, is self-contradictory. Indeed, it is a valid 
objection to the theory of public vengeance in any of 
its forms that a passionate justice is a contradiction in 
terms.
CHAPTER III
THE WILL OF THE ETTLEES THE SOTJECE OF 
PUNISHMENT
WHILST the theories hitherto studied all regard punish- 
ment as the expression, mediate or immediate, of one 
of the fundamental emotions and impulses of human 
nature, a group of Italian sociologists has advanced the 
view that the criminal law is in origin a highly artificial 
creation of statecraft, a bulwark to their privileges 
erected by the ruling classes against the onslaughts of 
the masses. This doctrine, which is supported by the 
authority of a Ferri, a Colajanni, has been most fully 
developed by Vaccaro upon whose writings the following 
outline of the theory is mainly based.
In their origin penal laws were means devised with 
the sole object of securing and perpetuating the dominion 
of the free over their slaves, the supremacy of the govern- 
ing class over all others.
At first it was the universal practice to slay indis- 
criminately all prisoners of war. Later on the custom 
grew up of sparing women and children, who, being less 
aggressive and more docile, were easily reduced to 
slavery. Finally, when the social organization allowed 
of it and the art of tarning human beings had reached a 
certain degree of perfection, the lives of adult males 
were spared too. Mutilations, fetters, blows and other 
forms of cruelty and torture were now habitually resorted 
to in order to break their spirit and to make them work; 
and this process of taming man for the service of man went
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on from generation to generation. In this way fear of 
punishment became in course of time fixed in the human 
brain-cell, became an organic motive, grew into con- 
science, into that feeling which causes man to shrink 
back with horror from the mere contemplation of certain 
courses of conduct, which makes him recoil before him- 
self and rends his heart with the tooth of remorse. This 
was the exact moment when the notion of crime first 
arose. Whilst, then, at first the conquerors, in order 
to induce the conquered to do certain acts and to refrain 
from others, actually maltreated and even killed them, 
it subsequently became possible, thanks to successful 
taming, to obtain almost as good results by the mere 
threat of punishment and by other cognate motives of 
a moral character. And humanity gained tremendously 
by this change. In the struggle for existence the moral 
sense must have proved an acquisition of the greatest 
value. For obviously those groups in which a certain 
subordination had become organic, that is to say, in 
which the mere threat of punishment proved, up to a 
certain point, sufficient to impel the subjects to do, or 
not to do, certain acts, had, other things being equal, 
an excellent chance of defeating other groups in which 
such subordination could be attained only by physical 
constraint, by means of the chain, of the stick, and of 
mutilations.
Rules of conduct thus began to form enjoining ab- 
stention from certain lines of action, just because the 
acts so forbidden were usually followed by painful conse- 
quences. When subsequently the causal relationship 
between the said acts and the painful consequences 
became constant, such acts came to be regarded as 
intrinsically hurtful and therefore illicit. If, then, it is 
certain that the moral sense did not begin to form till 
after certain acts had been condemned as wrong and 
actually punished; if the moral sense is, at any rate to
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a large extent, but a product of such disapproval and of 
such punishment; how is it possible, without committing 
a grave anachronism, without becoming involved in a 
vicious circle, to appeal to the moral sense in order to 
discover what acts ought to be punished ?
The first care of the conquerors was to render secure 
and unassailable their power over the conquered, and the 
penal laws were, no doubt, most effective means to that 
end. Indeed, the conquerors threatened with the harsh- 
est punishments any act which tended to subvert the 
political institutions. During the period immediately 
following the conquest, the severity of such laws was 
extreme. Later on, when by means of intimidation, 
education and artificial selection the parasitical relation- 
ship had been firmly established, their rigour could be 
mitigated.
Having in this way secured their political power, the 
conquerors next proceeded to protect, by severe punish- 
ment, their person and their property. Nay, among 
semi-barbarous races, theft is generally more severely 
punished than homicide, and for this reason : the con- 
querors alone carry arms; there is not, therefore, much 
risk of their being assassinated, whilst they are in constant 
danger of being robbed because all the wealth and all 
the property is theirs.
But how did those laws ever come to be enacted the 
sole object of which is the protection of the weak ? 
Not for long could the ruling classes remain blind to 
the fact that the forces of the masses must become, if 
properly husbanded and utilized, a source of strength to 
themselves. Hence after consolidating their political 
power, and having taken all necessary steps for the 
protection of their own lives and property, they con- 
centrated their energies upon devising means whereby 
to turn those forces to best advantage. The most 
elementary prudence must have taught them that it
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was to their own interest to prevent the conquered 
killing, maiming or robbing each other. And soon the 
necessity was realized of enforcing by penal legislation, 
again in the interests of the privileged classes themselves, 
the practice of self-restraint in their dealings with their 
inferiors. But as acts done in contravention of such 
laws did not directly affect their vital interests, but 
prejudiced them only in a somewhat remote fashion, the 
punishments by which they were sanctioned were much 
milder in character and were allowed to be commuted for 
money payments. Moreover, groups in which the lower 
orders of society enjoyed immunity from the more ex- 
treme forms of oppression were more likely to survive 
and prosper, when competing with others that wasted, 
or allowed to go to waste, such valuable resources. 
Thus natural selection, whilst tending to adapt both 
conquerors and conquered to conditions favourable to 
their common survival, restrained within the limits 
prescribed by stern necessity the sufferings of the in- 
dividuals within each group. Nature and enlightened 
self-interest thus combined to compel the conquerors to 
take some care of their subjects.
It becomes obvious now that those acts, and those 
acts alone, were forbidden under pain of state punish- 
ment, which the ruling classes regarded as highly pre- 
judicial to their interests, and which morality, religion 
and similar influences were not sufficient to restrain.
The best and strongest members of the defeated race 
could not adapt themselves to the new conditions of 
existence, to a life of slavery. Therefore, after a few 
generations, those only survived and continued to re- 
produce their race who, being made of a coarser material 
and gifted with a more pliable organization, succeeded 
in adapting themselves to an inferior type of life with 
the result that a degeneration, both physical and intel- 
lectual, ensued.
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If the adaptation of which we have just spoken, were 
perfect, every member of society would conform in his 
conduct to the juridical environment, i. e. to the estab- 
lished legal order. But since such adaptation is always 
imperfect and unstable, it follows that a certain number 
of people oversteps the bounds and enters on a sphere 
of activity from which the established powers seek to 
deter the subject by the threat of punishment. The 
number of such infractions (crimes) within each group 
depends upon the degree in which the individuals com- 
posing such group are adapted to the legal environment 
in which they are compelled to live and to carry on the 
struggle for existence. The more perfect that adaptation, 
the smaller is the number of offences committed within 
the social group, and vice versa. If the special conditions 
of life which the juridical environment offers are not 
too unfavourable, the adaptation involves a comparatively 
small organic sacrifice and proceeds fairly and satis- 
factorily. In the opposite case it remains very imperfect, 
since there are limits to the degradation to which human 
nature will submit. The phenomenon of criminality is, 
therefore, but that particular manifestation of a want of 
adaptation which the established powers regard as a 
source of serious danger to the interests which they 
represent. This want of adaptation may be absolute or 
relative. It is absolute when the legal atmosphere 
which a given number of individuals is bound to breathe 
is so oppressive as not to allow them to lead a life worthy 
of that name. In such a case it is vain stupidity to 
attempt to stem the tide of crime by the threat of punish- 
ment. It is relative if the legal environment, though 
permitting individuals to live normal lives, yet fails to 
harmonize with certain tendencies and habits acquired 
by them or by their ancestors in a superior environment.
Born of egoism, criminal justice betrays its parentage 
up to this day. Its soul is class selfishness, might posing
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as right the spirit which it breathes. It is now, as it 
has always been, but a safeguard to the privileges of the 
ruling classes, a means for adapting the many to the 
interests of the few. Nor is this truth contradicted by 
the experience that modern penal legislation tends more 
and more to protect the rights of the lower strata of 
society. For such protection extends no farther than it 
serves the purposes of the upper classes. This, at any 
rate, is the conclusion at which both Ferri and Vaccaro 
arrive. Colajanni, on the other hand, claims that 
through a process of gradual transformation penal re- 
pression has lost its original character and that it serves 
now, not the particular interests of the few, but the 
collective interests of society as a whole.
The theory just expounded rests on a number of 
assumptions none of which is substantiated by historical 
facts. It teaches that the soil which criminal justice 
requires for its growth is a social organization resulting 
from conquest in war and the subsequent incorporation, 
with the victorious community, of part or the whole of 
the defeated race, and founded upon the opposition of 
free men and slaves, of a ruling aristocracy and a plebeian 
order. It claims that the first penal laws were commands 
addressed to the servile masses, and that they were 
enacted in order thereby to curb their political ambitions 
and aspirations. And, finally, it lays down that the 
moral sense is the fruit of the habit of obedience ac- 
quired, through fear of punishment, by the lower strata 
of society, thus implying that it is their morality which, 
in the end, determines the moral tone of the whole 
community.
The institution of slavery, though widely diffused, has 
not by any means been universal, and history gives the 
lie to the contention that criminal justice is the exclusive 
invention of slave-holding communities. Nor has it 
ever been shown that the penal law has developed either
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earlier or at a more rapid pace where slavery prevailed. 
Again, among the lower races, the condition of the 
slave does not correspond with that picture which the 
theory of early Roman law and the practice of the 
American slave states have left in our minds. Even where 
the captive slave remained an enemy in the sight of law 
and morals, his descendants, being born within the tribe, 
were immune from those excesses of cruelty and torture 
which, according to the theory under consideration, had 
to leave their impression in the brain-cell, from generation 
to generation, if fear of punishment was to become an 
organic motive. Moreover, slavery was at first a purely 
domestic institution. The slave was an inferior member 
of the family and subject to the patriarchal jurisdiction of 
its head. In the public tribunals he had, as a rule, no 
locus standi; there the master, and the master alone, 
could be made answerable for his misdeeds. A criminal 
law, the threat of which is addressed to the slaves, is, 
therefore, an absurdity. In what courts could such law 
have been administered ? Not in the public courts; 
they had no jurisdiction over slaves. Not in joro domini ; 
for here the punishment was determined, not by legal 
provision, but by the will of the paterfamilias. It is 
true there were checks upon the latter's caprice, moral, 
religious and, possibly, even legal; but the sanctions 
applied to criminous slaves were certainly not prescribed 
by legal enactment. To be judged according to the 
provisions of the law spells liberty, not bondage. And 
this was true, and felt to be true, in the cradle of juris- 
prudence no less than it is to-day. Archaic law, founded 
as it was upon the customs and traditions of the pre- 
dominant race and encircled, like them, by the halo of 
religion, was a thing much too sacred to be shared by 
the common herd. It might, indeed, extend its protection 
to the lower orders of society, much in the same way as 
modern legislation protects the brute creation against
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wanton cruelty, but applicable to them it was in no 
sense. At a certain stage of social development not even 
all freemen could claim the law as theirs; subjection to 
the law was then the attribute of full citizenship, in other 
words, an aristocratic privilege. In the next place, the 
assertion that the commission of political crimes by slaves 
and attempts, on the part of the subjugated race, to 
assail the patrician monopoly of government were the 
most urgent dangers against which the ruling classes 
had to guard by the aid of penal laws, is contradicted by 
the plain teaching of history. Individually, the slaves, 
unarmed and excluded from participation in warfare and 
in the deliberations of the popular assembly, had no 
chance of indulging in treasonable practices of wider 
compass than those which the criminal law of feudal 
England described as petty treason, i. e. insubordination 
to the authority of the master. On the other hand, the 
first organized rising of the masses has generally been 
prompted, not by a wish to shake off the yoke of political 
subjection, but by a desire to escape from financial 
oppression and an intolerable economic situation. Thus 
patrician usury was the main cause of the first 
secession of the Roman plebs, and the English peasants' 
rebellion of 1381 was, in substance, a fight for better 
conditions of labour. If criminal law were really in 
origin a political scheme devised by the dominant order 
for the purpose of consolidating, and rendering exclusive, 
its privileges, we should expect that an aristocratic form 
of government was particularly favourable to the growth 
of penal legislation. Not only is this not the case, but 
the fact has often been commented upon that the ancient 
republics, which were pure aristocracies, were especially 
late in evolving a true criminal law.
We see then how flimsy the whole theory proves if 
examined in the light of histoty. Nor is the elucidation 
of historical truth the real object with which it has been
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elaborated. Vaccaro's genesis of punishment, at any 
rate, appears to be written with a clear, though unavowed 
purpose, viz. to lend support to the explanation which 
he has to offer of criminality as a phenomenon of the 
modern world, to the view that crime is due to the in- 
ability of a race adapted by heredity to a fuller life to 
accommodate itself to degrading conditions of existence, 
that the tyranny of society is responsible for the crimes 
committed in its bosom.
Yet like most erroneous doctrines, the theory under 
consideration contains just a particle of truth. Penal 
legislation has often been the means by which a powerful 
class or a victorious party has safeguarded its self- 
accorded privileges or the fruits of victory. Nor have 
aristocracies been the only sinners. When once the 
masses are admitted to the enjoyment of full political 
rights and become conscious of their own political power, 
it is usually not long before they learn the art of forcing 
the sword of criminal justice into the service of their 
particular interests. But to be capable of abuse, an 
institution must first have been in use; before being 
caricatured, its real features must be familiar.
CHAPTER IV
DOMESTIC DISCIPLINE THE SOURCE OF PUNISHMENT
THE exploded political doctrine according to which 
the state is but the reproduction, on a large scale, of the 
family, in the life of which the germs of all public institu- 
tions may be discovered, could not fail to ascribe the 
same homely beginnings to the state punishment of 
crime. This view of the origin of punishment has been 
saved from oblivion and given a new lease of life by the 
results of modern sociological inquiry. " Whence are 
derived the first punishments inflicted in the name of 
society ? The state has substituted itself for the family 
and the gens. The domestic jurisdiction has served as a 
model to the first criminal legislators." This is the con- 
clusion to which Kowalevski has been led by his researches 
into the laws and customs of the Ossetes (Dareste, 
Etudes, p. 151). Other writers describe the discipline of 
the house, not as the sole root, but as one among several 
roots, from which public punishments have sprung. 
Makarewicz, for instance, recognizes three such sources, 
viz. public vengeance, sacerdotal jurisdiction and paternal 
authority; and speaking of the latter, he says: "The 
most natural process of development makes of the pater­ 
familias an autocratic master. The starting-point of the 
judicial authority of the Indian rajah, of the Roman rex 
and of the Greek fiaadev/;, is the status of the paterfamilias. 
The administration of patriarchal justice has been the 
beginning, or the model, of the despotic jurisdiction of the 
tribal chief." According to Steinmetz, parental correction
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has served as a prototype, not to public sanctions in 
general, but to utilitarian state punishment. " Its possible 
sources," he writes (Ethnologische Studien, ii. 178, 179), 
" appear to be the power of the parents over their children, 
of males over females, of the masters over their slaves, 
of the leader in war over his soldiers, . . We presume 
that these primitive forms of discipline, which sometimes 
were very severe, had to prepare the soil for the first 
beginnings of public discipline and of public disciplinary 
punishment. . . As long as the child did not receive 
orders, and did not get a sound thrashing for disobeying 
them, society knew neither laws nor utilitarian punish- 
ments. Here, as in most other instances, the experience 
of the child determines the conduct of the man." G. Tarde 
teaches that punishment has been evolved by the blend- 
ing, in different proportions, of two heterogeneous forms 
of repression, viz. vindictive repression, as displayed 
in the feuds between tribe and tribe, and moral repression, 
as residing in the domestic tribunals. It is from the 
latter ingredient that state punishment derives its moral 
character. In the primitive reaction against a wrong 
done by a stranger " not a trace of moral sentiment, 
properly so called, can be discovered. The murderer, 
the thief is not adjudged ' guilty,' and the revenge 
taken upon him or his group has not the character of 
punishment." Serious crimes committed in the bosom 
of the family, such as parricide, raise a storm of genuine 
moral indignation in the small group, and " the offender 
is proscribed, excommunicated by the domestic tribunal." 
These family tribunals are found '' in the infancy of all the 
Indo-European, as well as of all the Semitic, peoples. 
We see them still flourishing among the Kabyles, among 
the Ossetes in the Caucasus, and even in China." " In 
its origin, then, the defensive reaction against the criminal 
act assumes two different shapes of very unequal compass : 
the one moral, indignant and yet compassionate; the
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other vindictive, hostile and pitiless a tendency to 
retaliation, real or feigned, being, however, a feature 
common to both. Now which of the two is the main 
source of the criminal law ? I claim that it is the former, 
though I fully recognize that the latter has more often 
and for longer periods of time served as model to the 
justice dispensed in the state tribunals, as they gradually, 
but in the end completely, supplanted both domestic 
justice and private feuds. It is, however, in greatly 
varying proportions that the two types, in themselves so 
utterly unlike, have combined to give birth to the criminal 
courts in different countries; and this fact alone proves 
that the evolution of criminal justice has been far from 
uniform. This variation admits of an explanation. A 
state is always formed by the more or less violent and 
extensive annexation of tribes or small peoples, either 
related, or strangers to each other, in blood, religion, 
language and historical traditions. When the bond 
between the tribes is as close as possible and the nation 
formed by their union is comparatively small, state 
justice borrows largely from the justice of the domestic 
tribunal; such was the case in Israel, in Athens and other 
Greek republics, in Rome at the time of the kings. When 
the union of primitive tribes results in the formation 
of a vast yet homogeneous empire, such as Egypt and 
China, in which the inhabitants of the most distant parts 
have not entirely ceased to regard each other as brothers, 
royal justice, without always, or even often, being able 
to substantiate its claim to be called paternal, betrays 
yet by certain features its domestic origin. . . But when 
hostile and heterogeneous tribes are violently united into 
a state, whether large or small, by a bond entirely artificial, 
those who are fellow-citizens in name, being devoid of all 
feeling of kinship, penal justice proceeds on lines purely 
military, dealing violent blows right and left and striking 
off men's heads in a sort of sanguinary fury. Such are
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the large but incoherent empires of Asia; such the small, 
but no less variegated, kingdoms of Africa." It is not 
true, then, that revenge " is the only, or even the main, 
starting-point in the evolution of punishment. Criminal 
law has two sources : the secondary, though more apparent 
source is vengeance; but its essential source is domestic 
punishment, the expression of moral blame, the counter- 
part of remorse " (Transformations du droit, pp. 14-21, 
passim).
Supported though it is by sociologists of the greatest 
eminence, the theory of the domestic origin of state 
punishment has a speculative rather than an historical 
basis. Modern research does not by any means bear out 
the claim that " the most natural process of development 
makes of the paterfamilias an autocratic ruler." As 
Grosse has shown, the father obtains patriarchal authority 
only as the inheritor of the authority which formerly 
belonged to the clan. In the infancy of societies parental 
power varies within very wide limits; and so far from 
being primitive and of natural growth, the absolute and 
irresponsible rule of the paterfamilias does not belong 
to the stages of savagery and barbarism, but reaches its 
full development only in the states of archaic civilization, 
i. e. at a period when public punishments were not by 
any means unknown. Besides, as Makarewicz has rightly 
perceived, the capricious chastisement inflicted by the 
domestic tyrant could serve as a model only to a despotic 
jurisdiction, and the tribal chieftain does not generally 
bear such unlimited sway as this writer wishes us to 
believe. On the contrary, " in the primitive tribe the 
power of the chief is seldom great or even assured" 
(Hobhouse, i. 61). The absolute ruler of more highly 
organized communities has, no doubt, an important share 
in moulding, and in furthering the growth of, the criminal 
law; but his will cannot be reckoned among its primitive 
sources.
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Again, the family tribunals which, according to Tarde 
and others, have been the pattern to which the criminal 
courts of the state have been fashioned, are met with 
at two different levels of social development. They are 
found, co-existing with public tribunals, in properly 
constituted states, and here, indeed, they appear, in some 
instances, to be mere depositaries of delegated public 
jurisdiction. Thus in ancient Egypt they formed part 
of the judicial hierarchy and exercised a summary juris- 
diction over minor offences; and a similar place they seem 
to occupy in modern China, where an appeal lies to the 
public courts against the sentence of the domestic tribunal 
(Pauthier, La Chine moderne, p. 256). To this category 
belong the family tribunals with which we are acquainted 
among Aryan peoples. Now it is quite possible, though 
proof positive to this effect is entirely wanting, that these 
family tribunals were pre-existing organizations which the 
nascent state found ready at hand and utilized for its 
purposes. But granting that they nourished before the 
birth of the state, we are quite ignorant of the nature of 
the jurisdiction which they then exercised. The family 
tribunals of truly primitive communities of which we 
possess any knowledge, those of Sumatra for instance 
(W. Marsden, History of Sumatra, i. 345, 346), deal, not 
with crimes committed in the bosom of the family, but 
with wrongs done to a stranger by a member thereof. 
And if they " proscribe " or " excommunicate " the 
offender, they do so in order to escape liability in blood 
or in money for his misdeed. The power of expelling 
a member who has brought trouble on his family appears 
here simply as the natural correlative of collective responsi- 
bility, and the function discharged by the family council 
can hardly be termed judicial; it deliberates and decides 
upon a question of domestic or shall we say foreign?  
policy, ptire and simple.
The reader has undoubtedly noticed that the authors
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who describe domestic punishment as one of the sources 
of public punishment, really mean by domestic punish- 
ment two different things. Some writers, e. g. Tarde, 
understand thereby punishment for such acts as are 
nowadays classed as crimes, perpetrated by one member 
of the family upon another. Others, like Steinmetz, 
refer to ordinary parental correction. The objection 
fatal to the former variety of the theory is that in primitive 
society even the most heinous of all domestic crimes, 
parricide to wit, goes entirely unpunished. At a period 
of social development when the family had to rely for the 
protection of its rights and interests upon the strong arm 
of its members, to punish such an act would have meant 
adding injury to injury, would have meant further to 
reduce the fighting strength of the little group at the very 
time when its paramount aim and object must have been 
to make good the loss just sustained. Indeed, " the only 
reproach which the slayer of a blood-relation incurs is 
that he has hurt himself by weakening his own family " 
(Steinmetz, Studien, ii. 164). Wherein, then, does that 
domestic reaction consist which, it is claimed, lies at 
the root of state punishment ? Frequently nothing at 
all happens. In other cases the malefactor is disliked 
and despised by his kinsmen; thus among the ancient 
Celts, we read (d'Arbois de Jubainville, Etudes, i. 67), 
the murderer of a near relative incurred no other penalty 
than being slighted by the members of his family. Since 
Kowalevski has published his researches, the practice 
of the peoples of the Caucasus has been one of the main 
props of the theory under review. Now among the 
Ossetes who formed the immediate object of his studies, 
" a parricide draws upon himself a fearful punishment : 
he is shut up in his house with all his possessions, sur- 
rounded by the populace, and burned alive" (von 
Haxthausen, Transcaucasia, p. 415; quoted by Wester- 
marck, i. 386). Note, that it is the infuriated populace
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that so deals with the wrongdoer; it is obviously a case 
of public punishment or, rather, of lynch-law. The 
murderer of a brother or other near kinsman, Kowalevski 
himself informs us, " becomes an object of such hatred 
and contempt that all intercourse with him ceases. 
Nobody will sit down at the same table with him or drink 
out of the same jug. In these circumstances he has no 
other choice than to leave his country." Again, the 
sanction, here social ostracism, is inflicted by the popula- 
tion at large. In neither case is there any trace of 
domestic punishment. It cannot, however, be denied 
that among the Ossetes the head of the family possesses 
a fairly extensive jurisdiction, or rather considerable 
powers of police, over members that disturb its peace. 
But we need not enter into further details, for the Ossetes 
cannot be classed among primitive peoples. Far more 
primitive is the condition of their neighbours, the Swanetes 
and the Pchaves, and among the former " the parricide 
continues to reside in the house with his other relations, 
without incurring any other sanction than that he has to 
wear a necklet of round pebbles " (Dareste, Nouvelles 
Etudes, p. 237), whilst among the latter " the offender 
continues to live among his people, despised by all, but 
not otherwise punished " (op. cit., p. 246). Hatred and 
contempt, then, are the sanctions with which the family, 
but by no means the family alone, visits upon the offender 
even the most serious offences committed in its bosom. 
Surely a vaporous model for the state to copy !
The disciplinary correction of the child by the father 
has certainly suggested a theory of public punishment, 
but public punishment itself never. The educational 
or reformatory view is but a late after-thought, which, 
up to quite modern times, has never had the slightest 
influence on the penal policy of the state.
PART II
HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF 
PUNISHMENT
CHAPTER I
THE FIRST CEIMES
NONE of the theories which we have so far studied 
supplies a satisfactory answer to the question : What is the 
origin of punishment ? a solution of the problem which 
can claim to be historically true. One of them, we have 
seen, is merely an after-thought, elaborated in support 
of preconceived notions in reference to the modern 
phenomenology of crime, and it cannot appear surprising 
if the prejudiced inquirer reads into the pages of history 
exactly that which he expects to find therein. The 
doctrine of public vengeance unjustifiably identifies, or, 
at any rate, without any evidence to that effect, regards 
as successive stages of the same phenomenon, unorganized 
and organized social reaction against wrong. The patri- 
archal view connects domestic correction and public 
punishment by the bridge of despotic rule, thus relying 
upon a political principle which is neither primitive nor 
universal. For the erroneous teaching according to which 
private revenge is the source of public punishment, a 
faulty method of investigation is mainly responsible. 
Authors who adopt this view invariably start with the 
question : How were such f amiliar acts of crime as murder, 
theft, etc., dealt with at earlier stages of human develop-
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merit ? Such an inquiry is, of course, perfectly legitimate 
and has, indeed, led to many highly interesting results, 
and foremost among them, to the discovery that, in the 
infancy of mankind and during long periods of legal 
evolution, those acts had no other consequence than to 
expose the actor to the vengeance of the injured party 
and his family. In other words, those very deeds which 
the experience of our assizes and sessions has associated 
in our minds, in a pre-eminent degree, with crime as an 
abstract notion, were not always looked upon and treated 
as crimes. In the light of this knowledge it must be 
obvious that the above formulation of the problem will 
be very unlikely to result in the discovery of the true fount 
of punishment, but will lead into byways foreign to the 
subject under consideration. Instead of perceiving this, 
the advocates of the theory jump to the conclusion that 
the only reaction which homicide elicited in early society 
must be the source of the genuine penal reaction against 
that crime, as we understand it. They assume that, 
at some time or other, the state substituted itself for the 
individual as the avenger of wrong, acting at first as the 
agent of the aggrieved party, but later as the organ of 
social justice. That the latter transformation, which 
is disposed of by some intellectual sleight-of-hand, goes 
to the root of the whole matter and requires historical 
elucidation, is entirely overlooked.
If our investigations are to rest on the solid rock of 
historical truth, we cannot do better than to leave 
behind, for the moment, all questions of How ? and 
Why ? the answers to which must always be of an 
inferential, and therefore of a more or less controversial, 
character and to begin our researches with the simple 
question of fact, Which are the first crimes ? or what 
amounts to the same thing For which acts, if any, are 
public punishments meted out in primitive stages of
society ? We shall refuse the attribute " public " to
F 2
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any punishments unless inflicted by a social group larger 
than the primitive clan and, by such conscious self- 
limitation, renounce the task of evolving punishment 
stricto sensu from that which is not punishment proper; 
a fortiori we shall have to forgo the satisfaction, so dear 
to the heart of the sociologist, of being able to discover 
the germs of a social institution in the life of the gregarious 
animals.
At the very outset of our inquiry we find that among 
some of the very lowest races wrongdoing is practically 
unknown, and the basis for a social reaction in the nature 
of punishment, therefore, entirely wanting. We do not 
feel justified to conclude from these instances that crime 
is a curse of civilization; nor are we inclined to advance 
the thesis that sin is the leaven of progress and that the 
tribes in question have remained at the lowest level 
just because this ferment was wanting. Paying no 
further attention to these little peoples from which we 
cannot possibly gain any inspiration for the solution 
of our problem, we turn to that vast store of information 
collected from every available source by the industry 
of a Post, a Kohler, a Westermarck, and especially by 
the pioneer work of Steinmctz. The material thus found 
ready at hand requires, however, careful sifting before 
we can utilize it for our purposes. We must erase from 
the list of alleged instances of public punishments occur- 
ring among primitive peoples all examples which belong 
to any of the following categories 
1. Cases in which the reaction emanates from a social 
group so small that " public " punishment would be a 
misnomer.
2. Cases in which the so-called punishment is in truth 
nothing else than private vengeance, more or less dis- 
guised, veiled, modified or mitigated; and it makes no 
difference that in many of these instances the avenger 
is supported by public opinion. A consistent applica-
THE FIRST CRIMES 69
tion of this test disposes of almost all cases in which 
murder, and of the vast majority of cases in which 
adultery, is said to be punished by primitive peoples.
3. Cases in which a tribe, too weak or too cowardly 
to defend one of its members against another tribe whose 
enmity he has incurred, delivers him into the hands of 
such tribe rather than to risk an attack by a superior 
force.
4. Cases in which either the sanction itself or the 
authority by which it is inflicted, is so indefinite that the 
repression has to be looked upon as moral and not as 
penal. On this ground examples of lynch- or mob-law 
have to be excluded. If, for instance, Steinmetz informs 
us upon the authority of P. Jones (History of the Ojibway 
Indians, p. 70. 1861), that if, during a famine, an Ojibway 
partakes of human flesh, the members of the tribe pounce 
upon him and batter his skull with their clubs, and adds : 
" The horror of cannibalism here raises public indigna- 
tion to so high a pitch that the masses, the community 
itself, inflicts in an entirely unregulated, impulsive, 
manner, a true popular form of capital punishment " 
(Ethnologische Studien, ii. 342), his own commentary 
proves that he is wrong in quoting this example as an 
instance of genuine punishment.
5. Cases in which punishment, genuine enough, is in- 
flicted by the tribal assembly or a tribal court upon 
" offenders," upon members " who commit wrongs," 
" who make themselves obnoxious," " whose conduct 
is particularly bad," " who by their transgressions incur 
the displeasure of the tribe." Such statements as these, 
which fail to disclose the nature of the offence or mis- 
conduct which is visited with punishment, are obviously 
much too vague to help us in the solution of the problem.
6. Classes of acts which are treated as crimes only 
by one or by very few primitive tribes. Where the form 
of wrongdoing thus publicly sanctioned in an isolated
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instance is only a species of a genus of offences generally 
punished in savage societies, it may, indeed, be a valuable 
illustration of a broader principle. Where, on the other 
hand, it is the only representative of a whole class, it 
has to be ignored. For our object is not to collect 
sociological curiosities, but to gain a wide basis for the 
discovery of the broad principle or principles of early 
punishment, and by entering in our catalogue of early 
crimes acts which are treated as such only in exceptional 
cases, we should vitiate our conclusions. E. g. if we read 
in Westermarck (i. 172, after Burton, Two Trips to Gorilla 
Land, i. 105) that among the Mpongwe a murderer is 
put to death by the whole community, or in Steimnetz 
(op. cit., ii. 344, after Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, ii. 189. 
1851) that capital sentence is passed by the village 
council of the Dakotas for certain aggravated forms of 
murder, such information had better be entirely neglected. 
To generalize from these isolated instances would lead 
us on absolutely wrong tracks, since we know that practic- 
ally from its cradle and during long periods of its history, 
mankind all over the globe knew no other kind of reaction 
against homicide than private vengeance.
7. Instances quoted from peoples which are not really 
primitive, though our knowledge of the earlier stages of 
ancient civilizations will prove valuable in throwing 
additional light upon the meaning of punishment as 
inflicted by the lowest races and in checking such infer- 
ences as we draw from the list of genuinely primitive 
crimes.
Though many of the examples mentioned by Stein- 
metz have to be excluded on one or other of the above 
grounds, we may provisionally accept, as substantially 
correct, his catalogue of " crimes first punished by the 
community." It reads as follows 
1. Witchcraft.
2. Incest.
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3. Treason.
4. Sacrilege.
5. Miscellaneous offences. To this group offences 
against sexual morality supply by far the largest con- 
tingent. Indeed, the only other crimes occurring in 
more than very isolated instances among primitive 
peoples are poisoning and allied offences, and breaches 
of the hunting rules of the tribe.
It will be convenient, before starting on a detailed 
examination of these different offences, which constitute 
the complete criminal code of primitive races, to re- 
arrange them by somewhat modifying the grouping 
adopted by Steinmetz and changing the order in which 
they are enumerated by this author, and to study them 
according to the following list 
1. Treason.
2. Witchcraft.
3. Sacrilege and other offences against religion.
4. Incest and other sexual offences.
5. Poisoning and allied offences.
6. Breaches of the hunting rules.
The punishment of treason is very general even among 
the lowest races with which we are acquainted; but save 
in those extremely rare instances hi which the chief 
enjoys large powers in a primitive people, as among the 
Society Islanders (EUis, Polynesian Researches, iii. 123), 
in Tahiti in particular (Eugene Delessert, Voyages dans 
les deux oceans, p. 251), or among the Msalala (Steinmetz, 
Bechtsverhaltnisse, p. 280), where rebellion is a crime, 
there is only one form of treason which is so punished, 
viz. treason, as we should express it, by adhering to the 
public enemies of one's people. As a rule, it is necessary 
that active assistance be rendered to an enemy at war 
with the tribe, as by joining his ranks or by a betrayal 
to him of military secrets; but in some instances refusal 
to help against an external foe is sufficient to constitute
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the offence. Thus we find cases where withholding the 
sinews of war is punished, whilst the examples are hy 
no means rare of cowardice in warfare being capitally 
sanctioned, e.g. among the Kansas (Hunter, Manners and 
Customs of several Indian Tribes, p. 306). This twofold 
aspect of primitive treason calls to mind the familiar 
passage from Tacitus's Oermania (c. 12) : " Proditores et 
transfugas arboribus suspendunt, ignavos et imbelles et 
corpore infames coeno et palude iniecta insuper crate 
mergunt." The early punishment of treason admits of 
several explanations. As was pointed out in an earlier 
chapter, treason in the sense in which it is a primitive 
crime, is the one instance in which a wrong to the com- 
munity is at once felt by every citizen, so that its punish- 
ment may be regarded, with some semblance of truth, 
as the organized expression of public indignation. But 
it is also one of those instances in which the dangerous 
character of the act is most forcibly brought home to 
the community, so that the utilitarian conception of the 
reaction which it excites has at least as much in its favour 
as the emotional view. But the problem really admits 
of a solution simpler even than either of those just 
attempted : he who makes common cause with the foe, 
becomes a foe himself, and is treated as such. This 
answer to the question is singularly well illustrated and 
confirmed by the primitive meaning of the classical 
Roman term for treason, perduellio. The word is derived 
from per in the sense which it bears in perfidia, periurium, 
etc., i.e. false, wrongful; and duellum, synonymous 
with helium ; its original signification being, therefore, 
a wrongful or unjust war. But " since every war waged 
by the Roman people was a just war, perduellis denoted, 
quite generally, an enemy of Rome " (Mommsen, 
Romisches Strafrecht, p. 538). In fact, it had the same 
meaning as hostis in its classical sense : " hostis apud 
antiques peregrinus dicebatur, et qui nunc hostis per-
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duellio" (Festus, voce perduellio). It was applied 
indiscriminately to the foreigner and to the Roman 
citizen who was fighting Rome. " According to Roman 
notions, a citizen, by his treasonable act, forfeits his 
citizenship and is dealt with as an alien enemy " (Hitzig 
in Mommsen, Kulturvolker). And until the practice 
was modified by the establishment of the duumviratus 
perduellionis, according to tradition by Tullus Hostilius, 
" the anathema pronounced by the law against the 
perduellis became immediately operative, that is to say, 
capital punishment could be inflicted without the inter- 
vention of the curice. Every Roman citizen was at 
liberty to slay a man guilty of manifest treason " (Du 
Boys, Peuples anciens, p. 253). A similar practice pre- 
vailing among some of the lower races, it may be ques- 
tioned whether the treatment meted out to the traitor 
is not an application of martial, rather than of criminal, 
law; and even where the traitor is brought to a regular 
trial and formally condemned and executed, as among 
the Wyandots (Powell, Wyandot, p. 67), it may still be 
argued that the proceedings are in the nature of a court- 
martial. However this may be, it is perfectly obvious 
that as long as the traitor is treated as a public enemy, 
whether he be slain by the individual warrior or executed 
in virtue of a judicial sentence, the principle upon which 
he is dealt with is of a purely utilitarian character.
Witchcraft is probably the first in point of time, and 
certainly the most universal, of all primitive crimes. 
The belief in human beings, male or female, capable of 
controlling supernatural forces, dates back to the infancy 
of human society and has accompanied mankind far 
down the path of civilization. As late as 1640, the 
enlightened author of the Religio Medici wrote (part i. 
sec. 30) : "I have ever believed, and do now know, that 
there are Witches," and not until 1736 was prosecution 
for witchcraft abolished by British Act of Parliament.
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It appears, indeed, that witchcraft as a crime is almost 
co-extensive with witchcraft as an article of faith: 
almost co-extensive, we say, since the public reaction 
which it excites is sometimes in the nature of lynch-law 
rather than of punishment. Still, there is not a single 
primitive criminal code in which it does not find a place, 
and in a few instances, e. g. among the Wagogo (Stein- 
metz, Rechtsverhaltnisse, p. 215), the punishment of magic 
makes up the whole of the criminal law. Sometimes the 
sorcerer is liable to punishment only if he is believed to 
have wrought some tangible mischief. Thus killing by 
occult influences is very frequently a public crime, whilst 
ordinary murder leads only to blood-revenge; but inas- 
much as words have magic power, predicting a person's 
death is sometimes, by the Cuna Indians for instance 
(A. Reclus, Le Panama et le Darien, p. 212), regarded as 
equivalent to killing him. Among the natives of the 
Timor Islands (Steinmetz, Studien, ii. 329) and other 
primitive peoples, making a person ill by magic, even if 
the disease do not prove fatal, constitutes the corpus 
delicti of a capital offence. Since some of the lower races 
ascribe every case of sickness and every death to sorcery, 
their criminal courts would be kept very busy, were it 
not for the fact that it is generally a member of a hostile 
tribe who is credited with having cast the evil spell. 
More usually than harm to individuals, public calamities 
are attributed to the machinations of the sorcerer. Epi- 
demics are his work among the Aht-Indians (Sproat, 
Scenes and Studies of Savage Life, p. 159) and elsewhere, 
whilst according to a belief common especially with the 
African negro tribes (Steinmetz, Rechtsverhaltnisse, p. 
215; Burton, Lake Regions, p. 664; Letourneau, p. 90, 
quoting Moffat), it is he that prevents the bursting of 
the clouds, should the rainy season be delayed. But in 
most cases the sorcerer is punished, not for what he has 
done or is supposed to have done, but for what he is,
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for what he knows, and for what he is capable, there- 
fore, of doing. The classical Roman jurist Paulus faith- 
fully reproduces primitive thought where he writes 
(Receptarum sententiarum lib. v., tit. xxiii., ad leg. 
Corn, de sic. et ven., par. 17 & 18) : " Magicae artis 
conscios summo supplicio affici placuit, id est bestiis 
obiici aut cruci suffigi. Ipsi autem magi vivi exuruntur. 
Libros magicae artis apud se neminem habere licet; et 
si penes quoscunque reperti sint, bonis ademptis ambus- 
tisque his publice, in insulam deportatur, humiliores 
capite puniuntur. Non tantum huius artis professio, 
sed etiam scientia prohibita est." So great, indeed, is 
the fear of witchcraft in early society that being suspected 
of being versed therein spells guilt. But it is not every 
kind of magic that is so sanctioned. If it is in the power 
of man to utilize supernatural agencies for the execution 
of evil designs, he may equally set them in motion for 
the accomplishment of desirable objects. If the sorcerer 
who prevents the rain from coming down at the appointed 
time is a villain of the deepest dye, the rain-maker is 
the benefactor of his people. If it is possible to cause 
sickness by occult measures, occult measures may be 
relied upon to effect a cure. Indeed, the magician is the 
primitive physician as well as the primitive priest, and 
frequently he is the recognized minister of public justice 
too; for often his aid is invoked to discover the author 
of mischief, often it is he who judges of the suspect's 
guilt or innocence. A distinction, then, is drawn between 
" white " and " black " magic, a distinction which, in 
practice, generally resolves itself into a discrimination 
between the sorcerer of good repute and the sorcerer of 
evil repute, or, sometimes, between the official and the 
unauthorized wizard. There can be no doubt that fear 
forged the sword with which early society slew the sor- 
cerer. He is done away with because he is a danger to 
the community. This is, in fact, the rationale of his
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punishment according to the testimony of some of the 
primitive tribes themselves. The Dayak-Biadju, we are 
informed (Steinmetz, Studien, ii. 330, quoting Perelaer) 
consider it necessary, " in the interests of public safety," 
to kill any person suspected of being an Antuen. In 
Greenland the witch is executed " because she is a source 
of danger to the whole community and not worthy to 
live " (Steinmetz, ibid. 334). So great, indeed, is the 
anxiety to get rid of the sorcerer that on the coast of 
Moreton Bay his tribe will not hesitate to extradite him 
to some other tribe upon a member of which he has 
practised his black art (Lang, The Aborigines of Australia, 
p. 342), that, as a rule, his own kinsmen will make no 
attempt to deliver him from punishment, but gladly 
give their consent to his execution, where such consent 
is required, as among the Hurons (Charlevoix, Histoire 
de la Nouvelle France, p. 283), or even go so far as to carry 
it out, as is the practice of the Ojibways (Jones, op. cit., 
p. 146), or, without waiting for the slower process of the 
criminal law, do him to death themselves, " not to remain 
in contact with so vile and so dangerous a being," to 
quote the motive with which the Thlinkits justify such 
act (Steinmetz, Studien, ii. 333, quoting Pinart). Now 
the explanation which we have just given, and in which 
most writers upon the subject concur, accounts quite 
satisfactorily and sufficiently for all those instances in 
which the sorcerer is punished because he is looked upon 
as a standing menace to society, and a fortiori for those 
cases in which some actual public calamity is imputed 
to him. But it does not, at first sight, seem to dispose 
of those cases in which he is called to account by 
the tribe for harm done to one of its members. In 
early societies wrongs to individuals are not generally 
regarded as matters of public interest. How, then, does 
the community come to concern itself with murder 
carried out through the instrumentality of supernatural
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forces, while it fails to take notice of murder effected 
through physical agencies ? This apparent discrepancy 
requires all the more careful elucidation because, as is 
often asserted, early criminal law disregards motives 
and means and looks exclusively to the result. The 
first reason which suggests itself for this discriminating 
treatment is that whilst a man can defend himself against 
the attack of an enemy whom he meets face to face, he 
is helpless against an unknown foe who, from a safe 
distance, shoots invisible arrows at him, arrows more- 
over, charged with supernatural energy which no merely 
human force can resist. Courage and fortitude being the 
qualities in its members most valuable to the tribe, it 
is good policy for the community, it may be said, to 
require the individual to rely on the strength of his own 
arm in repelling violence with violence, but to step in 
at the very moment when individual effort no longer 
avails. To offer this explanation is to give savages 
credit for an amount of political genius which they do 
not possess. Again, there is something uncanny in the 
mere idea of murder by witchcraft, and the sight of the 
victim could not fail most forcibly to bring home to 
each of his neighbours the " hodie tibi, eras mihi " and 
the necessity for dispatching the fiend from whose 
machinations no one was safe. This argument, however, 
accounts for action being taken by the tribesmen ut 
singuli i. e. for those examples in which the sorcerer 
is lynched, rather than for punishment being meted out 
to him by the regularly organized tribal authority. In 
truth, solus publica seems to be the principle governing 
even those cases in which sorcery practised to the detri- 
ment of the individual is said to be punishable. On this 
conception, the true ground of punishment is that the 
wizard is a dangerous being, dangerous to the tribe as 
a whole, while the injury inflicted upon the person 
bewitched is merely hi the nature of an overt act that
78 THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
affords proof of the actor's evil capacities. The fear of 
the magician is, after all, but the fear of magic, the dread 
of those occult forces which he can set free, but which, 
when once let loose, it is impossible to arrest and control. 
Sacrilege, as a primitive crime, means any act supposed 
to interfere with the material comforts of any of those 
supernatural beings which the tribe lives in awe of. 
Killing and consuming a sacred animal in which it is 
embodied, breaking a fetish-stone, polluting a well in 
which the dreaded spirit resides, injuring a tree which 
it inhabits, desecrating a tomb round which the departed 
soul hovers, destroying an idol, are examples of this 
offence. It is not difficult to understand why these 
acts are punished by the community. Since the dawn of 
religion man has created his deities after his own like- 
ness, and in the realms of psychology and of morals 
primitive anthropomorphism bears an even wider sway 
than in the somatic sphere. " There is," as Hume 
remarks, " an universal tendency among mankind to 
conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to 
every object those qualities with which they are familiarly 
acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious." 
Accordingly, the savage sees nothing incongruous in 
attributing human modes of thought and conduct to 
supernatural beings, even though they be embodied 
in animals, in plants, or in inanimate objects. They 
behave in the same manner as he would behave in similar 
circumstances; they are, like himself, extremely jealous 
of their rights, and they avenge a wrong, exactly as he 
would avenge it, not on the aggressor alone, but on the 
whole social group to which he belongs. Hence the tribe 
as a whole has to pay the price for an injury done to a 
supernatural being by one of its members. Now the god, 
in so far as he has a terrestrial abode and a tangible body, 
is by no means proof against hurt inflicted by human 
hands. But his powers for evil are so infinitely greater
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than those of any man, or combination of men, that it 
would be madness to risk his feud. The tribe, then, 
does what it would do if one of its men had incurred the 
enmity of a tribe so superior in strength that resistance 
would appear hopeless from the very outset. To ensure 
its own safety, it delivers the wrongdoer into the hands 
of the adversary, or dissociates itself from him by 
expelling him from the tribe. This is the meaning of 
punishment for sacrilege; its object is to free the tribe 
from collective responsibility to the supernatural being 
for the offence of one of its members.
Primitive religion is so closely interwoven with magic 
that, in studying religious offences other than sacrilege, 
we have to take notice of this relationship. Attempts 
have been made by modern writers to draw a sharp line 
of demarcation between magic and religion. Frazer 
contrasts magic, as being the realm of supernatural 
processes governed by law, so that like causes produce 
like effects, with animism, the field in which the caprice 
of spirits has free play. According to Westermarck, the 
difference between magic and religion turns on the dis- 
tinction between those supernatural phenomena which, 
like physical phenomena, are regarded as manifestations 
of energy that discharges itself without the intervention 
of volition, and those which are attributed to the will of 
supernatural beings. However valuable these principles 
of discrimination may be to the modern student, it seems 
impossible to apply them with complete success to the 
faith of primitive man. For in the mind of the savage 
the two classes of supernatural phenomena pass into each 
other by imperceptible transitions and enter into in- 
extricable combinations. The spirits themselves appear 
to be full of magic energy, and one of their most effective 
weapons are curses, the operation of which is avowedly 
purely magical. Even at considerably higher stages of 
religious thought, in the Vedic writings for instance, it
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is not always possible to distinguish between substances 
charged with supernatural mechanical power and the 
shadowy personality of demons. So much is certain, the 
environment in which primitive man lives, land, air and 
water, are filled with magic forces which the will of man 
or spirit may set in motion, but which may also be 
fanned into activity, quite undesignedly, by the conduct 
of human beings. They are so many potential factors 
for good and evil, and deeds are classed as lucky or 
unlucky, according to the nature of the supernatural 
energy which they cause to discharge. The greater the 
intensity of the discharge, the wider is the circle within 
which the shock is felt, the actor himself always being the 
centre. An act thus may bring misfortune to the actor 
alone, or it may involve in disaster, together with him, 
his family, his clan, or his tribe. Courses of conduct which 
are fraught with serious supernatural danger to the whole 
of the community are forbidden under pain of punish- 
ment, in other words are primitive crimes. But this is 
not all. The proximate effect of the evil deed is that the 
doer becomes unclean. Guilt, as we should call it, is 
represented as being in the nature of a polluting substance 
with which the offender, as the immediate consequence of 
his offence, becomes impregnated. The magic material 
sends forth effluvia which are absorbed both by living 
creatures and by inanimate objects, and which, if of 
sufficient virulence, consume and destroy everything with 
which they are brought into contact. By reason of their 
great penetrating power, they may act at a distance from 
the original focus of infection and thus produce results 
in remote quarters, and where least expected. The 
wrongdoer, laden, as he is, with contagious matter, is 
obviously a great peril to the tribe. If the virus be more 
or less volatile, he can be freed from it by lustrations, fasts 
and other ceremonies to which magic disinfectant pro- 
perties are ascribed. But if it be of a more tenacious
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nature and not so easy to remove, nothing will ensure the 
safety of society but the destruction of the offender, or 
his removal from the community. So far, then, as an act 
is a crime on account of its baneful magic effects, its 
punishment is really a measure of social hygiene. And 
where notions such as those just outlined are cherished, 
it is quite reasonable, nay it follows as a matter of course, 
that animals and inanimate things are punished no less 
than men. The magic element is conspicuous in such 
offences of a religious character as partaking of forbidden 
food or drink, for women or children to witness the 
initiation ceremonies or even to approach the spot where 
such ceremonies take place, and, generally, infringements 
of the laws of taboo, though even in these instances it 
is intimately blended with animistic notions. A good 
illustration is furnished by the jurisprudence of the Galelas 
and Tobelorese who punish transgressions of the dietary 
rules of the tribe because those who indulge in prohibited 
articles are transformed into suwangi, that is, demons 
who devour human souls (Riedel, " Galela " : Zeitschr. f. 
Ethnologie, p. 66. 1885).
The primitive gods are concerned with human conduct 
in the first instance only to the extent to which it affects 
their own well-being. Still, by reason of the permanent 
relationship which subsists between them and their 
worshippers, acts not directly prejudicial to their interests 
excite their displeasure in varying degrees, and some are 
so obnoxious to them that they pour out the vials of their 
wrath upon the community in which they are committed. 
To escape chastisement at the hands of the supernatural 
being, the tribe, then, has no choice but to proceed on 
exactly the same lines as it does in cases of sacrilege. 
But whilst, where their own rights are infringed, the ire 
of the spirits is easily accounted for, it is more difficult 
to understand why they should trouble about matters 
unconnected with their own welfare. The most obvious
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explanation, and the one most frequently given, relies on 
primitive man's anthropomorphistic notions. " Every 
act which the savage supposes to be disliked by the spirit 
he fears, is one which has in some way become equally 
distasteful to his own mind " (Wake, i. 334). In order 
to become obnoxious to the god, it must first be obnoxious 
to the community. In other words, public indignation 
is the source of the belief in the divine wrath. It must, 
however, be clearly understood that even then moral 
indignation finds expression in punishment only in a 
remote and circuitous way : an offence against the moral 
code does not become a crime until it is believed to be as 
hateful to a higher being as it is to man. The explanation 
just offered, though undoubtedly correct in a certain 
number of instances, has a narrower field of application 
than would at first sight appear, and certainly requires 
further elucidation, since it is by no means clear how, and 
upon what grounds, the savage comes to ascribe his own 
feelings to his supernatural beings. For the spirits which 
he lives in dread of, unlike the national gods of higher 
civilizations, are not guardians of morality, or of its 
primitive equivalent, custom; nor do they identify 
themselves with their worshippers. In so far, indeed, as 
they are disembodied souls of deceased tribesmen, the 
continuance theory sufficiently accounts for their still 
sharing the indignation which a certain course of conduct 
excites among the living. But the souls which supply a 
contingent to the spirit-world are, for the most part, 
those of ancestors, family ghosts, held in awe by their 
own kith and kin, but devoid of all power of harming the 
community at large; and though a mighty warrior or a 
skilled and successful leader in the chase may occasionally 
find a place in the primitive Olympus, hero-worship does 
not generally belong to the earliest phase of religious 
development. As a rule, the primitive spirits, those at 
least of which it is thought worth while to take serious
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practical notice, so far from being in sympathy with 
tribal feeling, are conceived as antagonistic demons, as 
knaves and rogues, as embodiments of all anti-social 
qualities. To trace to its true source the part they play 
in the first evolutional stage of the criminal law, we must 
advert to another psychological aspect of primitive man. 
The monotony of savage life has often been commented 
upon, and any occurrence that breaks it, however trivial 
in itself, forms the main topic of conversation for days 
and weeks together. So any human act, in the slightest 
degree out of the common, is bound to attract an amount 
of attention, and to impress itself on the memory with a 
vividness, out of all proportion to its real importance. 
Soon some unexpected calamity befalls the little com- 
munity, or some natural phenomenon profoundly stirs 
the emotions of its members. What more natural than 
to connect, as cause and effect, the two extraordinary 
events ? To the unsophisticated mind the " post hoc, 
ergo propter hoc " always holds good. The act has 
offended some powerful spirit who vents his anger upon 
the tribe. The fact is apparent; into the " how " and 
" why " primitive man does not stop to inquire. What 
interests him is the practical question how to arrest the 
catastrophe. Every effort is made to propitiate the god; 
but all attempts prove fruitless. It becomes clearer and 
clearer that nothing will appease his wrath but the death 
of him who has incurred his displeasure. For a long time 
his companions fight against this conviction, which yet 
grows daily stronger, till at last he is sacrificed. And 
behold the earthquake stops, the epidemic dies out, 
the rain bursts from the clouds. The inference has been 
verified by the course of events and remains valid. For 
no one that has seen with his eyes and heard with his ears 
is likely to put it a second time to the test. The act may 
have been of a purely a-moral character, one neither 
approved nor forbidden by custom, for the simple reason,
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perhaps, that it had never been thought of, or because no 
occasion had ever before arisen for doing it. It is in no 
sense a wrong, and the fate of the actor is not in the nature 
of punishment, but a measure of self-preservation forced 
upon an unwilling community by the iron hand of 
necessity. But henceforth the act in question is a sin 
and a crime, and it remains so, even though the particular 
form of the divine sanction may be forgotten. And any 
man who in future perpetrates it, is with perfect justice 
regarded and treated both as a sinner and as a criminal; 
for he designedly embarks upon a course of conduct which 
he knows or believes to be hateful in the sight of a god 
and dangerous to the society in which he lives. The same 
result may, however, ensue without the intervention of a 
deity. For an unusual act, like any other uncommon 
event or unfamiliar phenomenon, is pregnant with magic 
influences, and a public calamity may be attributed to 
the baneful mechanical forces which it unchains, quite as 
easily as to the vengeance of a spirit. 0av/ud£eiv, astonish- 
ment at the unexpected, the strange, the unfamiliar, then, 
seems to play as important a part in the genesis of magic 
and of religion, and so indirectly in that of the criminal law, 
as in the birth of philosophy. So far, our inquiry into the 
origin of offences against religion amply confirms Sir Henry 
Maine's thesis that dooms are older than laws, older even 
than customs; for we have seen how judgments, instead 
of being based upon custom, may themselves form the 
germ of custom. But there is another side to the medal. 
The savage, we know, is hidebound by custom, which 
regulates every detail of his life and rigidly prescribes 
his attitude in almost every imaginable circumstance 
and contingency; and so much is obedience to tribal 
custom a matter of course that any deviation, however 
slight, from the established rule of conduct at once acquires 
the character of an event exceptional, singular and 
amazing; and thereby becomes liable, in the manner
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just expounded, to be brought into contact with religion 
and magic. It is in this way, we claim, that current 
rules of morality acquire a supernatural, and mediately 
a penal, sanction.
If we have enlarged at what might seem undue length 
upon the problem of religious offences, the reason will at 
once be apparent if we state that it is on account of their 
religious and magical significance that most of the crimes 
which remain to be studied, are punished by primitive 
societies.
The close association which exists between our sexual 
life and the religious side of our nature is so well known 
to the student of the history of religious worship, to the 
psychologist and to the alienist that it cannot cause 
surprise if offences against sexual morality bear from the 
beginning a religious aspect. Indeed, not until compara- 
tively recent times in Christian countries have they ceased 
to fall within the special province of ecclesiastical juris- 
diction. Again, the sensations and emotions to which the 
reproductive instinct gives rise, and the phenomena 
connected with its satisfaction are full of mystery to the 
civilized man no less than to the savage, and at primitive 
stages of human thought magic properties are attributed 
to what is otherwise unaccountable in the experiences of 
the inner life, no less than to strange phenomena in the 
outside world. No wonder then that the rules relating to 
marriage are regarded as particularly sacred and that 
sexual relations between persons not allowed to intermarry 
are treated as offences of a particularly heinous type. So 
incest occupies a prominent place in the criminal codes 
of the lower races, a place which it owes, as Post (Grund- 
riss, ii. 388) remarks, entirely to Shamanistic notions, 
" it being generally believed that incestuous intercourse 
offends the spirits and brings disaster upon the land." 
Among the Dayak-Biadju it pollutes the whole village in 
which it is committed (Steinmetz, Ethnologische Studien,
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ii. 336, after Perelaer). The Hill-Dayaks make it respon- 
sible for every misfortune that subsequently befalls the 
tribe (Low, Sarawak, p. 301). The Macassars and 
Buginese know no other cause for the failure of the crops 
(Wilken, in Globus, lix. 22. 1891). The southern tribes 
of North America " looked upon incest as a serious offence 
against religion, which called down the curses of the gods," 
and accordingly punished it capitally (Kohler, Nord- 
amerika), whilst with the Aleuts the fruits of such inter- 
course are believed to be horrible creatures, born with 
seal-teeth, beards and all possible malformations (Petroff, 
" Report on the Population, Industries and Resources of 
Alaska," X Census of the United States, p. 155. 1884), 
a public calamity the full of extent of which we shall not 
appreciate unless we remember that monstrosities are 
regarded by primitive peoples as storehouses of such 
quantities of deleterious magic energy that they are 
looked upon and treated as criminals. If by incest we 
understand sexual commerce between persons within 
the prohibited degrees, we must take notice of the fact 
that in the lower cultural strata the prohibition, as a rule, 
covers a much wider field than it does in modern societies, 
sometimes as among the inhabitants of the Mortlock 
Islands (Kubary, " Die Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln," 
Mitteilungen d. geogr. Gesellschaft zu Hamburg, p. 251. 
1878-9), embracing the whole of the tribe, so that incest, 
as a primitive crime, had better be denned as a breach of 
the rules of exogamy. But whilst incest in this wider 
sense of the term exposes the offender practically every- 
where to the severest public punishments, the rules of 
endogamy are, strangely enough, hardly ever criminally 
sanctioned. The feeling of disgust which the mere idea 
of an unnatural gratification of sexual desire excites in 
people of healthy instincts would easily give rise to the 
belief, one should have thought, that such filthy practices 
are a source of pollution and of supernatural danger to the
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community in which they take place. Yet the primitive 
criminal tribunals do not appear to take cognizance of 
offences against nature, whether committed with man or 
with beast. Again, adultery and seduction are, as a rule, 
treated as mere private wrongs, in the nature of undue 
interferences with the proprietary interests of husband and 
father, the former being regarded as a kind of furtum usus, 
the latter as detracting from the value of the daughter in 
the marriage market. In most of the instances in which 
they are said to be punishable, the tortious intercourse 
is at the same time incestuous, and it is then from the 
latter quality that the act derives its criminal character. 
This truth is well brought out by Spencer and Gillen 
(p. 99) in the account they give of the law governing 
unlawful intercourse among the Australian aborigines. 
" If the intercourse," they write, " has been with a woman 
who belongs to the class from which his wife comes, then 
he is called atna nylka (i, e. vulva thief); if with one 
with whom it is unlawful for him to have intercourse, 
then he is called iturka, the most opprobrious term in 
the Australian tongue. In the one case he has merely 
stolen property, in the other he has offended against tribal 
law." There are, however, examples of adultery qua 
adultery, calling forth a public reaction, which, occasion- 
ally, as among the Caribs (Steinmetz, Ethnologische 
Shtdien, ii. 344), takes the shape of mob-law, but more 
often that of genuine punishment. The Swaheli treat 
it as a serious crime because it prevents success in the 
buffalo and elephant hunt (Livingstone, Last Journals, 
ii. 23), the Karens because adultery, no less than rape, 
spoils the harvest (Mason, " Eeligion among the Karens," 
Journ. Boy. Asiatic Soc., p. 150. 1868), the Batak because 
it brings misfortune to the kampong (Steinmetz, op. cit., 
ii. 357), whilst all over the Malay Archipelago " on great 
public emergencies persons guilty of adultery or incest 
are put to death to propitiate the gods " (Ratzel, i. 451).
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More rarely even than adultery is seduction visited with 
punishment. Both are equally treated as public crimes 
by the Ckaratshai (Steinmetz, op. cit., ii. 345, quoting 
Klaproth), while the Malays of Sumatra treat seduction 
both as a tort and as a crime, as a crime " because the 
stain must be removed from the earth " (Wake, i. 389). 
Generally it is looked upon as concerning no one but the 
father, who either takes revenge or exacts compensation. 
Nor does it make any difference in the eye of early law 
if the seducer has resorted to violence in order to attain his 
object, the Karens, who, as already mentioned, punish 
rape, being the sole exception to the rule. Whatever 
other offences connected with the reproductive functions 
are visited with punishment by one or another of the 
primitive peoples, magical or religious notions always 
supply the motive; so procuring abortion is a capital 
crime among the Baures because it is followed by an 
outbreak of fatal diseases in the village (Southey, History 
of Brazil, iii. 207). Indeed, so universal among the 
lower races appears to be the association of breaches of 
the rules of sexual morality with supernatural conse- 
quences that it is clearly discernible even where it does 
not fructify in true public punishments. To quote but 
one example, " the Sibuyan of Borneo regard sexual 
immorality as an offence against the deities of the tribe, 
and if a girl becomes a mother before she is married, their 
anger would be shown against the whole tribe if a pig 
were not sacrificed to them " (Wake, i. 389). " And 
even then any one becoming sick, or meeting with an 
accident within a month afterwards, has a claim on the 
lovers for damages, as having been the cause of the 
misfortune; while, if any one has died, the survivors 
claim compensation for the loss of their relative " (Wake, 
i. 284).
Primitive toxicology is a branch of magic. The 
insidious, withal fatal, effects of poisons and the curative
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action of drugs are equally attributed, in the infancy of 
mankind, to supernatural properties imparted to them 
either in Nature's workshop or in the cauldron of the 
witch. It is the sorcerer that knows where to find them, 
how to prepare them, and how to administer them for the 
good, or to the ruin, of his fellow-creatures. These are 
the ideas which make of the benevolent magician a 
medicine-man, of the poisoner an evil-disposed wizard. 
It is not then public regard for human life, but the general 
dread of black magic, which causes murder by poison to 
be included in the catalogue of primitive crimes. Here 
again, as in the case of witchcraft, it is not always neces- 
sary for a conviction that actual harm has been done; 
among some of the lower races, among the Karens for 
instance (Mason, loc. cit.), mere knowledge or possession 
of poisons is looked upon as a public danger and punished 
accordingly. Indeed, so close is the association of sorcery 
and poisoning in primitive thought that where a savage 
code is silent about the latter offence, we may yet assume 
that it is punished upon an indictment for sorcery.
Breaches of the hunting rules and customs form the 
last group of offences which we have to consider. Sporadic 
instances of their punishment might be quoted from 
different parts of the globe. But it is among the American 
Indians that this branch of criminal jurisprudence reaches 
its highest and most systematic development. To the 
red-skins the bison-hunt has always been a matter of 
supreme importance, an affair of the greatest possible 
interest to the whole of the tribe. It was, therefore, 
subject to very minute rules and regulations, and contra- 
ventions were looked upon as crimes of so serious a 
character that the offender was outlawed (Charlevoix, 
Journal, v. 192). The necessity of preserving the means 
of subsistence of the community would seem to account 
sufficiently for the inclusion of these offences in the 
criminal code and for the severe punishment with which
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they were sanctioned. And this impression is strength- 
ened if we remember that, among the motives assigned 
by primitive races themselves for the punishment of 
different offences, care for the food supply of the village 
plays, as we have seen, a by no means inconsiderable 
part. But in truth between many of the acts punished 
as transgressions of the hunting laws and ill success in 
the chase the modern reader can discern as little of a 
causal relationship as between incest and a bad harvest. 
Once again are we driven to the conclusion that magical 
and religious ideas are at play, and we shall not be greatly 
surprised to learn that the same Omahas who, in appointing 
special judges to try and execute those who frighten the 
herd before the chase has begun (E. James, Expedition 
to the Rocky Mountains, ii. 208), seem to pursue a policy 
quite intelligible to us and apparently free from 
superstition, yet look upon such offences as partaking 
of the nature of sacrilege (Dorsey, " Omaha Sociology," 
Smithsonian Reports, p. 367. 1885).
To sum up, our inquiry into the acts first punished as 
crimes has clearly shown that in every single instance 
regard for the welfare of the community has supplied 
the motive for the organized reaction of society. In 
treason, which, as we have seen, lies on the borderland 
of criminal and martial law, it was fear for the security 
of the tribe against external foes. In some instances 
fear of famine may have served as a contributory cause. 
But dread of supernatural agencies, of baneful magical 
influences and of the vengeance of the spirit-world, has 
been proved to be the main source to which public punish- 
ment has to be traced. We thus arrive at the following 
three conclusions 
Firstly, punishment has been utilitarian from the very 
outset.
Secondly, fear, not indignation, has been the root 
emotion in the genesis of criminal law.
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Lastly, it was under the aegis of religion that the 
criminal code was born. In a subordinate way other 
factors may have helped its seeds to sprout; it remains 
nevertheless true that it is religious thought, religious 
fears and feelings which public punishment has to be 
fathered upon. We are now able to perceive why Sir 
Henry Maine, whilst finding torts " copiously enlarged 
upon in primitive jurisprudence " and " sins not unknown 
to it," was unable to discover the generic type of crime. 
It is obviously impossible to distinguish sins and crimes 
as independent classes of wrongs, as sins were the first 
acts punished as crimes and as they were so punished just 
because they were sins. We cannot, then, agree with 
those authorities who, like Du Boys, look upon the 
religious element as a later importation, engrafted on a 
pre-existing trunk of criminal law. And if Ferri asserts 
that crime was subsequently transformed into sin, we 
are prepared to subscribe to the proposition that sin, 
without ceasing to be sin, was transformed into crime.
CHAPTER II
THE FIRST PUNISHMENTS
STARTING with the question, " Which were the first 
crimes ? " which engaged our attention in the preceding 
chapter, we arrived at the conclusion that it is within 
the circle of magic and religious notions that the origin 
of the idea of a public offence has to be sought. We 
shall now embark upon an investigation of the problem : 
" Which were the first punishments ? " and we shall find 
that its solution more than confirms the results of our 
previous inquiry. For even in those instances in which 
the supernatural colouring of a crime has faded, its 
punishment frequently retains unmistakable marks of 
its origin.
In the literature of primitive criminal jurisprudence 
clubbing, hammering, flogging, beating with sticks and 
with chains, putting to shame, and various fines payable 
in cattle or in whatever happens to be the currency of 
the tribe, are enumerated among public punishments. 
An exhaustive, and at the same time critical, examination, 
however, reveals the fact that the instances mentioned 
are all examples of mob-law, of moral condemnation 
expressed in acts or in words, or of compensation due 
to the injured party, while of genuine public sanctions, 
i. e. of such as are awarded by the organized tribal 
authority, there are only two kinds, viz. death and exile, 
the former considerably preponderating. Both are of 
course modes of ridding the community of the offender.
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In order to ascertain the motive which determines primi- 
tive societies so to dispose of their criminals, we choose 
for our point of departure the punishment meted out to 
the sorcerer and the circumstances attending its execution. 
For witchcraft has been shown to be a crime among most 
of the lower races, and its punishment, therefore, offers 
sufficient data for valid generalizations. Moreover, if the 
arguments previously advanced are sound and dread of 
supernatural forces is the mainspring of punishment in 
the case of sorcery as in that of many other offences, the 
fate which awaits the black magician cannot fail to throw 
a good deal of light on the meaning of primitive punish- 
ments in general.
" The punishments meted out to sorcerers," writes Post 
(Grundriss, ii. 395), " can hardly be called punishments. 
They are acts of annihilation." This statement is fulty 
borne out by facts. For, as a general rule, the sorcerer 
himself is done to death, and his wife and children, 
occasionally all his relatives, share his fate; his house 
is burnt down or otherwise demolished, and his movable 
property is destroyed. A sanction so comprehensive as 
to include the extermination of the culprit, and of all that 
is his, suggests at once that it is dictated by a desire to 
remove a taint transferable by contact and by hereditary 
transmission; and a detailed study of the items of which 
the punishment is made up will amply confirm this 
impression. We feel all the more justified in entering 
upon a minute examination since some of the component 
parts survive into times when their original meaning has 
been forgotten.
As regards the sorcerer himself, the sentence is always 
capital. The manner in which it is carried out varies 
from tribe to tribe and does not exhibit any particularly 
suggestive traits, except, perhaps, among the natives of 
New Caledonia, where the execution ceremonial, as 
described by Turner (Samoa, p. 343), raises a presumption
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that capital punishment takes the form of a human 
sacrifice. Here the sorcerer, after being condemned in 
due form, is entertained at a public banquet. He is 
decorated with a wreath of red flowers, his legs are covered 
with flowers and shells, his whole body is painted black. 
All at once he starts up, breaks through the assembled 
multitude, hurls himself from the cliff into the sea, and 
is seen no more. The watery grave which here awaits 
the wizard deserves attention. It is true, this seems to 
be the only known instance of a primitive people in which 
the punishment of witchcraft takes the form of drowning. 
All the more frequent are the examples in which the body 
of the sorcerer, after the capital sentence has been carried 
out in some other way, is committed to the sea. The 
reason is that sea-water is believed by the lower races 
to be particularly destructive of magic energy; even by 
merely crossing the sea " the suwangi loses his power " 
(Steinmetz, Ethnologische Studien, ii. 329, after Riedel). 
That is why so often in the infancy of mankind those 
hot-beds of impurity, monstrous births, are buried in the 
sea, a custom which lies at the root of the well-known 
Roman poena culei. That is why offences of a specially 
polluting character are quite commonly sanctioned with 
drowning, e. g. incest among the Dayak-Biadju (Steinmetz, 
op. cit., ii. 336). In any case, the conception of guilt as a 
virus which clings to the offender, living or dead, has led 
to the practice, not by any means rare among savages, 
and more frequently met with at a higher cultural level, 
of removing the bodies of executed criminals far from the 
abodes of the people. Thus in the islands of Nossi-Be 
and Mayotte, they are carried into the bush and left there 
(Steinmetz, Bechtsverhaltnisse, p. 389); thus in Athens 
capital punishment for sacrilege and treason was followed 
by burial in foreign soil. Not only the corpse of the 
offender, his very name is pregnant with supernatural 
dangers. Among the inhabitants of the two islands just
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mentioned he must never again be spoken of (Steinmetz, 
loc. cit.); in ancient Rome no member of his gens was 
henceforth allowed to bear the same praenomen.
The participation in the sorcerer's punishment of his 
wife and his children has been explained on the ground 
that, being in the theory of primitive jurisprudence the 
property of the husband and father, they are, as a matter 
of course, destroyed along with the rest of his chattels. 
But, as we shall presently see, the punishment meted out 
to them is not always capital. Besides, this view fails 
to account for those cases, rare though they be, in which 
punishment extends beyond the narrower family circle 
and includes all persons in any way related to the culprit. 
Again, it may be argued, a man is most likely to impart 
his knowledge to his own kith and kin and, even in the 
absence of definite, systematic instruction, the latter 
cannot help picking up the secrets of his nefarious trade. 
This opinion is all the more plausible as witchcraft is the 
one offence in which not only the deed, but the bare 
knowledge is punishable. An objection, however, fatal 
to this view is the fact that occasionally in primitive 
communities, not to mention higher stages of legal 
development, crimes are similarly sanctioned of which 
overt acts form a necessary logical ingredient, whilst 
knowledge is quite irrelevant. Moreover, if we 
accepted this explanation, which is clearly inapplicable 
to the property of the offender, we should have to look 
out, in order to account for the destruction of the latter, 
for an entirely different principle of interpretation; and 
such dualism cannot appear satisfactory where the 
phenomena to be accounted for are obviously eiusdem 
generis. When once the primitive view of the infectivity 
of the magic virus is taken for granted, the collective 
responsibility of the sorcerer's family follows as an 
unavoidable practical corollary. In the intimacy of 
domestic life those near and dear to him cannot, except
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by a miracle, escape contagion. Besides, supernatural 
impurity not only spreads from person to person, it is 
transmitted from the father to the unborn child. Among 
the Hebrews the taint of bastardy clings to the descen- 
dants " even to the tenth generation " (Deut xxiii. 2). 
The tragedians of the classical period have preserved for 
us the Greek version of the primitive theory of heredity, 
according to which the guilt of the ancestor reappears 
in his children with both an active and a passive aspect, 
as a demoniacal impulse to wrongdoing and as liability 
to suffer punishment, an hereditas bis damnosa. In the 
light of such teaching it appears true that " he acts fool- 
ishly who kills the father and suffers the son to live " 
(Aristotle, Rhet., ii. 21). And the English feudal lawyers, 
when inventing the doctrine of attainder, which meant 
corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate, merely 
revived, for the benefit of the crown, notions as familiar 
to the ancient Teutonic peoples as to other primitive 
races. Sometimes the virus conveyed to the children is 
believed not to mature till they have reached manhood. 
So in the Babar Islands the sorcerer is executed with his 
adult relatives, but the children of the family are sold as 
slaves, " generally to strangers, lest later, out of revenge, 
they make their owners ill." To their transmarine masters 
they can never become a source of danger; for, as we 
have seen, a sea voyage destroys the germ (Steinmetz, 
after Riedel, loc. cit.). In other cases the supernatural 
impurity is thought to have a predilection for the male 
sex, in which alone it attains its full virulence, whilst 
females are either altogether immune, or capable of 
breeding the contagion in a modified and attenuated 
form only. Therefore the Aht Indians, whilst killing 
the magician together with all his kinsmen, sell his 
womanfolk into slavery (Sproat, loc. cit.). But such 
mitigation of punishment in favour of particular classes 
of relatives proves the latter groups of instances to be
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subsequent deviations from a more ancient uniform type; 
for truly primitive jurisprudence does not differentiate, 
but treats all alike.
The demolition of the house and the destruction of 
the chattels of sorcerers and of other great offenders 
are likewise precautionary measures against imaginary 
supernatural dangers. These risks are of a twofold 
nature. The criminal's property, charged, as it is, with 
baneful magic energy, is unlucky, i. e. bound of itself 
to bring all sorts of misfortunes to any one who uses it 
and to the community in which it happens to be; and, 
secondly, his possessions represent so many vehicles for 
the transmission, to other human beings, of the impurity 
which they have imbibed whilst in contact with the 
culprit. By and by, the criminal's movable property, 
instead of being destroyed, is confiscated, first ad usum 
dei sive ecclesiae, later ad usum reipublicae. But during 
long periods of legal evolution his house is burnt down 
or razed to the ground, and survivals of this practice, real 
or symbolical, are met with until comparatively recent 
times in the penal jurisprudence of Western Europe 
(Grimm, Rechtsaltertumer, pp. 723 et seq.). An institution 
so universal and so persistent could not fail to court 
speculation, and quite a number of attempts have been 
made to account for its origin. According to Wilda, its 
object was to extinguish every trace and remembrance 
of the criminal, so that it merely formed part and parcel 
of an accessory damnatio memoriae. We have seen, it is 
true, that even his name is taboo, and it cannot be 
denied that the two practices are intimately related. But 
we are not entitled to conclude that the one was subor- 
dinate to the other; both seem to flow equally from the 
same root idea, from the belief that everything connected, 
materially or ideally, with the offender is contaminated. 
Another theory, both ingenious and simple, regards the
destruction of the offender's dwelling and goods as a
H
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natural incident of his banishment and discovers its 
rationale in the desire to prevent his return by depriving 
him of his means of subsistence. But if this were the 
sole obstacle to his coming back, the barrier does not 
strike us as formidable or insurmountable. The habita- 
tions of savages are not palatial structures, and to erect 
for himself a fresh mud hut or another rude tent is an 
enterprise in which the criminal might engage at home 
quite as well as abroad; and empty-handed as he goes, 
or with the few sticks which he carries away with him as 
the sum total of his worldly possessions, he is no better off 
among strangers than in the midst of his own people. In 
fact, even primitive races have devised more effective 
measures for keeping away an undesirable companion; 
the Ckaratshai, for example, when passing sentence of 
expulsion upon a seducer of women, couple it with a 
threat of capital punishment should he ever again show 
his face in the village (Steinmetz, after Klaproth, loc. cit.). 
Besides, in the instances hitherto under consideration the 
culprit is not expelled from the tribe, but executed; and 
though in the early phases of criminal jurisprudence 
destruction of his possessions is ancillary, not only to 
capital punishment, but also, though less frequently, to 
banishment, there is nothing to support the assumption, 
essential to the doctrine under review, that the latter is 
the older kind of punishment and that its concomitants 
were transferred to the former, when subsequently intro- 
duced. Indeed, what little there is of historical evidence, 
points all the other way. If further proof were required 
of the validity of our contention that fear of pollution 
is the motive which prompts primitive communities to 
destroy the dwellings of great criminals together with all 
their belongings, we could refer to the analogous practice, 
quite common at low cultural levels, of demolishing any 
house in which a death has occurred, even though from 
natural causes, a custom undoubtedly due to dread of the
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death germ, of that deadly magic contagion which the 
corpse harbours and promptly imparts to its environment. 
But perhaps the most direct clue to the meaning of des- 
truction as an accessory punishment is afforded by the 
form in which the practice prevails among the natives of 
the Banks Islands. The tribe is here divided into two 
exogamous halves, and sexual intercourse between mem- 
bers of the same division is looked upon as the most 
horrible crime. If such an abomination has been perpe- 
trated, the property of the division to which the guilty 
couple belongs is destroyed by the members of the 
other division, without a complaint being raised or any 
resistance offered (Codrington, "Social Regulations in 
Melanesia," Journ. Anthrop. Inst., p. 307. 1889).
Such, then, are the precautionary measures which 
primitive peoples find it necessary to adopt against crime 
fraught with magic dangers, measures which in their 
ensemble make up the punishment of the sorcerer. In 
striking contrast therewith stands the sanction with which 
sacrilege is visited in early societies. The offender is put 
to death, and there the matter ends; both his family and 
his property escape. This strict limitation of liability is, 
at first sight, all the more surprising since the notion of 
collective responsibility supplies the reason why this 
offence is punished at all. Yet the paradox is easily 
resolved, and the isolation of the criminal as an object 
of punishment flows quite naturally from, instead of 
being contradictory to, the idea that the group as a whole 
answers for the misdeeds of its members. There are 
wrongs which expose the family of the wrongdoer to the 
vengeance of spirits, viz. such acts as interfere with the 
rights and comforts of family ghosts. But these domestic 
deities, as we have previously remarked, are powers for 
good and evil to their kinsmen alone, and there is no 
reason why the community should take notice of them 
or of deeds obnoxious to them. Only such offences claim
H 2
100 THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
its attention as are directed against supernatural beings 
common to the whole of the tribe. The tribal gods, when 
offended, avenge themselves upon the tribe at large, and 
it is to avert their wrath that the sinner is executed. In 
its relations with these deities the community appears as 
an undivided whole, each member answering equally for 
the guilt of every other. In this common liability the 
distinction of clans and families disappears; the offender's 
relatives, near or distant, are merely tribesmen, and their 
responsibility, just like that of any other tribesman, 
ceases as soon as the criminal is killed or otherwise 
excluded from the community.
Whilst persons guilty of sacrilege suffer capital punish- 
ment in order that the anger of the spirits may be appeased, 
there is nothing to show that they are sacrificed to them. 
It is true, human sacrifices in general do not seem to 
belong to savagery, but rather to barbarism and to the 
dawn of civilization. Yet even among the lowest races 
the practice is not quite unknown in connection with the 
administration of criminal justice. Unfortunately the 
sources do not always disclose the nature of the crime for 
which offenders are offered up to the gods. But, strangely 
enough, that crime in which, more manifestly than in any 
other, the ire of a supernatural being supplies the motive 
for the intervention of the public authority, sacrilege to 
wit, is not mentioned in any one of the few instances in 
which we are given more definite information. We have 
already noticed a form of execution for sorcery strongly 
suggestive of a sacrificial ceremonial occurring among the 
natives of New Caledonia; and in this locality a similar 
fate awaits those guilty of adultery (Turner, Nineteen 
Years in Polynesia, p. 343). Among the African Negro 
tribes " one of the commonest occasions for human 
sacrifices is the causing of illness by witchcraft" (Ratzel, 
ii. 351); so intimately blended are magic and animistic 
conceptions in the mind of primitive man. In Polynesia
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capital punishment for violation of a taboo generally 
assumes the shape of a human sacrifice (Radiguet, 
Derniers Sauvages, p. 160). The Macassars andBuginese 
sacrifice the parties to incestuous intercourse to the 
offended spirits (Wilken, loc. cit.).
A supernatural element seems to be the most essential 
ingredient in almost all primitive crimes. And though 
magic and religion are undifferentiated at early stages of 
thought and cannot, therefore, be completely dissociated 
by the modern student when dealing with primitive 
institutions into the formation of which they enter, it is 
yet possible to arrange in a scale, according to the relative 
preponderance of the one or the other, the offences which 
make up the criminal code of savages. At the one end 
of the scale we should have to place witchcraft, which is 
magic almost chemically pure; at the other sacrilege, in 
which the theistic aspect is for all practical purposes 
unadulterated with magic. We shall then discover that 
to this scale of primitive crimes corresponds a scale of 
primitive punishments. At the one pole we find annihila- 
tion of the offender and of all that is his; as we go down 
the scale the scope of the sanction becomes narrower and 
narrower till we arrive at the other pole, where nothing 
remains but the execution or expulsion of the criminal 
himself.
There remains yet to be studied the punishment of 
treason, which, according to some authorities, is the 
foundation and prototype of all primitive punishment. 
Every criminal, it is said, is an enemy of his people and 
is dealt with as such. The manner in which the tribe 
disposes of those guilty of the most heinous offences, is 
an exact replica of the treatment meted out to the alien 
enemy. What happens to the conquered foe ? He is 
killed, his wife and children either perish with him or are 
reduced to slavery, his property is confiscated. The 
sanction with which treason is visited is, it must be
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owned, a faithful reproduction of these acts of hostility. 
But it is not permissible to infer that it has served as 
pattern to public punishment in general. For, firstly, 
this view leaves unaccounted for the origin of banishment, 
certainly one of the earliest sanctions; and, secondly, the 
property of the traitor, like that of the alien enemy, is 
confiscated, that of the typical criminal is destroyed. 
Confiscation versus destruction of property seems indeed 
to be the feature which most clearly marks off the law of 
warfare and military law on the one hand from genuine 
criminal law on the other.
Once again, then, the conclusion is forced upon us that 
primitive punishment is inflicted either to remove the 
stain of impurity from society or to prevent a supernatural 
being from taking revenge on the tribe. Its object is in 
either case expiation expiation, however, not for its own 
sake, but with a utilitarian background.
CHAPTER III
ANCIENT CRIMINAL CODES
HAVING investigated the crimes and punishments of 
savagery, and having thereby ascertained the reasons for 
the first intervention of the community in wrongdoing, 
we now proceed to trace the evolution of the idea of 
punishment through the next following stages, for which 
purpose it will be useful first of all to compile lists of 
offences punished by barbarous races and of those which 
first excited a public reaction among peoples of archaic 
civilizations. In the case of the latter it is not always 
easy to distinguish with accuracy and precision between 
the original stock and later additions. In some instances, 
indeed, we are fairly well acquainted with the whole 
course of development of the criminal code from its 
earliest infancy onwards. Sometimes, again, our know- 
ledge of the history of a people enables us to surmise 
which of the contents of its criminal code are primitive, 
which of subsequent growth; e. g. where different crimes 
are subject to different jurisdictions, it is permissible 
to infer that those punished by the most ancient tribunal 
are themselves the most ancient. Occasionally, how- 
ever, an ancient code is the most ancient historical docu- 
ment we possess of a nation, and we must then rely 
to a large extent upon such intrinsic evidence as it offers, 
in order to discover the nucleus round which the later 
accretions have clustered. Here the knowledge which 
we have acquired of savage criminal jurisprudence cannot
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fail to be of help. In studying the authorities, we have 
again carefully to apply the maxims of criticism previ- 
ously laid down. Thus many of the sanctions described 
in the sources as punishments are found, on closer scrutiny, 
to be enforceable or remissible at the discretion of the 
injured party, with the result that the acts so sanctioned 
have to be excluded from our catalogues, as being torts 
and not crimes.
Let us start with the criminal law of ancient Egypt, 
which is known to us only in the final shape it assumed 
after reaching full maturity. If the account given by 
Diodorus Siculus, our principal authority on the subject, 
is correct, primitive superstition and enlightened states- 
manship must have had equal shares in its production; 
it looks, indeed, as if a modern code were grafted upon 
a trunk of primeval growth. The assertion (Wilkinson, 
Ancient Egyptians, ii. 40) that the conscious aim of 
Egyptian law was the preservation of life and the re- 
demption of the offender, is, therefore, a half-truth. All 
the offences mentioned by Diodorus were true crimes, 
and were visited with genuine punishments, on the 
banks of the Nile. Private vengeance had been sup- 
pressed in the dim, distant past; compositions, if they 
ever existed, had long been superseded; and neither of 
these systems has left any traces in the criminal legisla- 
tion as it has come down to us. Every Egyptian was 
allowed to set the criminal law in motion; and in certain 
offences e. g. murder, robbery, and other acts of violence 
 it was the legal duty of eye-witnesses to prosecute the 
culprit, if the attempts which they were bound to make, 
under pain of capital punishment, to intervene and pre- 
vent the consummation of the crime had proved un- 
successful. The practice of the magic arts, such as the 
use of incantations, the concoction of philtres, heads the 
list of capital offences; the papyrus magicus Harris 
describes these practices as the greatest abominations
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in the world. Next in heinousness comes sacrilege, 
which includes such sins as intentionally to kill an animal 
sacred to one of the national deities, to kill, even accident- 
ally, an ibis, a cat, or a hawk, to evacuate the bowels 
into the Nile, and furthermore, according to Herodotus 
(ii. 38), eating forbidden food, revealing the place of 
burial of the bull Apis, maintaining that Serapis was a 
man, offering up in sacrifice kine, calves, or other beasts, 
not before dedicated and marked by the priests. To 
desecrate a grave, to deviate in the practice of the healing 
art from the stereotyped rules laid down, for the guidance 
of the physician, in the books of Hermes, belong to the 
same category of crime; and to such an extent was custom 
hallowed that to invent a new dance and to compose a 
new song were equally punished as religious offences 
(Plato, leg., lib. ii.). In cases of treason, rebellion, and 
conspiracy against the state, not only was the culprit 
himself put to death; his mother, his sisters, and his 
whole family shared his fate (Plutarch, Agis and 
Cleomenes, ch. Ixx.). Other capital offences were perjury, 
parricide, murder, of a slave no less than of a free man, 
wrongfully to accuse another of a capital crime, and, 
finally, earning a livelihood by illicit means and making 
a false declaration as to one's means of subsistence. 
The older law is said to have punished with death adultery 
if committed by a woman of noble rank; in historical 
times she escaped with her nose cut off. Her paramour 
suffered phallotomy, one of those " symbolical" or 
" expressive " punishments in which Egyptian juris- 
prudence abounds. Other applications of this principle 
we meet with in the punishment of rape, revealing state 
secrets, counterfeiting public seals, coining offences, using 
false weights and measures, forgery, etc.
If next we turn to Babylon, a cursory examination 
of the code of Hammurabi seems to reveal a large body 
of criminal law scattered through its venerable pages : so
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frequently does the phrase recur, the wrongdoer "shall 
be put to death " ; so numerous are the instances in which 
the offender suffers mutilation by losing the offending 
limb. Unfortunately, the code does not always specify 
by whom, at whose instance, and in what manner the 
sanction is to be applied. In a good many cases, however, 
the text provides the key to the solution of this problem. 
Thus if we read that only in default of payment of the 
statutory damages is death the fate of the thief (par. 8), 
or of the manager of an agricultural estate who has con- 
verted his employer's property to his own use (par. 
253-256), or if we are informed (par. 194) that it is at 
the suit of her master that a wet-nurse has her breasts 
cut off for starving to death her charge by nursing another 
baby without her master's consent, we know that the 
sanction is in all three cases civil, not criminal. Again, 
the provision of par. 25, that a thief at a fire " shall be 
cast into the selfsame fire," can have no other meaning 
than that the owner may thus avenge himself on the 
thief; for the fire would probably have long ceased to 
burn before the offender could be brought to trial. Clause 
229, which enacts that if a house collapses and buries its 
owner under the wreckage, the builder shall be put to 
death, seems to provide a somewhat severe, but not 
inappropriate, punishment for the jerry-builder; but if 
we find, on going on to the next clause, that " if it is the 
owner's son that is killed, the builder's son shall be put 
to death," we are no longer in doubt as to the real mean- 
ing of either clause; they both merely recognize the 
lex talionis, which belongs, as we have seen, to private 
vengeance and private law, not to criminal jurisprudence. 
A fair number of other examples might be quoted in 
which the sanction is but legalized revenge, and the 
application of the principle of analogous interpretation 
to similar wrongs will further reduce the number of true 
crimes dealt with in the code of Hammurabi. The follow-
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ing are the only unambiguous instances of public offences 
capitally sanctioned: misconduct in the discharge of 
public offices (pars. 26, 33, 34), for a votary to open, or 
to enter, a beershop (par. 110), for an innkeeper " the 
trade " seems to have been entirely in the hands of women 
in ancient Babylon to harbour seditious persons (par. 
109) or to serve short measure (par. 108), highway 
robbery (par. 22), for a woman to be accessory before 
the fact to the murder of her husband (par. 153), bigamy 
by a woman left well provided for whose husband is in 
captivity (par. 133), incest with mother (par. 157) or 
with daughter-in-law (par. 155). Incest with daughter 
is the only crime punished with banishment (par. 154). 
Whether the unsuccessful prosecutor in a trial for sorcery 
(pars. 1, 2) and the false witness in a capital suit (par. 3) 
were put to death only at the instance of the aggrieved 
party or by virtue of a sentence passed by the judge 
ex officio, we have no means of ascertaining. Somewhat 
hard to define is the legal character of adultery. Par. 129 
runs : " If a man's wife be caught lying with another, 
they shall be strangled and cast into the water. If the 
wife's husband would save his wife, the king can save his 
servant." The meaning probably is that the husband's 
initiative was required to set the law in motion, but that 
he could not enforce the sanction against his wife's lover 
alone. If this interpretation is correct, the most ancient 
code anticipates the provision of several modern con- 
tinental codes. If it is difficult to distinguish between 
crime and tort in every case where the sanction is capital, 
it is quite impossible to do so in most of the minor wrongs. 
Branding of the slanderer of a votary or of a married 
woman (par. 127) was certainly true punishment, and so 
was, in all probability, scourging "in the assembly" 
for brutal assault on a man higher in rank (par. 202).
We have dealt at considerable length with the Baby- 
lonian code in order to illustrate the methods which we
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employ in enucleating the criminal provisions from a 
general body of ancient law, and the difficulties with 
which the task is beset. We shall be more concise in 
our treatment of most of the remaining systems, and 
especially of Hebrew law, which is, to a considerable 
extent, a subject of common knowledge. The follow- 
ing crimes are capital by Mosaic law, those printed in 
italics being sanctioned with kerith as well: Idolatry, 
especially the cult of Moloch, divination in the name of 
false gods, sorcery, blasphemy, violation of the Sabbath; 
sodomy; bestiality, the beast being killed too; incest 
with mother, father's wife or daughter-in-law; marrying 
mother and daughter; adultery; ravishing or seducing 
a " virgin betrothed unto an husband " and for such 
virgin to be a willing victim; for a damsel to enter matri- 
mony without the tokens of virginity; for the daughter 
of a priest to prostitute herself; man-stealing; smiting 
or cursing father or mother, or being a stubborn and 
rebellious son and incorrigible withal. Apostasy of a 
city is punished with its utter destruction; the inhabitants 
and the cattle thereof are smitten with the edge of the 
sword; the city and all the spoil thereof is burnt with 
fire, to remain an heap for ever, and not to be built again. 
Kerith is the sole punishment of the following offences : 
Presumptuously to despise the word of the Lord by 
designedly breaking any of His commandments; non- 
observance of the ordinances relating to circumcision, 
to the day of atonement, or to the passover; consulting 
wizards; counterfeiting the holy anointing oil or the 
sacred perfume; offering a sacrifice outside the sacred 
precincts appointed by law; doing any of the three 
following things while in a state of impurity, viz. to 
enter the tabernacle of the Lord, to eat of the flesh of 
the sacrifice of peace, to discharge priestly functions; 
failure to undergo ceremonial purification after touching 
a corpse; eating blood, eating the fat of a sacrificial
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beast, eating of the peace-offering on or after the third 
day; to approach unto a woman whilst she is unclean 
with the catamenial flow; such forms of incest as are not 
capitally sanctioned; marrying two sisters. In one 
instance only is mutilation the prescribed public sanction : 
a woman who commits an indecent assault upon a man 
with whom her husband is engaged in a fight, loses her 
hand; whilst two classes of offenders are ordered by Moses 
to be scourged : the bondwoman betrothed unto an 
husband who lies carnally with another man, and the 
husband who wrongfully accuses his newly wedded wife 
of having entered his house not a maid. That it was for 
the goel to avenge homicide, and that theft merely 
founded a claim to damages, are well-known facts. 
Seduction and rape, if the woman was not betrothed 
unto an husband, were treated as torts, in talmudic as 
well as in biblical jurisprudence (Rapaport).
The foundations of Mahometan criminal law laid in 
the Koran are meagre in the extreme, and the doctors 
are not even agreed on the interpretation of the few 
texts relating to the subject. " The recompense of 
those who fight against God and His Apostles, and study 
to act corruptly in the earth, shall be, that they shall be 
slain, or crucified, or have their hands and feet cut off 
on the opposite sides, or be banished the land" (Sura v.). 
This passage is held to make apostasy a capital crime, 
forfeiture of all the property of the offender being in the 
nature of an accessory punishment, and to leave a choice 
between death and banishment, as alternative sanctions 
of rebellion, whilst a wider interpretation of the text 
includes highway robbery and brigandage as crimes in 
which capital punishment is permissible. Blood-revenge 
for murder is expressly sanctioned in Sura ii. The clause 
relating to theft runs as follows : " If a man or a woman 
steal, cut off their hands, in retribution for that which 
they have committed; this is an exemplary punishment
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appointed by God" (Sura v.). But this punishment, 
according to the Sonna, is not to be inflicted unless the 
value of the thing stolen amount to four dinars, or about 
forty shillings. For the first offence, the criminal is to 
lose his right hand; for the second, his left foot; for the 
third, his left hand; for the fourth, his right foot; and if 
he continue to offend, he shall be scourged at the dis- 
cretion of the judge (Sale, p. 78, note y). It is, however, 
only at the instance of the injured party that the sanction 
is enforced; theft is a tort, not a crime. Punishments 
are provided for whoredom, drinking, gambling, and 
similar favourite sports of pre-Islamite Arabia. It is 
claimed that the Koran originally contained a clause, 
now missing, which copied the provisions of the law of 
Moses relating to adultery and substituted lapidation 
for immuring, the form of punishment customary among 
the Arabs in pre-Mahometan times (Du Boys, Peuples 
modernes, i. 286). It has, however, been doubted 
whether capital punishment was ever inflicted in the 
early stages of Mahometan law (Wellhausen in Mommsen, 
Kulturvolker). In modern Mahometan law the following 
three crimes are said to be capital: " kufr," a religious 
offence which appears to include a multitude of sins; 
adultery and incest, if committed by persons of the 
" muhsan " class; and murder of a protected Mussulman. 
Death as the public sanction of the last-named crime 
has developed, it is said (Goldziher in Mommsen, Kultur- 
volker), out of the ancient practice of blood-revenge. 
But such progress seems to have been made in the theory 
of the law only; for, except where the jurisprudence 
of the Koran has been entirely superseded by the re- 
ception of foreign law, retaliation for homicide still 
flourishes in all Mahometan countries. Rebellion is 
sanctioned with banishment, whilst scourging is the 
recognized punishment for adultery and incest, if com- 
mitted by persons not belonging to the " muhsan"
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order, for casting unjustifiable aspersions upon the con- 
jugal honour and fidelity of a respectable Moslem, for 
drinking wine, and for a number of smaller transgressions. 
In Persia the criminal law of the Koran has developed 
into a simpler and somewhat harsher system. There, 
since olden times, treason, desertion and refusal of 
military service, apostasy and theft have always been 
capital crimes (Dareste, fitudes, p. 116); at a subsequent 
date sodomy was added to the list; and until quite 
recently a woman guilty of adultery incurred poenam 
culei (Drouville, Voyage en Perse, i. 262).
After casting a glance, in passing, at the old Parthians 
and Armenians, who knew but four public offences, all 
capital viz. treason, desertion, refusal of military service 
and apostasy (Letourneau, p. 400) we turn to that most 
venerable system of Aryan jurisprudence, Hindu law. 
The codes which have come down to us belong, however, 
all of them, to an advanced stage of legal development. 
For evidence of blood-revenge and compositions we must 
go back, far beyond the legal sources, to Vedic literature 
(Kohler, Indisches StrafrecM). Already the Ordinances 
of Menu provide public punishments for practically all 
the more serious crimes found in modern codes and, in 
addition, for many not nowadays regarded as crimes. 
The Hindu penal system is of a most complicated char- 
acter, the scale of punishments rising, through a number 
of grades, from gentle admonition to the most cruel 
death, as by being devoured by dogs, being cut piece- 
meal with razors. Fines and forfeitures, which always 
go to the king, and mutilations by loss of the offending 
part are the favourite forms of punishment; but publicly 
putting to shame, as by ignominious tonsure, whipping, 
branding, imprisonment either with or without fetters, 
and banishment are also liberally employed. The 
sanction varies not only with the nature of the offence, 
but also with the caste to which the offender belongs.
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We shall not attempt to compile from the various authori- 
ties a complete list of public wrongs with their respective 
sanctions. Our aim is rather to penetrate through the 
superimposed strata to the very foundations of the 
criminal law, and for the accomplishment of this task we 
shall rely upon the application of a principle which will be 
found to hold good, within certain limits, of all ancient 
legal systems, of the principle that the crimes described 
in a code as the most heinous offences are, in general, 
those longest visited with public punishments among 
the people to which the code belongs. Now in Hindu 
legal literature the system of " the ten crimes " is often 
mentioned, a heterogeneous group made up of the following 
offences : disobeying royal edicts, killing females, mixture 
of castes, adultery, robbery, impregnation by a man 
other than the husband, defamation, threatening lan- 
guage, violent assault, procuring abortion. This combina- 
tion of offences is, however, of late date; it is not found 
either in Menu or in Narada, to whom Oldenberg (in 
Mommsen, Kulturvulker) erroneously attributes it. It is 
from the first-named source that we learn what offences 
were regarded as the most serious ones in ancient Hindu 
jurisprudence. We read in Menu (ix. 235) : " The slayer 
of a priest, a soldier or merchant drinking arak, mead, 
or rum, he who steals the gold of a priest, and he who 
violates the bed of his natural or spiritual father, are 
all to be considered respectively as offenders in the highest 
degree, except those whose crimes are not fit to be named." 
This clause occurs in that part of the Ordinances which 
treats of " Law, private and criminal." A similar 
passage is found in chap. xi. (section 55), which bears 
the heading " On Penance and Expiation," with this 
modification, however, that in the latter text the associates 
of the said offenders are placed on the same footing as 
the actual offenders themselves. The greatest sins, then, 
are the greatest crimes, and the identification of these
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two conceptions in Hindu law is further proved by the 
fact that expiation and punishment are admitted, as 
appears from Menu (ix. 236), as alternative means of 
extinguishing guilt. The inclusion of the associates of 
great offenders in the later text, in contrast to their 
omission from the earlier one, is likewise characteristic; 
for whilst they have committed no wrong for which they 
could be called to account before the temporal tribunal, 
they have been contaminated by contact with sinners 
and, therefore, require expiation. It remains to ascertain 
what are the crimes " not fit to be named." In Menu (xi. 
55) the offences enumerated are declared to be "less than 
incest in a direct line, and some others." Applying to 
the concluding words of this sentence the eiusdem generis 
rule of interpretation, we presume that some other 
offences against sexual morality are meant, a construction 
which would seem to explain the legislator's reluctance 
to mention them by name. We shall probably be right 
in filling the lacuna thus left from the Institutes of less 
prude Narada who states (xii. 73-75) that one who has 
criminal connexion with any of the twenty-one descrip- 
tions of women specified in the text is said to be as guilty 
as the violator of his spiritual father's bed. There are, 
however, quite a number of other crimes capitally 
sanctioned. Menu (ix. 232), for instance, prescribes the 
death penalty for " such as forge royal edicts, cause 
dissensions among the great ministers, or kill women, 
priests or children, and such as adhere to the king's 
enemies." Strange to say, " for all sacrifices to destroy 
innocent men, for machinations with poisonous roots, 
and for the various charms and witcheries intended to 
kill, by persons not effecting their purpose," a compara- 
tively small fine only was payable to the king (ix. 290). 
In the absence of any express provision, we presume that 
if successful, the culprit was punished as for murder. 
In the case of a she-poisoner, however, Yajnavalkya
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(ii. 279) ordains as the sanction killing by bulls, after 
previous mutilation. In Hindu law aggravated forms 
of murder alone were capital crimes; in the absence of 
circumstances of aggravation, Menu directs " that for 
killing a man, a fine, equal to that for theft, shall be in- 
stantly set " (viii. 296), whilst according to Yajnavalkya 
(ii. 277), a homicide incurs the highest or the lowest 
amercement, the commentary of the Mitaksara explaining 
that the judge must be determined, in the exercise of his 
discretion, by the social position, character, conduct of 
the victim and similar factors.
Among all the offences known to Chinese law one 
group stands out in bold relief : Staunton deals with it 
under the title " Offences of a Treasonable Character," 
whilst Alabaster calls the crimes comprised in it " The 
Ten Felonies " ; but it seems that the correct translation 
of the Chinese original would be " The Ten Abominations." 
They are 
1. Rebellion; defined as an attempt to violate the 
divine order of things on earth.
2. Disloyalty to the emperor.
3. Desertion and every act that endangers the external 
security of the state.
4. Parricide.
5. Massacre in the technical sense of murder of three 
or more members of the same family.
6. Sacrilege, which is committed by stealing from the 
temples any of the sacred articles consecrated to divine 
purposes, or by purloining any articles in the immediate 
use of the sovereign; similar guilt is incurred by counter- 
feiting the imperial seal, by administering to the sovereign 
improper medicines, or, in general, by the commission of 
any error or negligence whereby the safety of his sacred 
person may be endangered.
7. Impiety, which is discoverable in every instance 
of disrespect or negligence towards one's parents.
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8. Sowing discord in families.
9. Insubordination of inferior towards superior magis- 
trates.
10. Incest.
The Ta Tsing Leu Lee, from which the above list, 
together with the definitions of some of the offences 
comprised therein, is taken, remarks that the crime is, 
in each of these cases, " a direct violation of the ties by 
which society is maintained," thus drawing attention 
to the distinction between offences of a public nature 
and offences primarily affecting individuals. The Ta 
Tsing Leu Lee is of comparatively modern date, being 
first promulgated in 1644. But " the ten abominations " 
were sharply demarcated from the rest of the criminal 
law as early as the Tse dynasty (A.D. 550), being then 
the only offences the punishment for which could not be 
commuted for a money payment, but had to be actually 
carried out. Now in modern Chinese law the commutable 
offences are certainly genuine crimes, and this is true 
even of those, such as accidental homicide and inflicting 
personal injuries (Alabaster, 77), in which the fine is 
payable, not, as in most instances, to the court, but to the 
injured party or his heirs; for in every case the sanction 
is enforced, commuted, or remitted, at the discretion of 
the sovereign. But in origin the system of money pay- 
ments for wrongs belongs to private, not to criminal, 
law, and where it is found in a criminal code, the offences 
to which it applies are later importations. There can 
be no doubt that the ten abominations are the most 
ancient, as well as the most heinous, offences known to 
Chinese law. The crimes comprised in that list fall quite 
naturally under three heads : offences against the state, 
offences of a religious character, and offences against the 
family. It is in connection with the abominations, and 
in some other offences which show a great affinity to those 
mentioned in the Chinese decalogue and which, as we
I 2
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have seen in the two preceding chapters, are undoubtedly 
public offences since the dawn of criminal jurisprudence, 
that the principle of collective responsibility survives. 
It attained its widest scope under the rulers of the house 
of Tsin (third century B.C.), when great offenders were 
executed together, not only with their own families, but 
with those of their neighbours as well (Andreozzi, p. 35). 
Soon, however, liability was limited to " the three classes 
of kindred," viz. the relations of the father, the wife 
and the descendants. Repeatedly restricted and ex- 
tended, abolished and re-introduced, the system has 
struck too deep roots in Chinese law to disappear per- 
manently. Nowadays it reaches its widest extent in 
the corporate liability of the whole family for the treason 
of one of its members. The following is the punishment 
of treason in modern China : the offender himself is to 
suffer death by a slow and painful execution; all the male 
relations in the first degree, above the age of sixteen years 
are beheaded by " male relations in the first degree " 
being meant the father, grandfather, sons, grandsons, 
paternal uncles and their sons. All other male relations 
above the age of sixteen, however distant their relation- 
ship, and whether it be relationship by blood or marriage, 
are likewise beheaded, provided that they were living 
under the same roof as the traitor at the time the offence 
was committed; the male relations hi the first degree 
under sixteen, and the female relatives in the first degree 
whatever their age, are reduced to slavery; all the 
traitor's property of every description is confiscated for 
the use and service of the government. In rebellion and 
massacre the offender is executed, his property is con- 
fiscated; but the members of his family escape with a 
milder punishment, slavery in the case of the first- 
named offence, banishment in the latter. The same 
punishment is inflicted for two other offences, for murder 
with intent to mangle and divide the body of the
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deceased for magical purposes, and for preparing poisons 
with intent to apply them to the destruction of man. 
In the former of these crimes capital punishment takes 
the form of " death by a slow and painful execution," 
which we have already met with in the case of treason, 
but which is also the sanction of massacre, parricide, and 
murder of a husband.
The oldest code of Japan, the Tai-ho ritsu (A.D. 701), 
is largely influenced by the law of feudal China. It dis- 
tinguishes ordinary and atrocious crimes. The latter are 
plotting and other offences against the emperor, sacrilege, 
emigration, murder of a near blood-relation or a near 
relation by marriage, murder attended with certain 
aggravating circumstances. All these offences are capital, 
and the nearest relatives of the culprit are condemned 
with him, deportation being, however, the severest 
punishment to which they were liable. In the case of 
atrocious crimes no distinction was drawn between 
attempt and consummation. They were, moreover, 
exempted from the operation of a general amnesty. And 
whilst it appears that up to an unknown date compositions 
were permitted and even customary for ordinary offences, 
the code expressly forbids them in the case of atrocious 
crimes (Dareste, Nouvelles Etudes, p. 303). One part of 
the punishment of offences of this class, confiscation of 
the condemned man's property, has not only survived 
until quite recent times, but has become incidental to 
every capital sentence (Letourneau, p. 198). Herein lies 
the rationale of the custom of hara-kiri, by which the 
Japanese nobleman escapes condemnation in order to 
secure for his family the succession to his property, in 
exactly the same way as members of the English landed 
aristocracy, to prevent forfeiture of their estates, often 
allowed themselves to be pressed to death rather than to 
risk a conviction by pleading to the charge laid against 
them.
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The penal code of the Mongol state of Jenghiz Khan, 
the Ulong Yassa, reproduces some of the characteristic 
features of Chinese criminal law. Once again we meet 
with the distinction between commutable and non- 
commutable offences. The latter class includes all serious 
offences against the state and, since the code was made 
to suit the requirements of a conquering army, against 
military discipline. Thus treason, rebellion, every act 
of disobedience, and espionage, are non-commutable, 
but so is witchcraft too. Capital punishment is also 
prescribed for three other crimes, homicide, ravishing a 
married woman, and theft; but in these instances sentence 
of death cannot be passed unless the accused has been 
caught in the act or confesses his guilt. Theft was cer- 
tainly, whilst rape and murder were probably, commut- 
able. The redemption-money always went to the state.
In ancient Mexico attacks upon, and overt acts of 
irreverence towards, the throne or altar were regarded as 
the most serious crimes. The traitor was flayed and his 
relatives within the fourth degree were reduced to slavery, 
whilst in Tlaxcala his kinsmen up to the seventh degree 
were put to death. Persons guilty of misprision of 
treason were made slaves, together with their wives and 
children. The man who usurped the functions of 
cihuacoatl—i. e. chief justice was executed, his relations 
within the fourth degree were banished from the realm. 
In all these cases the culprit's property was forfeited to 
the prince. To assume the insignia of royalty, to stir 
up revolt, to assault or ill-treat a minister of state, an 
ambassador, or an imperial messenger, were all capital 
crimes. Cowardice in warfare was punished with death, 
and so were such offences against military law as selling, 
or accepting ransom from, prisoners of war, or having 
sexual intercourse with a female captive. To break the 
peace by a challenge to fight was a capital offence, and 
it was even forbidden, under pain of punishment, to
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carry arms in times of peace. Again, sorcerers and 
witches who wrought mischief were put to death; strangu- 
lation was the punishment of him who sent another to 
sleep by magic means in order to purloin his property. 
Poisoners were executed, and so were accomplices who 
had supplied the poison (Bancroft, Native Races of the 
Pacific States, ii. 459). The priest who broke his vows 
of chastity was either sentenced to death or banished, 
his house razed to the ground, his chattels confiscated 
(Bancroft, ii. 469). The law threatened with capital 
punishment those who omitted to denounce a priest 
guilty of so horrible an offence. If a temple-maiden 
indulged in carnal pleasures, both she and her seducer 
were impaled, their bodies burnt to ashes and those ashes 
committed to the winds; she paid with her life even for 
secretly conversing with a man. The virtue of lay-girls 
of good family was, however, similarly protected. Death 
was the fate of the youth who surreptitiously entered a 
boarding-school for young ladies (Kohler, Azteken, p. 98). 
Indeed, almost all transgression of the rules of sexual 
morality were capitally sanctioned. So incest, which 
crime included, in Aztec jurisprudence, the re-marriage 
of a divorced couple (Kohler, p. 97). So homosexual 
practices, whether engaged in by males or females; 
even wearing the dress of the other sex was a capital 
crime, probably because generally symptomatic of homo- 
sexuality. So rape, so adultery by or with a married 
woman. For the latter offence capital punishment took 
the form of stoning, whilst in Quaxololitlan the adulteress 
was eaten. The husband who continued to live with an 
unfaithful wife was punished, a law conceived, as Kohler 
remarks (p. 91), in the spirit of the Roman Lex Julia de 
Adulteriis. Ignominious tonsure was the sanction for 
procuring women for immoral purposes. Drunkenness 
was also treated as a very serious offence. Ignominious 
tonsure, demolition of the culprit's bouse and loss of
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office were the penalty on a first conviction; on a second 
conviction, sentence of death was passed. Even a single 
deviation from the path of strict sobriety was a capital 
crime in the case of priests, noblemen, youths and women. 
We have not yet, however, by any means exhausted the 
list of capital offences. For, in addition to those already 
mentioned, it included abusing, or raising a hand against, 
father or mother, moving landmarks, using false measures, 
squandering a patrimony (Letourneau, p. 117, after 
Clavigero, History of Mexico, L), and, by a law of Mote- 
ouhma, even telling a lie (Kohler, p. 100). Again, death 
was the punishment for aggravated forms of theft, and 
the circumstance of aggravation might be found either 
in the place where the theft was committed, as in a 
temple or market-place, or in the value of the property 
stolen, e. g. stealing gold or silver. At the time of Chimal- 
popoca (1415-26), the third king of Mexico, the punish- 
ment for stealing large quantities of maize was death, for 
stealing fowls slavery; but dog-stealing was not an 
offence, " because a dog has teeth to defend himself with " 
(Kohler, p. 95). Theft was undoubtedly a public crime 
in ancient Mexico, though a reminiscence of the times 
when it gave rise to private vengeance only, survived in 
the procedure of Itztepec, where the owner carried out 
the sentence of the court. We read that homicide, 
even of a slave, or of a wife caught by the husband in 
the act of adultery, was punished with death (L. Biart, 
Azteques, p. 167), nay, that attempts to murder were as 
severely punished as murder itself (Biart, p. 201). But 
murder does not deserve to be classed among public 
offences in Aztec law if Kohler (p. 88) is right in asserting 
that the family of the victim were at liberty to pardon 
the murderer and to keep him as a slave in order that he 
might procure, by his labour, means of subsistence for 
those deprived of their natural bread-winner. And the 
same author's statement (p. 92), that he who killed another
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man's slave became himself the slave of the master of 
the slain slave, impresses such act with a purely tortious 
character.
The law of ancient Peru, like that of ancient Mexico, 
was written in blood. Our chief authority is Garcilasso 
de la Vega, and we learn from him that in the code of 
Pachacutec, the Justinian of the Incas, the following 
crimes were capital : treason, rebellion, bribing a judge 
and for a judge to accept a bribe, blasphemy, seeing one 
of the " chosen virgins," incest, sodomy, rape, abduction, 
adultery which was a genuine public crime, but was 
punished as a species of theft fornication, parricide, 
homicide, arson, larceny, to be a loafer. Prescott 
(History of the Conquest of Peru, i. 59. 1847) adds to this 
list the following offences : moving landmarks, diverting 
water-conduits, and destroying bridges. Nor was it 
always the offender alone that paid the price of his 
misdeeds. An earlier Inca, Capac-Yupangui, had ordered 
a whole city to be burnt down because one of its inhabi- 
tants had committed an unnatural offence. Truly 
terrible was the punishment which the law of Pachacutec 
provided for adultery committed by one of the numerous 
wives or concubines of the Inca. The guilty couple were 
burnt alive; their parents, brothers, children, and other 
near relatives, even their slaves, were put to death; their 
llamas were killed. Besides, all the inhabitants of the 
town where the act of adultery had taken place, were 
slain; the town itself was razed to the ground, and not a 
tree was left standing in the district. Almost as cruel 
were the legal consequences of sexual incontinence of the 
priestesses of the Sun. The Inca might, indeed, introduce 
into his harem any of these " chosen maidens." But if 
one of them betrayed an amorous inclination for an 
ordinary mortal, she was buried alive, her lover was 
strangled, her native city destroyed with all its inhabitants 
and the site covered with stones.
122 THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
The term originally used in Greek jurisprudence to 
denote crime proper was ayog, literally an abomination, 
a wrong that demands expiation. This term of art is 
applied in Greek literature to the following offences : 
sacrilege, more especially violations of the right of sanc- 
tuary, leaving the dead unburied, treason, regicide, and 
parricide. It was crimes such as these which fell under the 
cognizance of the Areopagus, the most ancient Athenian 
tribunal. It exercised a jurisdiction over all offences 
against the state and the national religion, of which 
the chief examples were sacrilege, profanation of the 
mysteries, blasphemy, magic, treason, desertion, deliver- 
ing into the hands of the enemy a city or a ship. All 
these crimes were capital; persons convicted of any 
of them were refused burial in Attic soil, their property 
was forfeited to the state, and sometimes, particularly 
in treason by joining the ranks of an enemy at war with 
Athens, the culprit's children were executed with him. 
In all these instances the public character of the wrong 
was apparent from the first, and every citizen, accordingly, 
might institute criminal proceedings. Other offences 
were, from an early date, added to the list of public 
crimes, e.g. stealing corn or cattle the thief, as in Rome, 
being hanged ill-treating one's parents, for which crime 
the sanction was drifiia of the highest degree, which 
was also the punishment of perjury. A law of Dracon 
gave every citizen the right to kill on the spot a man 
accused of murder who dared to offer a sacrifice to the 
gods or to show his face within any of the sacred precincts. 
But it was not before Solon that wrongs to individuals 
were treated as matters of public concern. " The best 
governed city is that in which every citizen feels an injury 
inflicted upon any other citizen, and prosecutes it with as 
much zeal as if he had suffered it himself." These are 
the words, according to Plutarch (Solon, 18), in which 
Solon enunciated the great principle of the solidarity of
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society as against the onslaughts of the criminal, a 
principle to which he gave effect in his system of legisla- 
tion, and which was subsequently fully recognized in 
Attic law. This is the spirit of the criminal law at the 
time of the great orators, and well might Demosthenes 
say : " A citizen institutes proceedings, but the really 
injured party is the state." Of the punishments in use 
in Athens two have already been mentioned, death and 
arifiia. The latter was of three degrees, an/ita in 
the highest degree being generally held to have been 
equivalent to mors civilis. But it really meant much 
more than this; for not only was it hereditary in character, 
passing to the descendants of the criminal, but it excluded 
him and them from the pale of divine, no less than of 
human, law. Confiscation of property was incidental to 
all the more severe forms of punishment, to capital 
punishment, to drijuia in the first degree, to slavery, and 
also to exile, which though technically not a punishment, 
but a legally recognized mode of evading condemnation, 
yet had a good many penal consequences. Legal develop- 
ment, so far as known to us, seems to have run a similar 
course in other Greek cities. It will, therefore, be suffi- 
cient to point out a few peculiarities of extra-Attic crimi- 
nal legislation. In accordance with the pre-eminently 
military character of that state, cowardice was, in Sparta, 
one of the most heinous crimes (Thucydides, i. 5). He 
who took to his heels in battle lost his rights of citizenship; 
his marriage was dissolved; he had to go about unshaven 
and clothed in rags; the first comer might thrash him 
with impunity; he was even under disability to buy or 
sell. Lycurgus made celibacy a crime punishable with 
great severity (Plutarch, Lycurgus, 15; Lysander, 30); 
and similar provisions were found in the criminal codes 
of some other Greek cities. The law of Charondas, which 
constituted, as it were, the common law of Greece (Dareste, 
Nouvelles fitudes, p. 29), treated wrongs to individuals
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as torts merely, and laid down a scale of compositions as 
elaborate as any found in the barbarian codes. But it 
contained also a few rules of criminal law, remarkable 
mainly for the nature of the sanctions with which they 
were enforced. Thus sycophants, besides being heavily 
fined, were ignominiously paraded through the city, 
wearing crowns of tamarisks. Deserters and those who 
had sought to evade service in the field were publicly 
exhibited for three days, attired in women's garments. 
At a stage of legal development at which even murderers 
got off with money payments made to the relatives of 
their victims, such public sanctions are truly notable. 
" Broad as it was, the Hellenic genius could yet sink to the 
level of Jewish bigotry " (Letourneau, p. 340) and would 
punish a town for a religious offence. The best-known 
instance is the complete destruction of the sacrilegious 
city of Cirrha and the consecration of its territory to the 
Pythian Apollo, in execution of a sentence passed by the 
amphictyony of Delphi.
Of the public offences belonging to the first stage of 
Roman legal history i. e. to the period preceding the 
Twelve Tables, two stand out prominently and have 
attracted most attention, viz. perduellio and parricidium. 
The etymology of the former, which has already been 
examined, leaves no doubt that its original meaning was 
treason by adhering to a public enemy at war with Rome, 
and such adherence would generally be manifested in one 
of two ways, by proditio, or by transfugium. The Twelve 
Tables seem to have dealt with this crime; for Marcian 
is quoted in the Digest (48, 4, 3, pr.) as saying : " Lex 
XII tabularum iubet eum qui hostem concitaverit quive 
civem hosti tradiderit capite puniri." The origin of the 
word parricidium has been a puzzle to philologists ancient 
and modern. Priscian writes : " Parricida, quod vel 
a pari componitur, vel a patre; quibusdam a parente 
videtur esse." Laurentius Lydus, who favours the
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latter derivation, is yet in doubt whether the a in parentes 
is short or long, in other words, whether killing xovi; yoviai;, 
one's parents, or TOW? im^Koovi;, subjects or citizens of 
Rome, be meant. Festus apparently takes the word to be 
a compound of par and caedes ; for he writes : " Parricida 
non utique est is qui parentem occidisset, sed qualem- 
cunque hominem indemnatum," and in support of his 
contention he quotes a law of Numa : "si quis hominem 
liberum dolo sciens morti duit, parricidas esto." Modern 
learning has added a further series of interpretations. 
According to Mommsen, parri stands for per, false, 
wrongful, according to Loning for perperam, parricidium 
meaning in either case caedes iniusta, unjustifiable 
homicide. It has also been surmised that the first two 
syllables represent the Latin equivalent of the Indo- 
European pasd, kin, paso, kinsman, Greek nr\6c, (Frohde). 
Brunnenmeister, who adopts the latter interpretation, 
holds that the word meant at first killing a gentilis, but 
that Numa's law gave it a wider signification, viz. murder 
of any freeman. We do not feel competent to judge of 
the relative merits and demerits of these different etymo- 
logical attempts, but, on the current interpretations of 
the term, the crime must have been either parricide, as 
we understand the expression, or murder of a kinsman, 
or murder of a free man in general. The latter construc- 
tion seems to be supported by Numa's law; but our only 
authority for the existence of such a statute is Pliny 
(Hist. nat. xviii. 3), and even he leaves us in complete 
ignorance as to the manner in which the capital punish- 
ment provided by that law was executed. " It can 
scarcely have been by a regular judicial sentence, or we 
should have some record of a change in the law in this 
respect; for capital punishment was not practised in 
historical times in (republican) Eome " (Cherry, p. 60). 
Brunnenmeister is probably right in assuming that the 
punishment sit venia verbo ! was deo necari by the
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proximus agnatus, that is to say, that Numa's law merely 
sanctioned blood-revenge. Indeed, there is nothing to 
show that homicide was a public offence in Rome before 
the Lex Cornelia de Sicariis. Yet parricide must have 
been a public crime from an early date. For not only do 
we read in the Digest (1, 2, 2, 23) that the qmestores 
parricidii were mentioned in the Twelve Tables; several 
crimes of undoubted antiquity were punished, if not as 
parricide, at least after the fashion of parricide. Thus 
Cicero tells us (de legibus, ii. 9) : " sacrum sacrove com- 
mendatum qui clepserit rapsitque parricida esto." It 
is probable that this ancient crime corresponded closely 
to parricide in the modern sense of the term, that it 
gradually came to include murder of other near relatives, 
that in this way its meaning became somewhat vague, 
uncertain and floating, until at last the Lex Pompeia 
defined the relatives whose murder was to be punished 
as parricidium. This view is supported, not only by 
the analogy of Greek law, in which murdering one's 
parents was a public crime from a very early period, 
but by the Roman sources themselves. The text attri- 
buted to the Twelve Tables, " qui parentem necasse 
indicatus erit, ut is obvolutus et obligatus corio devehatur 
in profluentem," is, possibly, not authentic; but Valerius 
Maximus, after reporting that the poena culei, the punish- 
ment of the custodian of the Sibylline books who proved 
unfaithful to his trust, was subsequently applied to the 
parricide, goes on to say : " Pari vindicta parentum ac 
deorum violatio expianda est." Unlawful publication of 
the sacred oracles, parricide and sacrilegium—i. e. theft 
of property dedicated to divine uses form a group of 
ancient crimes, the intimate relationship which they bear 
to each other being proved by the fact that in each case 
the offender was disposed of in the same manner as the 
monstrous birth. They all fell under the competency of 
the quaestores parricidii, and so did peculatus, theft of
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cattle belonging to the state. But we have not yet 
exhausted the criminal law of royal Rome. To do any 
act officially declared unlucky was a capital offence : 
" quaeque augur iniusta nefasta vitiosa dira defixerit, 
irrita infectaque sunt; quique non paruerit, capital esto " 
(Cicero, de legibus, ii. 8). The Vestal virgin who broke her 
vow of chastity was buried alive; her seducer was like- 
wise put to death; if a man saw her nakedness, even 
though quite accidentally, his life was forfeited (Plutarch, 
Num. 10). Sacratio of man and oxen was the punishment 
for ploughing up boundaries : " qui terminum exarasset, 
et ipsum et boves sacros esse " (Festus, voc. " Terminus "). 
This is the first of a series of offences against rural property 
which play a prominent part in the criminal law of the 
Twelve Tables, though they were probably punished long 
before the compilation of that code. " Frugem aratro 
quaesitam furtim noctu pavisse aut secuisse puberi XII 
tabulis capital erat suspensumque Cereri necari iubebant," 
writes Pliny (Hist. nat. xviii. 3, 12). The provision of 
the Twelve Tables (8, 9) is believed to have run as follows : 
" Si impavit in laetam segetem alterius, noxiam sarcito. 
Si noctu impavit secuitve sciens dolo malo, suspensus 
Cereri necator." To bewitch a neighbour's crops, whether 
by day or by night, with intent to blight the harvest, or 
in order to transfer them to one's own land was a crime 
likewise expiated on the arbor infelix. And if we can 
believe Servius (commentary to the Virgilian line, " atque 
mala vites incidere falce novellas"), the same fate 
awaited him who cut another man's trees or vines. For 
causing the death of another by magic or by poison  
both these kinds of murder are included in venenum, the 
term used, according to Mommsen, in the Twelve Tables  
the punishment was death by poison (Pliny, Hist. nat. 
28, 2 & 4). The same statute provided fustuarium 
supplicium for a form of iniuria called in the Twelve 
Tables occentare and carmen condere. Now this clause is
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universally held to apply to gross libel and slander by ribald 
songs; but though those words are undoubtedly capable 
of such interpretation, we beg to submit that they are 
used in the text with their older meaning, viz. reciting 
incantations, so that the crime in question is injuring 
another by means of magic formulae. The statute also 
forbade, under pain of capital punishment, nocturnal 
assemblies in the city and abuse by a patron of his 
fiduciary position : " patronus si client! fraudem fecerit 
sacer esto." There remain certain wrongs for which 
death is the penalty provided by the Twelve Tables, but 
which cannot be regarded as public crimes, since it 
depended upon the injured party whether he wished to 
enforce the sanction. So false testimony, the acceptance 
of a bribe by a judge, and bribery at elections, were 
prosecuted by the citizen prejudiced by the wrong, and it 
was he who executed the capital sentence (Mommsen, 
Romisches Strafrecht, p. 668). The legal nature of arson 
(Gaius, in Digest, 47, 9, 9) is doubtful. Furtum mani- 
festum, which was sanctioned with verberatio, followed by 
addictio, and iniuria, for which talio was the statutory 
satisfaction, were certainly private delicts, since it was 
lawful for the parties to compound. During the three 
centuries which followed the promulgation of the Twelve 
Tables, the criminal law of Rome remained absolutely 
stationary, no fresh crime being added to the early code. 
Individual acts prejudicial to the commonwealth were 
prosecuted as perduellio, till this term became as elastic 
and as comprehensive as crimen maiestatis under the 
Empire. It was in fact by an evasion of the famous 
principle of the Twelve Tables, " privilegia ne irroganto," 
that republican Rome escaped from the inconveniences 
of its scanty criminal legislation. Mos maiorum was 
invoked whenever a punishment was to be inflicted, 
without a precedent, for conduct not forbidden by law. 
This practice was enormously facilitated by the fact that
ANCIENT CRIMINAL CODES 129
the comitia, the legislative assembly, were alone competent 
to try a citizen for a capital offence. Every prosecution, 
as Maine remarks, virtually took the form of a bill of 
pains and penalties, " the people, guardian of its own 
majesty, causing the law to speak even when the law was 
silent " (Du Boys, Peuples anciens, p. 364). Maine 
regards the Lex Calpurnia Repetundarum as the opening 
chapter of a new era in criminal law. But it was in the 
numerous statutes which bear the name of Cornelius 
Sulla that wrongs to individuals were treated, for the 
first time in Roman history, as public crimes.
Turning now to the ancient codes of the Slavs, we find 
that the oldest Russian law-book, the Ruskaia Pravda, 
sanctions blood-revenge for homicide and lays down a 
scale of compositions for other wrongs, but contains 
nothing in the nature of true criminal law. It is in the 
code of Ivan III, promulgated in 1498, soon after the 
expulsion of the Mongols, that the notion of a public 
offence first becomes discernible. The following are the 
crimes for which it provides capital punishment : treason, 
for a slave or serf to kill his master, a crime analogous to 
old-English petit treason, sacrilege, and podmetzchek, an 
offence roughly corresponding to the Roman furtum 
oblatum. Incendiaries and other malefactors caught in 
the act might be killed on the spot; but this is legalized 
revenge, not punishment. The Sudebtnick, practically 
but a new edition of the former code, published by 
Ivan IV in 1550, admits murder to the list of crimes. 
In the Servian code of Stephen Dushan, which is two 
hundred years older than the Sudebtnick, homicide is 
treated as a public offence, being punishable with a fine 
if unpremeditated, with the loss of both hands if pre- 
meditated (art. 66). For certain aggravated forms of 
murder capital punishment is provided; hanging for 
the murder of a prelate, priest or monk, burning alive 
for murdering father, mother, brother or child (art. 69).
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Under the statute of King Otho of Bohemia (1229) the 
murderer must pay blood-money, varying in amount 
with the rank of the victim, to the relatives of the latter, 
unless the crime has been perpetrated in open court, 
when the assassin is at once sentenced and beheaded. 
Dalmatian law is obviously in a stage of transition. The 
traitor receives punishment at the pleasure of the prince, 
who has altogether a very wide discretion in criminal 
matters. The sanction for most offences consists in fines 
payable to the prince, who, in some instances, must hand 
over a moiety to the community. There are, however, 
cases in which the injured party takes part, or even the 
whole, of the money paid by the wrongdoer. Thus the 
composition for homicide goes to the family of the slain 
man, the prince having no claim to any portion thereof. 
The primitive Germanic catalogue of crimes has 
already been quoted on the authority of Tacitus. Of the 
five categories of offences mentioned by him only the last 
requires some explanation. The term cor pore infames 
is generally believed to refer to those guilty of filthy sexual 
practices. But this interpretation runs counter to the 
well-established fact that it was only under Roman and 
Christian influences that carnal offences became punish- 
able among Teutonic peoples. We feel tempted to make 
the suggestion, which is certainly supported by the literal 
meaning of the words in question, that they apply to 
monstrous births, to cripples, and generally to individuals 
afflicted with conspicuous bodily malformations. Tacitus's 
list appears, however, to be incomplete; for there is good 
reason to assume that sacrilege and black magic were 
capital crimes from the first (Brunner, RechtsgeschicUe, 
i. 175), and sorcery, in pagan times, included poisoning 
(Wilda). But if the Edda, a compilation of a compara- 
tively late date and largely influenced by Christian ideas, 
is relied upon to substantiate the claim, advanced for 
instance by Loiseleur (p. 108), that false testimony in a
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capital cause was coeval, as a public offence, with those 
enumerated in the Germania, such assertion is prepos- 
terous and untenable. In the most ancient Teutonic 
sources themselves a group of offences, technically called 
nithings-wo&s, stands out in bold relief. They were the 
only genuine crimes of the period and were all capitally 
sanctioned. Their distinguishing feature was that the 
perpetration of the misdeed at once branded the actor as 
a base, worthless creature; for either breach of faith or 
stealth was a necessary ingredient in every one of them. 
The following are said to have been comprised in the 
original list, or to have been assimilated to nithings-woiiks 
at an early date : treason, whether committed against 
the king or against the nation, desertion, sacrilege, murder 
by magic or by poison, killing in violation of a higher 
peace e. g. that of the thing—killing hostages, murder of 
husband by wife, and vice versa, parricide, murder of other 
near relatives or of an inmate of one's own house, con- 
cealed murder with secret disposal of the body, murder 
after accepting composition and after taking a solemn 
oath to keep the peace, killing a man in his sleep, secret 
theft. Christian morality has been responsible for the 
addition to the list of walreaf, which meant at first 
spoliation of a warrior fallen on the battlefield, later 
of a dead body generally, particularly after burial. It is, 
however, impossible to say whether all of the misdeeds 
enumerated, and if not all which of them, were in olden 
times genuine crimes. For the transition from nithings- 
weorc to bootless offence has been very gradual and 
imperceptible, and, as applied to wrongs against in- 
dividuals, the term " irredeemable," at any rate on the 
Continent, appears to have meant no more than that an 
unwilling party could not be compelled to accept a money 
compensation, if offered. It may safely be asserted that, 
taking the leges barbarorum as a whole, true punishments 
are provided for a very limited number of misdeeds only,
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the following alone being treated everywhere as " death- 
worthy " : serious political crimes, such as treason, sedi- 
tion, desertion, fleeing the country, plotting against the 
duke, offences of a religious character, magic practices 
and poisoning, which is looked upon, even in Christian 
times, not as a species of murder, but as a peculiarly 
dangerous form of sorcery, and is generally co-ordinated 
with bewitching cattle and crops; it is noteworthy that 
in the Anglo-Saxon texts mordhaed, mordweorc does not 
mean murder, but poisoning punished on account of its 
supposed connection with the black arts, as practised in 
pagan times. Only in isolated instances are offences 
against individuals treated as public crimes, theft being 
occasionally, homicide hardly ever, among the exceptions. 
Saxon law alone among the systems of purely indigenous 
growth often punishes where other codes provide compo- 
sitions. Elsewhere a more developed criminal law is 
found only where Roman notions and Roman rules of 
law have been adopted, as among the Langobards, the 
Burgundians and the Visigoths. Generally, wrongs to 
individuals only founded a claim to compensation, and 
in the case of irredeemable offences it rested entirely 
with the injured party whether or not to accept a com- 
position. Nay, even where outlawry was the sanction, 
it depended originally upon the victim or his family 
whether the malefactor should regain his peace, so that 
outlawry cannot be regarded as punishment, but merely 
as a form of procedure adopted in order to compel the 
wrongdoer to come to terms with the aggrieved party. 
By the capitulary legislation of the Merovingian and 
Carlovingian periods the criminal code was considerably 
enlarged. Highway robbery, man-stealing, theft, homi- 
cide, forgery, coining, incest, rape were successively added 
thereto, many of them being placed under ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, as were a number of religious transgressions 
which the capitularies had erected into public crimes,
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Charlemagne going so far as to threaten with punishment 
those who ate meat in Lent. But this golden age of 
criminal jurisprudence was of short duration. With the 
decline and ultimate collapse of the Frankish monarchy 
it fell into decay. Compositions again took the place of 
public punishment, and throughout the lawless middle 
ages the weak and poor alone paid with their bodies for 
their misdeeds, whilst the powerful avenged with a strong 
hand the wrongs they had suffered and wronged others in 
defiance of the law. This was the condition of things in 
the German Empire till with the Carolina effective criminal 
legislation was revived. In England the germs of the 
criminal code are to be found in the bootless offences of 
the Anglo-Saxon laws. " If any one plot against the 
king's life, of himself, or by harbouring of exiles, or of his 
men, let him be liable in his life and in all that he has." 
Thus runs the first criminal enactment (Laws of King 
Alfred, 4). Another law of Alfred imposed death as the 
penalty for fighting in the king's hall if the offender was 
taken in the act. Athelstan (4) made plotting against a 
lord a capital offence and sanctioned walreaf with out- 
lawry, the latter provision being reproduced in Leges 
Henrici I (c. 83, par. 3) in the words : " weilref wargus 
habetur." A law of Ethelred (vii. 9) enacts " that if any 
one fight in a church, or in the king's house, then let all 
he possesses be condemned, and let it be in the king's 
power whether he have life or not." In the laws of 
Cnut (ii. 65) we read : " Housebreaking, and arson, 
and open theft, and open morth, and treason against 
a lord are by secular law botless," an enactment re- 
peated in Leges Henrici I, with the addition of " effrac- 
tio pacis ecclesiae vel manus regis per homicidium." 
Breaking the king's peace is mentioned in nearly all the 
laws, and it need hardly be pointed out that it has become 
the corner-stone of the whole edifice of English criminal 
law.
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Our survey of the provisions of ancient codes has made 
it abundantly clear that the notions which inspired the 
criminal law in its cradle, have survived into compara- 
tively high stages of its evolution. Offences of a religious 
character continue to occupy a prominent place, and the 
desire to wash away the pollution of sin still is, in some 
system at least, the dominant factor in punishment. Of 
Hindu law, for instance, it has been truly remarked 
(Wake, ii. 216) that the test of wrongfulness is impurity 
instead of the reverse, as modern ideas of morality would 
lead us to believe. " As fire consumes everything with 
which it is brought into contact, so the guilt-substance, 
by its natural operation and by the operation of demons 
in which it is embodied, brings suffering and death not 
only to the guilty person, but to whomsoever it clings 
to;" so Oldenberg (Mommsen, Kulturvolker) sums up 
the conception of guilt in Vedic thought. When Moses 
prescribes punishment for great criminals, he generally 
concludes his ordinance with some such phrase as this, 
" so shalt thou put evil away from the midst of thee," 
or " from among you," or " from Israel." It is quite in 
keeping with such views that examples of collective 
responsibility, sometimes embracing all the inhabitants 
of the town of which the culprit is a citizen, are found in 
practically all archaic legislations, that his house, if not 
the whole of his native place, is razed to the ground, 
never to be rebuilt, that his movable property is with- 
drawn from commerce. The Institutes of Menu (ix. 
243, 244) direct : " Let no virtuous prince appropriate 
the wealth of a criminal in the highest degree; for he, who 
appropriates it through covetousness, is contaminated 
with the same guilt : Having thrown such a fine into the 
waters, let him offer it to Varuna; or let him bestow it 
on some priest of eminent learning in the scriptures." 
We see that Hindu priestcraft has anticipated the papal 
non olet. Holiness is an antidote to the virus of sin,
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and, instead of being destroyed, the criminal's chattels 
may be devoted to divine uses. This is the meaning of 
consecratio, and " publicatio is but a degenerated con- 
secratio " (Du Boys, Peuples anciens, p. 252). So in later 
Roman law, when the treasury of the state had taken the 
place of a deity as the destination of the offender's con- 
fiscated property, the proceeds thereof and the fines 
imposed in criminal causes were spent in the construction 
or decoration of temples, or in providing public games in 
honour of a god (Livy, x. 23, 33, 47; Puny, Hist. not. 
33, 4). Animals, no less than men, are defiled by being 
made participants in crime, and, especially in cases of 
unnatural offence, they are very generally killed along 
with the human culprit, or alone whilst the latter is 
banished, as in Norwegian law, or awarded arbitrary 
punishment in the discretion of the judge, as in Mahometan 
law. Fear of magic persists in undiminished strength, 
and, as before, the organized force of the community is 
directed towards the repression of the wizard and of his 
fellow-worker, the poisoner. More than ever is sexual 
morality enforced by penal sanctions. Unnatural offences 
come to be regarded, almost universally, as most atrocious 
crimes, and rape, seduction, adultery, and even simple 
fornication assume, more and more frequently, the 
character of public wrongs. Treason has now acquired a 
wider meaning. It is no longer necessary, in order to 
incur punishment, to make common cause with a foe 
engaged in warfare with one's country, or to commit a 
serious breach of martial law; at this stage the internal 
security of the state is guarded as jealously. Plotting 
against the sovereign or against the established order of 
government, rebellion, sedition figure prominently in all 
the codes, emigration and leze majesty in some of them. 
No longer, however, are offences against invisible powers 
and attacks directed against the social organism itself 
the sole concern of the criminal law. In the course
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of legal evolution, as traceable in the codes of ancient 
civilizations, avenging justice descends from its ethereal 
heights and commences to take notice of injuries suffered 
by the individual citizen. But strange to say, wrongs to 
property are punished long before wrongs to the person; 
theft has become a public crime at a period when the 
manslayer is still face to face with the family of the slain 
man alone. Slowly and painfully the criminal law begins 
to safeguard by public sanctions the life of the subject, 
at first only lives regarded as specially sacred, then 
ordinary lives temporarily enjoying a special protection; 
but it is not till a high cultural level has been reached that 
the sacredness of human life in abstracto is recognized in 
criminal legislation.
The causes responsible for the successive accretions to 
the criminal code supply the key to the meaning of 
punishment at different epochs in social history. Factors 
too numerous have been at work to allow of a detailed 
examination of each of them. No doubt the application 
of the fundamental notions to new fields has in itself led 
to a considerable expansion of criminal law. We may, 
for instance, be sure that the motive for the punishment 
of drunkenness in Mahometan, in Chinese and in Mexican 
law arose within the sphere of magic conceptions, alcohol, 
like other poisons, being credited, on account of its peculiar 
action, with supernatural properties. Again, by extensive 
interpretation new classes of acts were brought under the 
definitions of original crimes. Legal fictions have been 
resorted to from the infancy of the criminal law and have 
proved valuable expedients for furthering its growth. 
Among the Hurons, we read (Steinmetz, Ethnologische 
Studien, ii. 343), people who, for one reason or another, 
became a nuisance to the village, notorious thieves, 
adulterers, disturbers of the domestic peace of their 
neighbours, those who intermeddled with other people's 
affairs, persons who engaged in suspicious correspondence 
with strangers, were accused of possessing the evil eye or of
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practising the black arts. Similarly, Neuhaus calls the 
accusation of sorcery " the Kaffir state machinery to get 
obnoxious subjects out of the way." Both among the 
Red Indians and among the African Negroes we may 
distinguish, to use modern legal phraseology, between 
real and constructive sorcery, the latter covering a mis- 
cellaneous assortment of misdeeds which have nothing 
to do with sorcery, but are, by legal fiction, prosecuted 
and punished as such. We have already seen how Roman 
jurisprudence stretched the sense of the term perduellio, 
which originally meant adherence to an alien enemy, till 
it covered every act prejudicial to the state, and how 
mores maiorum, precedents purely fictitious, were appealed 
to in order to justify the punishment of wrongs not 
provided for in the criminal law. Regard for the welfare 
of the commonwealth was here undoubtedly the impelling 
force. Public policy may utilize the penal code to protect 
the citizen from harm in circumstances in which he is 
incapable of protecting himself effectively. The punish- 
ment of nocturnal offences, the same wrong, when com- 
mitted in the light of the day, going unpunished, may, 
perhaps, be so accounted for, though the fact must not be 
overlooked that he who works in darkness, or in the dark, 
is suspected of using, or of co-operating with, the powers 
of darkness. The severity of Teutonic law on nithings- 
weorc admits of a similar explanation. But the principle 
in question certainly underlies the punishment of theft 
in Mexican law, where dog-stealing is not an offence 
" because a dog has teeth to defend himself with." 
Among all the influences, however, which have helped to 
promote the growth of criminal law, three have been 
mainly instrumental in shaping the course of its develop- 
ment. They are 
1. The Evolution of Religion,
2. Kingship,
3. The Institution of Peace.
CHAPTER IV
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION ON THE 
EVOLUTION OF PUNISHMENT
As mankind advances from savagery to barbarism, 
and from barbarism to civilization, the spirit-world 
assumes more and more tangible shape, till at last the 
featureless phantoms which are primitive man's objects 
of veneration have been transformed into such clearly 
cut anthropomorphous deities as inhabit the Olympus 
and the Valhalla. The religions of ancient civilizations 
have their sources in hero-worship and Nature-worship. 
But whether in origin ghosts of former leaders of men or 
deified powers of Nature, the gods are now brought into 
intimate relation with the national life of their wor- 
shippers ; they become guardians of their morals and 
guarantors of their corporate welfare. It is easy to see 
how a departed chief or ruler continues to evince a pro- 
found interest both in the conduct and in the welfare of 
his people. In the moralization of the Nature-gods the 
conversion of magic into religious conceptions must have 
played an important part. Among the lower races, we 
have seen, certain wrongs, offences against sexual morality 
in particular, are believed to cause, in some unexplained 
supernatural way, failure of crops. At a higher cultural 
level, when the fruits of the land are looked upon as the 
bounty of Mother Earth, Gaea, Tellus, Demeter, Ceres, 
a bad harvest comes to be regarded as the visible sign of 
her anger, the act which kindles her wrath, as a sin against 
that deity, and the virtue of which such act is a violation,
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as one of her special attributes. Thus Vesta, who in 
origin is but the Earth-Mother under another name, 
becomes the goddess of chastity.
It is still only offences against themselves which the 
gods avenge. But the gods are no longer the self-centred, 
selfish beings that do not easily take offence unless their 
own material comforts are interfered with. They have 
identified themselves with the community in which thev 
dwell, share in its aims and aspirations, are concerned 
about its fate, and feel as an injury to themselves every 
act prejudicial to the public weal. The god of war leads 
his earthly hosts into battle; the enemies of his followers 
are his enemies, and he who makes common cause with 
the foe is not only a traitor to his people, he is a traitor 
to the war-god as well. Offences against the external 
security of the state, which were, perhaps, crimes before 
they were sins, now become sins as well as crimes and 
are henceforward punished because they are sins. It 
would not, however, be correct to assert in general terms 
that offences against society are converted at this stage 
into offences against the gods. Society is an abstract idea 
which the untrained mind of races just emerging from 
barbarism is hardly capable of forming; and only where 
the danger of an act to the commonwealth is so obvious 
as, for instance, in joining an alien enemy, does the notion 
of a crime against the state immediately arise. It is in 
the common worship of the national gods that a people 
first discovers its national unity and becomes conscious 
of its corporate existence. Even attacks upon established 
government and the constitution of the state are con- 
ceived, in the first instance, as acts of impiety against 
the national deities, as partaking of the nature of sacrilege. 
In ancient Greece and Rome such notions survived well 
into the classical period, and writers never hesitate to 
describe conspiracies against the republic as plots against 
the religion of the state. " Rebellion," says the Ta
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Tsing Leu Lee, " is an attempt to violate the divine order 
of things on earth "; that is to say, a purely political 
offence is explained by reference to things divine. It is 
quite true, the anger of the gods is but a reflex of the 
indignation which a course of conduct excites in the 
minds of their worshippers; to be obnoxious to a higher 
being, it must first be obnoxious to man. But its moral 
valuation upon earth is not sufficient of itself to annex 
to the act a penal sanction. The human judgment must 
be confirmed and ratified by the heavenly tribunal before 
it can find expression in a rule of criminal law.
To become enforceable by punishment, then, a rule 
of conduct must make a return journey to the abodes of 
the immortals. The ascension escapes the observation 
of men; its coming down to earth remains deeply engraven 
in their minds and gives birth, before long, to the belief 
that the law is divinely revealed. This is an article of 
faith common to all peoples of archaic culture. Twice 
did Thoth, the Trismegistos of the Greeks, the personifi- 
cation of divine intelligence, visit Egypt, bringing down 
with him on both occasions the law to be obeyed by its 
inhabitants, and the sacred books of Hermes were its 
code of laws until the latest period of its history. Brahma 
taught the laws to his son Menu in a hundred thousand 
verses, which Menu explained to the primitive world in 
the Dherma-Sdstra. Jehovah dictated the law to Moses, 
Allah to Mahomet. Themis, the assessor of Zeus, was 
the source of those early dooms which were older than 
law and made law. Minos had learnt from Zeus the laws 
which he gave to the Cretans; inspired by Minerva, we 
are told by Valerius Maximus (i. 2), Zaleucus became the 
legislator of Locri. Similarly, Lycurgus, Numa, and 
other ancient lawgivers claimed that their systems eman- 
ated from a divine source. It is not, therefore, without 
good cause if Plato opines that to disobey the laws means 
to disobey the gods.
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The offended deity still turns in his anger, not only 
against the individual offender, but against the state in 
which the wicked act is perpetrated or tolerated. The 
idea that a single citizen may by this impiety bring utter 
ruin on the whole of the nation, is one particularly slow 
to die. When the statutes of Hermes were mutilated, en- 
lightened Athens went in fear and trembling lest the sin of 
the one be visited on all. The preamble of a Bale statute 
against cursing and swearing, dated 1490, recites as a fact 
of experience that " God avenges such wickedness upon 
mankind with many secret punishments and divers public 
calamities, such as wars, famines, deaths, hailstorms, 
frosts, and bad harvests." The great problem to be faced, 
then, is how to avert the catastrophe which threatens 
the people. The priests were naturally called upon to 
appease the divine wrath, and they thus became the 
first judges in criminal causes. The belief that the law 
was divinely ordained, further strengthened the sacerdotal 
monopoly and proved a formidable obstacle to the 
secularization of the criminal code; for the sacred texts 
were in the keeping of the priests, who alone had access 
to their mysteries and became their sole interpreters. 
Indications of the intimate relationship in which dispen- 
sation of criminal justice stood to the discharge of sacer- 
dotal functions, are, accordingly, found in the early 
records of most ancient peoples. We learn from Aelian 
(Var. Hist.,lib. xiv., c. 34) that in Egypt the tribunals 
entrusted with jurisdiction over causes which concerned 
society and public order were chosen, from the remotest 
antiquity, from among the priestly order the priestly 
colleges of Memphis, Thebes and Heliopolis sending ten 
members each to the supreme court. Among the Hebrews, 
though the judiciary was secular (Exod. xviii. 21) and 
elective (Deut. xvi. 18), the supremacy of the priesthood 
in criminal matters is expressly recognized (Deut. xvii. 
8, 12); moreover, every judge is God's representative on
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earth (Deut. i. 17), and the court is, for this reason, in 
several passages (Exod. xxi. 6, xxii. 8, 28; Deut. xix. 17), 
called elohim. In Hindu law criminal jurisdiction apper- 
tains to the king, but it is a function of an essentially 
religious character; for, in punishing the guilty, "he 
performs, as it were, a perpetual sacrifice," " each day a 
sacrifice with a hundred thousand gifts " (Menu, viii. 
303, 306). Among the Teutons the administration of 
punitive justice, both in war and in peace, was the pre- 
rogative of the priests. " Ceterum neque animadvertere 
neque vincire neque verberare quidem nisi sacerdotibus 
permissum, non quasi in poenam, nee ducis jussu, sed 
velut deo imperante, quern adesse bellantibus credunt" 
(Tacitus, Germania, c. 7); and again, " sacerdotes quibus 
turn " (i. e. at the thing) " et coercendi ius est" (ibid., 
c. 11). In Gaul the Druids were the supreme judges in 
criminal, as well as in civil, causes. The gods themselves 
invested the Athenian Areopagus with its judicial powers, 
as we learn from the Eumenides of Aeschylus, where the 
traditional history of the origin of that most ancient 
criminal court is given at length. Historical evidence 
that in olden times the punishment of criminals fell within 
the province of the priest, is afforded by the fact that 
when the sovereign powers of the king were divided 
among the nine archons, the duty of conducting the pre- 
liminary inquiry in criminal matters and of presenting 
the case to the Areopagus devolved on the second archon 
who succeeded to the supreme pontificate. The priest 
appears to have been the sole judicial organ of ancient 
Etrurian society. But already in the opening chapters 
of Roman history the temporal power is seen invested 
with criminal jurisdiction, that of the college of pontiffs 
being restricted to certain religious offences committed 
by members of ecclesiastical corporations, the Vestal 
Virgins for instance. Yet though the king alone pro- 
nounced on the guilt or innocence of an accused person,
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the pontiff was the necessary adjunct of secular justice. 
For the sentence did not become effective till, by the 
terrible formula of the sacratio, he had given it its supreme 
sanction, and it was he who carried it into execution.
Not among the Romans alone did the execution of 
criminals form part of the official duties of the priest. 
Savage communities, we have seen, in order to escape 
the vengeance of the spirits, put the offending member 
to death or expel him from the tribe. At the stage now 
under review the belief gains ground that the surest way 
to appease the ire of the deity is to offer up to him the 
individual that has incurred his displeasure. Capital 
punishment thus assumes the form of a human sacrifice, 
the immolation of the victim naturally devolving on the 
priesthood. The term devovere is applied, in Exod. 
xxii. 19, to the execution of sinners; in 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 9 
we are told how seven of Saul's sons were hanged " before 
the Lord" that the famine might cease with which 
Jehovah had visited upon the people the guilt of Saul 
and of "his bloody house." "The Hebrew cherem," 
says Prof. Kuenen (Religion of Israel, i. 290 seq., quoted 
in Westermarck, i. 439), " is properly dedication to Jahveh, 
which in reality amounted to destruction or annihilation. 
The persons who were ' dedicated,' generally by a solemn 
vow, to Jahveh, were put to death, frequently by fire, 
whereby the resemblance to an ordinary burnt-offering 
was rendered still more apparent." Polytheism, in its 
evolution, assigns to each deity the control of a special 
department of human activities, and the criminal is 
sacrificed to the particular god whose sensibilities he has 
hurt by his misdeed. Thus in ancient Mexico the man 
who stole gold or silver vessels was flayed and offered up 
to Xipe, the patron-god of the goldsmiths (Bancroft, 
ii. 458). Thus in Rome certain forms of theft of agri- 
cultural produce were an outrage on Ceres, to whom the 
thief paid the penalty on the gallows, whilst the son
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wanting in filial piety was sacrificed to the penates. No- 
where, indeed, is the original connection between public 
punishments and human sacrifices more apparent than 
in the criminal law of ancient Rome. The oldest Latin 
word for punishment itself is supplicium, a term derived 
from the posture of the victim, when about to receive the 
fatal blow, thus affording unmistakable proof that the 
law at first knew no other than capital punishment, and 
that the latter was sacrificial in character. Again, 
sentence of death was called sacratio, and " sacratio, like 
the Greek avdOr/^a, meant the deliverance of a person to 
a deity" (Mommsen, Romisches Strafrecht, 901), the 
criminal being always dedicated to the god against whom 
he was supposed to have sinned, by some such formula 
as " sacer esto Jovi Capitolino," " sacer esto Diti." Hence 
a convicted criminal was homo sacer ; " homo sacer is est 
quern populus iudicavit ob maleficium" (Festus, voc. 
sacer mons), and a criminal statute is called lex sacrata: 
" sacratae leges sunt, quibus sanctum est, qui quid 
adversus eas fecerit, sacer alicui deorum (sit), sicut familia 
pecuniaque" (Festus, ibid.). Quite apart from the 
knowledge to be gained from these terms of art, sufficient 
information relating to the details of the execution is 
furnished by the authorities not to leave any doubt that 
it was carried out with sacrificial rites. From the veiling 
of the head to the descent of the hatchet every step was 
accompanied by mysterious formulae, of which a few have 
come down to us, and the whole procedure was " a faithful 
reproduction of the immolation of an animal" (Momm- 
sen, op. cit., 918). Like the sacratio hominis, the con- 
secratio bonorum was effected by means of a complicated 
religious ceremonial. If the incontinent Vestal was 
buried alive, the intention was to offer her up in the flesh 
to Tellus, the goddess against whom she had sinned. 
Among the Teutons criminals were not merely executed, 
but sacrificed to the gods. In Scandinavia, at any rate,
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they were beheaded or had the spine broken on the 
stone of sacrifice, or were drowned in a sacred pond; 
there, as elsewhere, the rope too was regarded as a sacred 
instrument (von Amira, Zweck und Mittel, 58, 59; 
Maurer, BeJcehrung des norwegischen Stammes, ii. 195, 196). 
The capital jurisdiction of the Swedish Uodgodars was 
founded on the immolation of the offenders, which formed 
part of their sacerdotal functions (Du Boys, Peuples 
modernes, i. 64). The Lex Frisonum provides (Add. iii. 
12) : " qui fanum effregerit et ibi aliquid de sacris tulerit, 
ducitur ad mare, et ibi in sabulo, quod accessus maris 
operire solet, fmduntur aures eius et castratur et im- 
molatur deis quorum templa violavit." There is evidence 
that the Franks sacrificed to the gods thieves previously 
convicted (Brunner, Deutsche Eechtsgeschichte, i. 175). 
In Gaul the punishment of criminals was to be burnt alive 
in honour of the gods; " supplicia eorum, qui in furto aut 
latrocinio aut alia qua noxia sint comprehensi, gratiora 
dis immortalibus esse arbitrantur; sed cum eius generis 
copia deficit, etiam ad innocentium supplicia descendunt " 
(Caesar, de bello Gallico, vi. 16).
But is the sinner always an oblation acceptable to the 
gods ? To force upon them an unwelcome gift would 
mean to add insult to injury. In some cases the form 
of punishment employed is such as at once to leave the 
deity his choice, e. g. where the offender is exposed in a 
leaky skiff or sent to sea in a rudderless boat. In other 
instances, as among the Western Teutons (Brunner, in 
Mommsen, Kulturvolker, and Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 
i. 176, ii. 468), the divine will was ascertained by means 
of an ordeal which preceded the sacrificial act. This is 
not the ordinary ordeal, which is evidentiary in character 
and serves to test the guilt or innocence of an accused 
person. Here the culprit is already convicted before the 
deity is appealed to, the sole object of the appeal being
to discover whether the god will receive him as an offering.
L
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The same idea underlies the provision met with in more 
than one ancient system of law, that a criminal is to be 
pardoned if one or more attempts to execute him have 
miscarried. The Scottish Regiam majestalem, for in- 
stance, enacts (iv. 18) : "Si latro suspensus fuerit et 
postea cadat de furca, quietus erit ulterius de furto." 
From the results of the ordeals rules would be evolved 
in course of time defining with precision the classes of 
offenders whose blood the deity will, or will not, accept. 
If the gods raise no claim to the head of the culprit, 
it does not follow that he escapes scot-free. A sacrifice 
offered and rejected does not appease the divine wrath. 
To avert the calamities with which the offended god would 
otherwise avenge himself on the state, the accursed person 
must be got rid of. But it is not enough to expel him 
from the city and to exclude him from his native soil. 
Those bonds must be formally broken which, in the sight 
of the deity, make him one with his people. At this 
stage, accordingly, excommunication, the religious isola- 
tion of the offender, becomes the dominant idea in exile. 
The exact meaning of the Hebrew kerith is a matter of specu- 
lation and of dispute among the learned; but under what- 
ever further disabilities the sinner who had incurred that 
punishment may have been labouring, so much is certain 
that he was " cut off from the presence of the Lord" 
(Lev. xxii. 3), " cut off from among the congregation " 
(Numb. xix. 20). In Hindu jurisprudence interdiction is 
a sanction applied with the avowed object of preventing 
the community contracting the contagion of guilt from 
great criminals who refuse or fail to undergo the pre- 
scribed purifications and expiations. Funeral rites are 
performed for the sinner, as if he were dead. A pot of 
water is overturned, and the words at the same tune 
uttered : " I deprive N.N. of water." The person so excom- 
municated is henceforth precluded from all intercourse 
with the pure (Oldenberg, in Mommsen, Kulturvolker).
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Both in Borne and in Greece exile was not looked upon 
as a punishment. " Exilium non supplicium est, sed 
perfugium portusque supplicii. Itaque nulla in lege 
nostra reperietur, ut apud ceteras civitates, maleficium 
ullum exilio esse multatum," says Cicero (pro Caecina, 
34); and the same is true of the Greek <pvyij. Yet in 
either country the quasi-voluntary abjuration of the 
realm was followed by a solemn exclusion from the 
religious cult. In the well-known aquae et ignis interdictio, 
"aqua" meant the lustral water, "ignis" the sacrificial 
fire (Festus). Similarly, the Spartan exile was cut off 
from that fire (Herodot., vii. 231), and Sophocles (Oedipus 
Rex, 229, 250) has preserved for us the terrible formula 
pronounced against the Athenian fugitive from justice : 
" Let him flee the country and never again enter the 
temples. Let no citizen speak to him nor receive him; 
let none allow him to join in his prayers or sacrifices. 
Let no man offer him the lustral water." " He who 
took meat or drink with him, or merely touched him, 
must purify himself, says the law " (Plato, leg. ix.). We 
have mentioned in the preceding chapter that arista in 
the highest degree meant interdictio sacrorum as well as 
mors civilis. It is remarkable that both in Rome and in 
Greece exclusion from the community was a necessary 
preliminary to the execution of a capital sentence; the 
ties which bound the offender to society had to be formally 
severed even before death finally broke them. The act 
by which the Roman convict was " a republica eiuratus " 
was certainly of a religious character; '' lex horrendi 
carminis erat," says Livy. It is probable that the erasure 
of the name of the condemned Athenian from the list of 
his demos had, originally at least, a similar import. The 
outlawry of druidic Gaul was excommunication pure and 
simple; the criminal was excluded from the sacrifices, 
with results described by Caesar (de bello Galileo, vi. 13)
as follows : " Quibus ita est interdictum, ii numero
L 2.
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impiorum ac sceleratorum habentur; ab iis omnes dece- 
dunt, aditum eorum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex 
contagio incommodi accipiant, neque iis petentibus ius 
redditur, neque honos ullus communicatur."
Immolation and excommunication of the offender are 
undoubtedly the most effective means, but they are not 
the only means, of placating an irate god. The trans- 
gression may be of a venial character, and expiatory rites 
are then sufficient to rehabilitate the wrongdoer in the 
eye of the deity. The idea of substitution suggests itself 
at an early date, and the scapegoat takes his place on 
the altar of sacrifice. The goodwill of the god may be 
recovered by liberal offerings, or lustration may be resorted 
to, to wash away the impurity of guilt. We thus arrive 
at the distinction between wrongs which rouse the divine 
wrath to such a point that nothing but the blood of the 
culprit or his removal from the community can avert a 
calamity, and wrongs which may otherwise be atoned for, 
in other words, between sins which are, and sins which 
are not, crimes. It is not always the gravity of the 
offence that makes the difference; a competing right or a 
competing duty may preclude a sin from attaining to the 
dignity of a crime. Herein lies the reason why homicide 
is so late in finding a place in the criminal code. The 
primitive view is well expressed by Mrs. Eastman, who says 
(Dacotas, p. 65) : " When murder is committed, it is an 
injury to the deceased, not a sin against the Great Spirit." 
Whilst the savage regards homicide as nothing but a 
tort to the slain man to be avenged by the family of the 
latter, the progress of moral evolution has erected it into 
an offence against the national gods as well. But the 
right of the victim to be avenged and the right of his 
relatives to avenge him, hallowed as they are by im- 
memorial custom, stand in the way, for long periods of 
time, of the claim of the deity to the head of the offender. 
The belief thus arises that to appease the divine anger
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nothing more is required than for the assassin to undergo 
ceremonial expiation, or that the community is safe if 
he leaves the country till the miasma of sin has become 
sufficiently dilute to be cleansed away by purificatory 
rites.
" Ah! nimium faoiles, qui tristia orimina caedis
Fluminea tolli posse putatis aqua." OVID : Fast. i. 2.
Though homicide, then, is a sin, private vengeance 
prevents its becoming a sin heinous enough to call for 
public punishment. Where the custom of revenge does 
not enter into competition, the gods demand and get their 
pound of flesh. Murder committed in the bosom of the 
family excites no reaction on the part of the other kins- 
men, and parricide, accordingly, becomes a crime at a 
comparatively early date. But even within the sphere 
of crime proper there is room for expiatory measures other 
than punishment. A death-worthy offence has been 
committed; the culprit has escaped or is unknown; a 
public sacrifice or some other purificatory ceremony is 
required to propitiate the deity and to remove the taint 
from the people. In the face of damning proof of his 
guilt Publius Horatius is acquitted by the comitia; the 
gods have been deprived of their due, and atonement has 
to be made for the city (Livy, i. 26). In these instances 
ritual purgation is in the nature of a penal substitute 
resorted to where the infliction of punishment is either 
impracticable or inexpedient. There are, however, 
systems of ancient law in which other modes of conciliat- 
ing the offended god are recognized as equivalent to public 
punishment, with the result that the criminal who has 
made his peace with the unseen powers can no longer be 
called to account in the tribunals of the state. Before 
the Spanish conquest of Mexico, the Aztecs, once in the 
course of their lives, confessed and were absolved by their 
priests. This religious absolution had a legal effect;
150 THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
once granted, it was held to extinguish all crimes previously 
committed and criminal liability even to the temporal 
power. Long after the conquest, Indians charged with 
crimes would hand to the court certificates of confession 
from their curates and would plead absolution in bar of 
criminal proceedings (Prescott, op. cit., Introd. i. 54; 
M. Chevalier, in Revue des deux Mondes, t. ix. livr. 15, 
Mars 1845). Moreover, every four years at the Tezcatli- 
poca feast, a general remission of sins was proclaimed, 
which, probably, afforded a complete protection against 
prosecution for past offences and operated as a general 
amnesty besides (Kohler, AzteJcen, p. 84). According 
to Islamitic doctrine, repentance manifested by the 
voluntary appearance of the culprit before the imam or 
before the cadi effaces his crime in the sight of God. 
And since social justice has no rights against a man other 
than those which it holds of God, it ought not to proceed 
against him whom Allah himself has forgiven. In Hindu 
jurisprudence penance and expiation mitigate temporal 
punishment even for the most heinous offences. " On 
such of those four, as have not actually performed an 
expiation, let the king legally inflict corporal punishment, 
together with a fine " (Menu, ix. 236). But "criminals 
of all the classes, having performed an expiation, as or- 
dained by law, shall not be marked on the forehead, but 
condemned to pay the highest fine" (Menu, ix. 240). 
The recognition by the state of the equivalence of cere- 
monial practices and punishments appears perfectly 
rational if we remember the principle which, at this stage, 
governs public punishment itself. It is inflicted with the 
sole object of warding off such public calamities as are 
expected to result from the wrath of the god offended by 
the crime. If the latter has been appeased by other 
means, it would be gratuitous cruelty to make the culprit 
suffer. The essence of punishment lies in the protection. 
of the community, and not in the infliction of an evil
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upon the person that undergoes it; and though the 
public sanctions in use, viz. death and exile, are obviously 
felt by him as evils of the first magnitude, such effect is 
merely accidental, and not at all intended. In this view 
the ancient theory of punishment and the modern doctrine 
of social defence meet.
For long periods of time the idea survives that the 
state is collectively answerable to the gods for the crime 
of any one of its citizens. When at last it gives way to 
the recognition of individual liability, to the principle 
that the wrongdoer alone is responsible for his misdeeds, 
the belief that punishment is divinely ordained has struck 
roots too deep to lose its hold upon the mind of man. 
The state, in striking down malefactors, is now looked 
upon as fulfilling a divine mission. Social punishment has 
been divested of its utilitarian character and has become 
a blind instrument of divine justice. The vengeance of 
the gods is fearful in proportion to their might, and their 
lieutenants on earth, not to be remiss in the discharge of 
their duty, faithfully copy the divine original. Whilst, 
before, punishment never overstepped the limits pre- 
scribed by the necessity of accomplishing a definite object, 
its harshness and cruelty now knows no bounds. More- 
over, the scope of the mandate is extremely wide, the 
powers of the agent being sometimes conceived as coex- 
tensive with those of the principal. Punishment then is 
no longer circumscribed by the capacities for suffering of 
the criminal as a finite being; the soul itself becomes 
vulnerable by the sword of public justice. Thus the true 
end of the Chinese punishment of death " by a slow and 
painful execution " is to destroy the future, as well as the 
present, life of the offender, to prevent his existence either 
as a man or as a recognizable spirit. Again, criminal 
legislation is no longer content to prescribe the sanctions 
to be enforced in this world; it determines the punish- 
ments, too, which the transgressor is to suffer after death,
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sometimes, as in the Ordinances of Menu, with a casuistry 
bordering on the grotesque. The close assimilation of 
social to divine justice and the idea that the magistrate, 
in punishing offenders, acts, not merely as the delegate, 
but as the plenipotentiary of the deity upon earth, also 
account for the belief that temporal punishment is a 
complete atonement for sin as well as for crime. " Men 
who have committed offences, and have received from 
kings the punishment due to them, go pure to heaven, 
and become as clear as those who have done well," says 
Menu (viii. 318). Similar notions underlie the teaching 
of the medieval Church that the body of the heretic must 
be consumed by flames if his soul is to be saved from 
eternal damnation.
CHAPTER V
THE INFLUENCE OF EARLY KINGSHIP ON THE EVOLUTION 
OF PUNISHMENT
THE constitution of primitive communities is purely 
democratic, the chief being, at the best, primus inter pares. 
In the course of evolution, however, the powers of the 
latter constantly grow, till a stage of despotic rule is 
reached in the history of most progressive communities. 
Now, a people whose infancy has been nurtured in an 
atmosphere of self-government can never entirely forget 
its past, cannot grasp the idea of absolute authority 
residing in the hands of a mere mortal, but persists in 
regarding omnipotence as an attribute of its deities alone. 
As soon, therefore, as the chief or king becomes invested 
with unlimited powers, he necessarily ceases to be human 
and is raised to the dignity of a god. In Loango the king 
is called samba or pongo, i. e. god. In the Sandwich 
Islands he is the incarnation of the deity (Vaccaro, 
Genesi, 54). Among the Natchez the chief was regarded 
as a superhuman being (Letourneau, 51, quoting Charle- 
voix); the rajahs whom the tribes of the Kuchis obey, 
have sprung from a divine stock (Dalton, Ethnology of 
Bengal, 293); in the theocratic kingdom of Tibet the 
monarch is a divine personage, reputed immortal. In 
Polynesia " the chief is believed to be made of material 
superior to that out of which simple mortals are fashioned'' 
(Letourneau, 58); " the high position of the prince being 
expressed in a number of ceremonies, putting him on a
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level with the gods " (Ratzel, i. 291). The same hiero- 
glyphic symbol expresses kingship and divinity; so com- 
pletely assimilated to the gods was the Egyptian Pharaoh, 
"the living image of Ammon" (Thonissen). The Hindu 
king was formed " of eternal particles drawn from the 
substance of Indra, Payana, Yama, Surya, of Agni and 
Varuna, of Chandra and Cuvera. And since a king was 
composed of particles drawn from those chief guardian 
deities, he consequently surpasses all mortals in glory. . . . 
He is a powerful divinity, who appears in a human shape " 
(Menu, vii. 4, 5, 8). In the Middle Kingdom the emperor 
is venerated as " the Son of Heaven " and is the recognized 
mediator with Heaven, his father. No less pretentious 
were the claims of the Mikado. The Inca, " the Son of 
the Sun," governed from on high the mortals, his subjects. 
The Aztec ruler was descended from the gods, a god 
himself, well able to control the forces of Nature; and it 
was, therefore, quite in the fitness of things that, when 
taking the coronation oath, he engaged, inter alia, to 
cause the rain to fall at the proper season, to give his land 
good harvests, and to prevent floods (Antonio de Solis, 
Conquista de Mejico, i. 494). To the Greeks the king 
was not exactly a god, but, at any rate, " the man most 
powerful to conjure up the wrath of the gods " (Sophocles, 
Oedipus Rex, 34), a sacred being flaadelg ISQOI, says 
Pindar, " the man but for whose intervention no prayer 
was efficacious, no sacrifice acceptable " (Fustel de Cou- 
langes, p. 208). Similar notions underlay primitive king- 
ship in ancient Rome; and when after more than four 
centuries of republican government all political power 
became once more concentrated in one hand, the Caesars 
had, by a transparent fiction, to become divi, had either 
to be deified in their lifetime, or, at any rate, to be clothed 
with an indefeasible claim to posthumous apotheosis, if 
a foundation, comprehensible to the subject, was to be 
found for their autocratic rule. So indissoluble has
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proved the association, in the human mind, of unlimited 
power with divine beings. " Where religion is too advanced 
for the actual deification of the king, as in Western Europe, 
he may yet be God's representative " (Hobhouse, i. 62). 
When, therefore, on the ruins of the feudal structure the 
new despotism raised its head, the doctrine of the divine 
right of kingship was coined, and " the king who could 
not be God Himself proclaimed himself at least God's 
vicegerent " (ibid.). Even a Filmer could find no better 
apology for the absolutist pretensions of the Stuarts.
The immediate consequence of the bestowal of divine 
honours upon the monarch is that every act of rebellion 
against his authority, every mark of irreverence to the 
throne assumes the character of sacrilege. In Polynesia, 
to speak disdainfully of the prince or of his government 
was a sin so heinous that nothing short of a human sacrifice 
could atone for it (Ellis, Polynesian Researches, iii. 123). 
Under Chaka, the Kaffir ruler, every sneeze or clearing 
of the throat in the tyrant's presence was punished 
with death, and so was every dry eye at the death of a 
member of the royal house (Ratzel, ii. 444). He who 
made a disparaging remark about the Inca incurred 
capital punishment as for blasphemy (Letourneau, 105, 
quoting Zarate, Pcrou, ii. 71). In the Greek city-states, 
during the monarchical period, treason against the king 
was called doe/Seta. The Digest (lib. xlviii., tit. 4. 1) 
explicitly states that crimen maiestatis is assimilated to 
sacrilege. In the Byzantine Empire the technical term 
for this offence was xaQooiowis (Mommsen, Romisches 
Strafrechl, 540).
We have seen that in the early phases of social develop- 
ment acts specially apt to provoke the anger of one 
of the deities are punished as crimes. When once the 
sovereign has taken his seat among the immortals, conduct 
obnoxious to him naturally tends to acquire the same 
legal character. At first but one god among many, he
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becomes, before long, the only one that has to be reckoned 
with in the sphere of criminal law. For the will of other 
supernatural beings, whether a mere echo of man's own 
moral impulses or revealed through signs and wonders, 
is discovered by their worshippers in an indirect and 
circuitous fashion, is divined rather than ascertained, and, 
therefore, but imperfectly known. The commands of 
the man-god, on the other hand, are uttered in no un- 
certain voice and in a language intelligible, not only to a 
priestly aristocracy, but to the humblest subject. And 
whilst the mills of other deities grind slowly, the divine 
ruler in his wrath strikes instantly, promptly, sharply. 
So a stage is reached when the whole criminal code is 
reduced to one single offence, revolt against the king's 
omnipotence. The intrinsic differences between the 
various forms of wrongdoing disappear; for they con- 
stitute all alike overt acts of leze majesty, and disobedience 
to the command of the prince is the sole ground of punish- 
ment. Thus the ancient Peruvians " said that a culprit 
was not punished for the delinquencies he had committed, 
but for having broken the commandment of the Ynca, who 
was respected as God " (Garcilasso de la Vega, Royal Com­ 
mentaries of the Yncas, bk. ii., ch. 12). The same theory 
formed the basis of Japanese criminal law (Montesquieu, 
Esftrit des lois, vi. 13).
When the despotic ruler has taken the place of the 
gods as the fountain of punitive justice, criminal law 
threatens to break away from current morality. For 
while the will of the other deities vaguely, it is true, yet 
on the whole faithfully, reflects the social valuation of 
human conduct, the sovereign, " un etre a part au sommet 
de 1'edifice," is less than they are imbued with the 
traditional sentiments of the community, less influenced 
by popular feeling, a law unto himself in his splendid 
isolation. Criminal law thus ceases to be evolved out 
of the soul of the people'and acquires the character of a
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command imposed upon it from without. Again, it is 
no longer transgressions of the law alone that are visited 
with punishment. The royal oracle issues not only 
decrees general in their tenor, but specific commands for 
particular occasions as well, and to disobey an order 
given ad hoc is to revolt against the authority of the 
absolute master quite as much as to break one of the rules 
promulgated by him. Nay, every act distasteful to him, 
whether previously forbidden or not, becomes an occasion 
for the infliction of punishment. As the caprice of the 
prince henceforth stands for the law of the land, so 
judgments and sentences are entirely governed by his will 
and pleasure. And whereas the gods were satisfied, as 
a rule, with the blood of the offender, the tyrant gloats 
over the sufferings of him that has incurred his displeasure. 
The answer which Tiberius gave to the wretch who, in 
the midst of his tortures, prayed for the finishing stroke, 
" How dare you think that I am already reconciled with 
you ? " faithfully portrays the mental attitude of the 
despot towards criminals.
In the preceding chapter we have learnt that in the 
common worship of the national gods a people becomes 
aware of its existence as a nation. But it is in the person 
of the prince that the organized force of the community 
first takes tangible shape, that the idea of the state 
becomes incarnate. The king, as the personification of 
the state, is not, however, at this stage differentiated 
from the king as an individual being, divine or human. 
Thus offences against the established order are conceived 
as directed against the concrete person of the ruler, and 
other crimes are punished as acts of disobedience to his 
personal will; in either case the affront, though to a 
person in authority, is to him personally. This erroneous 
identification of two radically different aspects of the 
king has powerfully stimulated the growth of criminal 
law. The train of thoughts which culminated in the
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practical recognition of the maxim, " L'etat c'est moi," 
was, no doubt, considerably facilitated by the fact that the 
divine ruler was naturally regarded as the absolute 
owner of the land and of all that is thereon, a notion which 
survived long after the monarch had laid down the mantle 
of the god. Among the Natchez everything belonged 
to the chief, men and things. In New Zealand the prince 
was undisputed eminent proprietor (Letourneau, p. 57). 
In the legal language of Java theft is called '' crime 
against the king's property," unlawful wounding " wound- 
ing the king" (Waitz, i. 444, 445). Among the Mongols, 
Pallas reports (Nachrichten uber die mongolischen Volker- 
schaften, i 194), a man who takes another by the hair 
is punished, not for having done that person a wrong, 
but because the hair belongs to the king. In Japan, 
cutting or maiming a subject is wounding the prince, 
or regicide (Spencer, Principles of Sociology, ii. 522). 
And similar views were entertained in Dahomey, in 
Morocco, in Abyssinia, in Persia, and elsewhere (see 
instances quoted in Post, Anfdnge des Slants- und Rechts- 
lebens, 123-125; Afrikanische Jurispnidenz, i. 115-118; 
Bastian, Eechtsverhaltnisse, 152). Where the subjects 
and all their belongings are chattels of the prince, wrongs 
to the person and wrongs to property alike become 
infringements of his proprietary rights, in the first in- 
stance torts merely which he avenges in exactly the same 
manner as an ordinary citizen would avenge an outrage 
to himself. But since the monarch disposes of the whole 
force of the state, of resources infinitely greater than the 
mightiest of his subjects, his vengeance is both boundless 
and irresistible, descends upon the culprit like lightning 
from the clouds, whilst his unlimited powers and his 
exalted position render him proof against retaliation, 
even after he has been divested of the sacrosanctity of a 
god. In vindicating his own rights, the king incidentally 
vindicates the rights of his subjects, and the seeds are
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sown of that cardinal doctrine of criminal law that 
offences against individuals may be public wrongs. We 
now clearly perceive the reason for the historical fact, 
often commented upon, that criminal law is slow to grow 
upon republican soil. Even a people of the legal genius 
of the ancient Romans did not arrive at the notion of an 
injury to the state through an injury to the individual 
till the republic had ceased to exist in everything but in 
name. Again, the king's jurisdiction is at first looked 
upon in the light of a private right, the share which he 
takes in the composition, as a reward for his trouble in 
adjusting the quarrels of his subjects, in the light of a 
personal perquisite. The portion appropriated by the 
monarch steadily grows, till in the end he claims the whole, 
with the result that, before long, the act which engenders 
the liability to make payment comes to be regarded as a 
wrong to the sovereign, the fact that it ever was a wrong 
to the subject sinking into oblivion. Civil jurisdiction 
is thus superseded by punitive justice, the crime has 
merged the tort. And finally, it may already here be 
remarked that a violation of the king's peace, which is 
the foundation of English criminal law, was originally 
conceived as an insult to the king personally, which it was 
for him to avenge.
What are now public wrongs were, then, in the early 
stages of monarchical government private wrongs against 
the prince which he avenged, and at first avenged with 
his own hand. In Central America (Bancroft, Native 
Races, i. 770), in Polynesia (Post, Anfange, p. 275), on 
the banks of the Gaboon (Letourneau, p. 71, after P. 
Barret) and of the Congo (Post, Afrikanische Jurisprudenz, 
i. 257) and in other parts of the Dark Continent (ibid, 
i. 113, 114) the chief himself carried out the sentence, and 
where he delegated this function to one of his subjects, 
the official so entrusted with the vindication of his honour 
and of his rights became " not in form only the chief
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dignitary of the court " (Ratzel, ii. 547). At any rate, 
it is for the ruler to determine whether his authority has 
been defied, whether his rights have been infringed; it 
is he who judges the accused person. And so the doctrine 
shaped itself, which has become a constitutional maxim 
of the modern state, that the sovereign is the fountain 
of justice, that justice emanates from the king. Again, 
the caprice of the despot is the sole measure of vengeance 
to be wreaked upon the offender. In the language of 
feudal criminal law, the wrongdoer is " in ducis potestate," 
" in manu regis," " in misericordia regis," " dans le mercy 
du seigneur." But since the king alone is supposed to 
be prejudiced by the offence, he, as the aggrieved party, 
is of course at liberty to waive his remedy and to remit 
the sanction. In this view is to be found the historical 
origin of the right of pardon as a prerogative of the crown. 
A pardon might be granted either freely or sub modo; 
that is to say, the sovereign could impose terms as a 
condition of his consenting to forego his right of revenge. 
Absolute rulers were not slow to perceive how easily the 
exaction of penalties could be converted into a source 
of income, and whenever the royal treasury threatened 
to become exhausted, new offences would be coined with 
a view to replenishing the exchequer. In this way the 
penal code grew by leaps and bounds; fines and forfeitures 
became prominent among public sanctions, and what we 
now call criminal law proved a valuable patrimony of 
the crown. So deeply rooted was the idea that offences 
are violations of the personal rights of the monarch and 
that he had an individual interest in their repression that 
in different parts of the world the king could only punish 
crimes committed during his own reign. So in Cambodia, 
so in ancient Wales. The lawlessness during an inter- 
regnum in the Holy Roman Empire bears witness to a 
similar doctrine, and in England, up to the accession 
of Edward II, the king's peace was in abeyance from
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the death of one sovereign till the coronation of his 
successor.
At last the sovereignty of the crown dissociates itself 
from the individual rights of the ruler, and the punish- 
ment of crime becomes an attribute of the former. Those 
acts and forbearances which formerly were in the nature 
of personal obligations to the king, now become duties 
which the subject owes to the state. Criminal law has 
become nationalized. But absolutism leaves behind a 
new principle of punishment, the principle of determent. 
Monarchical justice is nowhere a lenient one and often 
resorts to savage cruelties in repressing trespasses against 
the ruler. For it is the consciously adopted policy of 
the despot to strengthen his authority, to protect his 
rights and to safeguard his interests by striking terror 
into his subjects.
CHAPTER VI
THE INFLUENCE OF PEACE ON THE EVOLUTION OF 
PUNISHMENT
AMONG the Slavs the administration of justice was one 
of the forms of worship of Prowe, the god of justice and 
of peace. Slavonic mythology thus aptly symbolizes 
the great historical truth that the desire for peace was 
the main cause which led to the establishment of courts 
of law. The nascent state dealt exclusively with its own 
affairs and did not include among its functions the 
repression of wrongs between individual and individual, 
between family and family, between clan and clan. If, 
later on, it began to evince an active interest in these 
matters, it was because the custom of revenge, with its 
never-ending blood feuds, was a constant menace to public 
order and sapped the strength of the young common- 
wealth. In their conflicts with other societies those 
communities were sure to prevail and to survive which, 
unweakened by internal strife, offered a compact and 
united front to attacks from without. At first the public 
authority is content to act as mediator, intervening either 
of itself or at the instance of one or the other of the 
contending parties, in order to adjust their quarrel and 
to settle the amount of compensation. A share is claimed 
by the state as a commission for its trouble in bringing 
about a reconciliation between the parties (Kemble, 
Maine), or, perhaps, as the price payable by the malefactor 
either for the opportunity which the state secures for him
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of redeeming his wrong by a money payment (Wilda), or 
for the protection which it affords him, after he has satis- 
fied the award, against further retaliation on the part of 
the man whom he has injured (Henke). That this is the 
original meaning of the Germanic fredus, fredum, fretho, 
of the Anglo-Saxon wtte or fridesbbt, and that the desire 
to penalize the offender was not the end with which these 
payments were exacted, is proved by the fact, among 
others, that where the parties came to terms and settled 
their differences without invoking the aid of the public 
authority, the latter never demanded a portion of the 
compensation privately agreed upon. The subordinate 
character of the fine which goes to the state is rendered 
apparent by the provision met with in many Teutonic 
sources, and particularly in the northern codes, that 
where both bot and wife are due, the former shall always 
be paid first, so that where the property of the wrongdoer 
does not suffice to satisfy both claims, the victim shall get 
his damages. The aim of the law was clearly to assuage 
the passions of the latter lest the public peace be dis- 
turbed. In a few isolated instances fiscal interests 
prevailed and the parties were forbidden to compound 
without the intervention of the tribunals. So the Gragas 
enacts that in the case of graver injuries the agreement 
of the parties shall be subject to the ratification of the 
courts; without the authority of the all-thing the parties 
shall not compound for homicide and large wounds. But 
as a general rule the community, far from insisting upon 
the co-operation of its organs in the conclusion of the 
bargain, is only too glad if its members succeed in amicably 
settling their differences. It is to prevent bloodshed and 
violence that the state first steps in of its own initiative, 
and jurisdiction becomes compulsory when the aggrieved 
party is forbidden to avenge himself upon his adversary 
until the merits of the case have been investigated by the 
public authority. Even then the proceedings have the
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character of a civil suit, their object being to determine 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to his remedy. But the 
victim is not bound to come into court as long as he is 
willing to pocket the affront; and if he fails to take action 
nobody else will. Indeed, the law does not start with 
forbidding those acts which we now call crimes, but 
addresses its command to and threatens with its sanction 
the man who, in avenging a wrong, contravenes its pro- 
visions. The first legislative acts which deal with disputes 
between citizens restrict in various ways, in the interest of 
the peace of society, the right of revenge, by narrowing the 
circle of persons entitled to exercise it (e. g. Ruska/ia 
Pravda), by prescribing a time limit to its exercise (Gragas), 
by requiring the avenger to give preliminary notice to a 
government official (Japan), or publicly to proclaim hia 
deed as soon as it is consummated (Gragas, Lex Ripuaria, 
Decretum Tassilonis), or first to establish his right before 
the organs of the state (Laws of Alfred). In the end 
private revenge is altogether forbidden. It may still be 
left to the person prejudiced by an act of illegitimate 
revenge to set the law in motion and to enforce the 
sanction, which may consist in higher bdt or in twofold 
weregild. Finally, however, the state itself brings to 
justice the man who wreaks vengeance in violation of 
the law. To inflict even the most grievous injury upon 
another is still regarded at this stage as a mere tort; 
but to take the law into one's own hands, and to retaliate 
upon the aggressor in an unauthorized manner, is treated 
as a breach of the public peace and punished accordingly. 
In other words, unlawful self-redress, not crime in the 
modern sense, is visited with penal sanctions. As Henke 
rightly remarks, " among barbarous peoples the function 
of the judge is not to strike the offender, but to protect 
him against the vengeance of his victim."
The desire for peace, then, has been the impelling force 
which caused private vengeance to be superseded by
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jurisdiction, and to that extent it has been operative, 
as an organic principle in legal evolution, among all races 
that have emerged from barbarism; but it must be clearly 
understood that primarily it exhausted its function in 
the generation of civil law. Among the Teutonic peoples, 
however, peace as an institution has undergone a peculiar 
development and has a history of its own, closely associ- 
ated with the origin and rise of criminal law. In olden 
times liability to bear the feud of an adversary was the 
natural state of things, immunity from his vengeance, 
peace, an exceptional condition, intimately connected 
with the religious life of the people. The thing was held 
at the time of the high festivals in a place which one of 
the deities had chosen for his abode. Divine worship 
and sacrificial rites formed as important a part of the 
programme as the transaction of public business. Before 
the proceedings were opened, the priests cast lots to 
ascertain whether the gods favoured the meeting, and 
invoked their blessing on the assembly, at the same time 
proclaiming the " peace of the thing." The army was 
led by the god of battles; it was preceded by divine 
emblems, brought forth from the depth of the sacred 
woods, and was accompanied on its march by the priest, 
the guardian of the " peace of the army." The peacn 
which reigned throughout the land during sowing and 
harvest time seems to have had an economic rather than 
a religious basis and was, accordingly, less sacred than 
the former two. Whilst the peaces hitherto mentioned 
were all temporary in character, certain localities were 
permanently protected. The peace of the sacred woods 
and of the pagan temples was transformed, after the 
Germanic tribes had been converted to Christianity, into 
the peace of the church. In his own house every man, 
even the homo faidosus, the malefactor, enjoyed the 
same immunity; his house was indeed his castle, and in 
the language of the Norsemen, in which grid denoted both
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peace and house, the close association of the two ideas in 
the minds of our forefathers has become crystallized. 
" The peace of the house was probably founded on 
religion " (Wilda). The protection which it afforded 
extended beyond the actual homestead and covered an 
area around it varying in circumference with the rank of 
its owner and reaching its maximum in the case of the 
king. " The king's presence," writes Palgrave (Rise and 
Progress of the English Commonwealth, i. 284), " imparted 
peace, not only to his residence, but to a considerable 
district around it. Three miles, three furlongs, and three 
acre-breadths, nine feet, nine palms, and three barley- 
corns, constituted the mystical radius of the verge, which 
was reckoned from the town or mansion where the king 
held his court; and within this ambit the protection by 
royalty was to remain unviolated." The king's peace, 
then, was not of a purely local nature, not only an attribute 
of the royal palace. It emanated from the king's person, 
enveloping all around him in an atmosphere of peace, and 
followed him wherever for the time being he happened 
to take up his abode. Nor is the king's peace the only 
peace with a personal aspect. The heathen priests, and 
later the Christian clergy, were sacrosanct. And as 
between ordinary citizens immunity from violence could 
be secured by agreement, by a peace sworn in solemn 
form.
A breach of the peace was in the first instance an 
atrocious wrong to the person in whom such peace was 
vested, and founded a claim to damages. So if a man 
were treacherously attacked by an adversary who had 
pledged himself to keep the peace, he could exact bdt 
from the latter. The owner of the house was entitled to 
compensation for violence done to his guest whilst under 
his roof. And if a man were slain in his own dwelling, 
twofold weregild was payable to his family. A public 
peace conferred a right to peace on all the inhabitants, 
severally, of the district in which it reigned. In the Isle
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of Gothland the highest peace was therefore known 
even in Christian times as " all men's peace," and the 
personal operation of public peace is well brought out 
in manhaelgi, the term of art for it in the Scandinavian 
sources. Bbt and higher weregild were the sanctions 
enforceable at the suit of the person prejudiced by its 
violation, and process of outlawry lay against the recalci- 
trant malefactor who refused to fulfil his obligation. In 
so far as a public peace was hallowed by religion, its 
breach was a deadly sin and would be treated as such by 
the community; the culprit was sacrificed to the offended 
deity, or, if the god rejected the offering, he would be 
expelled and driven into the forest. It is a moot question 
whether a breach of a peace purely secular in character 
was ever visited with punishment before the king had 
become the depositary of the peace of the people. We 
read, indeed, of outlawry in connection with this subject, 
and many authorities of high standing hold that it was 
a genuine public sanction, founded upon the principle 
of retaliation, he who has disturbed the peace being 
himself deprived of its blessings, the man who violates 
the law being put outside its pale. But it is not quite 
clear whether outlawry for breach of a secular peace was 
in use, at this stage, for any other purpose than as a means 
of enforcing the claim of the individual thereby wronged. 
Again, it is said that the commonwealth, as being the 
party interested in the preservation of the public peace, 
exacts a fine from the wrongdoer in the same way and 
upon the same principle as the individual demands 
damages for breach of a private peace; and fredus, wite, 
it is claimed, is nothing but the fine thus payable to the 
state. But we have already seen that, according to the 
better opinion, this does not appear to be the original 
meaning of these terms.
The king's peace, we have found, was at first partly 
personal and partly local. In either aspect it was a purely 
individual right vested in the ruler, infringements of
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which gave rise to a claim analogous to that which the 
subject could enforce against the man who broke the 
peace of his dwelling-house, with this difference, however, 
that by reason of the king's exalted position the sanction 
was incomparably more severe and often entirely in the 
discretion of the monarch. Thus the laws of Ine enact 
(art. 6) : " Si quis in regia domo pugnet, perdat omnem 
suam hereditatem, et in regis sit arbitrio, possideat vitam 
aut non possideat." And similar provisions are found 
in the Laws of Alfred (art. 7), of Etheldred (vii. 9), of 
Canute (art. 60). With the growth of royal power the 
sovereign became, among all Teutonic peoples, the 
guardian of the public peace, the peace of the king as an 
individual blending with the peace of the king as repre- 
sentative of the state. In this process of amalgamation 
the national peace was assimilated to, and absorbed by, 
the older king's peace and was thus converted into a 
personal right of the monarch. Feudalism, which clothed 
the ruler both with a personal, quasi-contractual right 
over his subjects and with a quasi-proprietary right over 
the land comprised in his dominions, materially helped 
to bring about this confusion. Nowhere was the national 
peace, after the king had become its protector, so com- 
pletely divested of its public character as among the Anglo- 
Saxons. In this, as in so many other instances, however, 
an apparently retrograde step has marked the dawn of 
an era of progress. But if the peace of the people, in 
being converted into the king's peace, ceased to be publici 
iuris, it did not for that lose its religious flavour. We 
read in Leges Henrici I (c. 81) of pax Dei et domini, and 
it was treuga Dei which Maximilian I proclaimed 
throughout the Holy Roman Empire. A breach of the 
public peace could not now fail to be looked upon as a 
contempt of the king for which he would demand satisfac- 
tion, a view firmly established in this country about the 
beginning of the tenth century (Stubbs, Constitutional 
History, i. 183). Compensation being at that period the
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regular mode of atoning for injuries, the sanctions for 
violations of the king's peace generally assumed the form 
of fines and forfeitures; and since the court-fees for 
adjusting quarrels between subjects likewise found their 
way into the royal treasury and came to be regarded as 
personal perquisites of the king, the difference between 
the two classes of payments seems to have become obliter- 
ated, and the terms fredus and wife, deflected from their 
original meaning, were now applied to both indiscrimin- 
ately. The king's peace was not at first, any more than 
the peace of the folk had been, an institution either 
universal or permanent. Soon, however, the monarch 
acquired the privilege of proclaiming his peace in any 
particular locality, independently of his presence, and of 
conferring it as a favour upon particular persons. Especi- 
ally frequent were the occasions when he bestowed it, for 
a consideration, on persons who had got into trouble, 
and thus afforded them his protection against the ven- 
geance of their neighbours. It was under the Conqueror 
that the whole of this country was for the first time put 
under the king's peace (Hallam, Middle Ages, ii. 427), 
and a proclamation to the same effect was henceforth 
regularly made at the accession of each new king and 
remained in force during his reign. The consequences 
were great and far-reaching; for it now became an 
offence against the crown for any one, at any time and in 
any place, to commit an act of violence within the realm. 
The royal courts were established to enforce the king's 
peace, and before these the sovereign prosecuted as 
personal insults breaches of his peace. This, according 
to both Bracton and Britton, was the original meaning 
of Pleas of the Crown; to avenge the affront to the king 
remained for a long time the object of procedure by 
indictment. Where a breach of the king's peace was at 
the same time a wrong to the individual, the suit of the 
subject had priority to the sovereign's right of proceeding 
by indictment. But wager of battle being an incident of
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private prosecutions, the subject was, as a rule, only too 
glad to forgo his remedy in favour of the king's suit, and 
appeals for crimes other than homicide rapidly fell into 
desuetude. In the time of Edward I some violence was 
still essential to constitute a wrong a breach of the peace, 
and so a plea of the crown. But soon afterwards the 
practice grew up for the injured party, in order to escape 
liability to trial by battle, fictitiously to allege that the 
offence was committed " contra pacem domini regis," 
an averment which the accused was not allowed to 
traverse, even though there was no suggestion of violence 
having been actually used. It is not possible here to 
trace at length the evolution of the king's peace in this 
country; to attempt to do so would mean to write the 
history of English criminal law. To such an extent was 
a breach of the king's peace the very essence of a crime 
that, until a recent statute (14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 24) 
altered the law, an indictment was bad if it omitted the 
words " against the peace "; for without this phrase it 
was held not to charge any offence. " Why was this ? 
The real reason was that the averment that every offence 
was ' against the peace,' which in turn had become a 
mere formality, was originally the real statement of the 
crime with which the accused was charged " (Cherry, p. 94). 
In the end the king restored to the state what had origin- 
ally belonged to the people, and he restored it right 
royally with hundredfold interest. The king's peace 
became once more the national peace, a peace richer in 
content, wider in scope, fuller in meaning than the old 
peace of the folk had been. What had been offences 
against the king are now public offences, and it is as head 
of the commonwealth that the sovereign prosecutes 
criminals.
That proceedings instituted with a view to the preserva- 
tion of the peace were prompted by utilitarian motives 
need hardly be mentioned.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
THE results of our inquiry into the origin of punishment 
may be summed up in the following theses 
1. It is not true that in the beginning there was but 
one law in which the germs of civil and criminal juris- 
prudence lay undifferentiated. Civil and punitive justice 
are not, therefore, comparable to a double trunk growing 
from the same root. They arise from independent sources 
and resemble two rivers which run in parallel beds, the 
one at certain points of its course sending tributaries to 
the other.
2. Revenge is the source, not of punishment, but of 
rights to redress for wrong enforceable by civil action, to 
damages in kind or in money, of private, not of criminal, 
jurisdiction. When the courts first interfere in quarrels 
between subject and subject, they merely decide whether 
a tort has been committed for which the plaintiff is 
entitled to exact revenge or pecuniary compensation. In 
the case of certain wrongs liability to the aggrieved 
individual is later supplanted by, but not transformed 
into, punishment.
3. Public indignation certainly finds expression in a 
passionate reaction of society against wrongdoing. But 
there is no evidence to show that punishment proper has 
to be fathered upon mob-law.
4. Penal legislation has often been made to serve the 
particular interests of the ruling classes or of a victorious 
political party. But history gives the lie to the assertion
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that punishment was in origin a weapon forged by an 
aristocracy of conquerors with which to defend their 
privileges against the onslaughts of the conquered masses.
5. Nor is the position tenable that the state acquired 
criminal jurisdiction as the inheritor of the disciplinary 
powers of the paterfamilias, that the domestic tribunal 
has served as model to the criminal courts of the state. 
The analogy between parental correction and public 
punishment has been a late discovery, the theory of 
reformation, which is its fruit, arising within the same 
range of ideas as the doctrine of paternal government.
6. The acts first punished as crimes were such as im- 
perilled, or were believed to imperil, the safety of the 
community, either by jeoparding its security from external 
foes or by exposing it to supernatural dangers, to the 
vengeance of the spirit world, to the risk of contracting 
the pollution of guilt, to public calamities resulting from 
the quasi-mechanical operation of those occult forces 
which the deed sets in motion. Fear, then, has been the 
root-feeling in the genesis of criminal law.
7. Destruction of the offender, possibly with all that 
is his, and expulsion from the commonwealth are the 
oldest forms of punishment, the end with which it is 
inflicted being in either case the elimination from society 
of him who is a source of danger to it as long as he remains 
in its midst. Punishment is in origin a measure of social 
hygiene. The suffering which the application of the 
sanction involves is accidental, not intended, and is not 
consciously made to exceed the amount necessary for the 
accomplishment of the object of punishment.
8. Factors innumerable have helped to erect upon such 
meagre foundations the imposing structure of criminal 
jurisprudence. Three of them, however, have exercised 
the most decisive influence upon the course of its develop- 
ment, viz. the evolution of religion, the rise of kingship, 
and the institution of peace.
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9. In the primitive conception of crime a religious 
element is predominant, and it was through the religious 
associations with which they were hallowed that even 
the two last-named agencies were brought into contact 
with criminal law.
10. Whilst the spirits whom primitive man worships 
are completely absorbed in their own affairs, advancing 
religious thought and feeling converts the national gods 
both into guardians of national morality and into the 
legislators of their people. Conduct obnoxious to man 
is now punished as being obnoxious to the deities, and 
immolation and excommunication of the culprit become 
the orthodox modes of averting from the state the wrath 
of the offended god. When at last moral evolution 
replaced collective by individual responsibility, the 
religious aspect of crime was too deeply embedded in the 
mind of man to be uprooted all at once. Henceforth the 
state, in punishing criminals, acted, not in self-defence 
against a supernatural danger no longer existing, but in 
the fulfilment of a divine mission; and boundless as the 
wrath of the deity itself are the sufferings which the state 
inflicts in the name of the outraged god.
11. Clothed with divine honours the king enters the 
arena of primitive justice. Disobedience to his command 
is sacrilege. At first but one god among many, he becomes 
before long the only one that has to be reckoned with in 
the sphere of criminal law. The law now flows exclusively 
from his will, and every act of transgression is an act of 
revolt against his omnipotence. This view persists even 
after the despot has lost his divine halo. He then appears 
invested with two sets of rights, those which belong to 
him as an individual and those which he enjoys as head of 
the state. Early political thought fails to perceive the 
fundamental difference between these two classes of 
rights; they blend completely, and the monarch thus 
becomes the main channel through which notions
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primarily belonging to private law find their way into 
criminal jurisprudence. Every offence is now regarded 
as an insult offered to the king personally, and is avenged 
by him in the same way as the subject avenges injuries 
suffered. The ruler is not slow to discover that one of 
the most effective means of safeguarding his interests is 
to strike terror into his subjects, and the principle of 
determent manifests itself in those horrible mutilations 
and refined cruelties characteristic of the penal system of 
absolutism.
12. The first fruit of the desire for public peace has 
been the establishment of civil courts. The conduct of 
the man who refuses to submit his case to their jurisdiction, 
and persists in taking the law into his own hand, more than 
any other stultifies the efforts of the young common- 
wealth to preserve order by suppressing strife and blood- 
shed. Unlawful self-redress is, therefore, the first wrong 
visited with public sanctions in the interest of public 
peace. Peace was at first a temporary condition pro- 
claimed on special occasions or an attribute of particular 
localities or of certain persons, or classes of persons. 
Where kingship rises above the level of primitive chief- 
taincy and develops into either absolutism or feudal 
sovereignty, the ruler is generally clothed with a peace of 
his own. Among the Teutonic peoples, the Anglo-Saxons 
in particular, the king's peace gradually absorbed all 
other peaces. Still, it continued to be looked upon as a 
personal privilege of the monarch, which in its evolution 
ran through the same developmental stages as other 
personal rights of the king.
13. The community first punishes those acts only which 
prejudice its own security or bring about public calamities, 
i. e. offences against the state and offences against religion. 
Not till a comparatively late date does the notion arise of 
an injury to the state through an injury to the individual. 
In the birth of this idea moral and religious influences may
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have had a share. Concern for the peace of society 
undoubtedly led to the suppression, by means of public 
punishments, of acts of violence as between citizen and 
citizen. But the king, who in vindicating his own rights 
incidentally became the champion of the rights of his 
subjects, has certainly been the principal medium through 
which public sanctions were annexed to acts which before 
had been treated as private wrongs only.
14. Punishment has been from its cradle utilitarian in 
character, " a display of the power of society in the service 
of social self-preservation " (Merkel). Primitive common- 
wealths sought to attain their object by the elimination 
of the offender. Despotism, as we have seen, resorted to 
the principle of determent. It was in an age which had 
lost the key to the true relation in which primitive crime 
stood to religion that punishment for the first time ceased 
to serve practical temporal ends and was turned into a 
blind instrument of blind religious fanaticism.

BOOK II
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT

ASK the man in the street why a thief is sent to prison, 
and in all probability you will receive one of two answers : 
he will say, " because he has stolen," or " because it 
would not be safe to allow him to remain at large." 
These homely replies illustrate the two fundamental 
principles which have competed, since Grotius's time, for 
supremacy in the theory and practice of punishment. 
The substance of the rival doctrines has been compressed 
into short formulae, borrowed from the writings of Seneca : 
according to the one we punish " quia peccatum est," 
according to the other " ne peccetur."
Grotius defines punishment as " malum passionis quod 
infligitur ob malum actionis," as the infliction of pain on 
a person because he has done wrong, and the school of 
which he may be regarded as the intellectual father has 
steadfastly adhered to the view that the ground of punish- 
ment must be sought in the criminal act itself, its justifica- 
tion in the culpability of the offender. Punishment is 
" the correlate " (Grotius), " the equivalent " (Berolz- 
heimer), " the supplement" (Bradley), of guilt, and is 
inflicted upon the evil-doer because he deserves it. Its 
function is " pensatio mali cum malo," " to dissolve the 
vinculum juris to which crime gives rise, by meting out 
to the transgressor his due " (W. S. Lilly), to adjust and 
close an account by discharging the debt which he has 
incurred. Grotius indeed, goes so far as to compare 
punishment with the fulfilment of an implied term of a 
contract; it is a consequence which the criminal by 
the commission of the act has accepted and assented to.
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In any case, he pays the penalty because he owes it, and 
for no other reason. Punishment, then, has its root 
entirely in the past; it is an end in itself and does not 
serve any extrinsic purpose.
Plato (de legibus, xi. 934) and countless writers since 
have found it impossible to accept the position that mere 
regard for an immovable past should supply a sufficient 
motive for the infliction of punishment. They resent 
the assumption that evil must be met by counter-evil 
in the shape of pain to the wrong-doer, and ask with 
Be^caria : " Le grida di un infelice richiamano forse dal 
tempo che non ritorna le azioni gia consomate 1 " It does 
not stand to reason, they argue, that the state should 
set up and keep going a complicated and costly machinery 
whereby deliberately to cause suffering to any class of 
citizens, unless it be in the sure and well-founded expecta- 
tion that good will ultimately result from its operation. 
The justification of punishment must, therefore, be sought 
in some future advantage, and, since it is the function 
of the state to serve the ends of society, in the social 
benefits which it vouchsafes. By its fruits alone can 
it be justified, as a rational means for the furtherance of 
the objects of the state, whatever these may be.
In German legal philosophy the rival schools are known 
as " absolutists " and " relativists," because the latter 
account for punishment by a relalio ad effectum, the former 
by an absolutio ab effectu. But these expressions hardly 
convey the proper meaning to the English reader. It is 
obvious that if the ground of punishment lies in the mis- 
deed, if crime cries aloud for punishment, punishment 
becomes a necessity, and the state has no choice in the 
matter, but is under an absolute obligation to chastise 
offenders. If, on the other hand, punishment is inflicted 
only because it is useful, the limits of its utility prescribe 
the limits of its application, and it is for the state to 
determine how far it can be administered with advantage
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for the accomplishment of the desired object or objects. 
Were it not for the technical meaning which they have 
acquired in metaphysics and in ethics respectively, the 
terms " necessitarian " and " utilitarian " would aptly 
describe the two doctrines. Again, since the one regards 
punishment as an end in itself, the other as a means for 
the attainment of an extrinsic purpose, we might, but 
for our horror of barbarisms, call them " autoteletic " and 
" heteroteletic." On the whole we think it best to choose 
the terms " transcendental " with an apology to Kant  
and " political," which, as will soon become apparent, 
draw attention to the most fundamental difference 
between the two classes of theories.
Of late years science has taken the bold step of challeng- 
ing the value of punishments altogether. Whilst they 
agree with the advocates of the political doctrine in the 
demand that crime must be suppressed in the interests of 
society, the apostles of the new criminological movement 
claim that punishment, having proved a very imperfect, 
if not an entirely useless, instrument, ought to be 
abolished, or at any rate given a quite subordinate place 
in a system of social defence, founded on a careful study 
of the etiological factors which are at work in the making 
of criminals. A critical examination of this view cannot 
well be omitted from a modern work on punishment.
The philosophy of punishment has, therefore, to be 
studied under the three following headings 
1. Transcendental theories of punishment.
2. Political theories of punishment.
3. Theories of modern criminology.
PART I
TRANSCENDENTAL THEORIES
Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus.
WE have seen that the view according to which 
punishment is an end in itself, the guilt of the actor its 
sole motive, postulates, when consistently adhered to, 
I punishment as the necessary consequence of crime. 
This necessity is fully recognized and insisted upon by all 
the most prominent writers of the transcendental school. 
Their doctrines differ only in the source to which they 
trace the obligation of the state to strike down offenders, 
and the nature of that superior authority to the dictates 
of which the organ of society has to conform, sup- 
plies, therefore, the principle of classification of their 
theories.
1. It is in the fulfilment of its divine mission that 
the state dispenses punitive justice. To punish criminals 
is a religious duty. This is the theological view of 
punishment, of which the most uncompromising advocate 
is Joseph de Maistre.
2. The stain of guilt must be washed away by suffering 
in fulfilment of one of those metaphysical laws the 
meaning of which man, as a finite being, cannot compre- 
hend, but to which he must yet conform, since his own 
infinite nature makes him part of the order of the universe 
of which that law is an expression. This is the expiatory 
theory of punishment according to the version of Joseph 
Kohler.
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3. The moral law, which is binding on all rational 
beings, prescribes that crime shall be visited with punish- 
ment. The conception of punishment as a moral 
necessity has found in Kant its classical interpreter.
4. Crime postulates punishment as its necessary 
logical complement. This is the root-idea of Hegel's 
theory of punishment.
5. A misdeed displeases and continues to offend our 
sense of harmony as long as it remains unrequited. It 
is the function of punishment to resolve the discord and 
so to satisfy an urgent want arising within our aesthetic 
consciousness. The best-known advocate of this doctrine 
is Herbart.
A detailed examination of these groups of theories will 
form the subject-matter of the five following chapters.
CHAPTER I
THE THEOLOGICAL VIEW
THE law of theocracies is conceived as given by the 
national god to his chosen people. It is a mixture of 
rules of positive law, of positive morality and of ceremonial 
observance. The difference between crimes, acts of 
immorality and sins disappears; for the gist of every 
offence, whatever its nature, is that it constitutes a 
breach of a divine command, an act of disobedience to 
the will of the supreme Being.
Christianity starts with the separation of the functions 
of church and state. Yet from the first all temporal 
power is regarded as a delegation of divine power, and 
more particularly in discharging his punitive functions 
the sovereign is looked upon as wielding the sword of 
divine justice. " He is the minister of God, a revenger 
to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." On this 
text is founded the doctrine of punishment of both Tertul- 
lian and St. Augustine, the penal theory of the Canon 
Law : " Qui malos percutit in eo, quod mali sunt, et 
habet vasa interfectionis, minister est Dei," as well as 
that of medieval jurisprudence. Thus we read in the 
Introduction to the ancient Law Book of Jutland : "In 
punishing or executing evil-doers, he (the king) is the 
minister of God and the protector of the law." 
Strengthened by the political doctrine of the two lumi- 
naries, according to which the power of princes is derived 
from the visible spiritual head of the church, this view
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of punishment was generally adopted; but it survived 
after the temporal rulers had successfully asserted their 
independence of the holy see, and St. Paul's text has 
supplied the rationale of punishment to more than one 
modern author. According to Friedrich Julius Stahl, 
the state is the external manifestation, upon earth, of the 
divine order. The ten commandments are its founda- 
tions, and these it is that the criminal attacks. In 
punishing him, the state exercises a right which is an 
emanation of divine justice. Lucien Brun defines 
punishment of criminals by the state as " a delegation 
of the divine prerogative of punishing wrong." But the 
author in whose writings this theory is carried to extremes, 
is Joseph Marie de Maistre. The rule of earthly kings 
is the " temporal government of Providence." " Flesh 
and blood are guilty, and Heaven's wrath is kindled 
against flesh and blood." Since the sovereign is God's 
representative, the first attribute of his princely power 
is to strike down the guilty, to provide punishments, to 
exercise, with the utmost rigour, the power of life and 
death. The hangman, then, becomes the central idea 
in De Maistre's theory. The executioner is a being sui 
generis, and, though in appearance like other men, yet 
" fit only for the discharge of this single function." " In 
order that he may exist in the human race, a particular 
decree, a special fiat, must go forth from the creative 
power. His birth is like unto the creation of a world." 
Blood alone can redeem what blood has sinned; but the 
blood of the innocent washes away the guilt of the sinner. 
When a crime has been committed, blood must flow, and 
if its author cannot be found that of a scapegoat must 
be shed. Thus it is divinely ordained, and man has but 
the choice between blind obedience to the will of God and 
a futile, self-devouring struggle against it.
A theory which rests upon faith alone, may satisfy 
the mind of a theologian. To the philosophical or
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legal inquirer a doctrine which refers him to the unknow- 
able for the solution of his problem, can never be accept- 
able. He may well be allowed to ask why the Lord 
should require mortal hands to avenge his outraged 
majesty, and why he has not deigned to endow man with 
the full store of his divine wisdom if he entrusted him 
with a function to the proper discharge of which omnisci- 
ence is a necessary condition. For, on this view, the 
range of human punishment must be as wide as that of 
divine justice. The scope of the criminal code would be 
co-extensive with God's law, and we should have to 
revert to the view of ancient theocracies which were, at 
any rate, consistent in obliterating the boundary line 
between crime and sin. In the execution of its divine 
mandate, the state would have to punish not only overt 
acts, but wrongful desires and wicked thoughts, and 
would have to revive, however imperfect an instrument 
it may prove, the most stringent inquisitorial system. On 
the other hand, a theory which, in the hands of a De 
Maistre, represents the Deity as a Moloch who exacts of 
his worshippers human sacrifices to appease his wrath, 
and which, even in its more mitigated form, declares 
the infliction of evil to be divinely ordained, without at 
the same time assigning an ultimate good to which evil 
is subservient, runs counter to the modern ideal of a 
supreme being. The right to punish merely in order to 
punish we do not concede even to God. And if, according 
to St. Thomas Aquinas, the saints rejoice at the sufferings 
of the damned souls, " ratione alicuius adiuncti, conside- 
rando in eis divinae iustitiae ordinem," the associated idea 
may, in the consciousness of the blessed, overshadow the 
notion of evil; it fails to take away its sting in the mind 
of modern man.
The theory which regards God as the fountain of puni- 
tive justice, appears, however, also in another form in 
which it escapes from the last-mentioned difficulty.
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The god who delegates to temporal rulers the office of 
chastising criminals, is here not the god of wrath, but the 
god of love. Karl Daub's System der theologischen Moral 
may be taken as the prototype of writings in which this 
idea is expressed. The supreme principle of every law 
is love; for every law emanates from God, who is love. 
It is true, men, prompted by considerations of expediency, 
may enact statutes; but such statutes are not laws. Like 
every other law, criminal law is divine in origin, and the 
spirit which it breathes is the spirit of love. It is, therefore, 
utterly wrong to call punishment an evil; it is a boon, a 
blessing, even though the person who undergoes it, may 
fail to perceive it as such. One would have thought that 
this line of argument must necessarily lead to the reforma- 
tory view of punishment. And, indeed, we find that 
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, who starts from very 
similar premises, arrives at a series of conclusions which 
express the reformatory ideal in its loftiest form. Not 
so Daub. To him punishment is a blessing, though 
possibly a blessing in disguise, because it takes off the 
criminal the burden of a guilty conscience. We are here 
on the threshold of the expiatory view of punishment 
which lurks in the background of the theological doctrine 
whatever the formula in which it is enunciated. But 
more often in modern philosophy the theological learning 
of expiation is toned down to metaphysical speculation, 
and the theory appears in a mystical garment, in which 
we shall study it in the following chapter.
CHAPTER II
THE EXPIATORY VIEW
IN primitive communities, the notion of crime blends 
with that of sin. " Sin," writes Prof. Westermarck, " is 
looked upon in the light of a contagious matter which 
may be transmitted from parents to children, or be 
communicated by contact." Guilt, moreover, attracts 
another miasma " which injures or destroys anybody to 
whom it cleaves," the curse of a god. In this way any 
number of innocent persons nay, the tribe as a whole  
may have to suffer for the sin of an individual member. 
What more natural than to avert that danger by destroy- 
ing or driving away the person charged with the infective 
germ ? Death and exile, therefore, suggest themselves 
as suitable means for the purification of the community, 
long, perhaps, before any intention to punish the offender 
became associated therewith. For these primitive punish- 
ments are in origin probably but measures of social 
hygiene, comparable to the destruction of microbe- 
carriers or to the isolation of fever-patients at the hands 
of our sanitary authorities. The wish to retain the wrong- 
doer within the tribe may have suggested other processes, 
which subsequently developed into punishments, but 
which were primarily meant to free him from the polluting 
substance, to disinfect him. So we learn from the author 
above quoted that " beating and scourging was in certain 
cases originally a form of purification, intended to wipe 
off and drive away a dangerous contagion. . . . And 
though the pain inflicted on the person beaten was at
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first not the object of the act, but only incidental to it, 
it became subsequently the chief object." Such puri- 
ficatory processes as involved the infliction of pain upon 
the evil-doer, -were, no doubt, among the sources of early 
punishments. It is easy, then, to understand how the 
idea arose that punishment washes away the sin both 
from the individual wrong-doer and from the community 
at large. Punishment is not, indeed, the only means for 
attaining this end, ablutions and other ceremonial rites, 
sacrifices, penance, almsgiving and prayer being regarded 
at different stages of human thought to be equally 
efficacious for the purpose. But whenever the primitive 
mind attributes to punishment cleansing properties, the 
catharsis is not looked upon as the final object of its in- 
fliction; purification is conceived merely as a measure 
for ensuring the safety of the community. In other 
words, the primitive theory of expiation is eminently 
utilitarian in character.
In course of time the theory has lost its utilitarian 
basis, and expiation has become an end in itself. But 
the view that suffering washes away guilt, has never 
quite lost its hold over the human mind. " He that hath 
suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin," says St. Peter. 
" Deep, unspeakable suffering may be called a baptism, 
a regeneration, the initiation into a new state," writes 
George Eliot. And though thousands of years of in- 
tellectual and moral development separate the primitive 
tribesman from the modern philosopher, the rationale 
of punishment supplied by more than one contemporary 
writer does not differ so very much from the theory 
evolved in the infancy of mankind. Substitute in the 
latter, for the mixture of magic and anthropomorphism 
which fills the place of religion in primitive stages of 
civilization, a compound of pantheism and mysticism, 
and you get the theory of punishment which Joseph 
Kohler enunciates in his work, Das Wesen der Strafe.
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" Besides the harm which directly results from it, the 
immoral contains a second baneful element: it resembles 
a virus that not only destroys the limb first invaded, but 
spreads and affects other parts of the body a contagion 
which multiplies and gradually infects wider and wider 
areas. The reaction against the immoral is, therefore, 
twofold : it is either a reaction against its primary 
mischievous effects, or a reaction against the germ of 
the immoral and against those more remote baneful 
consequences that lie in its lap. This latter reaction is 
the penal reaction. All immorality may entail punish- 
ment ; but it is not fit that the state should punish 
all possible forms of immorality; state punishment is 
appropriate only where the immoral merges in the illegal. 
Punishment consists in the infliction of an evil; and the 
question must arise how it is that the infliction of an 
evil constitutes an effective reaction against the virus 
contained in the immoral how it comes about that 
humanity at large and in its corporate existence is benefited 
by the sufferings of one of its members. The answer is 
both simple and certain : it must be sought in the expia- 
tory, purificatory, not to say hallowing, action of pain. 
... Of all evils death is the one which offers the most 
complete atonement. For by death the individual is not 
merely painfully affected; it is broken, destroyed, cut 
off from its base; it disappears in the fountain of all 
being, never to be seen again. . . . And, finally, if we 
inquire into the deeper cause of the healing powers which 
suffering possesses, we are thrown back upon the most 
profound ultimate problems of philosophy; we are con- 
fronted with the question : What is the cause of all being ? 
What the cause of the pain of existence ? To me it seems 
certain that this principle is intimately connected with 
the cause of all individualization. Every pain is an 
attack upon individuality. In suffering the individual 
withdraws from its advanced position to the base of all
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being. Suffering in every shape and form promotes 
integration, arrests differentiation. Therefore, every 
pain, in extinguishing part of the individuality, extin- 
guishes part of the guilt of individual existence, and death 
balances the account of individualization, by annihilating 
individual existence."
" The significance of expiation lies in purification, in 
catharsis. It is a purification, not of the individual 
alone, but of humanity as a whole. Mankind which sighs 
aloud on account of the misdeed, is delivered therefrom, 
and the poison poured into mankind by the misdeed 
is consumed, is neutralized by its antidote. Mankind 
groans aloud over the enormous misdeed; it revives when 
the guilty head has fallen. To regard purification and 
catharsis as limited in its effects to the individual, is to 
overlook the organic unity of mankind, is to forget the 
terrible ravages which disease of a single cell works in 
the whole body. . . . Expiation by pain, then, is a 
purification, a catharsis, not restricted in its action to 
the individual member, but saving, by its health-giving 
properties, the organism as a whole."
It would be superfluous to examine all the articles of 
faith to which Kohler subscribes. For our purpose it is 
enough to discuss the theory of expiation, when reduced 
to its simplest proportions, when expressed in the for- 
mula : By undergoing punishment the criminal atones 
for his crime; for pain effaces wrong. Since it is some- 
thing in the composition of wrong that is to be neutralized 
by punishment, every wrong calls for punishment. But 
only certain classes of wrong are to be visited by the state. 
We are, therefore, entitled to know which is the point at 
which the wrongful merges in the criminal; and this is 
the first question which the advocates of the expiatory 
view leave unanswered. Every crime consists of two 
elements, one external, the other internal. It is granted 
by the staunchest supporters of the theory of atonement
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that punishment can have no effect upon the former : it 
cannot undo the physical act nor its mischievous conse- 
quences in the visible world. What it is supposed to 
counteract is the mental, the moral aspect of wrong- 
doing ; in other words, it is claimed that punishment 
destroys guilt. Primitive materialism which regarded 
guilt as a polluting substance, cannot be accused of 
absurdity if it attempted to wipe it off by material means 
such as the infliction of physical pain. But we moderns 
to whom guilt is a purely moral evil, are puzzled if we are 
told that it is counteracted by a physical evil. It is true, 
physical pain may lead to pain of conscience, punishment 
to repentance, and repentance, it may be said, extinguishes 
guilt; but surely not unless it brings about the reforma- 
tion of the offender. Now the theory which we are 
discussing, has nothing in common with the reformatory 
view of punishment. Its adherents either explicitly 
reject the latter, e. g. Kohler who stigmatizes it as the 
product of a sickly humanitarianism, or, at any rate, 
they make it perfectly clear that for them the state of the 
moral sentiments of the wrong-doer does not count; that 
for punishment to produce its full effect it is sufficient 
that it be inflicted; it need not even be accepted as just 
by the guilty party. In short, reformation is the cure 
of the criminal, expiation the cure of crime, as such, by 
punishment. As to the modus operandi of punishment in 
cancelling guilt, various explanations have been offered. 
But they are either mere re-statements of the question 
or arguments pregnant with transparent sophisms. As 
a specimen the theory of Arnold Kitz may serve : Every 
offence against the moral law results from the will yielding 
to the desire for pleasure. The contrary of the satisfac- 
tion of this desire is suffering evil. The will that 
was turned aside from the path of virtue by the allure- 
ments of pleasure, is, therefore, by the infliction of pain, 
moved in the opposite direction and thus brought back 
to the road of rectitude. " What the will has sinned, the
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will has atoned for." Punishment has " rescinded" 
the wrong. If we wished to criticize this theory, we 
should have to point out, inter alia, that the desire for 
pleasure is the motive, not only to wrong-doing, but to 
much perfectly innocent conduct, if not to human action 
universaliter; that whilst Kitz makes the will the meeting- 
place of moral and physical evil, to us the will appears 
always in the role of an agent, never in that of a patient; 
that if desire for pleasure formed the gist of the offence, 
its satisfaction by the consummation of the act must 
have been the most effective means of extinguishing it, 
and punishment would be justified, as an antidote of 
desire, only in the case of unsuccessful attempts at 
wrong-doing. But it is useless to discuss in detail an 
argument intended to elucidate that which is incapable of 
elucidation. For no intrinsic relationship can subsist be- 
tween moral guilt and bodily suffering; they are incom- 
mensurable magnitudes, and attempts to express the one 
in terms of the other must for ever remain as futile as 
attempts to square the circle. Indeed, most of the 
followers of the theory of atonement, instead of explain- 
ing how a certain amount of suffering, endured under 
compulsion by the guilty, will exactly balance the malice 
which prompted the criminal deed, are content to appeal 
to our inner life for a confirmation of their view. And 
an undeniable fact it is that suffering reconciles us to the 
sinner and causes us to forget or, at least, to pardon his 
misdeed. How, then, is it that in our consciousness two 
elements are allowed to compensate each other which, as 
a matter of fact, are utterly heterogeneous and entirely 
unconnected ? Are we unconsciously reproducing trains 
of thought transmitted to us from generations long gone 
by and kept alive among us by the Christian doctrine 
of expiation ? This may be a partial explanation of the 
riddle. But the true solution of the problem must be 
sought, I apprehend, in our own emotional life. The
crime excites in us a feeling of horror and of hatred against
o
194 THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
its perpetrator. Human suffering evokes our pity, and 
it does so even if the sufferer is an object of detestation 
to us. The feeling of sympathy thus aroused tends to 
neutralize, and after a certain point is reached, to over- 
come the antagonistic sentiment stirred up by the offence. 
The more heinous the wrong, the greater our ill-will 
against the actor; the more severe must also be the 
sufferings he endures in order to induce an amount of 
compassion sufficient to balance and to obliterate our 
aversion against him. Now it is a psychological law that 
the mind tends to project its own processes into the 
phenomenal world. In this instance we seem to go one 
better and to translate the play of our psychic forces into 
objective truths of the metaphysical order. Thus the 
extinction of antipathy by sympathy is transformed into 
an extinction of guilt by pain, and the equilibrium in 
the state of our emotions becomes an equilibrium in the 
absolute order of the universe. This, I take it, is the 
true foundation of the doctrine of expiation. It is, 
however, noteworthy that our pity is excited, not only 
by pain inflicted upon the guilty by way of punishment, 
but by any kind of suffering they undergo, even if it 
comes upon them independently of all human agency. 
Suffering of a sufficient degree of intensity, endured by 
the offender, whatever its cause or its source, ought, on 
the theory of atonement, to be a ground of exemption 
from punishment. Those who support the theory, are 
not consistent enough to draw this conclusion. But it is 
characteristic that when we see an evil-doer in agony 
and distress, we call his suffering his due punishment 
without always being alive to the fact that we are using 
allegorical language. And finally, if the account which 
we have given of the real basis and of the true meaning 
of the expiatory theory is correct, its critics are justified if 
they claim that it is merely an apology for giving vent 
to our ill-will against the wrong-doer.
CHAPTER III
KANT'S THEORY
" THE right of administering Punishment is the right 
of the Sovereign as the Supreme Power to inflict pain 
upon a subject on account of the Crime committed by 
him."
" Juridical Punishment can never be administered 
merely as a means for promoting another Good either 
with regard to the Criminal himself or to Civil Society, 
but must in all cases be imposed only because the indi- 
vidual on whom it is inflicted, has committed a Crime. 
For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a 
means subservient to the purpose of another, nor be mixed 
up with the subjects of the Law of Things. Against such 
treatment his Inborn Personality has a Right to protect 
him, even although he may be condemned to lose his Civil 
Personality. He must first be found guilty and deserving 
punishment, before there can be any thought of drawing 
from his Punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow- 
citizens. The penal Law is a categorical Imperative, and 
woe to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of 
Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may 
discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or even 
from the clear measure of it, according to the Pharisaic 
maxim : ' It is better that one man should die than that 
the whole people should perish.' For if Justice and 
Righteousness perish, human life would no longer have 
any value in the world."
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" But what is the mode and measure of Punishment 
which Public Justice takes as its Principle and Standard ? 
It is just the Principle of Equality, by which the Pointer 
of the Scale of Justice is made to incline no more to the 
one side than to the other. It may be rendered by saying 
that the undeserved evil which any one commits on 
another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself. . . . 
This is the Right of Retaliation (ius talionis); and properly 
understood, it is the only Principle which in regulating a 
Public Court, as distinguished from mere private judg- 
ment, can definitely assign both the quality and the 
quantity of a just penalty. All other standards are 
wavering and uncertain; and on account of other con- 
siderations involved in them, they contain no principle 
conformable to the sentence of pure and strict Justice."
" Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with 
the consent of all its members, . . . the last Murderer 
lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolu- 
tion was carried out. This ought to be done in order that 
every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that 
blood-guiltiness may not remain on the people; for other- 
wise they might all be regarded as participators in the 
murder as a public violation of Justice."
" Punitive Justice (iustitia punitiva) in which the 
ground of the penalty is moral (quia peccatum est), must 
be distinguished from punitive Expediency, the foundation 
of which is merely pragmatic (ne peccetur) as being 
grounded upon the experience of what operates most 
effectively to prevent crimes."
These extracts from The Philosophy of Law contain a 
full account of Kant's theory of punishment. It may 
be summarized in the following few sentences : There 
exists a categorical imperative to punish criminals by an 
application of the lex talionis. Punishment does not 
serve any end or purpose; it is an end in itself.
Kant's thesis that the penal law is a categorical impera-
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tive, at once raises a difficulty. For in the Grundlegung 
zur Metaphysik der Sitten he lays down that there is but 
one categorical imperative, though he expresses it in three 
different formulae 
1. " Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at 
the same time will that it should become a universal 
Law "; or, " Act as if the maxim of thy action were to 
become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature."
2. "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own 
person or in that of any other, in every case as an end 
withal, never as means only."
3. " Act according to the idea of the will of every 
rational being as a universal legislative will."
If these propositions express the only categorical 
imperative, and if yet the criminal law is said to be a 
categorical imperative, the only possible solution is that 
the punitive imperative is contained impliciter in these 
formulae, and is, therefore, analytically deducible there- 
from. Now, inasmuch as the rules of conduct prescribed 
by the criminal law are part and parcel of the moral law, 
they obviously fall under the sway of the categorical 
imperative. But the latter governs only the canons of 
conduct as such, and not the sanctions by which they are 
enforced. It might, indeed, be said that it must cover 
the latter likewise; for he who wills the rule must also 
will that obedience to such rule be enforced. Of criminal 
law conceived as part of municipal law, that is to say, as 
being founded upon the command of a sovereign or 
superior, this line of argument holds good; for positive 
law, as the creature of the sovereign or state, derives the 
whole of its obligatory force from the sanctions annexed 
thereto. This is not, however, Kant's view of the penal 
law. In the Kritik der praJctischen Vernunjt he takes 
great pains to make it quite clear that the idea of punish- 
ment is not an essential ingredient in the conception of 
crime; that it is not by reason of the penal consequences
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which it entails that an act is a crime; but that the act 
constituting a crime is forbidden because it is an evil in 
itself, quite irrespective of its consequences. To hold the 
contrary view would be "to reduce the will to a mechan- 
ism destructive of freedom." But even without this 
explicit statement it is clear that the train of thoughts 
above developed is quite incompatible with Kantian 
doctrine. The moral law is binding, because it is " the 
principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason " 
(Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten), the command of 
" practical reason directly legislative " (KritiJc der prak- 
tischen Vernunft): and an autonomous will, of course, 
knows neither lord nor master. The latter difficulty 
could be overcome if we suppose Kant to have conceived 
the criminal law as a body of rules of conduct laid down, 
under pain of punishment, by the noumenal self for the 
guidance of the phenomenal self. This definition, how- 
ever, could explain and justify self-punishment only, not 
punishment by the state ; and it would leave unanswered 
one last, and in my idea fatal, objection, namely the 
following : the proposition that assent to the rule implies 
assent to the sanction, rests on the assumption that the 
sanction is something subsidiary, that it discharges a 
function merely ancillary as a means for compelling 
obedience to the rule, and that it is not an end in itself. 
Thus understood, the punitive imperative is, in Kantian 
phraseology, a hypothetical, and not a categorical, 
command. With Kant punishment is not the comple- 
ment but an integral part of the moral law; not a mere 
sanction, but a direct application, an immediate realization 
of the law of duty.
According to Kant, the categorical duty to puuish is a 
supreme a priori principle of practical reason which, just 
because it is primitive and final, neither needs, nor is 
capable of, analysis or proof, but has to be accepted as 
a fundamental, though inscrutable, law of our moral
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nature. Few men, I think, will assent to this categorical 
imperative once it is clearly understood what it means. 
It is a command amounting to nothing less than this : 1 
" Return evil for evil. Return for evil an equal amount 
of evil. Inflict evil, not that good may come out of evil, j 
but inflict evil for evil's sake." Such a canon of conduct, 
far from being acceptable as an intuitive command of 
our moral nature, is repugnant to all our moral instincts 
and is condemned with no uncertain voice by our moral 
judgment. And if our philosopher goes on to teach that 
there can be neither pardon nor mitigation of punishment, 
that the soul that sinneth it shall die, and shall die at the 
hands of civil society even if such society were on the 
point of dissolution, he seems to be carried away by a 
blind moral (or immoral ?) fanaticism equalled only by 
the religious fanaticism of a Joseph de Maistre and his 
worship of the hangman.
In truth, on Kant himself the conception of punishment 
as an absolute and ultimate command does not seem to 
have dawned as an intuition; it appears to have forced 
itself upon his mind as a conclusion from the two following 
propositions 
1. Deeply rooted in our soul is the conviction that the 
universe is founded on justice, that pain is the fruit of 
evil-doing, a feeling, as Sir Edward Fry expresses it, that 
there is a fitness of suffering to sin.
2. Even in the criminal the human personality has to 
be respected; he must never be dealt with as a means 
subservient to the purpose of another.
If, then, the wrong-doer is to be made to suffer, and if 
yet his sufferings must not be made to serve an ulterior 
object, punishment must be an end in itself, an absolute 
imperative of duty.
It is not difficult to show that the conclusion does not 
by any means follow from the premises. First of all, the 
belief in a moral government of the world is an article of
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faith, shared by a large proportion of mankind, but not 
necessarily compelling assent. In founding punishment 
upon what is esteemed, in the face of the frequency with 
which wickedness apparently prospers, one of the hardest 
riddles of the universe, Kant seems to explain ignotum 
per ignotius. For Kant the absolute necessity of a causal 
relationship between evil-doing and suffering is a final 
principle of practical reason from the dictates of which no 
rational being, not even the Deity, can escape. But then 
the necessity ceases to be a moral law and becomes a 
metaphysical postulate; and in the giddy heights of 
metaphysical speculation anything may be necessary. 
Moreover, as a metaphysical proposition, the assertion of 
a necessary connection between sin and pain bears upon 
a relationship actually subsisting, not upon one to be 
established; and there is a wide gulf between the " Is " 
and the " Ought " which Kant has failed to bridge over. 
It may, indeed, be doubted whether Kant realized to the 
full the width of this chasm. For though he does not 
go so far as to assert, as does Leibniz, the solidarity and 
ultimate identity of the natural consequences of vice 
with the punishments provided by law, though he actually 
repudiates, in the Eechtslehre, the opinion which would 
flow as a corollary from this view, that where vice has 
brought about its own punishment, no further punishment 
ought to be awarded by judicial sentence, he yet sees a 
strong analogy between what in Bentham's terminology 
are called physical and political sanctions. Granting, 
then, that in the immutable order of things the wages of 
sin are sorrow, surely this law must be operative without 
human intervention, and it is not easy to see, unless we 
fall back on theocratic notions, why the state should 
constitute itself the organ of the dispensations of Provi- 
dence. And if the criminal receives no more than his 
due if the evil which he has done recoils upon him, why 
should the arm of human justice be raised to smite him ?
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As Leslie Stephen remarks, the sentiment that the moral 
order would be out of joint if wrong-doing does not lead 
to pain, is quite compatible with a horror of inflicting 
useless pain upon any one.
In the second place, the maxim that " the criminal 
must not be dealt with as a means subservient to the 
purpose of another " is converted into the postulate that 
" punishment must never be administered as a means for 
promoting another good," in other words, that it must not 
be made subservient to any purpose whatsoever. The 
second proposition is obviously not identical with the; 
first; for punishment may be made subservient to the \ 
purpose of the evil-doer himself. Thus, on a purely 
reformatory theory, the aim of punishment has its root 
in the guilty person alone. And even if punishment is 
conceived as serving the objects of society, it may be 
said to serve the objects of the criminal too; for, inasmuch 
as his true self is a social self, he shares in, and partakes 
of, the rational aims of society.
Even if we adopt the doctrine of the categorical punitive 
imperative, two difficulties, both relating to its scope, 
remain yet unsolved. Firstly, if it is an absolute duty to 
punish evil-doing, the criminal code ought to be co- 
extensive with the moral law. Kant's answer to this 
objection would be that in our consciousness certain 
wrongs bear a distinguishing mark that singles them out, 
with unmistakable clearness, as appropriate objects of 
punishment. But this reply postulates a criminal code 
eternal and immovable as the starry sky above, a view 
at once contradicted by the fact that the catalogue of 
crimes varies with time and place. And, secondly, a 
categorical imperative is ex definitions addressed to the 
will of all rational beings. The execution of the criminal 
law would, therefore, be incumbent as a duty upon the 
individual. Why, then, is the state alone armed by Kant <; 
with the sword of punitive justice ?
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Having found Kant's theory so full of flaws and pitfalls, 
we may well concur in the opinion of Henke that " it 
would never have gained a following were it not that a 
categorical imperative forms an excellent ingredient in 
ostensibly philosophical speculation, a dazzling cloak 
eminently fit to cover our ignorance." Even in Kant's 
own system the categorical imperative of punishment is 
introduced as deus ex machina for the one and only purpose 
of supplying a rationale of punishment. For it is in 
flagrant contradiction with the whole of his ethical system. 
The latter being founded upon the doctrine of moral 
autonomy, on the principle that we ought to obey the 
moral law only out of respect for that law, the act itself, 
one would have thought, constitutes its own and only 
possible reward and punishment. And it is in accordance 
with this doctrine that with Kant the notion of punish- 
ment is quite extrinsic as to that of crime. But if, in 
spite of this, he maintains (in the Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft) that punishment ought to be connected, as a 
consequence, with wrong by the principles of a moral 
legislation, in other words, that it is incumbent, as an 
absolute duty, upon the state to carry into effect the prin- 
ciple of retaliation, it looks as if we find Kant sacrificing 
unwittingly on the altar of utilitarianism which he has 
evinced so much zeal to demolish. Moreover, Kant sees 
the sole justification of legal compulsion in the fact that 
constraint, in being applied to the wrong-doer, removes 
an obstacle to freedom, and he regards it as legitimate 
only in so far as it serves this purpose, viz. the protection 
of legal rights. Now punishment surely involves com- 
pulsion and restraint; how, then, can it be justified if 
inflicted without an end to justify it as a means ? And, 
finally, as soon as he descends from abstract speculation 
to the consideration of concrete instances, Kant becomes 
unfaithful to his own maxim. In the Kritik der prak­ 
tischen Vernunft we read : " Suppose a man to pretend
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that his sensual impulses became irresistible whenever 
the object of his desire and an opportunity for satisfying 
the same presented themselves. Imagine that a gallows 
were erected in front of the house in which he finds that 
opportunity, in order to hang him as soon as he had 
gratified his lust, and ask yourself whether he would not 
control his inclination. It cannot long remain in doubt 
what the answer would be." Again, in the Einleitung 
in die Rechtslehre he quotes a supposititious case, made 
famous by a dictum of Lord Bacon's, to the effect that, 
assuming two persons who have been shipwrecked get 
on the same plank, and they find that it will not bear both, 
either of them is justified in shoving the other off, and is 
not responsible if his friend gets drowned in consequence. 
Kant says : " There can be no system of criminal law 
that awards capital punishment " to the actor in such a 
case.  " Such a law could not possibly produce the effect 
intended. For the threat of an evil as yet uncertain 
(death by judicial sentence) could not outweigh the fear 
of an evil" (of equal magnitude) " apparently certain 
(death by drowning)." As a matter of fact, two systems 
of law, at least, do not excuse the actor in such a case : 
in English law, after the decision in R. v. Dudley and 
Stephens (1884), the celebrated case of the crew of the 
Mignonette, he would be guilty of murder, whilst in 
Commonwealth v. Holms the judgment of an American 
court practically amounts to this, that the two men on 
the raft were bound to toss up as to which should go. As 
a matter of theory, it is obvious that Kant's ratio decidendi 
in both his cases was not the categorical imperative, but 
a view of punishment which clearly foreshadows Feuer- 
bach's ingenious theory. In thus becoming, by his very 
inconsistency, Feuerbach's intellectual father, Kant has 
rendered a greater service to legal philosophy than by 
his doctrine of a categorical punitive imperative, which, 
after all, explains nothing and illuminates nothing.
CHAPTER IV
HEGEL'S THEORY
HEGEL develops his theory of punishment in sections 
95-104 of the Grundlinien der Philosophic des Rechts. 
The following passages contain an outline of his argument.
" A first act of constraint, implying the use of force 
by a free man, and violating the concrete embodiment of 
freedom, namely, law as law, is crime. It is a negative- 
infinite judgment complete in scope, inasmuch as it 
negates not merely the particular, the subjection of an 
object to my will, but also the universal, the infinite as 
involved in the predicate ' mine,' the very capacity of 
being clothed with rights; and in doing so, it operates, not 
by influencing my intention (as in the case of fraud), 
but against my intention. We are here in the sphere of 
criminal law.
" An accomplished violation of the law as law is a 
positive external fact; yet intrinsically it is a nulh'ty. 
This nulh'ty is rendered manifest by the annihilation of 
such violence likewise accomplishing itself as a fact. 
This means the realization of the rule of law in the neces- 
sary process of its overcoming its own violation.
" The nullity consists in the pretension to have abolished 
law as law. For law, being absolute, cannot be set aside. 
Hence the manifestation of crime is intrinsically null, and 
this nullity is the essence of the effect of crime. But 
what is null must manifest itself as such, that is to say 
must declare itself to be violable. The criminal act is
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not the primary and positive, punishment supervening 
as the negative. It is the negative, and punishment is, 
therefore, but the negation of a negation.
" The violation has a positive existence only as being 
the particular will of the criminal. The violation of 
this will in its concrete existence means, therefore, the 
extinction of crime, which would otherwise have estab- 
lished itself as valid, and the restoration of the rule of 
law.
" The violence which the criminal experiences, is not 
only intrinsically just as being just, it must express his 
own absolute will, the reality of his freedom, his law; it 
is also just as a right against the criminal himself, founded 
on his will as concretely realized in his act. For his act, 
as the act of a rational being, must contain a universal 
principle, must establish a law which, by his act, he has 
recognized as binding on himself, and he has no cause for 
complaint if he is subsumed under a rule which is his own 
law. ... In that the punishment is regarded as flowing 
from his own law, the criminal is honoured as a rational 
being.
" The annihilation of crime is retaliation in so far as 
it implies the injury of an injury, and in that as the crime 
in its manifestation has a definite qualitative and quantita- 
tive content, its negation, in becoming manifest, must be 
similarly definite. This notional identity, however, is an 
equality in the essential and inherent, not in the specific, 
character of the injury an equality in value ... as 
the inner identity of things specifically different.
" Crime and avenging justice represent the visible 
outer form of the development of the will, as occurring, 
first of all, in the opposition of the universal, absolute 
will and the particular will claiming independence of 
the former. Next, by rising above the opposition, the 
universal will is turned back into itself and has become 
an absolute reality. Thus law, in establishing its validity
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as against the individual will, is being realized through 
its own inherent necessity."
This text obviously requires a good deal of explanation. 
Indeed, hardly a single sentence is intelligible unless 
interpreted in the light of Hegel's general philosophical 
system. It will, therefore, be necessary to elucidate his 
actual meaning, before proceeding to criticize his theory.
" Rationality, viewed abstractedly, consists in the 
thorough unity of universality and individuality." Man 
acts rationally if, and only so far as, he brings his own 
personal will into complete harmony with the universal 
will. The concrete expression of the universal will is 
Law. Hence follows that rationality, " taken concretely, 
consists in action determined by universal laws." Now 
law, as the immediate concrete expression of the universal 
will, is independent of the state and, if not anterior to, 
at least coeval with it. The state, Hegel tells us, is not 
an antecedent condition of justice; indeed, in the Eechts- 
philosophie the theory of rights and wrongs precedes the 
theory of the state. But inasmuch as punishment is 
the form which justice assumes in the state, we must 
inquire into the relationship which will and law bear to 
the state. The state, according to Hegel, is the realized 
self-conscious will of man raised to the plane of universal- 
ity which belongs to it by its own nature. " The state 
is the march of God in the world; its ground or cause is 
the power of reason realizing itself as will." Thus the 
law of the state is the law of reason, the actualization of 
the universal law. In the state the individual finds a 
revelation of his own larger and better self. Therefore 
the laws of the state are his own laws, and only by con- 
forming to them can man conduct himself rationally. 
" It is the absolute purpose of reason that freedom should 
be actualized." True freedom is, then, attainable only 
through voluntary obedience to the law of the state. 
Disobedience to that law constitutes " wrong." Doing
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wrong means opposing the individual will to the universal 
will. The universal alone is rational. Acting wrongfully, 
therefore, is acting irrationally. Now it is one of the 
fundamental tenets of Hegelian philosophy that " that 
only is real which is rational." Wrongful conduct, being 
irrational conduct, is unreal. Thus we arrive at the 
proposition that wrong is a mere nullity. What is true 
of wrong generaliter must a fortiori be true of crime 
which is the climax of wrong-doing. Unlike civil injury, 
crime not only infringes individual rights of another, but 
attacks his very personality. For crime involves the 
exercise of violence. Being a voluntary act, and free- 
dom being an attribute of the will, it is a manifestation of 
the freedom of the actor. To use force against another 
means to interfere with his rights against his will; and 
it is immaterial whether the criminal act is directed 
against his person or against his property; for a man's 
property is but the aggregate of objects into which he has 
projected his will. In either case the criminal negates 
the freedom of the offended party, i. e. his very capacity 
of being clothed with rights. Crime, then, is an attack of 
freedom upon freedom and, therefore, self-contradictory. 
But more than that : by his act, the criminal proclaims, 
louder than he could by words, a rule of conduct founded 
on the assertion of freedom in the actor and its negation 
in his fellow-creatures. For the act of a rational being 
can never be an isolated phenomenon, universality being 
an attribute of rationality. His maxim of conduct 
must, therefore, pretend to universal applicability. In 
doing so, it enters into competition with, claims validity 
against, and seeks to supersede the general law which 
is based on the affirmation of the freedom of all rational 
beings. The criminal's particular law, which we may 
call the law of licence, is at war with the universal law, 
the law of freedom. But since the latter is the immediate 
manifestation of practical reason, and therefore, absolute,
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indefeasible and the only reality, the law set up in op- 
position to it must be a nullity, a phantom, a mere 
negative. In the conflict of the particular law with the 
universal law the latter must manifest its reality by 
rendering apparent the hollowness of the former. The 
particular law owes its phantom existence to its being 
derived from the act of the will of a rational being. In 
the criminal's will crime has its only positive existence, 
and here it has to be attacked in order that its nullity 
may be made manifest. We have seen that crime is 
an act of violence, an act of the will negating freedom. 
The criminal will has, therefore, to be negated in order 
that freedom, the rule of law, may be re-established. 
And it is negated by the negation of the essential attribute 
of that will, of its freedom. Freedom can be negated 
only by constraint; and constraint thus applied is punish- 
ment. The function of punishment, then, is to negate 
crime, the negation of law, and through the double 
negation involved in the process the rule of justice re- 
affirms itself. " By turning back to itself out of its 
negation, law becomes actual and valid, whereas at first 
it was only an implicit potentiality." Punishment, then, 
is the necessary condition precedent to the realization 
of law. Inasmuch as the objective will is reflected in 
the self-consciousness of all rational beings, that of the 
criminal himself included, the latter, in suffering punish- 
ment, but obeys his own law. As against him, the 
legem sibi dixerat ipse holds also good in another and more 
subjective sense. By his deed, we have seen, the criminal 
has set up a law peculiar to himself, viz. the law of force, 
and his punishment is but a particular application of his 
own legislative act. In that a principle of conduct is 
deduced from his crime, he is honoured as a presumably 
rational being : from the act of a madman, an infant, a 
brute no one would derive a universal maxim. Punish- 
ment is retaliation, intrinsically as being an injury of an
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injury; extrinsically because punishment must vary in 
(negative) value with the negative value of crime if it 
is to annul and cancel the latter. It is true, in its essence 
crime is an infinite-negative judgment, and, therefore, 
incapable of standardization; but in the region of the 
finite it has a definite and variable content. Here the 
ideal identity of crime and punishment is obscured. 
What is postulated, therefore, is not equality of these two 
phenomenally incommensurable quantities, i. e. material 
talio, but equivalence, equality in value, which represents 
the inner identity of things specifically different.
The critical student of Hegel's theory cannot fail to 
be impressed, first and foremost, by the peculiar notions 
which he entertains of the fundamental conceptions : 
State Law Crime.
The definition of the state as the realized ethical 
spirit Hegel has borrowed from Plato; and he is only the 
mouthpiece of Hellenic ideas, if he goes on to assert that 
the individual can attain rationality only by complete 
subjection of his particular will to the general substantive 
will as actualized in the state; that the end of the state 
" has the highest right over the individual, whose highest 
duty in turn is to be a member of the state." Hegel 
himself warns us in the Phanomenologie des Geistes that 
the highest realization of the state, that in which it is 
the universal which completely sums up the individuals 
that compose it, may be considered as being in the past 
or the future. But whenever he deals with the state in 
its concrete relations, he becomes forgetful of this limita- 
tion, forgetful of the high value which modern thought 
sets on individual personality. Yet only as seen with 
Hegel's eyes, only as being the actuality of universal 
reason, can the state take it upon itself to realize reason 
by annulling unreason, i. e. by the punishment of criminals.
Law, to Hegel, is the objective spirit in itself, the 
transcendent solidarity of all rational beings, the general
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will, the rule of reason, the realm of freedom. It is the 
law of humanity as a whole and at the same time each 
individual's own law, since it expresses the will logically 
implied in intelligences as such. It is not imposed upon 
man as the command of a higher power, but flows from 
his own specific nature as destined to freedom.
" Es ist nicht draussen; da sucht es der Thor. 
Es ist in dir; du bringst es ewig hervor."
And it derives its authority from the fact that man must 
fulfil it in order to realize his higher, his rational self. 
It is binding because it is inherently reasonable, reason- 
able in the sense of a logical proposition : it is impossible 
to deny its validity without falling into a contradiction 
in terms. Truly a lofty conception ! But, unfortunately, 
Hegel identifies the law of reason with the Prussian 
Criminal Code.
Hegel's conception of crime involves a number of 
propositions which we shall examine as we proceed.
1. "A crime is an act of violence." According to 
Hegel, the use of force is the distinguishing feature of 
crime, as compared with civil injuries and more par- 
ticularly with fraudulent wrongs. This definition is 
obviously too narrow : it identifies crime with what we 
call crimes of violence, the genus with the species, and 
entirely ignores those public offences in which not force, 
but negligence or fraudulent intent enter into the corpus 
delicti.
2. " Crime is an attack upon the freedom of the in- 
dividual." Why ? Because it is an attack upon a man's 
person or property, the immediate or mediate embodi- 
ment of his will. Now a man's freedom has, rightly or 
wrongly, been held to consist in the aggregate of his 
rights. Hegel's limitation of the term to personal and 
corporeal rights appears arbitrary, though no doubt 
necessary from bis standpoint, since incorporeal rights,
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not being materialized in tangible things, cannot become 
the object of an act of violence. Furthermore, though 
Hegel sees in every crime an attack upon law as law, the 
point of attack to him is always the individual as the 
vessel containing the universal. The large and important 
class of offences of a public nature can, therefore, find no 
place in the Hegelian criminal code.
3. " Crime is a denial of the idea of freedom." The 
assertion that in violating the freedom of one particular 
individual, the offender negatives freedom in abstracto, 
in other words the freedom of all rational beings, implies 
that the object of the attack is a matter of utter in- 
difference to the criminal; that all he cares about is to 
commit a crime, no matter upon whom. This may be 
so in a limited class of cases, e. g. petty thefts, but it is 
certainly not true of all, nor of the most heinous, acts of 
crime.
4. " Crime is an attack upon law as law." According 
to our philosopher, law in itself is inviolable; it can be 
attacked only in its concrete manifestations, in the form 
of particular rights. And that, for Hegel, every violation 
of an individual right amounts to an attack upon law as 
law we may infer from his statement that in a civil action 
there is no violation of rights as such, but only a question 
in whom a certain right resides, while in a matter of 
criminal law there is involved an infraction of right as 
such, which, by implication, is a denial of the whole 
sphere of law. This distinction is not tenable; for a 
wilful breach of contract, though giving rise to a civil 
cause only, amounts to a most emphatic violation of 
a definite right, and the same holds good of wilful torts. 
As to the " how " and " why " the breach of a single 
paragraph of the penal code should amount to a negation 
of the idea of law, Hegel fails to offer any explanation. 
Instead of adopting this view, unsupported by argument, 
on the mere authority of Hegel, we shall attempt to
p 2
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trace the idea to its source. As a matter of philosophic 
speculation, it is platonic in origin; for Socrates insists 
in the Crito that the wrong-doer destroys, so far as in him 
lies, the order of reason. It also accords with the philo- 
sophy of the New Testament which teaches that he that 
offendeth in one point, is guilty of all. As a matter of 
history, it is the theory of crime of early absolutism which 
Hegel adopts and adapts to his purposes, the view that 
the essence of crime is that it constitutes an act of dis- 
obedience to the will of the ruler. On the principle of 
absolutism : " L'etat c'est moi," disobedience to the will 
of the prince becomes disobedience to the will of the state, 
and this transformed into its Hegelian equivalent be- 
comes disobedience to the universal will, i. e. to law as 
law. In other words, the criminal is considered and 
treated as a rebel. As a doctrine of jurisprudence, the 
assertion that crime is the negation of law as law rests 
on a confusion of terms. " Wrong," used as an adjective, 
signifies the contrary of the adjective " right," from which 
the abstract noun " Right," the synonym of justice, is 
formed. " A wrong," i. e. an unlawful, act is a violation 
of " a right," of a capacity or faculty residing in a definite 
person. Ensnared by the ambiguity of the words " right " 
and " wrong," Hegel is led to blend their dissimilar 
meanings. Thus a crime, being " a wrong " in its most 
aggravated form, is conceived as an attack, not merely 
upon " a right," i. e. a particular right, but upon " Right " 
in abstracto, upon justice, upon law as law. That the 
erroneous identification of those disparate objects, sug- 
gested by the identity of the terms in which they are 
expressed, lies at the root of the proposition which we 
are discussing, is made apparent in the writings of Hegel's 
most distinguished modern disciples. " A wrong is the 
contrary of Right," says Kostlin, whilst we read in 
Halschner : " Crime as a form of wrong is, first of all, 
the contrary and the contradiction of Right." In claim-
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ing that the breach of a single rule criminally sanctioned 
amounts, by implication, to a denial of the whole body 
of law, Hegel offends against one of the most fundamental 
rules of logic which forbids to infer the general from the 
particular, to generalize from one single concrete fact. 
If we come to test the Hegelian thesis in the light of 
actual experience, we find that a negation of the legal 
order may justly be attributed to those enemies of society 
who have deliberately chosen a career of crime, and who 
are prepared to go to any length in order to accomplish 
their criminal purposes. But to concede this is something 
utterly different from concurring in the assertion that 
every criminal act, even if it is an isolated phenomenon 
in the life-history of the offender, amounts, by implica- 
tion, to a denial of the rule of justice; and it is surely a 
grotesque view of the situation to see in every wretch 
that leaves the dock of the Old Bailey with a conviction 
recorded against him a Prometheus raising his head in 
defiance of Olympian reason.
5. " A crime is an act of legislation." As being an 
act of the will of a rational being, it must embody a 
maxim which at any rate the criminal wishes to pro- 
claim as law. Here we have the categorical imperative 
with a vengeance, the categorical imperative transformed 
into a categorical statement of fact. It is no longer, as 
with Kant, the criterion of the rationality of an act that 
it can be erected into a rule for the guidance of all men. 
According to Hegel every act of a rational being contains 
a universal principle; in other words, every act of a 
rational being must be treated as a rational act even 
if such act bears, on Hegel's own teaching, the hall-mark 
of unreasonableness on the face of it, as being the mani- 
festation of the particular will in its opposition to the 
universal will. In attributing to crime the universality, 
even if only the subjective universality, of law, our 
philosopher applies to unreason the rule of reason. Truly
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he sees method in madness, system in unreason. The 
particular law of the criminal enters into competition 
with the general law. As against the state, the offender 
plays not only the part of the rebel, but also that of a 
rival legislator, promulgating the law of force against 
the law of freedom, the law of unreason against the law 
of reason, the law of evil against the law of good. Now, 
in spite of the recognition, by Aristotle, of a class of men 
who are the very incarnation of badness (nania rtteia 
xal ebrAaij), it may be doubted whether any rational 
being can ever adopt evil, merely as evil, for its guiding 
principle and, in steering the barque of life, consistently 
take its direction from the beacon of wrong. In any case, 
this is not the habit of mind of the ordinary criminal. 
Far from contesting the validity of the general law by 
opposing to it a system of his own creation, the average 
offender fully realizes the wrongfulness of his conduct, at 
any rate both before and after the deed is done, even if at 
the time of its commission passion should prevent him 
from seeing it in its true light; and in understanding 
the wrongful character of his act, he impliedly acknow- 
ledges the universal law as entering into him. Indeed, 
incapacity to appreciate the wrongful nature of the act, 
so far from being a characteristic mental attribute of the 
criminal, is treated in more than one system of law as a 
factor negativing responsibility. In short, crime is not 
a law, is not intended by the criminal to become law, and 
could never acquire the mere semblance of law, even if 
the criminal wished to proclaim it as such.
6. " Crime is a nullity." Only what is reasonable has 
a right to exist. Crime, being irrational, ought not to 
exist, and since it conflicts with the universal, the realm 
of reason, it is doomed, by an inherent necessity, to come 
to grief, to be overcome, to be annihilated. This is the 
idea which Hegel clothes in the formula that crime is 
a nullity. As a mere figure of speech, this phrase might
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be allowed to pass unchallenged; but since it forms one 
of the corner-stones in the Hegelian construction of 
punishment, it is necessary to point out that the assertion 
that a thing calls for its obliteration, implies the affirma- 
tion, not the negation, of its existence. Crime is not 
a bare naught; it is something positively bad, an actual 
violation of the law, a real disturbance of the social order.
7. " Crime is a judgment." The same crime that 
advances all the extravagant claims hitherto discussed, 
is all at once degraded to a judgment, an infinite judgment 
it is true, nevertheless a mere judgment, an erroneous 
judgment. And the criminal who has hitherto paraded 
in the guise of the rebel and of the legislator, turns out, 
on being unmasked, to be an ordinary mortal guilty of 
nothing more than an error of judgment, a logical in- 
consistency. It need hardly be said that here, as through- 
out his analysis, Hegel misrepresents the psychological 
genesis of crime by treating human conduct as being 
determined by considerations of the intellectual order 
alone, and entirely ignoring the influence of the emotions 
upon the will.
From crime thus defined Hegel deduces punishment as 
a necessary logical consequence. The demand for punish- 
ment is as absolute, as imperative with Hegel as it is with 
Kant. But here it is no longer a question of moral duty : 
crime has to be punished because it postulates punishment 
as its necessary logical complement. Crime is a nullity. 
What is null must manifest itself as such, and punishment 
is the demonstratio ad oculos of the nullity of crime. This 
proof has to be furnished since crime, borrowing from 
will the cloak of reality, is likely to deceive the un- 
initiated by its phantom existence; the function of punish- 
ment is to destroy the illusion. The nullity of crime 
consists in the attack upon, and the attempt to usurp 
the place of, law, whilst law is, in its very conception, 
incapable of being wounded or ousted. Why, then, it may
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be asked, should Justice, in her very nature inviolable, 
move out of her dignified repose in order to strike, merely 
because a dog barks where he cannot bite ? Hegel's 
answer to this objection is : " Because by destroying 
wrong, Right verifies itself as a necessary factor in 
reality." The ultimate object of punishment, then, is 
the establishment of the validity of the rule of law, 
which before had existed as a mere contingent possibility; 
 obviously a moral, not a logical end. So the moral 
law, though carefully hidden behind the scenes, turns out, 
after all, to be the central figure in the play of Hegelian 
dialectic. Here again the disciple confesses what the 
master has taken pains to conceal; for we are told by 
Halschner that " whatever definition be adopted as 
expressing the proximate conception of law, punishment 
as a legal institution is incapable of explanation unless 
law itself is regarded, not as the creature of the subjective 
will, but as a force of the moral order of the universe." 
Granting, however, that it is incumbent upon the state as 
the realized ethical spirit to actualize justice by tearing 
the mask from crime in order to show that there is no 
face behind it, it remains to be seen why the infliction of 
an evil, the exercise of restraint, should be necessary for 
the purpose. Punishment being, in the Hegelian view, 
in its essence demonstrative, one would have thought 
that a declaration by the state that crime is a delusion, 
should amply suffice. The claim that "a community 
can hardly express an idea in words, and hence an 
external physical act is the most natural vehicle for its 
thoughts" (Miller), is untenable; for the community, 
the state not only can, but does, speak through an author- 
ized mouthpiece, viz. the judges. To understand how 
Hegel escapes from this difficulty, we must follow him 
deeper into his logical labyrinth. Crime, the naught, has 
a positive existence in the will of its perpetrator, though 
even here it is in substance a mere negative. The liberties
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which our philosopher here takes with mathematical 
symbols, calls for special notice since his theory of punish- 
ment ultimately resolves itself into an algebraic equation. 
Crime is the negation of freedom by its perpetrator. 
Punishment is the negation of his own freedom. The 
double negation of freedom is tantamount to its affirma- 
tion, i. e. to the assertion of justice. It would seem, at 
first sight, as if the negation of freedom started by the 
actor would become accentuated by being continued in 
his own person. But Hegel's view is that by negating 
the criminal's freedom, you negate his will; and since it 
is his will that negates freedom, punishment, by ex- 
tinguishing his will, extinguishes the source of the negation 
of freedom. The notion underlying all this sophistry 
is probably this : The will of the criminal, in attacking 
another's freedom, has overstepped its legitimate limits; 
punishment, in restraining his will within its lawful 
bounds, restores the status quo ante delictum. Returning 
to Hegel's version of the process, we are confronted with 
the question how restraint applied to the body can 
extinguish the crime or logically negate the antagonistic 
will in which alone the wrong has its positive existence. 
It cannot possibly be Hegel's meaning that punishment 
produces this effect by leading the offender to repent 
and to find his better self; for Hegel categorically 
rejects as superficial the reformatory view of punishment. 
On the other hand, genuine spontaneous repentance 
ought to exclude punishment. For in the will of the 
reformed criminal crime no longer exists; and since it 
has no reality outside his will, it has ceased to exist 
altogether and can no longer be negated or annulled. 
To the question how punishment destroys crime in its 
roots, Hegel offers us no answer; and his followers are 
only playing with words if they tell us that punishment 
has this effect because wrong is in the self in which 
will and body are united, or if seeking refuge behind
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Schopenhauerian notions, they assert that the body is 
but the incarnation of the will.
Punishment flows from crime and is just because it 
realizes the will of the criminal himself as that of a rational 
being. This is Hegel's paraphase and explanation of 
the well-known Kantian proposition that " the undeserved 
evil which any one commits on another is to be regarded 
as perpetrated on himself." It has been understood to 
mean that the criminal is being served as he would say 
any one should be served, whom he saw acting as he 
had done, in any case where his own person was not 
engaged; and that as a reasonable creature he could not 
avoid recognizing as deserved, when inflicted upon him- 
self, a punishment which he would unhesitatingly ac- 
knowledge as merited when inflicted upon another 
person. This interpretation is erroneous; for it represents 
the offender as consenting to the application to himself 
of a pre-existing law, not as himself laying down the law; 
in other words, it regards him as an impartial judge in 
propria causa, not as a legislator. To Hegel, as we have 
seen, the criminal appears as the embodiment of two 
laws, both emanating from his will; and punishment is 
his subsumption under both of them. Inasmuch as the 
universal is realized in him, the law of reason is the law 
of his will. In as far as he is a criminal, his will enacts 
the law of force, i. e. the law of unreason. Punishment, 
then, is the simultaneous application of the law of reason 
and the law of unreason; it is reasonable in its unreason, 
and it is so in order that the law of reason may prevail: 
a dialectical somersault not easy to match ! Having 
pointed out this inconsistency in the doctrine, let us 
now look upon punishment as the recoil, upon the 
criminal, of the force issuing out of him. The law of 
force is the law of unreason, and it is certainly not dignified 
for the state to descend to the level of the criminal and 
to answer the fool according to his folly. " The mummery
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which puts a crown of thorns upon the head of the offender, 
as the symbol of his legislative dignity, is cruel sport " 
(Laistner). And if Hegel claims that the state honours the 
criminal by adopting his maxim, it may be replied that 
society has no occasion to honour the criminal, though 
it is bound to respect in him the human personality, a 
postulate utterly disregarded by Hegel's theory of punish- 
ment, which now strikes us as the incarnation, not of the 
force of logic, but of the logic of force.
As to the measure of punishment, Hegel's teaching is 
far in advance of that of Kant. It is true he discovers 
a certain similarity between punishment and retaliation 
in that they both imply " the injury of an injury." But 
the analogy fails for want of a genuine tertium compara- 
tionis ; for the meaning of the lex talionis is not " the 
injury of an injury," but " an injury for an injury." 
And if he goes on to postulate equivalence of crime and 
punishment, without supplying a standard of value, the 
result of his disquisitions, translated into the ordinary 
language of forensic practice, appears to be nothing more 
than the homely rule : " The greater the crime, the 
heavier the punishment."
Having criticized the Hegelian notions in detail, we 
must now take a bird's-eye view of his position as a 
whole. Hegel's theory of punishment turns out to be 
but the application, to the idea of Justice, of his general 
dialectic method, of that process of reconstruction which 
takes place by the alternate production and removal 
of contradictions. The absolute idea is to him the soul 
of reality. But in the content of consciousness it is 
present implicitly only. In order to become explicit, 
it must go out of itself, particularize itself, oppose itself 
to itself, that it may reach the deepest and most com- 
prehensive unity with itself. So law, at first a mere 
potentiality, has, in crime and punishment, to go through 
a double negation in order to assert its reality. As it is
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an immanent impulse of rationality to actualize itself 
continually in human experience, it is an absolute end of 
human reason that justice establish its validity. And 
since both crime and punishment are necessary links 
in the process, a strange conclusion is forced upon us, as 
the outcome of Hegel's doctrine : Crime ceases to be some- 
thing accidental that ought not to be and ought never to 
have been; it becomes a necessary element of the moral 
order. So again punishment, instead of being merely a 
necessary evil, necessary because, and provided that, 
crimes are committed is erected into a categorical 
necessity. In other words, our moral nature demands 
that crimes be committed in order that punishments 
may be inflicted. And it becomes clear at once that 
Hegel is unfaithful to his principles if he concedes to 
the sovereign the right of pardoning criminals.
Hegel's doctrine of punishment, then, stands and 
falls with the proposition that the idea is the soul of 
reality, which forms the corner-stone of his whole philo- 
sophical system. When despoiled of the intellectual 
garnish with which its author has so richly and ingeniously 
supplied it, and seen in its nakedness, the theory turns out 
to be but a tissue of logical propositions with empty 
abstractions for the material out of which it is woven. 
To attempt to develop the real content of an idea out of 
its bare form is to fight windmills; and human conduct, 
whether individual or collective, refuses to be reduced 
to a mere play of logical categories.
CHAPTER V
THE AESTHETIC VIEW
"!T is undoubtedly true that we experience a certain 
satisfaction if the consequences of his wrong-doing recoil 
upon the doer. The misdeed disturbs the harmony of 
our being, the sight of punishment re-establishes the 
equilibrium of our nature" (Jellinek). We feel that 
" the two things, injustice and pain, which are both con- 
trary to our nature, ought to go together, and in conse- 
quence we naturally desire to bring about an association 
of the two where it does not already exist " (Fry). This 
harmony which in our consciousness exists between 
suffering and sin has been held to be of the nature of an 
aesthetical perception, and the function of punishment 
has been thought to consist in the gratification which it 
offers to an aesthetic want. Notions of this order underlie 
the punitive theory of the Pythagoreans. They become 
more explicit in the writings of the scholastics; if, for 
instance, St. Thomas Aquinas tells us that the saints 
rejoice at the sufferings of the damned souls because they 
discern therein the harmony of divine justice, this joy of 
the blessed is but a reflection of the quasi-aesthetical 
satisfaction which the law-abiding citizen derives from 
the dispensations of temporal justice. But the aesthetic 
view reaches its full development in the theories of 
Leibniz and Herbart.
According to Leibniz, there is a " pre-established 
harmony " between punishment and crime. Avenging
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justice flows from a law pervading the universe, from a 
divinely ordained " principle of fitness under the opera- 
tion of which things are arranged in such a manner that 
every wrong brings about its punishment." The fitness 
of this relationship " pleases not only the injured party, 
but also the wise man who perceives it, in the same way as 
good music or a fine piece of architecture pleases refined 
souls." The connection between crime and punishment, 
then, exists quite independently of human intervention 
by virtue of a natural causal relationship, and the only 
appropriate attitude towards it for the human mind to 
assume is the contemplative one, when the perception of 
an immanent harmony will appeal to our artistic instinct 
and compel our assent and approval. The sole reason 
why human justice interferes at all lies in the imperfection 
of nature which unaided is not always able to evolve the 
punishment inherent in every crime. Thus punishment 
is the resolution of a discord which would continue to 
offend our aesthetic sense were crime to go scot-free.
Herbart discovers the source of punishment in the 
displeasure which an unrequited misdeed excites. If a 
person suffers an evil, not the consequence of his own 
conduct, a disparity results between offender and offended 
party, a disparity which strikes as disharmonious the 
impartial spectator and causes him a certain amount of 
mental unrest which lasts until he sees a second something 
supervening to restore the disturbed equilibrium. It is the 
idea of equity that haunts him; for equity, being equality, 
postulates that the wrong-doer suffers an evil equal in 
amount to that which he has inflicted. " The deed that 
disturbs the balance displeases, and the gravity of the 
deed determines the degree of displeasure which the deed 
excites. . . . Now if such displeasure were a force 
capable of acting upon the deed it would arrest it; like 
every kind of resistance, it would operate in the opposite 
direction and would thus tend to counteract the deed,
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whilst still in process of execution. But displeasure is 
not a force, and the deed is actually accomplished. Yet 
even after it is consummated, the idea of a counteraction 
which ought to have prevented its execution, remains. . . . 
To return an equal amount of evil upon the head of the 
doer is that to which our judgment points. Eetribution 
is the symbol wherein displeasure expresses itself." . . . 
" Two remarks at once suggest themselves. First of all 
it is quite immaterial what kind of evil is inflicted and 
suffered. For this reason it does not matter either what 
shape retribution assumes. In returning one evil for 
another, the equalization of the amounts alone would be a 
source of difficulties; yet it is most important to preserve 
a strictly accurate measure since the slightest error would 
leave an unrequited balance which, in its turn, would 
again demand adjustment by fresh retaliation. And 
secondly, it remains undecided who is to retaliate. The 
deed is to recoil upon the doer; but nobody is specially 
destined to take upon himself the execution of the deed 
that balances, as it were, the account. The victim is not, 
therefore, obliged to take revenge. But if the Eumenides 
were to come upon the offender, he would get no more 
than he deserves." On second thoughts the Eumenides 
do not seem to Herbart sufficiently reliable organs of 
avenging justice. What is no one's business, therefore, 
is made the business of the state. " Incessantly the cry 
of unrequited wrongs is heard, but nobody is called upon 
to listen. . . . But just because no single individual is 
bound to heed what all perceive, they all that have per- 
ceived are bound to silence the voice of displeasure."
The ideas of proportion, of harmony, of fitness, as 
underlying the aesthetic views of punishment, are nothing 
else than the idea of justice, if not of an intellectual talion, 
in other words, purely moral notions behind a transparent 
aesthetical veil. It will not be necessary to discourse 
upon the relation between the good and the beautiful,
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nor to remind the reader that a false analogy between 
these two classes of conceptions has led a long series of 
writers to found ethical systems upon the aesthetic sense. 
The fallacy upon which these systems rest, has been 
exposed so frequently and so thoroughly that they have 
now a merely historical interest. Suffice it to say that the 
theory which finds the justification of punishment in the 
satisfaction which it offers to our aesthetic taste, is in 
substance identical with the conception of punishment 
as a moral necessity, and all the objections which may be 
urged against the latter view are, therefore, equally valid 
as against the former. But those who affect a preference 
for the artistic variety of the theory of justice, we may well 
ask with Alfred Fouillee : " Can you really improve the 
moral architecture of the universe by introducing sham 
windows ? "
CHAPTER VI
APPRECIATION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL THEORIES
OUR critical examination of the main varieties of the 
doctrine according to which punishment is its own end, 
has made it abundantly clear that the Leitmotiv in each 
of them is the idea of justice. However deeply disguised 
their true meaning may be by language which on closer 
scrutiny turns out to be merely metaphorical, they all 
come to this, that criminals are punished because justice 
demands it, that the rationale of punishment lies in its 
intrinsic justice. Indeed, the modern representatives of 
this school are quite content to call, nay they take a pride 
in calling, their doctrines theories of justice. For is it 
not more in accordance with that human dignity which 
we are bound to honour even in the criminal, to be sacri- 
ficed to the abstract idea of justice than to be punished 
simply because the suppression of crime is one of the 
fundamental conditions of existence of civilized society ? 
Let there be no mistake about it, the justice to which all 
these systems appeal is that abstract justice which is said 
to govern the universe and to be the innate heritage of all 
rational beings. They are all founded upon a supposititious 
transcendent truth, and for this reason we have termed 
them Transcendental.
Of the criticisms which we have offered when examining 
the different groups of transcendental theories, many are 
valid objections to the absolutist teaching in every shape 
or form. Thus the reality of metaphysical justice which
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is their common basis, though asserted to be an axiomatic 
truth, does not by any means compel universal assent. 
Again, they all postulate freedom of will, liberty of choice 
between right and wrong, a spiritual power to control 
impulses, claims no more supported by a general consensus 
of opinion than is the opposition of good and evil as 
absolute principles, which they likewise imply. In the 
next place, upon any theory of metaphysical justice the 
obvious fact that the criminal code is not co-extensive 
with the moral law can be accounted for only on the 
assumption that there are two intrinsically different classes 
of wrong-doing. What then distinguishes wickedness of 
which punishment is the necessary complement, from 
wickedness which does not call for the intervention of 
the criminal tribunals ? To this question the tran- 
scendentalists have not so far been able to supply a satis- 
factory answer. The acceptance of the doctrine of an 
eternal, innate justice would offer less difficulties if we did 
not know that the content of the moral, no less than of the 
criminal, law has varied within extremely wide limits and 
is even now constantly undergoing slow but unmistakable 
changes. Its supporters are of course at liberty to reply, 
in the spirit of Hegelian teaching : Absolute justice is not 
yet completely realized in the phenomenal world. History 
is the stage upon which it gradually actualizes itself in 
human experience, and the farther we read through its 
pages the closer do we find the approximation to become 
of positive justice to the absolute idea. Punishment thus 
conceived as flowing from an immanent principle of an 
ideal order of the universe which realizes itself in the world 
of experience not otherwise than through the operation of 
a blind impulse of " rationality " (?) " does not," indeed, 
" differ in substance from divine punishment " (Lasson); 
it comes upon the culprit as the dispensation of an in- 
exorable, inscrutable destiny. In so referring us to the 
unknown, to the unknowable, for an explanation of
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punishment, the theories of justice are really begging the 
question; for their very object is, we should say, to deter- 
mine wherein the justice of punishment consists. But does 
it ring true that the state, in administering the criminal 
law, is but the passive instrument of providence ? Cer- 
tainly not. The modern state finds its mission in the 
regulation of social relationships, not in the satisfaction 
of absolute moral justice. " The legislator is not called 
upon to regulate the relations between man and God, or 
between man and his own conscience; his sole function 
is to regulate and these to a limited extent only the 
relations between man and man, in other words social 
relationships " (Roland). Social law is not an abstrac- 
tion. It exists for the accomplishment of definite human 
objects, and for their attainment the social organ relies 
on means consciously adopted because, within the realm 
of the finite, they are found suitable for the purpose. 
Without, then, either asserting or disputing the existence, 
in a transcendental region altogether separate from the 
phenomenal world, of a principle of eternal justice, we 
claim that such principle does not form the basis of the 
state punishment of crime. We thus arrive at the con- 
clusion that the theories of justice are, all of them, theories, 
not of actual, but of fictitious punishment, invented by 
their authors as part of an ideal system of laws.
In spite of all that has been said, it cannot well be 
denied that the ordinary consciousness clings to the 
conviction that it is just to make the guilty suffer. How 
shall we account for this sentiment which is both strong 
and persistent ? Is it true that " in our natural instinct 
justice reflects itself as an impulse to retaliate " (Lasson); 
in other words, that the popular demand for punishment, 
if not punishment itself, is but an echo of the old-world 
cry of blood for blood ? If our interpretation of historical 
facts is correct, vengeance is the source of rights to civil 
redress, not of punishments. It is, however, quite con-
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ceivable that the feelings which clustered round the 
presentation of the act at a period when private revenge 
was the normal, and the only, reaction which it excited, 
survived even after public sanctions had supplanted the 
civil remedy. But this explanation is not sound since 
the punishment of the culprit, instead of satisfying the 
victim alone, together with his friends, gratifies a desire 
diffused throughout the community. A partial solution 
of the problem may, perhaps, be found in the fact that 
the Christian doctrine of expiation has kept alive amongst 
us trains of thought which properly belong to an era when 
purification was really the object of punishment. Again, it 
may be argued that the regular administration of criminal 
law in civilized countries has rendered the sequence of 
crime and punishment so much a matter of course that it 
is felt to be an injustice if an individual offender is allowed 
to escape scot-free. If public opinion does no more than 
to insist upon bare legality, upon an impartial administra- 
tion of the provisions of the penal code, we need not fall 
back, in order to account for the popular demand, upon 
an habitual association of ideas between crime and 
punishment. For these terms, taken in their strict legal 
sense, connote each other, and the propositions, which 
have become classical since Feuerbach formulated them, 
" nulla poena sine delicto; nullum delictum sine poena," 
are not only juridical postulates, but flow with logical 
necessity from the very definitions of the words. But this 
is hardly a correct account of the popular attitude towards 
crime. The instances are not so very rare when a sentence 
passed in strict conformity with the spirit, as well as with 
the letter, of the law is decried as " unjust " by the voice 
of the people, which, in its turn, occasionally declares 
criminal, and clamours for the punishment of, conduct for 
which no public sanction is provided a sufficient proof 
that positive law is not the standard of the popular notion 
of justice. Nor is the dispassionate appreciation of the
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act which we associate with the dispensation of punitive 
justice by the organs of the state, an attribute of the high 
court of public opinion. To the ordinary citizen the 
horror of the deed and the detestation of the criminal 
supply his ratio decidendi, and our problem, then, assumes 
a different form, viz. : How does it come about that the 
moral sentiments of the community, as expressed in the 
demand of punishment for crime, are, on the whole, in 
harmony with the provisions of the penal code ? One of 
the reasons why " the term crime is one of the most 
notable meeting-points of law and morality," is certainly 
the fact that the criminal law has been a potent factor 
in moral evolution. The pages of history afford ample 
proof of the truth of this assertion; but no evidence, 
perhaps, is more likely to convince those inclined to doubt 
the power of the criminal legislator to influence the moral 
sentiments of the citizens than the modern experience 
of this country where a strong public opinion condemna- 
tory of child labour is certainly to a large extent the fruit 
of the Factory Acts. Whilst " great part of the general 
detestation of crime which happily prevails amongst the 
decent part of the community in all civilized countries 
arises from the fact that the commission of offences is 
associated with the solemn and deliberate infliction of 
punishment whenever crime is proved " (Stephen), it is 
a gross exaggeration to assert that the moral condemna- 
tion of crime is in every instance due to the sanction with 
which it is visited. When once it is realized that both 
municipal law and current morality are products of the 
social milieu, that both alike have their roots hi the 
history of the nation and in those innumerable conditions 
which make up its environment in the past and hi the 
present, it ceases to cause surprise if the same acts and 
classes of acts are forbidden by both. Where the popular 
element has an important share in legislation and in the 
administration of criminal justice, it follows almost as a
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matter of course that in the vast majority of cases public 
opinion ratines the judgment of the court. It is not, 
however, permissible to infer from the powerful support 
which the enforcement of the criminal law derives from 
the public indignation excited by crime that punishment 
is the fruit, or merely an expression, of such indignation. 
Nor does the concurrence of moral and legal sanctions 
tell in favour of the transcendental theory. For if to our 
moral consciousness it appears just that the guilty should 
be made to suffer, the morality here spoken of is not a 
universal eternal law, inherent in our organization and 
coeval with the human race, but a body of positive rules, 
varying with time and place and with the specific civiliza- 
tion of a people. Neither is it a metaphysical justice, 
an absolute principle ruling the whole creation, which 
formulates that demand. It is a postulate of the social 
spirit, as manifested in the conscious activity of rational 
beings directed to the accomplishment of social ends. 
Herbert Spencer, indeed, reduces the moral sense to 
primitive judgments, based on the experience of the 
usefulness of certain rules of conduct, which subsequently 
became instinctive, and according to J. S. Mill "justice 
is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern 
the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are 
therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules 
for the guidance of life." Without subscribing to any 
particular theory of the origin of morality, and without 
committing ourselves to a hedonistic ethical doctrine, we 
may claim with Sheldon Amos that if the idea of " wicked- 
ness " as contrasted with that of " dangerousness" 
distinguishes the moral conception of crime from the legal 
conception, the most wicked acts, those done by the most 
vicious men, and done with the most malevolent motives, 
are often at the same time those most pernicious from the 
point of view of the state.
PART II
POLITICAL THEORIES
Fiat iustitia, ne per eat mundus.
UNLIKE the systems hitherto studied, the theories 
upon an examination of which we now enter discover the 
rationale of punishment, not in an absolute metaphysical 
truth, not in an immutable law of the cosmos, nor in a 
want of our individual organization that craves satisfac- 
tion, but in the aims and objects, realized in actual 
experience, of society as organized in the state. Upon 
this view crime is the necessary condition of, but not the 
reason for, punishment. Punishment, instead of being 
an end in itself, is but a means for the furtherance of the 
purposes of the state.
Subject to one exception to be presently mentioned, 
the political theories agree in regarding the security and 
welfare of society as the end to which punishment is 
subservient. The central idea in crime is that it con-' 
stitutes a danger to society, which it is the function off 
punishment to ward off. The difference of opinion be-li 
tween the advocates of the doctrine turns entirely on 
the mode in which punishment is thought to accomplish 
this object. The main line of cleavage lies between those 
theories according to which it is in its infliction that 
punishment becomes operative as an instrument of social 
defence, and those which teach that the primary object
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of the state in providing penal sanctions is to prevent ab 
initio the commission of crimes by the threat of punish- 
ments. The latter view, elaborated by Feuerbach, may 
aptly be termed the preventive theory. The former group 
comprises several varieties which are not, however, in 
theory at least, mutually exclusive. Indeed, of the 
authorities who rely, for the protection of society, on the 
actual execution of punishment some attach equal 
importance to the several proximate objects by which 
that end is to be attained. Thus Blackstone writes 
(Commentaries, vol. iv., ch. i.) : " The public gains equal 
security, whether the offender himself be amended by 
wholesome correction, or whether he be disabled from 
doing any further harm; and if the penalty fails of both 
these effects, as it may do, still the terror of his example 
remains as a warning to other citizens." Reformation, 
disablement and determent are in fact the three immediate 
purposes for which punishments are believed to be 
inflicted.
The amendment of the criminal, whilst looked upon 
merely as a means for the protection of society by most 
advocates of the reformatory view, is conceived by others 
to be the final object of punishment. The state is credited, 
not indeed with the mission to realize an absolute moral 
order, but with the inclusion, among its positive purposes, 
of a self-imposed duty to provide for the moral education 
of the subject, in the fulfilment of which it attempts, by 
means of punishment, to bring about the moral regenera- 
tion of those of its citizens who have proved by their acts 
that they do not come up to the moral standard prevailing 
in the community, but stand in need of further moral 
training. Though radically different principles form the 
bases of the corrective view of punishment in the two 
cases, many of the criticisms which we shall have to offer, 
apply to both indiscriminately, and it will, therefore, be 
convenient to study them together.
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Four classes of political theories, then, will require 
investigation 
1. The theory of determent.
2. The theory of reformation.
3. The theory of disablement.
4. The theory of prevention, or Feuerbach's theory.
CHAPTER I
THE THEORY OF DETERMENT
WHEN it is said that the object of punishment is to 
deter, the term " determent" is capable of different 
significations. The deterrent effect may be ascribed 
either to the perpetual threat with which penal rules are 
sanctioned and which operates upon the mind of every 
prospective offender, or to the infliction of punishment 
upon the actual transgressor. To escape from this 
ambiguity it is better to designate the first-named function 
of punishment as " preventive," a subject which will be 
studied in a subsequent chapter. But even if we confine 
the use of the expression " determent " to the result 
flowing from the actual execution of the criminal law, 
it is yet left in doubt whether we refer to the influence 
which punishment exercises upon the wrong-doer himself 
who undergoes it, or to the example which his sufferings 
set to others. Upon the former view, the aim of punish- 
ment is to strike terror into the malefactor in order that 
he may be brought to his senses and be taught in future 
to obey the law; in other words, determent is but an 
instrument of reformation. Here we are concerned with 
punishment as deterrent in the sense that others are 
deterred from committing the crime for which the criminal 
is seen by society to suffer.
To provide the citizens with an object-lesson has been 
recognized, from early times, as one, though seldom as 
the sole, function of punishment. Among the Greek
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philosophers the sophist Protagoras seems to have been 
the father of this theory. In the Platonic dialogue which 
bears his name punishment is represented as aiming at 
the determent of both the offender and the public : 
'' Iva /LIT) avdn; adixijor] fiijre ovro/;, /j,i]re &llo<; 6 rovtov 
Iddav xoiaoddvia . . . anoTQonfji; yovv Hvexa xold^ei." In 
Gorgias Plato combines determent with reformation: 
de navrl za> ev TifiwQiq OVTI vri tillov 
(o fj j3ehiovi yiveaOai, xal ovivaaOai, fj n 
Tt roii; aUoli; yiveadai, Iva aUoi dgwreg nda^ovxa, & &v 
7ido%oi, (pofiov/Lievoi ftefalovi; yivcavrai." We find the de- 
terrent aspect of punishment illustrated in practically 
all the Greek orators, in Lysias and Demosthenes, in 
Aeschines and in Lycurgus. To quote only one passage 
from this source, we read in Dinarchus (in Demosth.): 
Iva vavrrjc; zv%d>v zfji; £rj/j,ia(; naqddeiy/«z yivr\iai ioli; 
aKloa;. Sentences might be cited both from Cicero 
(de officiis) and from Seneca (de ira) in support of the 
deterrent view of punishment. To come to modern 
authorities, Cujas writes : " Poena est delictorum sive 
criminum coercitio inducta ad disciplinae publicae emenda- 
tionem, et ut exemplo ceteri deterreantur . . .". Fichte 
says : " It is to some extent true that punishment serves 
as an example, namely to convince all of the infallible 
execution of the law. The execution of the law is, there- 
fore, a public act. Each citizen who has heard of an 
offence, must also learn that it has been punished. It 
would be an evident injustice towards all those who 
might, in future, be tempted to violate the same law if 
the actual punishments of previous violations of that law 
had been concealed from them; for such concealment 
would lead them to hope for escape from punishment." 
Public punishment for the sake of its effect upon the 
spectators is also advocated by Bentham : "A real 
punishment which should not be apparent would be lost 
upon the public. The great art consists in augmenting
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the apparent punishment without augmenting the real 
punishment. This may be accomplished, either in the 
selection of the punishments themselves, or by accompany- 
ing their execution with striking solemnities. . . . Were 
it possible to keep up the illusion, all might pass in effigy. 
The reality of punishment is only necessary to maintain 
the appearance of it." As one of the objects of punish- 
ment, indeed, determent is accepted by a vast array of 
writers; those among moderns in whose theories it is the 
dominant idea, are Filangieri and Gmelin.
Nor is this view of punishment peculiar to speculative 
philosophy. In the past, determent was often the avowed 
object of the punishments with which rules of criminal law 
or whole collections of such rules were sanctioned. "Ut 
unius poenae metus possit esse multorum," "ut et con- 
spectu deterreantur alii ab iisdem facinoribus " ; these and 
similar phrases abound in Roman criminal jurisprudence. 
Numberless instances, all expressing the same idea, might 
be cited from medieval legislation, both English and foreign. 
But nowhere, perhaps, does determent appear so clearly 
as the foundation of the whole administration of criminal 
justice as in the conclusion of the old Scots indictment 
which craved punishment " to deter others from commit- 
ting the like crimes in all time coming." The same spirit 
of the law is well interpreted by the English judge who, 
when passing sentence of death upon a convicted horse- 
thief, remarked in reply to the latter's complaint about 
the want of proportion between the crime and the punish- 
ment : " Man, thou art not to be hanged for stealing a 
horse, but that horses may not be stolen."
Though determent has been one of the motives for 
punishment in the past, it may be thought that it has 
ceased to be so, at least in those countries in which public 
executions have been abolished. As Bentham remarks, 
you have to appeal to the eye if you want to move the 
heart, and in abandoning the means, the state may be
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held to have designedly repudiated the end. Now the 
reason usually assigned for this change of policy is that 
public executions were found to brutalize the spectators, 
to deprave the public feelings and to destroy that sym- 
pathy with suffering which it is the interest of the state 
to foster. Frequently, however, they produced the 
contrary effect and tended " to counteract in some 
measure their own design, by sinking men's abhorrence 
of the crime in their commiseration of the criminal" 
(Paley). Nay, more than that: a criminal displaying a 
certain bravado on the gallows had every chance of 
becoming to the masses an object, not of abhorrence, but 
of admiration, a hero among his kind. At the best, there 
was always the danger that familiarity with punishment 
might breed contempt for it, might blunt, instead of 
sharpening, the edge of criminal justice. The Vicar of 
Wakefield is quite right if he says : " The work of eradi- 
cating crime is not by making punishments familiar, but 
formidable." It is doubtful, however, whether these 
considerations would, in themselves, have been sufficient 
to induce the legislature to do away with public executions. 
The true cause appears to be that they have had their day 
and no longer served any useful purpose. At a stage of 
civilization when, owing to the very primitive police 
organization and other causes, the authors of the majority 
of crimes remained undetected, it was necessary to utilize 
such malefactors as were caught and convicted in order 
to show in their person that the criminal law was not a 
dead letter, but a living reality. In our own days the 
discovery and actual punishment of the more heinous 
offences is a rule subject to so few exceptions that we 
look upon the administration of criminal justice as a 
matter of course, and there is, therefore, no need for its 
demonstratio ad oculos. But whilst the scope of deterrent 
punishments has thus been narrowed down in proportion 
to their limited range of usefulness, we still fall back upon
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them when circumstances render their application ex- 
pedient. For if in a particular district a certain crime 
is greatly on the increase, our judges are in the habit of 
passing much severer sentences than if it were but rarely 
committed there, and they do so with the avowed object 
of stamping out offences of that kind. In the words of 
the Duke in Measure for Measure: "It is too general 
a vice, and severity must cure it."
Determent, then, as an aim of punishment, though it 
has lost much of its former importance, cannot be said 
to be entirely eliminated from the policy of modern courts 
of criminal jurisdiction. It is, however, quite out of 
harmony with modern sentiment. Not only is there a 
constant risk that the judge will incline to undue severity 
if the punishment of the one is to serve as an example to 
the many; but any punishment will strike the modern 
mind as both arbitrary and excessive which is standard- 
ized, not according to the quality of the offence, but 
according to the probability that persons whom the 
offender has never seen, will commit similar acts in the 
future. The iniquitous character of punishment founded 
upon this principle was already recognized by Tacitus 
where he says : " Habet aliquid ex iniquo omne magnum 
exemplum, quod contra singulos utilitate publica repen- 
ditur.'V-: Attempts have, indeed, been made to justify 
the deterrent view of punishment by such arguments as 
the following : The criminal has, by his crime, forfeited 
the rights of citizenship. Society may, therefore, deal 
with him as it pleases; and instead of having ground for 
complaint, he has every reason to be grateful if he escapes 
with any treatment short of capital punishment. It is 
true instances may be quoted from the history of criminal 
jurisprudence where the criminal was looked upon as 
having outlawed himself, even before conviction, by the 
very act which constitutes the offence. But to found a 
modern theory upon such ancient examples is to be guilty
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of an unpardonable anachronism. For modern law 
extends its protection even to the convicted criminal, 
and modern morality concedes rights to man as man,! 
quite independently of all questions of citizenship. Most1 
recent writers frankly confess that if punishment is 
awarded as a means of warning off others, the criminal 
who undergoes it is sacrificed to the ends of society, but 
many agree with Bentham in calling such sacrifice 
" indispensable." Unavoidable social necessity, but 
nothing short of such necessity, will reconcile modern 
man to a view of punishment which entirely disregards 
what Green aptly terms " the reversionary rights of the 
criminal." Circumstances do occur in modern life when 
a few exemplary sentences prove the most rapid means 
of restoring law and order; whether they are absolutely 
indispensable even on such occasions is a question difficult 
to answer. But it is certainly not permissible to base a 
general theory of punishment on what is exceptional, and 
this doctrine, upon which a class of human beings is, in 
Kantian phraseology, treated purely as a means, though 
still occasionally acted upon in forensic practice, cannot 
claim a high ethical value.  
CHAPTER II
THE THEORY OF REFORMATION
REFORMATION of a criminal, in the widest sense of 
the term, means such a change in his mental habitus that 
he will not offend again. When it is said that punish- 
ment aims at bringing about such a change, reformation 
may either be looked upon merely as a means for the 
protection of society; for the reformed evil-doer no longer 
constitutes a danger to its peace and good order. Or 
it may be conceived as an end in itself, as the final object 
of punishment. On the former view, punishment has 
done all that can be expected of it if, after undergoing it, 
the quondam offender refrains from further infraction 
of the law of the land. It is immaterial whether his 
future lawful conduct be prompted by a recollection of 
the sufferings which his former crime has brought upon 
him, or whether he has been freed of the criminal prompt- 
ings of his nature. External conformity is all that 
matters; for the interests of society are equally safe- 
guarded whether his motive be fear or a moral sentiment 
of a high order. " Nee ad imperii securitatem refert, 
quo animo homines inducantur ad res recte admini- 
strandum, modo res recte administretur," says Spinoza. 
It has, indeed, been argued that a true conversion offers 
more solid guarantees for future good behaviour than 
mere terror. But even so, moral improvement is merely 
desirable, not absolutely necessary, for the attainment 
of the ultimate purpose. It is otherwise when reforma-
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tion is sought for its own sake. Here punishment fails 
of its object unless it really cures the offender of his 
vicious tendencies; for the interest which it is intended 
to serve is that of the criminal alone.
That theory according to which punishment is to 
frighten, the criminal from offending again, would naturally 
lead, if acted upon, to the conversion of our prisons into 
blocks of torture-chambers; for the more cruel the treat- 
ment which the convict receives, the less likely will he be 
ever to forget it again. It need hardly be said that the 
spirit of the age would never tolerate the adoption of 
this plan. On the contrary, it clamours incessantly 
for further and further mitigation of the prisoners' lot; 
and this tendency is certainly not compatible with a 
policy of intimidation. However, the experiment has 
all too frequently been made in the past, but never with 
even a semblance of success. A glance into the writings 
of a Beccaria, of a Howard, proves sufficiently that a 
savage penal system produces no effect other than to 
render its victims more brutal, more callous, and more 
reckless than they were before. The experience of the 
English courts with the administration of the " cat " 
seems, however, to point to a different conclusion; it 
appears to teach that punishment, judiciously selected, 
may well deter criminals from a repetition of their offence. 
Unlike other modern punishments, severe physical pain 
is said to leave a lasting impression upon the minds of 
the scoundrels who are made to suffer it. But the lesson 
thus learnt is incapable of extensive application. For 
it is only when the terror inspired by a series of crimes 
of violence amounts almost to a panic in a particular 
district that public opinion will tolerate the systematic 
use of that implement of torture; and in spite of its effi- 
cacy in appropriate cases, humanitarian considerations 
have permanently excluded it from the penal codes of 
all other Western European nations.
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The curative view of punishment according to which 
its infliction serves to dry up the spring of evil in the 
soul of the offender, either for the ultimate good of 
society or for the benefit of the criminal alone, has given 
rise to three groups of theories, according as to whether 
the defect to be remedied is looked upon as pathological, 
intellectual, or moral.
The notion that all crime partakes of the nature of 
disease, originated with Franz Joseph Gall. The analogy 
between moral evil and physical illness had occurred to 
many writers before him. But it was only in metaphori- 
cal language that both Aristotle and Plutarch described 
punishment as larqeia. Tfjs yv^fj? or that the Church spoke 
of poenae medicinales. The founder of phrenology was 
undoubtedly the first seriously to advance the claim that 
crime is a symptom of mental alienation and that punish- 
ment is a therapeutic measure adopted to cure a disease 
equally dangerous in its consequences to social order and 
to the patient himself. Similar views gained a temporary 
ascendency, owing to the genius of Lombroso and his 
school, i We shall have to deal with them when study- 
ing the teachings of modern criminology. Here it is 
enough to remark that whatever the scientific merits 
and demerits of this doctrine may be, it has never been 
adopted in practice; no state has yet transformed its 
prisons into hospitals or lunatic asylums^
The second form which the remedial theory assumes 
is founded upon the experience that crime is much more 
rife among the ignorant masses than among the cultured 
classes. Statistics, moreover, seemed to prove that the 
percentage of those unable to read and write reaches a 
much higher figure in the case of prison inmates than 
among the general adult population. The conclusion 
appeared justified that the higher the educational standard 
attained by an individual, the less likely was he to get 
into conflict with the law, and that improved popular
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education was the most reliable means for stamping 
out crime. " To open a school is to close a prison," 
says Victor Hugo. It was to be the function of punish- 
ment to make good the want of an early intellectual 
training. Now the accuracy of the statistical material 
which seems to support this view has been seriously 
doubted. But even if the tables are correct, the conclu- 
sions founded upon them are open to criticism. It does 
not require a long array of figures to render it probable 
that a man who has not mastered the rudiments of the 
three R's is at a serious disadvantage in the struggle 
for existence, and therefore more likely to commit offences 
against property than his well-educated neighbour. But 
in the environment of one whose schooling has been so 
hopelessly neglected, there are, as a rule, so many factors 
at work, social, moral and economical, which might 
quite as well be held responsible for his greater criminal 
proclivities, that it seems quite inadmissible to pick out 
a single one to serve as an explanation. A higher educa- 
tion, on the other hand, has hitherto been an almost 
exclusive privilege of the well-to-do, whose whole mode 
of life offers far fewer temptations to crime. Yet even 
an eminent degree of mental culture has not always proved 
an effective protection against criminal tendencies, and 
a trained intellect, if coupled with a low moral character, 
has been found to produce specially dangerous offenders. 
Nor is it easy to see how mere acquisition of knowledge 
should cure a criminal of his evil ways. The supporters 
of the theory have not found it necessary to offer ex- 
planations, with the sole exception, so far as I know, of 
Friedrich Groos, whose attempt, though by no means 
recent, is all the more interesting because isolated. Our 
actions, he argues, wrongful and innocent, are deter- 
mined by motives. The barren mind of the uninstructed 
produces no ideas, or only ideas insufficient in number 
and vividness to counteract their impulses. The ignorant
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are, therefore, helpless victims to promptings to crime, 
as soon as they arise. Education by punishment cures 
the defect by furnishing the mind with a store of new 
ideas and by opening up fresh paths of associations. It 
would be superfluous to waste any more words upon this 
view of punishment. For though the schoolmaster is 
found in most modern prisons, the position he occupies 
there is quite a subordinate one. Intellectual training 
is not of the essence of punishment, and our prisons 
resemble educational institutions no more than they 
resemble hospitals.
The reformatory theory par excellence is that which 
regards as the object of punishment the moral regeneration 
of the criminal. Punishment has accordingly been de- 
fined as " a physical measure adopted to excite in the 
soul of the guilty true repentance, respect for justice, 
sympathy for their fellow-creatures and love of man- 
kind," the notion underlying this view of punishment 
being either that only a good man can make a good citizen, 
or that the state, being a moral institution, is bound to 
ensure the private morality of its subjects by all means 
in its power. Of its advocates some expect of reformatory 
punishment an all-round improvement in the character 
of the offender, others a correction of a particular moral 
defect, which they look upon as the most fruitful source 
of crime. As an instance of the latter view we may 
quote Howard's well-known dictum that the object of 
punishment is to make the criminal industrious and 
thereby honest. A peculiar variety of this theory has 
been evolved by Karl David August Boder, whose 
argument proceeds on the following lines : In investing 
with full legal capacity those who have attained their 
majority, the law starts with the presumption that 
persons who have reached years of " discretion " know 
how to take care of themselves, know how to exercise their 
rights and how to perform their duties. This presump-
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tion of the law is not, however, conclusive, but may be 
rebutted by proof to the contrary. The criminal supplies 
the necessary counter-evidence. He proves by his act 
that in his case the presumption does not hold good, 
that, though of full age, he cannot be trusted with the 
rights of full citizenship. He is still in loco infantis and 
requires looking after. The criminal law is, in fact, but 
a branch of the law of guardianship and is treated under 
this heading by Roder. The state takes the offender under 
its tutelage and gives him a belated moral training to 
make up for his neglected early education. Such educa- 
tion is state punishment. In differs in nothing from 
domestic or disciplinary punishment, and the only form 
of punishment which completely performs its proper 
office is imprisonment. Prison is in truth a house of 
correction.
It is generally in the sense of moral improvement that 
reformation is understood when said to be the object of 
punishment. This is the form in which the reformatory 
theory has enlisted most of its supporters, from Plato 
down to our own times; and it is this form which we shall 
submit to a detailed critical examination, though some of 
the remarks which we are about to make, will be found 
equally applicable to reformatory punishment when 
given one of its other meanings.
There can be no doubt that the reformatory view 
proves more attractive than any other to modern humani- 
tarian sentiment. It robs punishment of its sting. The 
criminal is looked upon as an object of pity, not of hatred, 
and punishment becomes a work of charity. For whether 
its final aim be the good of society or that of the offender 
himself, it cannot fail to benefit the latter. " The state," 
says Hoffding, " by punishment vouchsafes a good to 
the individual." Nor is it material that to the wrong- 
doer himself the instrument of correction appears an 
unmixed evil. Punishment is a blessing in disguise,
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and only his own short-sightedness prevents him from 
piercing the veil. " Non enim nocet (is qui punit), sed 
medetur specie nocendi; nee ulla dura videtur curatio, 
cuius salutaris effectus est," writes Seneca, and times out 
of number has the comparison been made between 
punitive justice and surgical operations since Plato 
discovered an analogy between them in that both are 
painful but both beneficial. Moreover, as has been said, 
" in reformatory punishment the state expiates, as it 
were, the collective guilt inherent in every crime; for 
in attempting to reform the offender, it seeks to counteract 
the baneful influence of those social factors which have 
contributed to the formation of his character and have 
been instrumental in the causation of his misdeed."
But if punishment is in reality a boon conferred upon 
the offender, is it still punishment ? Yes, answers 
Krause; for punitive justice is still first and foremost 
justice, and the realm of justice is but a province of the 
empire of that one and only good, the divine good as 
realized in temporal conditions. Even if it were possible 
to counteract evil by evil, human justice, being an image 
of the divine, could never allow its pure fountain to be 
polluted by it. Punishment, conceived as an evil, is but 
a crime of a higher order. Crime thus begets crime, and 
the attempt to cure evil with evil leads into a vicious 
circle from which there is no escape. It is only by good 
that evil can be effectively overcome; only by the infusion 
of nobler sentiments can a corrupt heart be healed. 
Punishment, then, to be legitimate, must be an absolute 
good good in its means as well-as in its ends. The gospel 
of love preached by Krause may possibly have inspired 
the penal system of some happy island on Alpha Centauri; 
it has certainly nothing in common with the conditions 
actually prevailing among even the most advanced 
inhabitants of this planet. Indeed, it has been remarked 
of reformatory theories in general, and there is a good
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deal of truth in it, that they have mostly originated in 
the brains of dreamers who are inclined to forget the real 
man in their ideal conception of man. If we wish to 
remain on solid ground we shall have to avow that 
punishment means the infliction of evil upon the offender, 
and that it ceases to be punishment when it ceases to 
be an evil.
Open to even graver objections is the reformatory 
theory when the moral amendment of the criminal is 
looked upon as the sole end of punishment, quite irre- 
spectively of any advantages which society may derive 
from his transformation into a law-abiding citizen. 
Thus viewed, punishment is no longer founded upon a 
right of the state against the criminal; it becomes a claim 
to curative treatment which the criminal has against 
society. In the light of this opinion, it is difficult to see 
why the state should take the initiative and force its 
benefits upon an unwilling recipient, instead of waiting 
till he asserts his claim. Or, at any rate, it should be open 
to the offender to waive this right, like any other right 
vested in him. If it is attempted to justify the spon- 
taneous intervention of the state on the tutelary principle, 
our answer is that the paternal form of government is so 
completely discredited that an appeal to its doctrines 
cannot appear a satisfactory explanation. If, on the 
other hand, it is claimed that the state has a moral 
mission in the exercise of which it has to provide for the 
ethical education of its subjects, it is obvious that such 
teaching, if carried to its logical conclusions, would render 
it incumbent upon the state to ameliorate, by forcible 
treatment, any man whose life or ideas are thought to 
be capable of improvement : the boundary line between 
criminality and immorality becomes, in fact, completely 
obliterated. In truth, the modern state does not interfere 
with the private morality of its members, and if it takes 
no active methods of promoting it, the moral regeneration
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of evil-doers cannot, in itself, form one of its political 
or legal aims.
Furthermore, if punishment is in substance a benefit 
conferred upon the offender, why should it not be a bless- 
ing in form as well ? Why should it involve suffering at 
all ? For on this theory its usefulness depends in no 
way upon its being painful, but exclusively upon the 
changes which it brings about in the subject. And if 
it is found that the same, if not better, results can be 
produced by the creation of conditions pleasant to the 
convict, why not adopt the ideal of remedial treatment, 
suaviter in modo ? It has yet to be proved that a man 
must be made unhappy in order that he may be made 
good. An atmosphere of love may be more conducive 
to moral recovery. But to call such a cure punishment 
is playing with words. What people who denounce 
painful punishments really mean is that we ought to 
reform criminals instead of punishing them. To decide 
the relative merits of punishment and moral training as 
alternative methods of dealing with criminals would be 
outside the scope of this treatise. But to call the educa- 
tive treatment which is to take the place of punishment 
itself punishment is obviously a misnomer.
If, then, suffering is a necessary ingredient in the 
conception of punishment, we must next inquire what 
there is in physical pain that leads to moral regeneration. 
Undoubtedly influences may be brought to bear on a 
prisoner, whilst undergoing his sentence, that open out 
to him the vista of a better life. The ministrations of 
the prison chaplain, instruction, religious or secular, a 
book from the prison library may excite in him a horror 
of vice or love of virtue which he had not before. But 
if this change is wrought by any of these agencies, it 
is not wrought by punishment as such. It is in a certain 
sense a mere coincidence if the time which the convict 
does, turns out to be the period of his reformation. We
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do not thereby wish to deny that it is incumbent upon the 
state to provide for the moral and spiritual as well as 
for the physical needs of those unfortunate creatures, 
whilst it has them under its absolute control, and to put 
them in the best possible conditions for recovering from 
their evil propensities. Indeed, so far as it is compatible 
with the true objects of punishment and with the require- 
ments of prison discipline, the state ought to endeavour 
to reform criminals as well as to punish them. But then, 
reformation is the complement, not the foundation, of 
punishment. All this, however, is not to the point. 
What we are really anxious to discover is how punishment 
qua pain is reformatory. With TO. naOtj/j-ara juaQtj/uara and 
similar proverbs we have all been familiar since early 
youth. Here we cannot rest contented with the mere 
assertion of the existence of such a relationship; we 
want to know the "how" and the "why." Many 
solutions of this problem have been attempted; but of 
the so-called explanations some are bare circumlocutions, 
e.g. " The discipline involved in the pain of punishment 
toughens the moral fibre" (Stawell), " Punishment 
strengthens the criminal's power of resistance to such 
of his individual inclinations as are contrary to current 
morality " (Post). The first real answer to the question 
to suggest itself is that his sufferings may convince the 
offender that vice does not pay. Mere outward reforma- 
tion is thus sufficiently accounted for unless there is 
truth in the alleged discovery of the anthropological 
school that sensitiveness to painful impressions is con- 
siderably diminished in the vast majority of criminals. 
In any case regulation of conduct by the recollection of 
the painful consequences of wrong-doing in the past is 
something different from genuine moral improvement. 
Rashdall argues that the change brought about in the 
criminal through pressure of pain, if not true reformation, 
is at least the condition thereof. " Everyman," he says,
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" has a better self, as well as a lower self. And if the 
lower self is kept down by the terror of punishment, 
higher motives are able to assert themselves." The view 
that one side of our nature has to be compressed in order 
that another may have a chance to expand, cannot fail 
to strike us as far too mechanical a representation of 
our moral life. But granting that the pain of punishment 
prepares the soil for moral amendment, it does not follow 
that it does anything towards sowing the seeds thereof. 
Upon another version, the pain of punishment is an 
instrument of reformation because it impresses upon the 
mind of the offender, with great vividness, the fact that 
the act which he has done is a wrong to society. Now 
in the case of the more heinous crimes, the actor, pro- 
vided he is in his sound senses, fully appreciates, ah 
initio, the nature and quality of his act. The explana- 
tion given can therefore hold good of none but the most 
venial transgressions. And even here the knowledge, 
if previously wanting, is acquired by the wrong-doer as 
soon as the verdict is brought in and sentence is passed, 
so that the actual suffering involved in the carrying-out 
of the latter can discharge but the ancillary function of 
bringing such knowledge home to him with greater force. 
Besides, though ignorance of the law is no defence to a 
criminal charge, before the moral tribunal absence of 
malice will excuse; and an offender falling within this 
category, cannot stand much in need of moral correction. 
Indeed, the education which the criminal is to derive, 
upon this view, from the pain of punishment, is not 
moral at all, but purely intellectual. The only kind of 
pain which can lead to true moral progress is pain of 
conscience, i. e. remorse. By the infliction of external 
pain one hopes to strengthen the voice of conscience in 
those in whom it has begun to make itself heard, and to 
excite it in those in whose breasts it has hitherto been silent. 
To supply the required stimulus was to be the function of
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punishment. Now it appears doubtful whether repent- 
ance can ever be imposed from without. For its essential 
characteristic is its spontaneity. It originates in the 
depth of the soul, and " the patient has to be his own 
physician." The most we can hope for, is that punish- 
ment may create a psychological disposition favourable 
to the spontaneous growth of remorse, that " punishment, 
by bringing a man up, as it were, with a round turn, 
may awaken the reflective consciousness in him, and then 
that consciousness may, if it chooses, proceed to do its 
own work " (Stawell). But the prospects of punishment 
leading to pain of conscience even in this indirect way do 
not seem particularly bright if we believe Garofalo and 
others who assert that the faculty of feeling remorse 
and repentance is practically nil in the case of criminals  
except for such regrets as are the fruit of the knowledge 
that wrong-doing has brought them to their present 
painful predicament. In any case, punishment cannot 
even remotely favour repentance unless it is accepted as 
just by the offender, unless the judgment of the court 
is ratified by the appellate tribunal of his own soul. 
Punishment enforces upon the criminal the disapproval 
with which his action is regarded by public opinion, as 
expressed through its organized mouthpiece, the judicial 
bench; and provided that he recognizes the latter as an 
authority in moral matters, the conviction of his own 
ethical inferiority will grow upon him, and an impetus 
may thus be given to his repentance and reformation. 
Far more frequently, however, it is to be feared, his 
sufferings are felt by the criminal to be imposed by an 
authority superior, not in moral force, but in physical 
power, with the result that, instead of feeling himself 
to blame, he rebels against his punishment and finally 
leaves prison permanently at enmity with society.
We thus find ourselves brought face to face with the 
question : Does punishment reform offenders ? This is
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a simple question of fact to which, unfortunately, the 
general answer must be in the negative. " In the re- 
formation of criminals little has ever been effected, and 
little, I fear, is practicable. From every species of punish- 
ment that has hitherto been devised, from imprisonment 
and exile, from pain and infamy, malefactors return 
more hardened in their crimes, and more instructed." 
These lines of Paley's are as true to-day as they were at 
the time when they were written. And if we are not 
prepared to subscribe to every word of Bentham's where 
he says : " In a moral point of view, an ordinary prison 
is a school in which wickedness is taught by surer means 
than can ever be employed for the inculcation of virtue. 
. . . Upon the ruins of social honour is built a new honour 
composed of falsehood, fearlessness under disgrace, forget- 
fulness of the future, and hostility to mankind," the 
extent to which his picture strikes us as unduly gloomy, 
shows the degree in which all the most strenuous efforts 
of modern prison reform have furthered the reformatory 
ideal. Every now and then an individual may leave 
prison a better man than he entered it; but even in these 
isolated instances it remains to be seen whether the 
change will endure after he has returned to circles where 
crime and punishment are regarded as an honour rather 
than as a disgrace.
It is true that not until quite recent times has the moral 
reclamation of convicted evil-doers become an avowed 
object of governmental activity. Nor is it even now the 
true aim of punishment. It cannot, therefore, strike 
us as very wonderful if penal measures, devised for the 
attainment of quite different ends, do not readily lend 
themselves to the furtherance of a subsidiary scheme, 
which, when all is said, has been a mere after-thought. 
At the present time we have practically only two forms 
of punishment at our disposal, death and imprisonment; 
and it must be confessed that both are eminently unsuit-
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able for the accomplishment of the reformatory task. 
Capital punishment, one would have thought, is quite 
incompatible with the reformatory view. Yet even the 
penalty of death has been pressed into the service of 
this theory. It has been argued that extreme cases 
postulate extreme measures, and that criminals who prove 
refractory against the milder measures of penal reform 
must be executed, in the hope that the fear of impending 
death may yet lead to repentance. But the principle 
that the body must be sacrificed that the soul may be 
saved, is certainly foreign to the spirit of modern codes. 
Prison, indeed, has been credited with offering conditions 
highly conducive to moral improvement. Neither the 
allurements of pleasure nor the evil influence of bad 
example penetrates its walls. Regular work deprives 
the convict of that leisure which is Satan's opportunity. 
The solitude which it gives for reflection, disposes the 
prisoner to hold spiritual intercourse with his Creator 
and forces him to listen to the voice of conscience which 
the tumult of the world too easily stifles. Such argu- 
ments, however specious, fail to carry conviction if we 
remember that society is the birthplace of moral senti- 
ments in the individual as well as in the race, and that 
the essential shortcoming of the criminal is a want of 
adjustment to his environment. The aim of true reforma- 
tion, must therefore, be the artificial adaptation of the 
offender to the social conditions prevailing in the outside 
world. Now prison discipline has aptly been described 
as "an unnatural compound consisting of monasticism 
and militarism " (Morrison), which trains the inmate to 
accommodate himself to highly artificial conditions of 
existence, which have no counterpart in the life of the 
free population. To restrain a man's freedom is surely 
not the best method of teaching him how to use his 
freedom, nor keeping him aloof from temptation the 
surest means of making him proof against temptation.
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The educational success of prison training is best shown 
in the experience expressed in the familiar paradox that 
the good prisoner is a bad subject.
We arrive, then, at the conclusion that however 
inspiring reformation may be as an ideal, the position 
that it forms the practical end of punishment is untenable. 
Quite absurd are the results to which this theory leads 
in the hands of fanatics who see in moral regeneration 
the sole object of punishment. On this view, two classes 
of offenders would have to escape scot-free : those who have 
already repented of their evil ways, and those proved to 
be incorrigible; penal visitation would be unnecessary in 
the former, useless in the latter. The opinion that re- 
pentance, if genuine, should be a ground of exemption, 
has been adopted, inter olios, by Schleiermacher who 
writes : " If a change of mind has been brought about 
either by voluntary repentance or by outside influences, 
neither the criminal himself nor anybody else has any 
further interest to invoke the interference of the law." 
But as regards the incurable, the reformatory view 
postulates as a necessary complement their extirpation, 
a truth fully appreciated both by Plato and by Aristotle.
CHAPTER III
THE THEORY OF DISABLEMENT
"!F I had a commonwealth to reform or to govern, 
certainly it should not be the Devil's Regiment of the 
Line that I would first of all concentrate my attention 
on. To them one would apply the besom and try to sweep 
them with some rapidity into the dustbin. Away! 
Begone, swiftly, ye Regiments of the Line, in the Name 
of God and of His poor struggling servants, sore put to 
it to live in these bad days."
This passage, taken from Thomas Carlyle's Essay on 
Model Prisons, contains a literally " sweeping " state- 
ment of the doctrine that it is the function of punishment 
to protect society by the elimination of criminals. No 
other writer with whose works I am acquainted has 
adopted this view in so uncompromising a fashion. On 
the contrary, where disablement enters as an element 
into penal theories, it occupies, as a rule, a subordinate 
place and is looked upon as an object subsidiary to some 
other end which is regarded as paramount, generally 
reformation.
Historically, the intention to deprive offenders of the 
power of doing future mischief has been very prominent 
among the motives with which punishments were inflicted. 
The punishments first in point of time were death and 
expulsion from the tribe, both means of ridding society 
of one who had proved a source of danger to it, either 
directly or indirectly by calhng down upon the com-
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munity the wrath of some deity whose displeasure he had 
incurred. Again, many of the so-called " characteristic " 
punishments were chosen, not for the sake of symbolizing 
the crime, nor, as is commonly alleged, as a sort of talio, 
namely for the purpose of visiting the sin upon the offend- 
ing member, but in order to incapacitate the offender for 
repeating his offence. This accounts largely for the 
mutilations which played so prominent a part in the 
history of the criminal law; a handless thief is no longer 
light-fingered, and the sanctity of the marriage-bed is 
not likely to be violated by an adulterer once he is cas- 
trated. A similar motive affords a partial explanation 
for the practice of branding offenders. For in many 
cases to make a criminal recognizable as such is to disarm 
him. It is easier to protect your flock when the wolf 
comes in his own skin than when he approaches " a sheep 
without, a wolf within."
Among the punishments now in use in civilized 
countries, those of death, transportation and imprison- 
ment for life are often cited as complete realizations of 
the principle of disablement. According to some authors, 
very long terms of imprisonment embody the same idea : 
they hold that the rationale of long sentences is to be 
found in the expectation that the convict will leave prison 
an old man, too broken both in spirit and in body to do 
further harm. That the first-named punishments have 
the effect of permanently eliminating the criminal goes 
without saying. Similarly, any prisoner, as long as he is 
behind lock and key, whether his term be short or long, 
is, for the time being, forcibly restrained from making 
onslaughts on society. It does not, however, follow that 
that which is the result of punishment, is also the object 
with which it is inflicted. The opinion that incapaci- 
tation is the end, and not merely a by-effect, of punish- 
ments which permanently remove the offender from 
society, is contradicted in the case of those criminal
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systems in which several such kinds of punishment are 
found side by side, by the fact that the law exactly pre- 
scribes for what offences the one or the other is to be 
awarded. As they all answer the purpose equally well, 
one of them ought to have been chosen, on account of 
the collateral advantages which it offered, as applicable 
to all cases in which it seemed desirable to eliminate the 
offender : capital punishment on grounds of economy, or, 
where public sentiment will not tolerate the taking of 
human life by judicial sentence, either transportation or 
imprisonment for life, whichever of the two appeared 
preferable for other reasons.
There seems to be a complete consensus of opinion 
that these drastic measures ought to be resorted to only 
in the case of such malefactors as have shown themselves 
utterly unfit for life in society. Professional criminals 
and habitual offenders in general answer this description; 
and penal codes seem to give practical recognition to this 
consideration when they provide that certain offences 
shall be punishable with a life sentence only after one or 
more previous convictions. But inasmuch as incarcera- 
tion for life is not the sentence pre-appointed by law for 
such cases, but only the maximum allowed, the judge 
being generally clothed with a wide discretion, in the 
exercise of which he may award much shorter terms, it 
is not permissible to infer that the legislature intended to 
substitute, all at once when reaching the top, an entirely 
new principle for that which it had adopted all along the 
ascending line. Moreover, punishments which render 
the culprit permanently innocuous are not by any means 
restricted to old offenders; instances occur in all modern 
penal codes where a single act of crime is considered a 
sufficient qualification. Take the case of murder in 
English law, which prescribes that sentence of death 
must, of necessity, be passed as soon as a verdict of guilty 
has been brought in. It might be said that a person who
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has committed a murder, has proved by his act that to 
him human life is a thing of no value and that he would 
not shrink back from shedding more innocent blood when 
it suited his purpose. And this view was obviously 
adopted by the malefactor, quoted by Henricus Stephanus, 
who, when sentenced to death for a seventh murder, 
petitioned the King of France for a pardon, and when his 
petition was refused, complained that the six last murders 
lay at the door of the king, whilst he, the actual assassin, 
was morally guilty of the first one alone; for if the king 
had done his duty by having him executed for the first, 
it would not have been in his power to commit any more. 
Yet circumstances are certainly imaginable which would 
render it highly improbable that a murderer would ever 
commit another crime, even if he were to go quite un- 
punished. A poor nephew kills his uncle whose heir he 
is, in order to satisfy the pressing demands of his creditors. 
The victim was rich beyond the dreams of avarice, and 
the murderer, having come into his property, has certainly 
every inducement henceforth to lead the life of a respect- 
able and law-abiding citizen. Again, a man of hitherto 
unblemished reputation has, in the heat of passion, fired 
a bullet through the heart of his best friend, from whom 
he had received but the slenderest provocation. The 
catastrophe cannot fail to make a lasting impression on 
his mind, and he is more likely for the future to keep his 
passions in check than if their strength had never been 
brought home to him in so dramatic a fashion. On the 
principle of disablement there seems to be no reason why 
the state should come down upon either of these offenders. 
But would such a defence be admitted in a court of law ? 
Certainly not. And if not, why not ? Because the 
malignity revealed by the act of the former, the uncon- 
trollable temper displayed by the latter constitute, in 
themselves, disqualifications for life in civilized com- 
munities. Thus would answer the advocates of the
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theory of elimination, to which Sir James Stephen seems 
to signify his adhesion, where he says : " If a man commits 
a brutal murder, or if he has done his best to do so and 
fails only by accident; or if he ravishes his own daughter, 
. . . or if several men acting together ravish any woman, 
using cruel violence to effect their object, I think they 
should be destroyed, partly in order to gratify the indigna- 
tion which such crimes produce and which it is desirable 
that they should produce ; and partly in order to make the 
world wholesomer than it would otherwise be by ridding 
it of people as much misplaced in civilized society as wolves 
or tigers would be in a populous country"; though the 
peculiar choice of offences which he has made in the com- 
pilation of his list renders it not improbable that the first- 
mentioned motive has, after all, proved with him the 
stronger of the two. Granting for the moment that the 
answer given sufficiently meets the two hypothetical cases 
adduced by way of objection, it can certainly not be relied 
on to explain the catalogue of crimes which legislatures 
have made capital or punishable with perpetual imprison- 
ment. It cannot be seriously maintained that the man 
who " maliciously and advisedly, by writing or printing, 
maintains that the sovereign with the authority of parlia- 
ment may not make statutes to bind the crown and the 
descent thereof," constitutes either a more urgent or more 
lasting menace to society than the shark who practises 
every imaginable species of fraud on a gullible public. 
Yet the former must, under 6 Anne, c. 7, be sentenced to 
death, whilst the latter cannot possibly get more than five 
years' penal servitude. Lest it be said that my argument 
is bolstered up with an anomaly of the English law, 
explainable on historical grounds, another example will 
serve to substantiate my contention. Society has most 
emphatically less to fear from an accused person who has 
on one occasion forged the endorsement of a bill of ex- 
change than from a professional thief, or from a brute who
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unhesitatingly knocks down the most inoffensive passer-by 
who happens to cross his path.
Criminal codes deal with crimes, not with criminals. 
Of modern penal systems Guizot's dictum still holds good 
that "punishment has a right but against crime"; in 
other words, the scale of punishments in actual legislation 
is determined in reference to classes of offences. Dis- 
ablement, on the other hand, is a remedy appropriate to 
certain kinds, not of offences, but of offenders. It could, 
therefore, claim a rightful place only in such penal schemes 
as were built up on the foundation of Liszt's doctrine that 
" the object of punishment is not the crime but the 
criminal." The advocates of those theories according to 
which disablement is one of the ends of punishment, have 
felt this, though they do not all appreciate the trend of 
their opinions. They generally postulate elimination as 
the complement of reformation, as the punishment suit- 
able for incorrigible offenders. If this position is once 
fully taken, the nature of the crime in respect of which the 
culprit has been proved refractory to all reformatory 
efforts, ceases to be material, and the incorrigible vaga- 
bond, the incurable thief and the incorrigible murderer 
will all have to be dealt with in exactly the same way. 
This method of disposing of malefactors, then, has no 
longer the character of true punishment, but is a pure 
measure of social defence. It is significant that long be- 
fore the doctrines of the new criminological schools were 
dreamt of, incorrigible criminals were compared by 
authors who advocated their elimination from society, to 
every possible species of ferocious animals known to zoo- 
logy ; and the true significance underlying the claim for 
their destruction has been well recognized by Fichte, 
though his teaching is inextricably mixed up with that 
peculiar view according to which the criminal by his crime 
becomes an outlaw, where he writes : " The outlaw is 
considered simply as a wild beast, which must be shot;
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or as an overflowing river, which must be stopped; in 
short, as a force of nature, which the state must render 
harmless by an opposing force of nature. The death of 
the outlaw is not a means of punishment, but merely of 
security."
CHAPTER IV
FETJERBACH'S THEORY
WHILST in the theories of punishment hitherto discussed 
the whole attention is concentrated upon its actual 
infliction, the doctrine on the study of which we now 
enter represents the threat of the law as the essential 
aspect. That fear of punishment is a powerful instrument 
for promoting obedience to the law has been early recog- 
nized. Among the Greek schools the Cyrenaics were the 
first to give clear expression to the idea. " The laws,'' 
says Theodorus, " have no other object than to keep in 
check the irrational masses." And though every pleasure 
is good in itself, however polluted its source, yet a wise 
man will refrain from acts forbidden by law and custom; 
his only motive for so refraining is, in the opinion of both 
Meleager and Cleitomachus, as reported by Diogenes 
Laertius, fear of being punished and of getting a bad name. 
The wisdom of a view based upon the truth that preven- 
tion is better than cure, has strongly appealed to Aulus 
Gellius who remarks: " Summa enim professio stultitiae 
est, non ire obviam sceleribus cogitatis, sed manere oppe- 
ririque, ut cum admissa et perpetua fuerint, tune denique, 
ubi quae facta sunt, infecta fieri non possunt, puniantur," 
and has inspired the political maxim laid down in the 
Code of Justinian (ad Legem Corneliam de Sicariis) : 
" Moneat lex poenalis, priusquam feriat . . . melius est 
his occurrere et mederi quam iniuria accepta vindictam 
quaerere." To be guided by the knowledge that the
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threat of punishment operates over a wide area, whilst its 
application has no influence beyond the comparatively 
narrow circle of individuals that actually undergo it, 
Ovid enumerates among the attributes of a wise prince :
" Multa metu poenae, poena qui pauca coercet, 
Et iacit invita fulmina rara maim."
The same conception seems to underlie the Ciceronian 
dictum " ut poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat," 
though it is equally applicable to the view, in support of 
which it is frequently quoted, that the value of punish- 
ment lies in the object-lesson which it provides. Spinoza 
teaches that the state must, for the sake of self-preserva- 
tion, enact laws and ensure their observance by threats; 
for " terret vulgus nisi metuat." If he adds " Summa 
potestas . . . non odio percita ad perdendum civem, sed 
pietate mota eundem punit," the obscurity of the meaning 
of the word " pietas " leaves in doubt what end he thought 
the infliction of punishment should serve. The psycho- 
logical process upon which the preventive view relies, is, 
for the first time, clearly brought out by Samuel von 
Pufendorf. " The threat of punishment," he writes, 
"is to restrain people from sinning and to prompt them 
to obey the laws. Before embarking upon a course of 
action, men are wont cunningly to compare the advan- 
tages which they hope to derive with the harm which they 
fear may result therefrom. And it is easy to see that 
they will hardly be deterred from vice if they feel that 
the net gain to them is greater than the inconvenience of 
the punishments with which it is to be visited." Here 
the utilitarian character of the theory becomes at once 
apparent: and it is not surprising that the father of 
English utilitarianism took hold of it and incorporated 
it in his system. " The will cannot be influenced except 
by motives; but when we speak of motives, we speak of 
pleasures or pains. . . . The pain or pleasure which is
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attached to a law form what is called its sanction." " To 
prevent an offenee, it is necessary that the repressive 
motive should be stronger than the seductive motive. 
The punishment must be more an object of dread than 
the offence is an object of desire." Whilst the aim of the 
penal sanction, then, is, with Bentham, the prevention 
of crimes, its infliction upon the criminal serves three 
purposes : determent of others, reformation and disable- 
ment. After a crime has been committed " it still 
remains to prevent like offences, whether on the part of 
the same offender or of others. There are two ways of 
arriving at that end; one to correct the will, the other to 
take away the physical power. To take away the inclina- 
tion to repeat the act is reformation; to take away the 
power is incapacitation." To Fichte " punishment is 
merely a means for the end of the state, to maintain 
public security; and the only intention in providing 
punishment is to prevent by threats transgressions of the 
law. The end of all penal laws is, that they may not be 
applied. The threatened punishment is intended to 
suppress all evil purposes and to promote a good disposi- 
tion, so that the punishment may never be applied. 
Hence, in order to attain this end, each citizen must know 
that the threat of the law will invariably become reality if 
he should commit any offence." " The original intention 
of punishment," then, " is solely to deter the criminal 
from the crime." But once this end has failed, " he 
having committed a crime, his punishment has another 
end in view, namely to deter other citizens from com- 
mitting the same offence."
These quotations show that the efficacy of the menace 
of the law in checking crime has been well appreciated 
by a long series of writers. None of them, however, looks 
upon the threat as the essential feature in punishment. 
Far less does the aim of preventing crimes by acting upon 
the fears of potential offenders supply to them a true and
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complete rationale of punishment. In other words, whilst 
they fully recognize the political wisdom of enforcing 
obedience to the law by threats, the actual application 
of the sanction appears in their systems completely 
dissociated from the threat, and, therefore, as being in 
need of an independent justification, which they supply 
by relying on the deterrent, reformatory or disabling 
aspects of punishment. It was Anselm von Feuerbach 
who bridged over this chasm and thereby erected the 
preventive side of punishment into a well-rounded, self- 
sufficient theory. It is unnecessary to trace in his 
writings the modifications which the theory underwent 
in his hands till it assumed its final shape : the author 
himself has supplied us with an excellent summary of his 
matured views in his Lehrbuch, from which we shall 
quote: 
" By combining their wills and their forces for the 
purpose of guaranteeing to each other the freedom of all, 
individuals form a civil society. A civil society organized 
by subjection to a common will and by means of a con- 
stitution, is a state. The end of the state is to create 
legal order, i. e. to provide for a social life regulated by 
the law of righteousness."
" Violations of the law, of whatever kind, contradict the 
end of the state. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that 
no violations of the law whatever occur in the state. 
Hence the state is both entitled and bound to take such 
measures as will render violations of the law absolutely 
impossible."
" The measures which it is incumbent upon the state 
to take, must, of necessity, be compulsory measures. For 
this purpose, the state relies, in the first instance, on 
physical force."
" But physical force does not suffice to prevent viola- 
tions of the law altogether."
" If, then, violations of the law are altogether to be
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prevented, there must exist, by the side of physical 
restraint, another form of constraint which precedes the 
accomplishment of violations of the law, and which, 
emanating from the state, becomes operative in every 
single instance, whether the impending violation of the 
law be or be not known beforehand. Such a constraint 
can only be of a psychological character."
" All offences have their psychological origin in the 
sensual sphere, inasmuch as man's desires are moved to 
action by the pleasure to be derived from, or to be gained 
through, such action. This sensual impulse can be 
checked by the knowledge that the act will be followed, 
unavoidably, by an evil greater than the pain resulting 
from the suppression of the impulse to action."
" In order that the necessary connection of such evils 
with offences be established as a universal conviction, 
it is necessary (1) that a law ordain them as the necessary 
consequence of the act (threat of the law). And in order 
that the reality of the ideal connection created by law 
be impressed upon the minds of all subjects, it is further 
necessary, (2) that such causal relationship become 
manifest in other words, that the evil threatened by the 
law be actually inflicted whenever an offence has been 
committed (execution). The harmonious co-operation 
of the executive and of the legislative power for the 
purpose of determent constitutes the psychological 
constraint."
" The evil threatened by the state by means of a law 
and inflicted by virtue of such law is political punishment 
(poena forensis). The general reason why such punish- 
ments are necessary and exist (both in law and in the 
execution of the laws) is the necessity of preserving the 
freedom of all by the suppression of such sensual impulses 
as prompt to violations of the law."
" (1) The object of the legal threat of punishment is to 
deter all, as possible offenders, from violating the law.
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(2) The object with which it is actually inflicted, is to 
render the threat of the law effective, since, without such 
execution, it would remain an empty threat. Since the 
law is to deter all citizens, and since the execution is to 
render the law effective, the mediate (ultimate) end of its 
infliction is likewise to deter all citizens by means of the 
law."
" From the above propositions may be deduced the 
following supreme principle of the criminal law : Every 
legal punishment in the state is the juridical consequence 
of a law founded upon the necessity to preserve external 
rights and which sanctions a violation of the law with a 
physical evil."
Hence " Nulla poena sine lege; nullum crimen sine 
poena legali."
" The general juridical ground for the existence of all 
legal punishments is the necessity of preventing the legal 
order being endangered. Hence the gravity of the 
danger supplies the measure of punishment; hence also 
the maxim : the more an act endangers the legal order, 
the more severe the political punishment with which it is 
to be visited."
The superiority of the preventive view over all others 
becomes at once apparent if we express in simple terms 
the different attitudes which the state takes towards 
crimes and criminals upon the various theories of punish- 
ment. Upon all other theories the state virtually says 
to the criminal or the prospective criminal: " Do what 
you like. I lie low and wait till you have committed an 
offence. Then I come down upon you and do what I 
consider to be my duty." " I cannot prevent your going 
wrong; you are a moral, i. e. a free, agent. But neither 
am I at liberty to alter the predetermined consequences 
of your choice. For my line of action is but the necessary 
moral complement of your own conduct." Thus reasons 
the theory of justice. " Your choice has shown you to
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be a danger to society, and I have to deal with you in such 
manner as the interests of society demand," so speaks 
the state according to the other political theories, " by 
making an example of you " (deterrent view), " by 
making it impossible for you to offend again " (theory of 
disablement), " by teaching you such a lesson that you 
will not be likely ever to forget it," or, " by casting the 
devil out of your soul " (theories of legal and moral 
reformation). Far otherwise the doctrine of prevention. 
" What is the good of waiting till the mischief has been 
wrought ? " here asks the state. " Every crime is a 
shock to the peace and good order of society. I, being 
the guardian of the public peace, must prevent it, must 
nip it in the bud. I may not always be successful; but 
if I fail, it shall not be for want of trying."
The threats with which criminal laws are sanctioned 
are, then, political contrivances devised by the state with 
the object of preventing the occurrence of those acts 
which, if frequent, must result in the dissolution of society. 
But how about the execution of the penal laws ? To the 
authors who wrote before Feuerbach the actual infliction 
of punishment appeared either as a moral necessity flowing 
from something in the act itself, but something quite 
independent of its legal character, or merely as another 
measure of political expediency intended to serve the 
ends of society. Even those writers who appreciated the 
important office which criminal legislation performs in 
the prevention of crime, completely dissociate the inflic- 
tion of punishment from the threat of the law. And 
since, in chastising the offender, the state pursues an 
object different from that for which it proclaims its 
threat, the enactment of penal laws is not a necessary 
condition precedent to the punishment of criminals. Far 
less is it incumbent upon the state to provide definite 
sanctions, and Grolman consistently expresses this view 
if he says : " It is not at all necessary that he who
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endangers the safety of society should know beforehand 
what evil will befall him in case he transgresses the law. 
The state is in any case bound to take such measures as 
he, the source of danger, renders necessary." Yet the 
doctrine that penal law forms the necessary basis of 
criminal liability, was a fundamental principle of one of 
the most ancient systems of law. Talmudic jurisprudence 
goes, indeed, even beyond Feuerbach's teaching in laying 
down the maxim : " No punishment without a previous 
warning " : at the time of the act the law which he was 
about to violate, as well as the punishment with which 
such law was sanctioned, had to be pointed out to the 
offender if he was to be held responsible for his crime. 
In other words, there could be no punishment without a 
de facto knowledge of the legal quality of the act at the 
time of its commission. Again, we read in the Digest : 
" Poena non irrogatur, nisi quae quaque lege vel quo alio 
iure specialiter huic imposita sit." Whilst, then, the 
proper relationship between penal sanctions and their 
application was perceived and acted upon by the practical 
genius of ancient legislators, it escaped the searchlight 
of speculative philosophy till Feuerbach's lucid analysis 
assigned the true reason for the execution of punishments. 
" When the legislator associates a punishment with an 
act, he does nothing else . . . than to make the punish- 
ment the necessary legal consequence of the crime, and 
proclaims that such act cannot be done without the actor 
suffering that punishment." The legislator, in providing 
penal sanctions, aims at suppressing crime altogether. 
But being aware of the frailty of human nature, he foresees 
that occasions will arise when the threat will have to be 
carried out. The infliction of punishment will incident- 
ally bring home to the community at large the reality of 
the menace and will thereby strengthen the fear of the 
law and its preventive force. It is not the sight of the 
suffering incurred by the transgressor that produces this
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result, but the deepening of the conviction that the state 
is in bitter earnest when it enacts a penal law. This is 
Feuerbach's meaning if he says that the ultimate end of 
the infliction of punishment " is likewise to deter all 
citizens by means of the law," with the stress on the five 
last words of the sentence. But however desirable may 
be this operation of the execution of the criminal law 
upon the mind of the public, it is no more than a by-effect. 
The application of the sanction, in truth, serves no 
independent end whatever, but flows almost automatically 
from the provisions of the law itself. In civilized com- 
munities the law is carried out as a matter of course, and 
its execution requires no further justification. Upon 
this view, then, the infliction of punishment bears an 
absolute character. Punishment is awarded, with un- 
avoidable necessity, quia peccatum est. The necessity, 
however, is not an extraneous one, but a necessity of the 
law's own creation; in other words, it is a legal necessity. 
In advancing this doctrine, Feuerbacb. has rendered 
obvious, what previous writers on punishment had too 
long forgotten, that the penal code is, first and foremost, 
a part of the law, and has restored to the administration 
of the criminal law its juridical character. A criminal 
court is no longer, as it would be on the transcendental 
theory, a tribunal where the mechanism of the moral 
order of the universe is given free play, nor, as it would be 
if it were once admitted that the infliction of punishment 
serves an independent end, an organ of the state destined 
to pursue political aims, but a tribunal where the law of 
the land is administered, a court of law, a court of 
justice.
No theory of punishment has been more admired, none 
has been more severely criticized than that which is 
associated with Feuerbach's name. Having explained 
wherein consists the novelty, the essential feature and, 
in our opinion, the merit of that great jurist's doctrine,
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we must now examine the chief objections which have 
been raised against it.
The first of Feuerbach's positions which has been 
violently assailed, is his claim that " all offences have 
their origin in the sensual sphere, inasmuch as man's 
desires are moved to action by pleasure." This text, 
read by itself, would suggest that Feuerbach subscribed 
to the doctrine of psychological hedonism. But a study 
of his other writings, the Revision in particular, leaves no 
doubt, as we shall presently see, that, as a true disciple 
of Kant, he acknowledges man's freedom, i. e. his 
capacity to regulate his conduct by the light of reason in 
accordance with the dictates of duty. Reason can never 
prompt us to a violation of our duty; and it is of breaches 
of duty, i. e. of offences, and of offences alone, that 
Feuerbach asserts that they always have their source in 
the sensual sphere. The latter term he uses in the broad 
Kantian sense, as comprising all desires which originate 
within the compass, and the gratification of which serves 
the ends, of the empirical self. However, even after full 
allowance has been made for all these considerations, it 
may be granted that Feuerbach's views as to the etiology 
of crime are unduly narrow. Bauer has elaborated a list 
of factors, other than sensual impulses, which may be 
instrumental in the causation of offences, viz. moral 
inertia, absence or weakness of the moral sentiments, a 
dull conscience; error which causes the actor to believe 
that an act wrong in general is permissible or even meri- 
torious in the special circumstances of the case; culpable 
inadvertence ; want of correct and clear notions as to the 
character of an act or as to the degree to which it is 
wrongful. But when all is said, the assertion that crimes 
always originate in the sphere of the senses, is not at all 
material to the correctness of Feuerbach's theory. As 
long as it is conceded that man's conduct is determined by 
motives, it is reasonable for the state to create artificial
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motives that restrain man from actions which the state 
looks upon as dangerous to society.
This brings us to a second objection. Feuerbach's 
psychological constraint, it has been said, relies on the 
basest and most cowardly motive that can influence man's 
conduct, the emotion of fear. To appeal to the basest 
side of human nature is derogatory to the dignity of the 
state and of the subject alike. Assuming that it is the 
blandishments of pleasure that most frequently supply 
the impulses to crime, it does not follow that the legislator 
must check them by the threat of pain. If the inclina- 
tions to wrong-doing originate within the lower sphere, 
man has yet a better and higher self, and it is upon the 
latter that the legislator ought to act. " A threat," 
writes Hegel, " assumes that man is not free and will 
compel him by vividly presenting a possible evil. Right 
and justice, however, must have their seat in freedom and 
in the will, and not in the restriction implied in menace. 
In this view of punishment it is much the same as if one 
raises a cane against a dog; a man is not treated in 
accordance with his dignity and honour, but as a dog." 
And since of Feuerbach's own showing the final object of 
the law is to guarantee the freedom-of all, surely a doctrine 
which seeks to promote freedom by means which imply 
a denial of freedom is self-contradictory and inconsistent. 
As against this last criticism, we wish to point out that in 
proclaiming, no doubt under Kantian influence, freedom 
as the end of the state and of state legislation, Feuerbach 
is on debatable ground, but that the correctness or 
incorrectness of this view is not at all material to the 
truth of the main argument by which his theory is 
supported. The state, for purposes of its own, decides 
that certain acts shall not be done, and Feuerbach's 
reasoning is equally cogent whatever those purposes may 
be. But to come to the gist of the objection, nowhere and 
never has Feuerbach uttered the opinion that the state
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intended fear of punishment to be the mainspring of man's 
actions. In the Revision he makes it abundantly clear 
that penal enactments are not the only means by which 
the government ought to regulate the conduct of the 
subjects. On the contrary, he demands first and foremost 
that educational institutions be provided in order to 
promote public spirit and civic virtue among the citizens, 
so as to prevent criminal inclinations ever arising in 
their breasts. But he appreciated that the best directed 
efforts of the state are bound occasionally to miscarry.
" Oderunt peocare boni virtutis amore, 
Oderunt peooare mail formidine poenae."
The reality of things which suggested to the medieval 
commentator the antistrophe with which he supple- 
mented Horace's verse, caused Feuerbach to perceive 
that social order would rest on insecure foundations if it 
were supported by the moral instincts of the community 
alone. Whilst, then, the state expects the vast majority 
of its members to adopt, of their own free choice, the 
common ends of society as their own and spontaneously 
to obey the law, special measures have to be taken to 
restrain the feet of those who are disposed to wander 
into crooked paths. " The law is not made for a righteous 
man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly 
and for sinners." The dictum of St. Paul, then, applies 
with special force to criminal law. But must the law 
operate upon those frailer minds by means of threats ? 
Anton Bauer has modified Feuerbach's theory by ascribing 
to the law a monitory, instead of a minatory, effect. 
'Man being a rational creature, he argues, a warning 
addressed to his will, his inner self, is more effective and 
also more in accordance with his dignity than a menace 
which merely influences outward conduct. This view, 
however, betrays a poor knowledge of the psychology of 
the criminal. For those prepared to lend a willing ear
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to such friendly monition do not really stand in need of 
it : to them the voice within speaks louder than the 
distant echo of a penal statute ever could. On coarser 
grained natures, the very ones whose criminal impulses 
are to be restrained, the gentle hint is lost; for they see 
in the law, not a friendly counsellor, but a deadly foe.
" Des Gesetzes strenge Fessel bindet 
Nur den Sklavensinn, der es verschmaht."
The compulsion of the law, then, is automatically limited 
in its operation to those cases in which it is required. 
Those who spontaneously regulate their lives in accordance 
with the dictates of the law, do not feel its restraining 
influence; and in so far as man is free, he can at any time 
emancipate himself from its fetters by choosing for himself 
the path of rectitude which is the path of freedom. The 
menace of the law not being addressed to any definite 
person, anybody is free to make it inapplicable to himself. 
It becomes effective only where the passions and the 
narrow interests of the phenomenal self, the most serious 
obstacles to true freedom, threaten to gain the ascendant. 
It is, therefore, clear that Feuerbach's teaching is quite 
sustainable on pure Kantian principles.
Yet the deadliest sin which has been laid at Feuerbach's 
door, is that his doctrine is necessitarian in character. 
In passing judgment on this indictment, we have to draw 
a distinction. So far as the problem of ultimate or 
metaphysical freedom is concerned a question of specu- 
lative creed, and nothing else the theory is equally 
compatible with a belief or disbelief therein. But in this 
sense Feuerbach is an avowed libertarian. Psycho- 
logical determinism, on the other hand, which is but the 
application of the principle of sufficient reason to human 
conduct in the phenomenal world, seems indeed to be 
postulated by Feuerbach's theory, though the lines upon 
which he argues in the Eevision, render it more than
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doubtful whether the author was quite alive to this fact 
at the time when he first shaped his theory. At any rate, 
a being whose conduct we could not influence by supplying 
him with motives, would be completely independent of 
us; and Feuerbach's final position is that in the mind of 
the prospective criminal the desire to avoid the greater 
evil will of necessity prevail and that it is the business of 
the state to make punishment always the greater evil. 
But the question of free will is really altogether foreign 
to the problem of the state punishment of crime, and it 
has been owing to a confusion of legal and moral responsi- 
bility that it has been imported into the discussion of the 
subject. Free will is a purely ethical notion, postulated 
because without it moral imperatives would become 
meaningless. Outside the realm of ethics it loses its 
significance. Now positive law, concerned as it is with 
the regulation of external conduct alone, is not a branch 
of morality. A criminal court is not a court of conscience. 
The jurist can. never concede that a man ceases to be 
liable to the law because we can assign the cause of his 
act, because we know that in the given instance the 
impulse to crime proved the stronger motive and that he, 
the man he was, could not have acted differently in the 
actual circumstances of the case. " Tout comprendre 
c'est tout pardonner " is certainly not a maxim of criminal 
law. It now becomes obvious that those who attack 
Feuerbach's theory because it rests on a deterministic 
basis, are really begging the question. For such criticism 
presupposes that legal liability is founded upon desert, 
a postulate which of necessity involves assent to the 
transcendental theory. Instead of being a ground for 
reproach, it is one of Feuerbach's chief merits that he has 
lifted the metaphysical veil in which the problem had 
been enveloped by Kant. And whilst agreeing with the 
latter in making ill-desert a condition of moral condemna- 
tion, he emancipated state punishment from the fetters
T 2
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of the free-will doctrine and restored to it its true char- 
acter, that of a politico-legal institution, an institution 
created by the state for the furtherance of its own ends.
The same considerations dispose of the charge of 
inconsistency which has been preferred against Feuerbach. 
Upon deterministic principles, it is claimed, the blame for 
every crime committed would lie at the door of the state, 
not of the offender. For the criminal could not help 
yielding to the stronger motive, whilst the law was at 
fault in not providing a more powerful threat. This 
criticism loses its force once it is fully grasped that 
criminal liability means legal, not moral, responsibility.
Again, it has been urged against Feuerbach's theory that 
since the object of punishment is the prevention of crimes 
by means of threats, the severity of punishment of offences 
ought to vary in direct ratio with the likelihood of their 
being committed; in other words, that the most trivial 
transgressions, being the most common ones, ought to be 
visited with the harshest penalties, whereas in truth and 
in fact the law is most severe on those misdeeds the 
frequent occurrence of which society has least ground to 
fear, and from the perpetration of which all but a very 
few individuals would refrain even if they were not 
punishable at all. To advance this argument is to betray 
a complete want of understanding as to the true signifi- 
cance of the doctrine of psychological restraint. The 
latter acts, not upon the masses collectively, but singly 
and separately upon the mind of every person who 
contemplates the commission of a crime. In providing 
sanctions, the state must, therefore, study their effect 
upon the conduct of the individual, and the frequency or 
rarity with which they become psychologically operative, 
need not enter into its calculations. Other critics deduce 
from Feuerbach's theory the principle that the strength 
of the criminal impulse ought to supply the standard of 
punishment : the man who steals a loaf of bread when
FEUERBACH'S THEORY 277
hunger gnaws at his stomach ought to be dealt with more 
harshly than he who commits the same offence whilst 
digesting a substantial meal. Bentham indeed draws 
this conclusion from the preventive function of sanctions 
and lays down as a legislative maxim that " the greater 
the temptation the greater should be the punishment." 
Starting from similar premises, Feuerbach arrives at a 
different result and thereby gives proof of the superiority 
of his system over that of Bentham, of a deeper insight 
into the practical legislative problem involved than is 
displayed by his critics, and of the internal consistency, 
and of the mutual interpenetration of the different parts, 
of his doctrine. Whilst clearly perceiving and pointing 
out that every criminal impulse can be checked by the 
presentation of an evil of a sufficient magnitude as the 
consequence of the act, he neither explicitly nor impliedly 
lays down the principle that punishments ought to be so 
graduated that the impulse to commit an offence may 
always be so overcome. The attempt to overpower 
criminal motives by the menace of the law is, after all, 
but a means to an end, and to derive the measure of 
punishment from the strength of those motives, no regard 
being paid to the ultimate object to be accomplished, 
means to sacrifice the end to the means. If the true end 
of punishment, the preservation of social order, is to 
remain paramount, it must supply the scale of punish-' 
ments, the gravity of the offence being determined by the 
degree in which it endangers the peace of society, the 
fundaments of the state and the system of rights guaran- 
teed by it. And this is the measure of punishment 
advocated by Feuerbach. To adopt the contrary view, 
to associate the extremest terror with an offence which is 
a source of but a trivial mischief because the temptation 
to commit it is strong would be as reasonable as to call 
out an army corps to prevent a pocket being picked in a 
case where a purse would not otherwise be safe.
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This insinuation of a false standard of punishment into 
Feuerbach's doctrine is further responsible for the asser- 
tion that the theory cannot be given effect to, because it 
is impossible to gauge with precision the strength of the 
criminal motive in each individual case and to arrange 
punishments so as to counterpoise the pleasure sought by 
the commission of each offence by the anticipation of the 
exact amount of physical suffering sufficient for the 
purpose, as well as for the claim that the theory would in 
practice lead to the most appalling results since sometimes 
the most heinous crimes are perpetrated for the sake of 
some trivial advantage.
Finally, it has been urged that Feuerbach's theory 
refutes itself, since every crime actually committed proves 
the futility of the threat, which forms the root idea of his 
teaching. And this lack of efficiency is not peculiar to 
this or that penal system; no punishment has yet been 
devised which proves adequately deterrent in all cases. 
" Murder and manslaughter, burglary and larceny, have 
continued to harass society through all the changes in- 
the allotment of punishment : and no change is likely 
to put an end to them." It must be conceded that as 
against Feuerbach's own wording of his doctrine this 
objection is valid. " Violations of the law, of whatever 
kind," he writes, " contradict the end of the state. It is, 
therefore, absolutely necessary that no violations of the 
law whatever occur in the state." If it is true that any 
and every act of transgression is equivalent to the immi- 
nent dissolution of political society, then the prevention 
of crime becomes a necessity so absolute that the menace 
of the law which is to avert that danger, altogether fails 
of its object if it fails in one single instance. Our learned 
philosopher has undoubtedly been guilty here of using 
exaggerated language. There is a heavy bill of crime in 
all modern states, but they do not, therefore, tremble in 
their very foundations. The legal threat does not then
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cease to be useful because it cannot completely abolish 
crime. It is enough if it keeps within the bounds of the 
law the vast majority of the population and reduces 
criminality to manageable proportions. It has, however, 
been denied that it does even as much as that. It has 
been contended that the terror of the law cannot fulfil 
its office because it is addressed to the mind, whilst the 
object for the sake of which offences are committed, is 
always a material advantage in the outside world, an 
argument that does not require serious refutation. Again, 
it has been averred that the bare intellectual knowledge 
of the connection of punishment with crime cannot 
influence the conduct of a prospective offender an 
objection which involves the question whether reason 
can serve as a motive. But the same criticism has been 
advanced in a form in which that moot point is evaded. 
Impulses and temptations to break the law, it has been 
said, are strongest in the lower strata of society, which, 
being the least educated, are prone to be governed alto- 
gether by feeling, and little, if at all, influenced by reason. 
Hence the threat of the law which appeals to the intellect, 
must be least effective where the need for a check on the 
emotions is greatest. As against this, it has been well 
pointed out by Leslie Stephen that a genuine realization 
of the proposition " Offenders are liable to punishment " 
is not a mere recognition of an intellectual truth, but 
involves an emotional process, the logical aspect of which 
is symbolized by the words. In any case, the point 
raised does not weaken Feuerbach's position, since he 
never asserted that the anticipation of pain which is to 
supply the restraining motive, is an anticipation in 
thought rather than in feeling. The proverbial improvi- 
dence of criminals which causes them to prefer the 
immediate gratification of the desire of the moment to 
immunity from a distant evil, and the fact that many 
offences are perpetrated in the heat of passion which
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excludes all calculation are further arguments adduced to 
show that intimidation is but rarely of service in saving 
a person contemplating a crime from its actual com- 
mission. The extent to which fear of punishment 
prevents crime is difficult to determine since the operation 
of the sanction upon the mind leaves no palpable traces 
in the material world and so fails to supply data for 
that mode of investigation by which alone we would be 
enabled to give a conclusive answer to the question, viz. 
the statistical method. But if we remember how success- 
ful, in every age and in every country, religion has been 
in enforcing conformity to its precepts by presenting to 
the imagination of its followers gloomy pictures of the 
ultimate doom of the wicked, it would be absurd to deny 
the practical efficacy of a system of threats the fulfilment 
of which lies not in the dim, distant future, but close at 
hand, and is a matter, not of mere faith, but of daily 
observation. Furthermore, a little introspection and 
psychological self-analysis will convince us that there have 
been occasions in the lives of all of us when we who flatter 
ourselves to be men of principles and law-abiding citizens, 
have not been uninfluenced by those coarser restraints by 
which the penal code seeks to shape and guide the course 
of our frailer fellow-creatures. To gainsay that the sanc- 
tions of the criminal law operate upon the mind of the 
would-be offender, and that they operate upon his mind 
even where they do not prove strong enough to overpower 
the impulse to crime, is to dispute that human actions 
are determined by motives, is to deny that man in his 
sound senses desires to avoid suffering. And if the 
negation of the two last-named propositions strikes us as- 
absurd, the case for Feuerbach's theory is made out.
CHAPTER V
THE TKUE FUNCTION OF MODERN PUNISHMENT
HAVING completed our critical survey of the more 
important theories of punishment, we may now summarize 
the conclusions at which we have arrived as to their 
respective value in reference to positive criminal legisla- 
tion and criminal jurisdiction. We have seen that the 
transcendental theories, founded as they are upon a 
principle entirely foreign to our subject-matter, cannot 
contribute to the solution of our problem. Proceeding to 
a study of the political theories, we found that in modern 
times the state has, without much success, undertaken 
the task of reforming criminals, whilst they are serving 
their terms, that in exceptional circumstances judges 
sometimes pass " exemplary " sentences for the sake of 
their deterrent effect upon the spectators, and that some 
forms of punishment incidentally disable criminals 
from doing future mischief. Whilst these factors may 
count for something, their practical importance is quite 
secondary and subordinate as compared with what we 
believe to be the paramount object of the legislator in 
providing criminal sanctions for certain classes of wrongs, 
viz. the prevention of offences by the menace of the law.
When examining, in the preceding chapter, Feuerbach's 
doctrine which is founded upon this idea, we so zealously 
defended his main position that it might appear super- 
fluous to attempt to give an independent exposition of 
our views on the subject. But whilst fully endorsing his
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leading principles, we could not help feeling that his 
argument is closely interwoven with propositions to which 
we were not prepared to subscribe, and which, though 
not essential to his theory, yet lay it open to attack. 
Besides, he occasionally fails to explain and reconcile 
apparent discrepancies in his system and to express in 
the most lucid and forcible manner his most lucid and 
powerful ideas. Moreover, whilst exhausting the main 
object of criminal legislation, his theory overlooks another 
aspect which, if not the cardinal one, is of considerable 
significance, viz. the educative effect of the penal code and 
its influence upon positive morality.
Realizing that certain classes of acts are highly detri- 
mental to the commonwealth because they tend to subvert 
the fundaments of political society, endanger the public 
order, or violate those rights of the citizens the enjoyment 
of which the state regards as vital and, therefore, as 
worthy of special protection, the state attempts to 
prevent their occurrence by making them the subject of 
legal prohibitions of a particularly emphatic nature, the 
observance of which it seeks to enforce by means of con- 
trivances believed to be eminently efficacious for that 
purpose. The acts so forbidden are crimes, the aggregate 
of laws containing such prohibitions forms the penal code, 
and the special measures adopted in order to ensure 
obedience are called penal sanctions or punishments. In 
devising the latter, the state relies on the following 
psychological facts : Before the will is finally determined, 
a struggle goes on in the mind of a person who contem- 
plates embarking on a certain course of conduct between 
two orders of motives, those which urge him on to pursue 
it and those which prompt him to desist. In this struggle 
the stronger of the two groups is bound to prevail, and 
the act will be done or left undone according as to whether, 
to use Bentham's terms, the "seductive" or the "re- 
pressive " motives proves the more powerful. If the act
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under consideration is a wrongful one, the checks are, 
state interference apart, in the main utilitarian, religious, 
and moral. But their joint force is not always sufficient 
to overcome the temptation to do it; and in exceptional 
instances, religion and morality, instead of promoting 
obedience to the law of the land, supply the very impulses 
to actions which the state looks upon as dangerous. It 
is, however, generally possible, by placing a sufficient 
extra-weight into the scale which contains the inhibitory 
motives, to cause the balance to incline to the side of 
law and order. And this result the state attempts to 
bring about by adding to the restraints which operate 
spontaneously and independently of its intervention, and 
which may be called natural restraints, an artificial one 
of its own creation, the threat of an evil of sufficient 
magnitude to be inflicted by the state upon the actor if 
he breaks the command of the law. The desire to avoid 
suffering it will enter into the conflict of motives, and will 
in many instances prove the determining factor: in 
many instances, but by no means always. Offences have 
been committed in spite of the most cruel torments which 
the devilish ingenuity of barbarous ages could suggest. 
Far less can we hope that the criminal impulse will always 
be suppressed by even the harshest forms of punishment 
which our humanitarian era will tolerate. In modern law 
" the highest penalty depends for its efficacy upon the 
love of life; and there are many circumstances under 
which a man may cease to care for life, and so far be 
beyond the power of the legislator." The greatest 
measure of success would be attained if it were possible 
for the state to contrive a mechanism by means of which 
every crime would automatically bring about the infliction 
of the punishment provided for it. A penal sanction 
might then be likened to a Damoklean sword hung over 
the head of every intending transgressor of the penal code 
and always ready to descend upon him as soon as by his
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own act he severs the single horse-hair by which it is 
suspended. But since the Watt of statecraft has not yet 
arisen to design the required machinery, the politician 
and the legislator have to be content with an approxima- 
tion to the ideal by adopting the practical maxims which 
it suggests.
First of all, punishment must ex vi termini be an evil, 
and it must be an evil of sufficient magnitude, or it ceases 
to be deterrent. A sanction disproportionately light is, 
as Hobbes remarks, " rather the price or redemption than 
the punishment of a crime," and will encourage criminals 
to imitate the example of the Roman madman, mentioned 
by Montesquieu, who spent his time boxing the ears of 
casual passers-by, while a slave who followed him had 
instructions to hand to each of his victims twenty-five 
coppers, the statutory penaky for such offence. Besides, 
a sanction inadequate to prevent crime means so much 
gratuitous suffering; as it fails of its object, the pain 
which it occasions is simply wasted. And inasmuch as 
it has to be actually inflicted in a larger number of 
instances, the sum total of human agony of which it is 
productive, may well be a good deal larger than it would 
have been in the case of a harsher and therefore more 
effective punishment. The amount of suffering which 
constitutes a sufficient menace has to be determined in 
relation to the physical and moral susceptibilities of that 
section of the community in the midst of which crime 
is liable to be prevalent. At this point we are confronted 
with one of the most serious obstacles to the success of 
punishment as a preventive of crime. For the choice of 
sanctions rests in the first instance with the legislative 
bodies and in the last resort, at any rate in democratic 
states, with public opinion; and the men who compose 
the former and lead the latter cannot help being guided 
by their own feelings in judging of the effects which the 
threat of different punishments will produce in the minds
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of those to whom it is chiefly addressed. Yet the chances 
are that the anticipation of an evil which would drive 
to despair, and possibly to self-destruction, men endowed, 
as the leaders of the community generally are, with a vivid 
imagination and a sensitive nature, might not cause a 
single sleepless night to people of that coarser fibre of 
which criminals are made. Deprivation of freedom 
strikes the self-respecting citizen as a calamity of the 
highest order; but the appalling proportion which persons 
previously convicted bear to the prison population as a 
whole, proves that the conditions of life in confinement 
do not compare so very unfavourably, in the opinion of 
those best fitted to judge, with those under which the 
strata of society from which the majority of criminals is 
recruited, generally labour when at large.
Whilst, then, sanctions are worse than useless unless 
they are of sufficient intensity to act as checks on crime, 
they ought not to be more than sufficient for the pur- 
pose. The true function of punishments assigns the 
limits of their severity. If the state can attain its end, 
the prevention of offences, by a mild penal system, there 
is no justification for a savage code. For punishment 
means pain, and humanity forbids us to inflict unnecessary 
pain on any sentient creature. Utilitarian considerations 
lend further strength to this ethical postulate. Montes- 
quieu says : " L'atrocite des lois en empeche 1'execution. 
Lorsque la peine est sans mesure, on est souvent oblige 
de lui preferer I'impunite." The truth of this statement 
is most strikingly illustrated by the course of events 
where the penal legislation of a barbarous age survives 
into, and has to be administered by, a milder-mannered 
generation. Where such is the state of the law, the 
victims will suffer a great deal in silence at the hands of 
the criminal classes rather than come forward, as prose- 
cutors, to set the law in motion; witnesses cannot be got 
to attend the trial; and miscarriages of justice will be
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matters of daily occurrence since the attention of juries 
will be unconsciously diverted from the consideration of 
the evidence and will be directed to the consequences of 
an adverse decision. Thus, till the reign of William IV, 
larceny of certain goods in process of manufacture was, 
in English law, a capital felony. For many years it had 
been impossible to obtain a conviction on an indictment 
for this crime, however clearly the evidence might have 
established the guilt of the accused, till, at last, the 
manufacturers for whose protection the extreme penalty 
had been annexed to the offence, in order to obtain effect- 
ive, instead of nominal, protection, petitioned parliament 
to substitute a milder form of punishment. The legis- 
lator, then, in the choice of sanctions, has to reckon with 
the opinions, the sentiments, and even with the prejudices 
of his times, and the attempt to conform to them may land 
him on the horns of a dilemma. Punishments sufficiently 
harsh to deter may prove ineffective, because they enlist 
the sentiments of the community against, instead of in 
favour of, the laws of the land and may lead to dangerous 
criminals being let loose on society by unjust verdicts of 
acquittal; whilst punishments which the spirit of the 
age will admit of, may fail to make an impression upon 
the criminal classes. Even those who minimize the value 
of punishment as a check on crime, generally make an 
exception in favour of capital sentences and own that the 
fear of death, though of nothing less than death, will 
cause many a prospective offender to desist from the 
execution of his criminal design. But a sickly sentimen- 
tality of the public has led, in more than one country, to 
the abolition of capital punishment, though it forms the 
most reliable, and in my opinion a necessary, means of 
safeguarding the life of the subject. Again, the progres- 
sive alleviation of the convict's lot by modern prison 
reforms has deprived our chief penal instrument of much 
of its terrors and is, probably, the factor mainly respon-
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sible for the measure of truth which there is in the claim 
that our penal law is but an indifferent weapon in the 
battle against crime. To steer a safe course between the 
Scylla of public opinion and the Charybdis of the criminal 
mind is, indeed, one of the most difficult tasks which 
the modern statesman has to accomplish, and practical 
experience alone can teach how to adjust penal sanctions 
in so delicate a fashion that, without violating the one, 
they operate upon the other.
The deterrent effect of the criminal law depends, 
however, not solely upon its rigour, but largely upon the 
accuracy with which it is administered. Paley goes so 
far as to assert that " the certainty of punishment is of 
more consequence than the severity." At any rate, a 
person who contemplates the commission of an offence 
takes into account not only the actual punishment with 
which it is visited, but also the chances of escaping 
punishment altogether. Indeed, criminals are only too 
apt to flatter themselves that the arm of the law will not 
be long enough to reach them. Now " even a small 
uncertainty takes away from the pain which we fear, 
whereas even a great uncertainty does not destroy the 
attraction of a pleasure which we are hoping for " (Ferri). 
Cicero was, therefore, right if he remarked (pro Milone) : 
" Maxima illecebra peccandi est impunitatis spes." In a 
somewhat different fashion do the prospects of discovery 
or concealment enter into the psychology of the pro- 
fessional criminal. He reckons with, and accepts, the 
possibility of punishment as a risk incident to his trade, 
and will thereby be deterred from crime no more effectively 
than the miner is deterred from working in the coal-pit 
by the knowledge that he may be killed by fire-damp 
The professional criminal calculates the chances of being 
caught before deciding whether it is worth his while to 
undertake a certain job. The greater the risk the less will 
a career of crime pay. Change the risk into a certainty
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and you create conditions under which his business cannot 
possibly be carried on. But whatever the type of criminal 
upon whose mind the sanction is to operate, its efficacy 
appears to be the function of two variables, its severity 
and the probability of its actual infliction. If we imagine 
the offences dealt with in the criminal code to be sym- 
bolized by one ideal or average crime, the criminal classes 
as represented by one typical criminal, and if we under- 
stand by marginal deterrent force the strength of the 
motive just, and only just, sufficient to deter the typical 
criminal from the ideal crime, we may express the relation- 
ship spoken of above by the following algebraic formula : 
d = s. c, where d stands for the marginal deterrent force 
of punishment, s for its severity, and c for the chance of 
its infliction. We see, then, that the more certain the 
state can be of bringing offenders to book, the more 
lenient it may be in the construction of its criminal code 
without loss in security to its subjects. And since the 
risks which the criminal runs depend on the chances that 
he (1) will be caught, and (2) will be condemned if caught, 
it becomes apparent that a well-organized and vigilant 
police, a public opinion strongly on the side of law and 
order, a good and clear criminal code, a simple procedure 
, free from technical intricacies which offer so many loop- 
holes to the guilty, and an efficient and incorruptible 
judicial bench will allow of a considerable mitigation of 
the penal system without increase of crime. The un- 
certainty of punishments, on the other hand, must be 
compensated by their greater severity.
The efficacy of punishment as a deterrent depends, in 
the next place, upon the promptitude with which it 
follows the offence. Crimes are usually committed for 
the sake of a pleasure close at hand, for the immediate 
satisfaction of a desire both keen and urgent; and fear 
of an evil which lies in the remote future cannot, then, 
;be relied upon as a check. For, by a well-known law of
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perspective which applies to mental as well as to ocular 
vision, the more distant an object is the smaller it appears. 
Besides, futurity suggests contingency, and however 
illusive the association of these two ideas often proves to 
be, it influences conduct none the less powerfully for that. 
Hence a procedure which ensures that an offender is 
rapidly brought to trial and that the judgment is promptly 
carried into execution, greatly enhances the terror which 
the criminal law inspires. In this respect this country 
is far ahead of other states, owing mainly to the Habeas 
Corpus Act, which, though passed in the interests of 
accused persons, has rendered impossible in England those 
long delays of the law which detract so materially from 
the deterrent force of continental codes.
We have now evolved from the theory of psychological 
constraint the supreme penological principles which 
govern the choice of penal sanctions and the determination 
of the level of punishments in genere, that is to say, the 
harshness or leniency of the criminal code as a whole. 
But we have not deduced therefrom, as some authorities 
of repute have done, the scale of punishments applicable 
to particular offences. We do not subscribe to Bentham's 
" rule of moral arithmetic," according to which the 
severity of the sanction must vary with the strength of 
the motive which usually prompts the commission of a 
certain type of offence. Nor can we agree with Paley if 
he teaches that the facility with which any species of 
crimes is perpetrated and the difficulty of discovery are 
among the chief factors in the standardization of punish- 
ments. Graduation of punishments in accordance with 
these rules would result in a code running counter to 
public opinion and could never fulfil the purpose for which 
it were adopted. For criminals, not being, as a rule, 
trained lawyers, are not acquainted with the minute 
provisions of penal statutes and could not, therefore, be 
influenced by a scale of sanctions elaborated on highly
u
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technical principles. What they do expect and fear are 
such punishments as correspond with popular notions as 
to the relative gravity of different offences. If the essence 
of crime and its distinguishing mark from a mere civil 
wrong lies in the fact that it violates those interests, 
individual or collective, which society regards as vital, 
and if the true function of punishment is to protect the 
community from such violations, the gravity of the offence 
from the state's point of view, i. e. the degree in which it 
endangers public order, can alone supply the standard 
of penal sanctions. This was the opinion of Beccaria, 
who says : " Crimes are only to be measured by the hurt 
done to society." And it is the view adopted, as we have 
seen, by Feuerbach. Now it is quite possible that, in 
the case of minor offences, a punishment which appears 
appropriate if measured by the standard just laid down 
may prove an evil too insignificant to suppress them. 
Yet the state will not be justified, except within ill-defined 
but fairly narrow limits, to increase its severity so as to 
render the threat completely effective. For considering 
the smallness of the mischief, the price necessary to be 
paid for its prevention would be too dear. The legislator 
has here to choose between two evils, and even a compara- 
tively frequent occurrence of trivial transgressions may 
well appear the lesser one. When, on the other hand, the 
rights to be protected are so fundamental that their 
enjoyment must at all costs be secured, we must not 
complain of the means, however painful, by which alone 
that object can be accomplished. The existence and the 
security of established government and the protection 
of human life are the two objects which, according to 
modern notions, deserve to be safeguarded at all risks, 
and herein lies the justification of capital punishment for 
treason and murder. It might be objected that the 
measure of punishment which we advocate, cannot be 
applied in practice since the degree in which acts falling
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under the same category of crimes endanger public safety, 
varies within very wide limits. The least touching of 
another in anger, spitting at a man's face, throwing a 
bottle at him, cutting a pauper's hair against his will, 
giving a woman a black eye, dealing an opponent a blow 
which knocks him down or sends him reeling all these 
misdeeds fall, in English law, under the definition of 
assault. Again, larceny is committed by the hungry 
wretch who steals a loaf of bread from a baker's shop, no 
less than by the professional criminal who takes a situation 
in order to empty his master's plate-chest. But this 
criticism does not hold good since modern codes make due 
allowance for these possible variations by not prescribing 
a stereotyped punishment for a given class of crimes, but 
only fixing the maximum and the minimum; and English 
law shows even superior wisdom in having done away, 
long since, with minimum punishments altogether, with 
the result that it has become possible to award a merely 
nominal punishment where the offence is of a purely 
technical character. But what is it that makes the same 
offence a merely technical breach in the one instance, a 
heinous crime in another ? It is the character of the 
offender, as expressed in the act. And this is the principle 
upon which judicial sentences are measured out within 
the latitude allowed by the code. " Si duo faciunt idem, 
non est idem "; the difference lies in their desires and 
passions, in their dispositions and habits, and it is a 
consideration of these which guides the judge in the 
exercise of his discretion if, in the case of two offenders 
charged with the same crime, he passes a severer sentence 
upon him whom he judges to be the more serious menace 
to society. We see, then, that the dangerousness of the 
act, from the social point of view, " the objective danger ", 
as it may be called, supplies the measure of the legal 
punishment, whilst the dangerousness of the actor, " the 
subjective danger", determines the judicial sentence.
U 2
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This distinction seems to underlie the maxim of English 
criminal jurisprudence that the criminal motive is irrele- 
vant on the issue " guilty ? " or " not guilty 1 " but an 
important factor which has to be taken into account in 
awarding punishment. For the motive cannot alter the 
character of the act, but it supplies the key to the charac- 
ter of the actor. It is because sanctions are fixed and 
punishments dispensed according to the rule just explained 
that criminal legislation and criminal jurisdiction gener- 
ally conform to and satisfy public opinion. In the popular 
mind the gravity of an offence is determined by the alarm 
which it spreads, i. e. by the degree in which it is felt by 
society to endanger its peace and security; and where 
the moral and intellectual levels of the rulers and of the 
ruled do not materially differ, the popular and the official 
index to the measure of punishment cannot but practically 
coincide.
Crimes, we have found, are in their essence acts which 
menace, or are believed to menace, the existence of the 
state, the peace of society or the fundamental rights of 
the individual, and the function of punishment is to 
prevent their commission. Penal sanctions have been 
found by experience to be powerful instruments for 
shaping men's conduct; but there is nothing in them to 
limit their application to acts falling within the above 
definition of crime. Indeed, rulers have discovered at 
an early date how easily they can be utilized for the pur- 
pose of enforcing obedience to rules which they were 
anxious, for one reason or another, to impose upon their 
subjects. Modern democracies, likewise, have only too 
well learnt this lesson, and more than one instance has 
occurred where the public has clamoured for the annexa- 
tion of penal sanctions to legislative measures intended 
to carry into effect some popular scheme of social or 
economic reform. In one way and another, a certain 
amount of heterogeneous matter has thus been introduced
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into the penal law of every state. And so it has come 
about that analytical jurisprudents were at a loss to find 
any generic character whereby to recognize a crime, until 
at last in despair they advanced the doctrine that the 
difference between crime and civil wrong is merely a 
difference in procedure, though in formulating this view 
they run counter to popular feeling which obstinately 
clings to the association of crime and public alarm. 
When once this artificial conception of crime had been 
adopted, the true object of punishment could not fail to 
be obscured. \,The truth is that the extension of penal 
sanctions beyond their legitimate sphere forces us to 
distinguish between a material and a formal criminal 
law. The domain of the latter has, it is true, to be denned 
by reference to the remedies alone by which it is enforced; 
for it comprises all the rules the transgression of which 
is visited with punishment. Material criminal law, on the 
other hand, deals only with those acts criminally sanc- 
tioned which fall under the definition of crime which we 
have given. It is only by concentrating our attention 
upon criminal law in the latter sense and by adhering to 
the conception of crime as implying a disturbance of 
public order, that a clear insight into the true rationale 
of punishment can be gained.
The function of punishment does not, however, exhaust 
itself in muzzling wild beasts, to use Schopenhauer's 
metaphor. It exercises in no mean degree a moralizing 
influence upon the community at large. Let the legislator 
penalize a line of conduct to which current morality is 
but slightly averse, wholly indifferent, or even somewhat 
favourably inclined, and the immediate result will be 
that the vast majority of the citizens will refrain from the 
prohibited act, partly because they desire to avoid the 
sanction, but partly because in a well-ordered community 
obedience to the commands of a lawfully constituted 
authority is recognized as a binding duty. Conduct
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conforming to the dictate of the law thus becomes habitual, 
and, habitual conduct reacting on opinion, a moral 
aversion to the opposite conduct may gradually grow up; 
in other words, what was originally only a legal duty, 
gradually acquires the obligatory force of custom too. 
Besides, the forbidden act being constantly visited with 
punishment by the state, the feelings of repugnance 
which the mental picture of the gallows or of the broad 
arrows inspires, are communicated, by a ready association, 
to the deed which brings those horrors in its tail; and 
that which is in the first instance a source of evil rapidly 
comes to be looked upon as an evil, and finally as evil. 
In both these ways a malum quia prohibitum is converted 
into a malum per se, into a moral wrong. The legislator, 
then, has it in his power, by branding certain acts as 
crimes, to modify, in the course of a few generations, the 
moral sentiments of the community, and it may safely be 
asserted that in the past the penal code has been one of 
the most valuable instruments in the moral education of 
the human race. We have here a partial explanation 
of the reason why, though crime is a creature of the law, 
and nothing else, public opinion generally endorses the 
dispensations of the criminal courts. The fixed associa- 
tions gradually formed, as we have seen, in the minds of 
the whole population are one of the roots of that sense 
of justice which imperatively demands the punishment 
of crime. Upon the lower strata of society into the dark 
recesses of which the ethical spirit of the age penetrates 
with difficulty, the operation of the criminal law, as an 
engine of moral discipline, is even more direct; there are 
probably thousands, as Mr. Bashdall remarks, who have 
scarcely any moral notions except those rudimentary 
ideas of right and wrong which are inculcated at assizes 
and petty sessions.
The conclusion at which we arrive, then, is that though 
punishment cannot be regarded as a panacea for crime,
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it is a valuable means of social hygiene in the struggle 
against that disease of the body politic. Such efficacy 
as it possesses, flows, in the main, from its character as an 
agent of prevention; and it discharges the functions of 
this office in two different ways : by appealing to the 
fears of persons likely to commit crimes and by operating 
upon the habitual sentiments of the citizens in general.
PART III
THE DOCTRINES OF MODERN CRIMINOLOGY
FOB, thousands of years the sword of punitive justice 
has never departed from the throne of earthly rulers; yet 
the criminal, like the poor, we have always with us. 
Crime remains a problem, a problem of a particularly 
pressing character, and punishment offers but a partial 
solution, according to some extremists, like De Girardin, 
Minzloff, Kropotkin, no solution at all. This ill-success 
has been ascribed to the standpoint from which the 
problem has hitherto been approached; for crime is a 
social phenomenon, and classical jurisprudence which 
relies in the study thereof on the descriptive and analytical 
methods alone, could produce nothing, it has been said, 
but barren generalizations and abstractions. When once 
it is granted that crimes are not the outbursts of an 
incalculable, quasi-demoniacal power, termed free-will, 
they become events in an orderly, intelligible world, 
subject to the law of sufficient reason and capable of 
truly scientific study. Crime has its causes, and these 
we must discover if we wish to deal with it effectively. 
Considerations such as these have led to the birth of a 
new science, the science of criminology.
Whilst preventive punishment merely seeks to avert 
the actualization of crime when its germ is already 
developed and active, the aim of the " positive school " 
is to eradicate it completely by the discovery and elimina- 
tion of its etiological factors. Now the causes of crime
296
MODERN CRIMINOLOGY 297
may lie either in the criminal man or in the social environ- 
ment; and according as to whether biological or social 
conditions are believed to constitute the dominant 
influence the advocates of the young science are divided 
into two camps : that of criminal anthropology or biology 
on the one hand, that of criminal sociology on the other. 
The main tenets of the rival schools may be summed up. 
in the following two aphorisms : " Crime is a character 
which attaches to an individual," and " Crime is a 
product of society."
Criminal anthropology starts with the proposition that 
the crime which the criminal perpetrates, is but the 
manifestation of natural forces operative within him and 
which produce their effects with the same unavoidable 
necessity as other physical forces. If the commission of 
offences is as natural to him as barking is to the dog or 
man-eating to the tiger, it is useless to study crimes, to 
dissect the corpus delicti and to classify offences. True 
scientific inquiry must be directed to those peculiarities 
in the constitution and organization of the criminal man 
which cause him to act in that peculiar manner, in a mode 
different from his fellow-creatures, in short, to act abnor- 
mally. " All progress in penal jurisprudence lies in giving 
consideration to the man," says Salillas; and Lacassagne, 
though essentially a sociologist, has allowed himself to 
be carried away by this idea to such lengths as to pen 
the paradox : " There are no crimes; there are only 
criminals." Criminal anthropology regards the criminal 
as a natural deviation from the type, a variety of the 
species homo sapiens, and studies him in the same way 
in which one studies the different human races ; or it looks 
upon his distinctive features as morbid in character, in 
which case the science which has him for its subject- 
matter would more aptly be spoken of as criminal 
pathology. In any case, the abnormalities are either 
bodily or mental, and criminal biology accordingly
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consists of two branches, criminal somatology and criminal 
psychology. Again, since the physical characteristics are 
partly structural, partly functional, criminal somatology 
may be sub-divided into criminal anatomy or morphology 
and criminal physiology. As is well known, this field of 
research was cultivated chiefly by the Italian school, the 
majority of the members of which follow the master in 
concentrating their attention principally upon the corporal 
features, whilst others, Colajanni for instance, lay the 
main stress upon the psychic elements. It would be 
impossible within the compass of this chapter to sum- 
marize the vast material accumulated by the ingenuity 
and industry of Lombroso and his disciples. But a few 
examples chosen from each of the three departments may 
illustrate the lines on which the inquiry is pursued, and 
the data upon which criminal anthropology relies when 
formulating its practical postulates. Morphologically, 
much importance has been attached to anomalies in the 
size and shape of the skull, such as microcephalism, 
macrocephalism, oxycephalism, a receding forehead, 
cranial asymmetry, prognathism; whilst confluent cerebral 
fissures, a fourth frontal convolution, presence of the 
Darwinian tubercle in the ear, a scanty beard strikingly 
contrasting with an abundant crop of hair on the head, 
have been noted as occurring with special frequency 
among criminals. Among physiological peculiarities 
extraordinary agility, left-handedness, deranged reflex 
action, abnormalities in the vasomotor sphere, insensi- 
bility to pain, " disvulnerability " (or rapid recovery from 
wounds); auditory, olfactory and gustatory obtuseness, but 
exceedingly keen eyesight may be mentioned. Stupidity 
coupled with cunning, lack of forethought, laziness, 
inaptitude for prolonged and sustained exertion, inordinate 
vanity, suspicion, hypocrisy, superstition, moral insensi- 
bility, cruelty; incapacity to experience remorse, yet with 
it all a certain sentimentality; craving for excitement
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which finds vent in gambling, in excesses in Baccho et 
in Venere, and its culminating satisfaction in the orgy; 
emotional instability these are the properties found in 
the mental and moral armoury of the criminal classes. 
Garofalo describes as the essential characteristic of the 
criminal the absence or weakness of one or both of the 
fundamental altruistic sentiments, sympathy and honesty, 
Dr. Wey (of Elmira) finds the basis of all criminality in the 
ineradicable tendency to lie, Dr. A. Krauss in the love of 
pleasure combined with aversion to work. But in what- 
ever else they differ, the students of criminal anthropology 
are all agreed that the criminal is a poor creature both in 
mind and in body.
If next we inquire into the origin of those anthropologi- 
cal features by which the criminal is distinguished from 
other members of society, we find that the biologists 
arrange themselves in two schools, according to the manner 
in which they attempt to solve that problem, viz. the 
evolutionists and the pathologists. The latter look upon 
the criminal as suffering from a morbid condition or a 
morbid defect which stamps him as abnormal with what- 
ever healthy human being he may be compared. Of the 
two eminent advocates of this doctrine, Maudsley regards 
the criminal as congenitally wanting in one of the mental 
faculties, the moral sense, in other words, as a moral 
idiot or imbecile, i. e, as a kind of lunatic, whilst Benedikt 
describes criminality as a neurosis, akin to hysteria and 
epilepsy. Maurice de Fleury, adopting the modern 
terminology of neuro-pathology, speaks of a paralysis 
of the neurons. To the evolutionist, on the other hand, 
the criminal appears abnormal only when contrasted with 
civilized man; for criminality is to him an atavistic 
phenomenon, a reversion to the type of savagery. 
" Among savages," says Lombroso, " crime is by no 
means the exception; it is there the general rule. Hence 
it is not there regarded as such by anybody, but it blends
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in its origin with other acts not in the least wrongful." 
In a similar strain writes Poletti : " Crime is unknown at 
a certain stage of social life. The acts which nowadays 
constitute crimes were indeed done in former times. But 
they were in keeping with savage life, of which, among 
us, they are, as it were, a continuation." Even a pre- 
human, nay a pre-animal, atavism has been invoked by 
the Italian school in explanation of criminality. The 
criminal has been credited with reproducing in all their 
primordial violence the indomitable instincts and impulses 
of the brute creation. According to Garofalo, " the 
typical criminal is a monstrosity in the moral world, 
having features in common with the savage, and others 
which place him even below the plane of human beings." 
And no less an authority than Lombroso himself writes : 
" If we cast a glance at the phenomena of Nature, we see 
that the acts which are considered by us to be the most 
criminal, are really the most natural; so generally and 
so frequently do they occur in the animal and even in 
the vegetable kingdom. As has been well said by Renan, 
Nature gives us the example of the most implacable 
insensibility and of the greatest immorality." Lombroso 
then proceeds to mention in the same breath insectivorous 
plants and homicidal criminals, as if it were possible, 
without absurdity, to regard them as representing pheno- 
mena of the same order. All this is mere intellectual 
jugglery, the less deserving of serious criticism, as the 
main position, viz. the atavistic explanation of criminality, 
is quite untenable. The point of contact between the 
" typical " or " born " criminal and the savage is, accord- 
ing to Lombroso, the prevalence of antisocial instincts, 
according to Garofalo, the want of altruistic sentiments. 
This teaching is based upon a view of savage life which 
modern sociological research has hopelessly discredited. 
The blind obedience to custom which all observers agree 
in describing as one of the most striking characteristics
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of primitive peoples, shows that the savage is essentially 
a social being. The strength of clan and tribal feeling, 
coupled with a callous indifference, if not unmitigated 
hostility, towards the stranger, which is the universal 
attitude of primitive races, merely proves that if the 
circle within which altruistic sentiments are excited, is 
much more restricted in the savage than in modern man, 
their intensity within that charmed circle is ah1 the greater 
for being confined within narrower limits. And if it is 
true, as Lombroso remarks, that Australian aborigines 
feel no more compunction in killing a human being a 
stranger to wit than in killing a toad, this fact cannot 
be regarded as evidence of antisocial impulses or of 
incapacity for altruistic sentiment by us who, with all 
our much-vaunted civilization and imbued, as we have 
been for nearly two thousand years, with the humanitarian 
spirit of Christianity, still look upon slaying an " enemy " 
in warfare as something morally excusable, if not actually 
praiseworthy.
According to the abnormalities or " stigmata " which 
they exhibit, criminals may be arranged in different 
anthropological groups. Each author, however, appears 
to have a system of classification of his own. Lombroso 
distinguishes five types, viz. bom criminals, epileptic 
criminals (a Lombrosian speciality !), criminals by impulse 
or passion, criminal lunatics and occasional criminals. 
Benedikt makes short work of all these niceties by boldly 
advancing the thesis : " All criminals are born criminals.'' 
Garofalo recognizes three categories of criminals, according 
as to whether there is complete absence of both funda- 
mental altruistic sentiments, or merely deficiency in the 
development of the one or other of them : the typical 
criminal or assassin knows neither sympathy nor honesty, 
in the violent or energetic criminal the feeling of sympathy 
is but rudimentary, whilst the thief or neurasthenic 
criminal is not as honest as he might be. According to
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Ferri, there exist five classes, namely criminals by passion, 
occasional criminals, criminal madmen, instinctive crimi- 
nals and criminals by acquired habit, the latter type 
testifying to the recognition, by Ferri, of the sociological 
factor in the genesis of crime.
The results of anthropological research into the causa- 
tion of crime necessarily subvert the groundwork upon 
which the whole structure of criminal jurisprudence is 
built up. If it is true that the criminal is born with the 
mark of Cain indelibly impressed upon his forehead and 
haunted by a destiny from which he cannot escape, then 
the fundamental notions of the penal law become meaning- 
less ; or, at any rate, they have to be revised in the light 
of the new scientific discoveries. A crime ceases to be a 
" wrong " " imputable " to the criminal and becomes a 
mere natural phenomenon, " like water, fire, lightning 
or subterraneous vapours " dangerous but unavoidable. 
There can no longer be a question of guilt, or of punish- 
ment proprio sensu; for you cannot make a man re- 
sponsible for the manifestations of his physical or psychical 
abnormalities when they happen to be crimes, any more 
than you can impute to him a limp resulting from a 
crippled leg, or a deformed nose, the visitation upon 
him of his father's sin. What, then, is to be done with 
him ? Is he to be given a free hand to continue his on- 
slaughts on his fellow-citizens ? Certainly not. By the 
act which has brought him into conflict with the law, 
he has proved that he is a menace and since the deed 
has to be regarded, not as an isolated phenomenon, but 
as an indication of a permanent, deeply rooted, consti- 
tutional defect, a standing menace to society. And if 
the crime flowed from his organization with unavoidable 
necessity, the social, like any other, organism reacts, of 
the same unavoidable necessity, against what disturbs 
the conditions of its existence. Society must protect 
itself and deal with him in such a manner as its own
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interests demand. " The welfare of the community is 
the end and is the ultimate standard. Its right and duty 
is, in brief, to be a Providence to itself " (Bradley). As 
against the claims of society the criminal's own claims 
are nil: he is not a responsible, i. e. not a moral, being, 
and for that very reason no question of justice can 
arise as between him and society. According to Garofalo, 
society thus speaks to him : " Men have ceased to see in 
you their equal; between you and the others every tie 
is broken. Therefore you have no longer a place in 
society." He has shown himself a noxious creature 
" and may be destroyed as a lion or tiger, one of those 
wild savage beasts with whom man can have no society 
nor security." The words between inverted commas 
show that John Locke has anticipated the conclusions of 
the Italian school. But even he was not the first to 
advocate the wild-beast principle in the treatment of 
criminals. Seneca justifies the elimination of incorrigible 
offenders both by a similar argument and by that now 
more fashionable doctrine of social surgery : "At corrigi 
nequeunt, nihilque in illis lene aut spei bonae capax 
est ? Tollantur e coetu mortalium facturi peiora quae 
contingunt et quo uno modo possunt desinant esse mali; 
sed hoc sine odio. Nam quis membra sua tune odit cum 
abscidit ? Non est ilia ira, sed misera curatio. Rabidos 
effligimus canes, et trucem atque immansuetum bovem 
occidimus, et morbidis pecoribus, ne gregem polluant, 
ferrum immittimus. Nee ira sed ratio est, a sanis inutilia 
secernere." We read in Spinoza's Cogitata metaphysica : 
" Si tan turn illi, quos non nisi ex libertate fingimus peccare, 
essent puniendi, cur homines serpentes venenosos exter- 
minare conantur; ex natura enim propria tantum pec- 
cant, nee aliud possunt." Again, Fichte says : " The 
outlaw is considered simply as a wild beast which must 
be shot; or as an overflowing river which must be stopped; 
in short, as a force of Nature which the state must render
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harmless by an opposing force of Nature. The death of 
the outlaw is not a means of punishment, but merely of 
security." The passage would be accepted, I suppose, 
by any modern criminal anthropologist as an excellent 
presentation of his case. At any rate, it is on all fours 
with Lombroso's argument which is, in substance, as 
follows : " One might entertain doubts as to whether 
wild beasts lacerate men out of viciousness or by virtue 
of their natural organization. But nobody will be pre- 
vented by such scruples from killing the brute, and 
quietly allow himself to be torn to pieces. Again, but 
very small will be the number of those who, out of regard 
for the rights of those others of God's creatures, the 
domestic animals, out of respect for their life and liberty, 
will hesitate before putting them to the yoke or before 
killing them to eat their flesh. And what other right 
have we to confine lunatics or to isolate those suffering 
from contagious diseases ? " In short, measures of social 
protection will have to take the place of punishments 
proper. Now the chief means of social defence is the 
elimination of the criminal. " The evil-doer is one whom 
we must destroy, not punish/' remarks Diderot. It is 
not, however, necessary to do him to death; segregation 
from the social environment will answer the purpose 
equally well. If Lombroso describes the current theories 
of punishment as mere mystifications, the popular attitude 
towards the criminal is, according to Garofalo, in complete 
harmony with the new doctrine. " What the public 
demands is that the criminal be eliminated, not that he 
be made to suffer. When a crime has been committed, 
the first question always is : Has the criminal been 
arrested ? It is only because punishment satisfies the 
desire for segregation that his punishment is demanded, 
and only because punishments happen to be painful does 
the public wish him to suffer. Suffering is not, however, 
the true end of the reaction demanded by popular senti-
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ment, but in the natural order of things it always goes 
with the true end, the elimination of the criminal." Some 
criminal anthropologists look upon elimination as the 
sole weapon in the warfare of society against the criminal; 
and the hereditarians among them, in the utter hopeless- 
ness inspired by their theory if consistently adhered to, 
will not rest satisfied with anything less than permanent 
elimination. Others, who regard crime as partaking 
rather of the nature of disease, recognize the alternative 
" kill or cure " and demand the permanent elimination 
of the incurable criminal, temporary segregation and the 
application of remedial measures, till a cure be effected, 
in the case of those whose condition justifies a more 
favourable prognosis. But inasmuch as it is impossible 
to determine beforehand how long it will take till the 
criminal recovers, indeterminate sentences form an 
integral part of their programme. Whilst, as we have 
seen, the wild fauna serves as the stereotyped simile 
when the principle of elimination is to be justified, the 
experience of the arboriculturist is drawn upon in explana- 
tion of the alternative measures of social defence : " The 
evil-doer has to be treated like a faulty tree which one 
improves and in certain circumstances even fells. The 
fact that the fault lies in the nature of the tree and of the 
man, so far from, barring such treatment, is the very reason 
which compels us to adopt it."
It must not, however, be assumed that " the new 
horizons in criminal jurisprudence" open a vista of 
unmitigated harshness. On the contrary, our prison 
population includes many an individual that bears not 
a single mark of the beast upon him, and such persons 
are not, according to anthropological doctrine, appropriate 
subjects for the application of the criminal law. No act 
ought to fall within the province of the latter which does 
not brand its perpetrator as an anti-social being. This
is the meaning of the dictum, so often quoted after Major
x
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Griffith, that there are only two classes of people in jail, 
first, the majority, those who should never have been let 
in, and, second, the remainder, those who should never 
have been let out. Short sentences for trifling trans- 
gressions are an abomination to the criminal biologist. 
Fines ought to be substituted for them in all cases, or 
better still, those peccadilloes, since, as a general rule, 
they prejudice individuals rather than endanger the 
safety of society, ought to be transferred from the penal 
to the civil code and ought to impose upon the wrong- 
doer an obligation, to be enforced with the utmost rigour 
by the state, to make full compensation to the injured 
party an excellent postulate the practical application of 
which is, unfortunately, confined within very narrow 
limits, owing to the absolute impecuniosity of the over- 
whelming majority of offenders.
Under the system of social defence, criminal responsi- 
bility acquires an entirely new meaning. It must now be 
understood to signify the liability of the criminal to be 
dealt with by society in such a manner as his own consti- 
tutional abnormalities and the interests of the common 
weal demand. In the words of Alfred Fouillee, the 
offender is responsible to society in no other sense than 
a torrent which is always ready to leave its bed is re- 
sponsible to the engineer who will take the measures 
required to avert the danger. Hence it is no longer a 
question of guilt and punishment, but a question of 
biological diagnosis and appropriate treatment that 
engages the attention of the tribunals. It is not now the 
business of judge and jury to ascertain whether the facts 
established answer the definition of this or that crime and 
justify the application of a certain section of a criminal 
statute. i,The object of the judicial investigation is, first 
of all, to prove that the person on his trial has committed 
a crime. This part of the inquiry is merely preliminary 
in character and necessary only to give the court juris-
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diction; for the nature of the illegal act in no way deter- 
mines the fate of the criminal. The latter depends 
exclusively upon the main trial which resolves itself into 
a biological examination and appreciation of the accused 
person. His act may, indeed, be one symptom among 
others of his infirmity; but he, the criminal himself, 
" will be the true and living subject of the trial." His 
heart and his reins are searched, and anthropometric 
and physiognomic data, records of sensibility, of reflex 
activity, of vasomotor reactions, tattoo marks, psychic 
peculiarities and the details of his family history are now 
relied upon as evidence in order to discover to what type 
of criminal he belongs. It is obvious that in such a pro- 
cedure there is hardly room for the discharge of judicial 
functions. The work of the jurist proper is practically 
at an end as soon as it is established that the prisoner is 
the author of the crime. Henceforth the scientist and 
the administrator divide the field between themselves; 
but the former is the true master of the situation. For 
his findings guide the administrator in the choice of the 
appropriate measure of social protection and in the 
disposal of the criminal's destiny. But if the claims of 
the Italian school are true, if a study of the anthropo- 
logical features enables the scientist a priori and inde- 
pendently of the actual commission of a crime to spot 
criminals and so to supply the guardians of the law with 
reliable information, why postpone proceedings till they 
have wrought mischief, possibly irreparable mischief ? 
Why not take steps for the protection of society before 
they have had a chance to perpetrate offences ? Surely 
we do not wait till the tiger has had his tribute of human 
flesh before slaying him. The more extreme of the 
disciples of Lombroso, who, it must be conceded, are also 
the most consistent, do draw this conclusion from their doc- 
trines and demand that potential criminals be dealt with 
by the state according to the defects of their organization.
X 2
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Others, without going to that length, suggest that where 
the authorship of the crime cannot with certainty be 
brought home to an accused person, the presumption 
in dubio pro reo, upon which the courts now act, ought 
to be reversed, so that the prisoner, if the anthropological 
scrutiny goes against him, would be treated in exactly the 
same way as if his connection with the offence had been 
fully established.
Such are the practical lessons to be learnt from the 
biological study of the criminal. The doctrine of social 
defence has been attacked on the ground that collective, 
like individual, self-defence is resistance to unrighteous 
attack, and ex vi termini legitimate only so long as the 
danger is imminent. At the time of the judicial investi- 
gation the attack has long ceased, and the aggressor is 
disarmed and no longer a source of danger. In answer 
to this objection it might be urged that the right of 
personal defence does not endure beyond the attack, 
because, when once the danger is over, the injured party 
has only to invoke the assistance of the state to be safe- 
guarded from further molestation. This argument in 
favour of limiting the right of defence does not apply 
to the case of collective defence; for there is no superior 
power to which society can appeal in order to obtain 
protection for the future. But this answer does not go 
to the root of the matter, nor does it touch the most 
vulnerable spot of the criticism. The real weakness of 
the objection lies in this that it rests on an entire mis- 
conception of the position of the anthropological school. 
According to the doctrine of the latter, the danger against 
which society has to defend itself is not the crime but the 
criminal, not the anti-social act as an isolated phenome- 
non but the individual with his anti-social instincts; and 
this source of danger persists as long as those organic 
abnormalities endure which form the physical and psychic 
substrate of his inaptitude for life in a civilized com-
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munity. The doctrine of social defence is certainly open 
to the charge that the conception of the relation of society 
to the individual which it involves, runs counter to modern 
ideas. According to that theory, society alone has a 
claim to consideration, the individual counts for nothing. 
If out of harmony with the social whole, he may be crushed 
out pitilessly by the manifestation of superior force. 
Current morality still respects, even in the criminal, the 
divine image and will not tolerate a leviathan that ruth- 
lessly devours human beings. If the new system is of 
doubtful ethical value, logically it is unassailable  
provided that the premises from which it starts are sound. 
The discoveries of criminal anthropology, when first 
published, were received with that enthusiasm with which 
everything new and startling is greeted when clothed in a 
scientific garment. But a reaction promptly set in when 
the new thesis began to be subjected to more careful 
examination and sober analysis. The doctrine that 
crime has a biological basis would sound less paradoxical 
if the penal law were eternal and immutable. But since 
a perfunctory glance at history is enough to convince us 
that crime is entirely a question of time and of place, that 
even popular notions of right and Avrong may undergo 
radical changes in the course of a very few generations, 
the course of organic evolution would have to be a million 
times more rapid than we know it to be were it to keep 
pace with the developments of the criminal law. More- 
over, since crime is not a natural product, but a course of 
conduct which derives its whole significance from the 
relation between man and man, in other words a social 
phenomenon, the theory of its organic origin in the 
individual implies that Nature in the choice of the mon- 
strosities which it brings forth is determined by tendencies 
antagonistic to society; and the absurdity of the assump- 
tion that some people are predestined to become 
murderers, others burglars, others again forgers, is in
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no sense mitigated by the adoption of terms borrowed 
from pathology to designate these different classes of 
criminals and by providing, after the example of Garofalo, 
the born thief, for instance, with the alternative label 
" neurasthenic." The zeal of anthropological investi- 
gators has indeed rendered it probable that certain 
peculiarities, morphological, physiological and psychical, 
are found more frequently in habitual criminals than in 
law-abiding citizens. But as to the true significance of 
these "stigmata" we are still completely in the dark; 
and interesting though those observations may be, they 
cannot help us in the practical solution of the problem of 
crime, nor guide our steps when dealing with an accused 
person in concrete. Shall we really allow our judgment 
on the prisoner in the dock who happens to have, or not 
to have, an ear ad ansa, to be influenced by the knowledge 
that Ottolenghi found the handle-shaped ear in thirty-nine 
per cent, of the criminals he examined as against twenty 
per cent, of normal persons; what help would we derive 
from such knowledge even if we were ignorant of the fact 
that Lombroso found that peculiarity in only twenty-, 
eight per cent, of his criminals, Knecht in twenty-two, and 
Marro not more frequently than among normal persons ? 
Henri Thierry tells us how, on a certain day, he attended 
the Paris assizes, and discovered that of seven prisoners 
who in succession left the dock with a conviction recorded 
against them only one answered Lombroso's description, 
whilst of the ikree-judges who presided at the trials, no 
less than two displayed unmistakable stigmata.. This 
homely observation, devoid of all scientific pretensions, 
shows, in its irony, the value which criminal anthropology 
as yet possesses in the administration of justice. The new 
science, with the impatience of youth, clamours for the 
practical application of its scientific data. " The modern 
world," however, " will never tolerate a court which pre- 
tends to sit in judgment on men's mere thoughts as opposed
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to their actions. But is it possible that we could tolerate 
a court which, even in a qualified way, sat in judgment, 
not upon men's thoughts, but upon their mere dispositions 
and tendencies ? " (Watt). Certainly not as long as these 
tendencies and dispositions have to be determined by rules 
which are premature generalizations from an insufficient 
number of imperfectly digested observations.
Criminal sociology, like criminal anthropology, looks 
upon crime as symptomatic of a morbid condition; but 
the patient is the social body, not its individual member. 
The latter supplies but the raw material to be fashioned 
in the workshop of society, and if the finished article is 
faulty, the workman who has bungled, is alone to blame. 
One author, Carl Heath, indeed, goes so far as to under- 
stand by social responsibility, not the responsibility of 
the criminal to society, but the responsibility of society 
for the production of crime. It is the temptation which 
makes the criminal, and society provides the temptations 
which are the true causes of crimes. The criminal cannot, 
then, be regarded as standing to the social whole simply 
in the relation of aggressor and victim. " He is a member 
of its body; bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh. If he has 
sinned, it has also sinned through him." The doctrines 
of criminal sociology were first systematically elaborated, 
with the aid of a vast statistical material, by Quetelet, 
who in his Physique sociale thus sums them up : " Society 
holds in its bosom the seeds of all crimes that are going 
to be committed. It is society that prepares them, and 
the actual offender is but the instrument to carry them 
into execution. Hence every social state brings with it a 
certain number and a certain order of crimes which result, 
as a necessary consequence, from its organization." We 
see, then, that sociologists, too, look upon crime as the 
inevitable outcome of causes which are irresistible in their 
operation. The antecedent conditions which are thought 
to reside in the social environment, have in modern tunes
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been studied with special care by the Lyons school, with 
Lacassagne at its head, who writes : " The social environ- 
ment is the culture-medium of criminality; the microbe 
is the criminal, an element of no importance until it finds 
the broth on which it thrives." The influence of a very 
large number of sociological factors in the genesis of crime 
has been fully established, and the results of sociological 
inquiry generally have a ring of common sense about them 
by which they contrast favourably with many of the tenets 
of the anthropological school. That political oppression 
leads to political offences, that the social ostracism of the 
girl-mother favours infanticide, that a boy trained to pick 
pockets will, when grown up, in all probability become a 
professional criminal, that during periods of unemploy- 
ment offences against property are especially prevalent, 
that the wave of criminality rises and falls with the price 
of corn; all these propositions appear quite acceptable 
to us in the light of our ordinary experience and would 
compel our assent even if they were not proved by 
statistical tables. Sociologists differ somewhat in the 
relative importance which they attach to the different 
factors. Thus according to Tarde the influence of example 
is paramount in the production of crime, as in the shaping 
of man's conduct in society generally; Coutagne insists 
upon the relation between occupation and criminality, 
whilst Raux lays special stress on the influence of educa- 
tion. That an unwholesome domestic atmosphere during 
the years of childhood, that poverty and ignorance are 
potent factors in the etiology of crime, is conceded by 
most authors.
In the practical conclusions which they draw from 
their theories, sociologists are far less aggressive than we 
have found the advocates of the biological doctrines. It 
is not here a question of completely revolutionizing our 
penal methods. An isolated voice is, indeed, heard now 
and then demanding that punishment should be done
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away with altogether. But most writers agree that we 
should retain punishment for what it is worth, though the 
value which they themselves put upon it is an extremely 
low one. They claim that it is absurd for society to expect 
that the threat of the law should prove a very effective 
deterrent so long as practically nothing is done to minimize 
the operation of those causes which powerfully impel to 
the commission of crimes; that all attempts to reform 
prisoners must prove abortive if they are again exposed 
to the same old morbific miasmata as soon as they leave 
jail; that, to eliminate offenders is to begin at the wrong 
end and to waste a good deal of valuable material. I At 
any rate, punishment must cease to be the only, or even 
the main, weapon in the fight of society against crime. 
Only by suppressing the causes can we hope to suppress 
the effects, and since the cause of the evil lies in the social 
milieu, all our efforts must be directed towards the reform 
of society. The social structure has not been cunningly 
enough devised to allow elbow-room to men of every 
stamp. The straight roads are too few and too narrow to 
permit all members to take them; many are forced into 
crooked paths. These defects must be cured. The 
measures of social amelioration taken with this end in 
view Ferri calls penal substitutes, whilst others describe 
them as prophylactics of crime. There is hardly a measure 
of social improvement which has not been included in the 
sociological propaganda against crime; objects so widely 
different as universal adult suffrage, free-trade and the 
establishment of state-orphanages, the introduction of 
the political referendum, cheapening of the means of 
communication and an efficient popular education, 
restrictions on the production of intoxicating beverages, 
simplification of the law and the provision of public works 
during hard winters, have all been advocated as indispens- 
able reforms if we wish to reduce the volume of crime. It 
is conceded that each of these measures by itself can do
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but very little towards palliating an evil the germ of which 
lies in the intricate interaction of practically all the social 
forces; but their combined effect, it is hoped, will be 
appreciably to reduce and finally to suppress crime.'
We have now reached a point where we can clearly 
perceive what the teachings of criminal sociology come to. 
On the theoretical side they amount to this that at the 
millennium criminality will vanish, together with all other 
kinds of evil now prevalent upon earth; and the practical 
policy which they suggest is that we should endeavour, 
by all means in our power, to hasten its advent. In other 
words, the sociological theory, which at first sight appeared 
full of promise, is now shown to give us but very little 
assistance in the solution of the problem of crime. Still 
it must be granted that the ideal which it holds before our 
eyes, is an inspiring one, and it is satisfactory to know 
that every step we take towards the alleviation of human 
suffering, towards the liberation of the oppressed, towards 
the elevation of the submerged, towards the enlighten- 
ment of those walking in darkness, will concurrently 
diminish the bill of crimes.
" The social environment is the culture-medium of 
criminality; the microbe is the criminal, an element of 
no importance until it finds the broth on which it thrives." 
A better acquaintance with the elements of bacteriology 
would have saved Lacassagne from the use of a false simile 
and, at the same time, from a one-sided criminological 
theory. The vital phenomena of a microbe are by no 
means determined by the culture-medium alone, but 
depend to a large extent upon its own specific nature. 
The composition of the soil may, within certain limits, 
modify the biological characters, including the virulence, 
of the comma bacillus; but no broth which we may con- 
coct, is capable of transforming the bacillus prodigiosus 
into a vibrio cholerae. Lacassagne's error is typical of 
the whole sociological school. It overlooks the resistance
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which the organism opposes to external forces and regards 
man's nature as entirely plastic, as passively reproducing 
the impressions, and submitting to the impulses, which it 
receives from its social environment. The best of modern 
criminologists have overcome the opposition of the anthro- 
pological and the sociological schools. They recognize 
with von Liszt that the two hostile camps represent but 
two different points from which the same problem may be 
attacked; that they differ in their methods of research, 
the one relying on the systematic study of the phenomenon 
in the individual, the other on the statistical investigation 
of the same phenomenon, when observed in large bodies 
of persons; that the tenets of either school are, in their 
isolation, untenable; and that a careful appreciation of 
the combined results of both modes of investigation can 
alone advance our knowledge of the subject. This is the 
position taken up by the two most eminent English 
criminologists, the Rev. William Douglas Morrison and 
Mr. Havelock Ellis. The synthetic view may be expressed 
in the following short formula : " Since crime results from 
an imperfect adaptation of the individual to its social 
environment, two groups of causes are responsible for its 
production, personal defects and social shortcomings. 
Etiological therapeutics, to be successful, must take into 
account both series of factors." But since criminological 
eclecticism has found its most eloquent mouthpiece in 
Enrico Ferri, we may be permitted to borrow the following 
summary from the writings of this author : " Every crime 
is the result of the simultaneous and indivisible con- 
currence of the biological conditions of the criminal and 
of the social conditions of the environment in which he 
has been born, in which he lives and acts." Hence " the 
most reliable and the most fruitful measure of defence 
against crime which society can adopt, is of a twofold 
character, and both parts must be employed and developed 
simultaneously. On the one hand, the improvement of
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the social conditions, as the natural preventive of crime, 
on the other hand permanent or temporary means of 
elimination, according as to whether the influence of the 
biological conditions in the causation of the crime is almost 
absolute, or greater or smaller and more or less curable."' 
But where the occurrence of an event depends upon the 
interaction of two forces, surely it is impossible to appor- 
tion the shares which they have in the production of the 
phenomenon. The concluding sentence of the passage 
quoted from Ferri is about as scientific as would be the 
assertion that hydrogen is the more important element in 
the composition of water because two atoms of it, as 
against one only of oxygen, enter into the formation of a 
molecule. And if the same author states that " the 
biological factor of crime is something specific, which, so 
far, we are unable to determine, but without which all 
the other conditions, physical and social, are insufficient 
to account for all forms of crime and for crime itself," we 
discover that one arm of the bifurcate criminological 
theory ends in a very big note of interrogation, whilst 
the other, as we have already found, points to a distant 
Utopia.
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